The New Politics of Accountability

Section 1: National Level

In “Educational Accountability and Policy Feedback,” McDonnell uses a policy feedback lens to point out the elements of a new politics of education that emerged in response to accountability policies. The policy feedback approach assumes that policies establish new or augment existing institutional rules and structures, which impose benefits and costs to political actors who respond by mobilizing to protect their interests. These policies also generate interpretive effects. McDonnell argues that the evolution of accountability policy and its core design elements, in conjunction with other policies such as school choice, have progressively led to shifts in interest group coalitions (e.g., a split in the Democratic Party) and new interest group strategies (e.g., teacher unions’ efforts to both limit the development or impact of policies in conflict with their interests and accommodate new policy directions). Accountability policy has also fostered complex organizational arrangements concerned with professional development, technical assistance, testing, and instructional materials. However, McDonnell contends that this expansion in the complexity and diversity of the educational delivery system has not been accompanied by sufficient development of new governance structures and capacities, especially at the local level. Expanded centralization in conjunction with local governments’ reactive politics and dependency on external providers to build capacity have led to what McDonnell concludes is “fragmented centralization” (Meyer, 1979). Additionally, McDonnell explains that accountability policies have also had interpretative effects whereby parents mobilize to oppose or alter accountability policies. Though, as McDonnell concedes, parental mobilization is currently limited. McDonnell then explains how the politics surrounding the Common Core State Standards are an example of policy feedback shaping new standards and accountability policy.

In “The Politics of Accountability: Teacher Education Policy,” Lewis and Young use Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams framework to describe how teacher education accountability has come to be prominently featured on the federal agenda. Lewis and Young contend that the confluence of multiple factors resulted in a “perfect storm,” which drove teacher education accountability policy up the national policy agenda. They found that within the problem stream, indicators of low student achievement and feedback related to perceptions about the ineffectiveness of traditional teacher preparation programs along with two focusing events, the enactment of NCLB and RTTT, propelled interest in teacher education accountability policy. Lewis and Young reason that the mechanisms in the problem stream were not enough in and of themselves to bring attention to teacher preparation accountability policy. Rather, teacher education accountability achieved agenda status largely because of multiple mechanisms at play in the political stream. In particular, public sentiment supported the notion of accountability, and both political parties and organized interests supported the idea of accountability—though they diverged on their preferences for the form and consequences of any national accountability policies for both traditional and nontraditional teacher preparation programs. Lewis and Young conclude that the Obama administration—active in all three streams and a significant force in the political stream—was the primary factor in teacher education accountability’s agenda status. This finding suggests that federal involvement in teacher education is increasing in both frequency and scope, and educational accountability policy, in general, is growing in scope and targets.

Section 2: State Level

Rutledge, Anagnostopopulos, and Bali’s article “State Education Agencies, Information Systems, and the Expansion of State Power in the Era of Test-Based Accountability” documents findings from case studies of three states’ efforts to gather and coordinate the technology and people necessary to process test-based accountability data through statewide, longitudinal student information systems (SLSIS). As Rutledge, Anagnostopopulos, and Bali note, SLSIS are critical to test-based accountability because they collect, store, and process the data that are used to evaluate students’, teachers’, and schools’ performance. Much of the focus on SLSIS has focused on technical issues. This article discusses the implementation of SLSIS as a political matter that requires state education agencies (SEAs) to mobilize fiscal, organizational, and political resources and manage many actors (e.g., testing companies, technology vendors, state legislatures, schools, and LEAs) involved with different aspects of SLSIS (i.e., installing, operating, and utilizing SLSIS), who have competing interests. The authors draw on science and technology constructs—problematization, enrollment, and mobilization—to describe SEAs’ strategies to design, install, and operate SLSIS. They describe the challenges SEAs face with SLSIS from not only entities external to the SEA—schools, districts, and external entities assisting with technical aspects of SLSIS—but also from people and units within the agency itself. The article also shows that test-based accountability policy that is supported by SLSIS has given rise to informatic power, which is comprised of coercive power based on states’ abilities to impose incentives and sanctions and states’ control over measurement and computing technologies. This growth in informatic power has resulted in the expansion of state power. The authors point out that SLSIS are sites for challenges to informatic power as well. Notably, external consultants and vendors who provide both the technology and expertise necessary to operate SLSIS not only facilitate states’ acquisition of power but they also attempt to acquire informatic power for themselves. Furthermore, with the information in the SLSIS being used to monitor and potentially punish them with sanctions, schools and districts also have an incentive to challenge informatic power by undermining data collection (which occurs at the local level) and SEAs’ efforts to improve the capacity of SLSIS.

In “Seeking Accountability Through State-Appointed Emergency District Management,” Arsen and Mason describe the origins and early implementation of Michigan’s Local Government and School District Accountability Act of 2011 (PA 4), which allows the governor to appoint emergency managers to school districts in fiscal crisis, essentially giving the state authority to intervene in local districts. They contend that PA 4 departs from its predecessor, The Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1990 (PA 72) in three notable ways: target, goal, and level of authority. In brief, whereas PA 72 applied to school districts and other local governments, PA 4 focused on school districts. The goal of PA 72 was fiscal responsibility, yet the goal of PA 4 was fiscal accountability. Most importantly, PA 4 considerably expanded the powers of emergency managers, consequently eliminating local and professional control over a district’s education system and weakening democratic accountability. Arsen and Mason conclude that PA 4 diminishes both academic and fiscal technical accountability as well. In addition, they point out that PA 4 continues a trend of increasing centralization of education in Michigan. Their discussion of the origins of the law includes an extensive discussion of how changes in the state legislature and office of the governor (in 2010, Republicans took control of the state House of Representatives and the office of the governor; they already had control of the state Senate), municipalities, and school districts’ fiscal deficits (exacerbated by school choice policies that led to declines in enrollment in school districts), and Robert Bobb’s controversial tenure as emergency financial manager for Detroit Public Schools contributed to the enactment of PA 4. The authors’ analysis of the activities (i.e., terminating teachers, altering compensation policies, and privatizing services without input from the public) of the first three state-appointed EMs—who as the authors point out are in predominantly African American districts—leads them to characterize the EMs as having aggressive management styles. Lastly, the authors also draw attention to the fact that EMs have not been able to eliminate their respective school district’s deficits without additional assistance from the state.

Mawhinney also examines state takeovers in her article, “Reactive Sequences in the Evolution of Maryland’s Consequential Accountability Regime.” Specifically, this piece examines how federal accountability policies shaped Maryland’s political dynamics in 2006 when the Maryland State Board of Education attempted, but failed, to take over 11 Baltimore City schools. Mawhinney questions what strategies states use to mediate the tension between local control and federalized accountability. Prior to the passage of NCLB in 2002, each state had developed its own unique set of accountability policies. While some states had well-developed accountability systems in place, others were only beginning this process. Mawhinney argues that these unique histories are critical to understanding the emerging political dynamics between states and local school district. The current dynamics cannot be understood unless the process that has unfolded overtime is examined. Moreover, because the implications for the unfolding political dynamics are embedded in institutions, Mawhinney uses a historical institutionalist approach to analyze accountability politics in Maryland. By challenging and expanding on the idea of policy path dependence, Mawhinney explores the reactions and counterreactions that occurred as a result of the takeover attempt. Using a backward-forward mapping approach to analyze accounts of influences on reactions or counterreactions during and subsequent to the 13-day takeover attempt, Mawhinney provides a rich and detailed account that illuminates the political dynamics that were unleashed at the local and state levels by the federal government’s NCLB legislation. Her analysis suggests that although state–local governing cultures may mediate the evolution of state education accountability regimes, they do so in embedded sequences of reactions through which federal accountability mechanisms gain more or less tenuous purchase, and significantly, that local–state reactions reform those mechanisms.

DiMartino and Scott’s article “Private Sector Contracting and Democratic Accountability” explores how the dramatic growth in the number and diversity of private sector contracting resulting from accountability policy has diminished democratic accountability. Drawing on data derived from a case study of New York, DiMartino and Scott show that growth in the private sector has altered power dynamics whereby some institutions and groups have expanded their power while other entities have experienced a reduction in power. This change in the power structure has also altered the public’s access to decision-making processes, thereby limiting the ability of public citizens to provide input and oversight over educational policy. Adapting a typology developed by the authors in a previous work (Scott & DiMartino, 2009), DiMartino and Scott show that the Chancellor of the Board of Regents and the State Commissioner of Education set policy not only through formal mechanisms but also by establishing partners (i.e., the Regents Fellows) who exert considerable influence over policy although they are not held accountable to citizens of New York. Additionally, new political actors, notably private entities with whom New York State is contracting to develop, implement, and deliver a wide range of activities associated with accountability policy, such as Pearson and Wireless Generation, are successfully competing for influence over educational policy and in some instances, such as the education advocacy group Education Reform Now (ERN) success in lobbying for charter schools, a new teacher evaluation system and a new SLSIS, have become formidable opponents of the teachers unions. DiMartino and Scott contend that as the power of these private entities grows, both transparency and public participation in the educational policy process wanes, and concerns about to whom these private entities are accountable arise. On the whole, the authors contend that with limited capacity to enforce and regulate contracts with private entities, the state of New York is unable to provide sufficient oversight and foster democratic accountability.

Section 3: Local

In her article, “The Disproportionate Erosion of Local Control: Urban School Boards, High-stakes Accountability, and Democracy,” Trujillo moves away from debates regarding the impact of accountability on student outcomes to ask whether these policies alter the potential for democratic governance. By drawing on three conceptual lenses to judge the degree of democratic governance—collective educational goals, deliberative participation and decision making, and locally determined practices—Trujillo analyzes how, if at all, high-stakes accountability policies are related to an urban board’s potential for local, democratic control. Through an in-depth study of one urban school board, which includes interviews, observations, and document analysis, Trujillo provides a comprehensive look at how the board’s actions were shaped by accountability policies. She finds that board members embraced competitive, individualized goals for teaching and learning. To further these goals, board members adopted an autocratic style of governance where decisions were made behind closed doors and without public input. Finally, reflecting the emphasis accountability policies often place on standardization, Trujillo finds that the school board she observed centralized decision making to minimize local adaptation. Indeed, this research provides evidence that, as some have hypothesized, accountability policies intended to maximize effectiveness and efficiency may be eroding public, democratic school governance. Moreover, like many urban districts, the one examined in this study faced intense pressure about students’ test scores. Trujillo identifies the ways that this intense pressure fueled the governance choices made by board members, often serving as the justification for the elimination of democratic governance. Because low-income communities and communities of color are differentially impacted by high-stakes accountability policies, Trujillo argues, based on this study, that these communities are even more at risk of losing deliberative decision making and representation of local interests and needs. This study makes an important contribution to our understanding of the way school board politics are shaped by today’s accountability policies.

As local districts attempt to implement multiple accountability policies simultaneously, the potential for unintended effects from the interaction accountability policies rises. In “When Accountability Strategies Collide: Do Policy Changes That Raise Accountability Standards Also Erode Public Satisfaction?” Jacobsen, Snyder, and Saultz examine what happens to public opinion regarding school quality when two popular strategies are implemented in New York City. The first strategy, the public dissemination of data, provides the public with accountability data, which can then be used by interested citizens to apply pressure for improvement if performance data is deemed unsatisfactory. The second strategy, raising the bar, uses data to set performance targets and foster continuous improvement. While the authors acknowledge that each strategy has been found to improve student achievement when implemented individually, they argue that these accountability strategies may collide to produce a corrosive long-term consequence for public opinion. When the bar is raised, many schools experience a decline in achievement, as they are required to reach a new, higher standard. When both strategies are implemented together, this decline is made highly public through accountability report cards, and the public may misunderstand the drop in achievement. The resulting policy feedback may wrongly erode public satisfaction with the public schools, ultimately hindering public support for future reform. To test this possibility, Jacobsen, Snyder, and Saultz examine parent satisfaction data from the New York City Schools Survey before and after New York City raised the bar on school performance grading criteria. After the change was implemented, Jacobsen, Snyder, and Sautlz find that there was a decline in parent satisfaction. Their findings demonstrate that efforts to shape accountability data to spur continuous improvement can easily lead to public concern. Inadvertently, citizens may come to believe that there is little point in participating in or supporting the education system because they do not see positive returns for their previous investments.

In “Tensions Across Federalism, Localism, and Professional Autonomy: Social Media and Stakeholder Response to Increased Accountability,” Berry and Herrington examine how local-level actors make sense of state and federal policies and use social media outlets to voice their views. Their study extends our understanding of how local stakeholders respond to the implementation of accountability policy at the district and school level. Berry and Herrington posit that tension in federalism is especially acute at the school and district level where local leaders become the target of public ire as they attempt to carry out state and federal policy mandates. To examine how the tension plays out, Berry and Herrington examine one Florida school district’s implementation of the federal government’s differentiated accountability policy (DA). As online media continue to grow, they have increasingly become an outlet where individuals connect with others to share ideas, develop common understandings, and organize responses to policies. Analyzing this relatively new source of communication, Berry and Herrington capture the local politics of implementation of DA. Their examination of blog comments posted on a newspaper’s website highlights how social media can be used for sensemaking and mobilizing against district’s implementation of accountability policy. This study shows that the implementation of the DA policy placed local leaders in a difficult political position. As the superintendent of the district tried to support state and federal accountability policy, parents and teachers became increasingly frustrated, believing that DA undermined limited use sense of autonomy and limited their use of their professional judgment and experience to make decisions in the classroom. Berry and Herrington found that this tension at the local level detracted from the shared goal of raising student achievement. This frustration further complicated the implementation of the DA, which resulted in policy retreat by the school district. The authors suggest that to overcome some of the tension at the local level, accountability policy should account for professional knowledge and teacher autonomy.

Section 4: Evolution of Accountability Policy

This volume concludes with an article by Kenneth Wong, Politics and Governance: Evolving Systems of School Accountability. Wong discusses the new landscape and future of accountability policy.