Struggle and Hope: Challenging Gender Violence in Pakistan

Introduction

Women in developing countries have played an active role in confronting their unequal status and are currently taking part in collective action for change (Bhavnani et al., 2003; Marx Feree and Tripp, 2006). In Pakistan, as well as in most countries throughout the world, the women’s movement has been animated by the issue of gender violence because of the profound violation of women’s human rights to life, health, and security. Despite the overwhelming media attention to the rise of fundamentalism and Pakistan’s geopolitical role in the ‘war against terror’, Pakistan has an often unrevealed side characterized by an active women’s movement that serves as a key democratic force committed to expanding women’s rights (Basu, 2005; Keddie, 1988; Weiss, 1999). Within civil society, women activists are advocating the implementation of strategies to limit gender violence as well as provision of care for survivors. The women’s movement continues to negotiate women’s interests with the state and society and has become increasingly effective over time, strengthened by regional and international recognition of its work (Basu, 2005).

Post-colonial and transnational feminists such as Mohanty (2003) have criticized western feminists for projecting monolithic understandings of women’s oppression based on their own culturally specific but supposed universal experience under the rubric of ‘global sisterhood’. The assumption that all feminist movements are guided by or based on western models is contested because it denies women of the global south their historical subjectivity and erases national, class, and cultural specificities (Mohanty, 2003; Narayan, 1997). Cross-cultural feminist praxis must be attuned to differences arising from cultural, social class, and global geopolitical locations and research frameworks that are informed by the complex intersection of differences (Grewal and Kaplan, 1994). Feminist social movement literature provides additional theoretical tools for understanding the political and cultural circumstances under which women organize and the issues, strategies, and action programs they adopt (Basu, 1992, 2005; Ray, 1999). Raka Ray’s (1999) theory of political fields provides a framework to capture the historical-political-economic-social dimensions of local environments of organizations allowing for a nuanced analysis of women’s experiences that avoids universalizing and homogenizing interpretations. Ray argues that the types of protest that occur are very much dependent on the locale due to the different ‘fields’ in which women’s organizations operate. Organizations act not as autonomous entities but as organs that are attached to the field in which they originate, so that their actions are in response to it and within it (Ray, 1999). Relationships between organizations and fields may be antagonistic or complementary. Organizations may operate in the ‘political’ field, occupied by the state and mainstream parties within the already established order or within ‘protest’ fields that operate within the political fields but are often in direct opposition to those in power. Women’s movements may also be situated in fragmented, autonomous fields with a low concentration of power and no dominant organization, leaving them freer to set feminist agendas. In contrast, hegemonic political fields may be dominated by one or a few organizations and have high concentration of power so that a few dominant organizations may control the bulk of available resources and are able to influence others. The structure of the field, together with the relative position of an organization within it determines the degree of access that an organization has to policy decisions, its capacity to implement policies, the availability of allies, and ultimately its strategies (Ray, 1999).

This article applies the framework of these scholars, in particular Ray’s (1999) model, to analyze the experiences and activities of two prominent nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan that provide legal services, operate a shelter for women and engage in lobbying and advocacy activities to improve the treatment of women. We add to the literature on women’s activism against gender violence through a study within the Pakistani context, where women’s groups engage with a State confronted with crises of legitimacy. While there is extensive scholarship on women’s movements and activism of certain regions of the South Asian subcontinent, most specifically India, research in Pakistan concerning this topic remains limited. This study provides an important corrective to the invisibility of Pakistani women’s activism in the scholarly literature and the failure to consider how Pakistani women are agents and activists in their own right. In-depth interviews with 10 women’s activists explore several broad themes including the ways in which the political climate in Pakistan affects organizational work and strategies of action, the impact of recent legal and policy changes such as the Women’s Protection Bill on their efforts to assist women, and their assessment of the challenges and achievements. The experiences of these movement activists offer a number of related insights into the struggle against global gender violence beyond the experiences of these organizations.

Challenging Gender Violence: The Pakistani Context

Women’s movements do not develop in a vacuum and motivating issues are shaped by the local context. They are also heterogeneous because they are embedded in particular histories and geographies. Political fields are dynamic and may change with new state regimes, new economic policies, or the rise of ideologies such as Islam (Moghadam, 1993; Ray, 1999).

A key distinguishing feature of the context for women’s activism in Pakistan has been the continual crises of state and society and breakdown in the democratic process which includes frequent periods of political turmoil, martial law regimes, and internal strife over ethnic, linguistic, and provincial autonomy issues, and economic instability (Basu, 2005; Jahangir, 2000). These have impacted on the development of civil society and have weakened civilian institutions and political parties compared to other countries in the region such as India (Basu, 2005).

The ideological division over the role of Islam in national life poses a significant societal cleavage that has had consequences for the women’s movement. Pakistan was established in 1947 as a homeland for Muslims at the time of the partition of British India. Establishing Islam as the state ideology was a device aimed at defining a Pakistani identity during the country’s formative years (Haqqanni, 2005). Although the predominant vision for Pakistan was that of a modern liberal secular nation-state that embraced Islamic universal principles, ideological battles over the role of Islam have ensued since then. Pakistan’s leaders play on religious sentiment as a means of strengthening the country’s national identity and to rally national unity against perceived and real external threats such as India (Jahangir, 2000; Haqqanni, 2005; Qadeer, 2006; Weiss, 2009). Persistent and growing challenges are mounted by retrogressive political Islamists.

South Asian women’s political activism to improve their status extends back to the anti- colonial movement. Pakistan achieved nationhood in 1947 with a powerful military bureaucracy and a weak political framework. As a result, military regimes have ruled longer than civilian governments: from 1957 to 1968, from 1977 to 1988, and from 1999 to 2008 (Weiss and Gilani, 2001). From the time of independence in 1947, however, women had the right to vote, and Muslim women had the right to inherit property. In the initial years after independence women’s organizations were involved in mostly non-controversial social welfare activities and nation-building efforts and generally received the support of the government (Shaheed and Warraich, 1998). The political process was derailed during a 10-year period of martial law in starting in 1957 under Ayub Khan’s military government. Although this regime was not overtly adversarial toward women, women’s issues dropped off the socio-political radar screen and the struggle for women’s rights ceased to be visible as a movement (Shaheed, 2010). During this period, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 was promulgated which constrained polygamy and provided some modest safeguards for women in marriage. These continue to be challenged by religious groups claiming they are un-Islamic (Women Living under Muslim Laws, 2006).

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s presidency from 1971 to 1977 is considered as a period of progress and politicization of women. The 1973 Constitution greatly expanded women’s rights with articles granting equal status and participation. All government posts were open to women and women were appointed to several high-ranking positions. Women’s groups expanded their agendas and in 1976 launched a Declaration on the Rights of Women in Pakistan (Shaheed and Warrraich, 1998).

Such gains for women were undermined when a coup d’état by Military Dictator General Zia-al Haq in 1977, followed by the hanging of Bhutto, ushered in the harshest period of martial law in Pakistan. This regime was enabled by military aid from the US and Saudi Arabia in support of Pakistan’s role as a proxy to fight the Soviet Union during the Afghan war. The United States and Saudi Arabia funneled large sums of money, estimated to be between $3.5 billion and $10 billion in arms and aid, to Pakistan (Stern, 2000).

The Islamization process that began under Zia instituted a spate of anti-women laws based on a conservative interpretation of religious teachings, rescinding many of the gains and rights that had been attained by women. Discriminatory laws such as the Hudood Ordinances of 1979 sought to implement Islamic law for crimes of Zina (extramarital sex), Qazf (false accusation of zina), theft, and the drinking of alcohol. The law failed to distinguish between extramarital sex or zina and rape (zina-bil-jcthr), disallowed a woman’s testimony to these crimes and instead required the evidence of four Muslim males (Jahangir, 2000). Women faced further discrimination through the Law of Evidence (Qanoon-e Shahadat), promulgated in 1984, which required the testimony of two women to counter the testimony of one man. Mandatory dress codes for women, gender-based admissions to medical schools, and questioning of whether females could compete in international sports competitions were part of the process (Weiss, 1999). Women began to report growing harassment for previously acceptable norms of behavior (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987). Significantly, political parties and all forms of political protest were banned.

Paradoxically, the Zia military regime provoked a strong surge in the women’s movement in Pakistan and played a critical role in shaping the human rights movement there. The focus on gender issues and discrimination served as a catalyst for a wide spectrum of women’s rights groups to form a lobby-pressure group known as the Women’s Action Forum (WAF) which held numerous protests in defiance of the ban. Early on there were strong linkages between the women’s movement and the human rights movement.

Charitable and welfare organizations have a long history in South Asia but advocacy NGOs saw an upsurge during the 1980s and 1990s, partially as a result of the dictatorship and the assaults on the rights of minorities and women (Khan, 2001). This period also coincided with the ‘women in development’ orientation of donor institutions regarding their funded projects and the preference to allocate their funds to non-state actors such as NGOs (Bari and Khattak, 2001). Many leading women’s activists, disillusioned with the domination of the mainstream political parties and the legislatures by feudal and big business interests, and the lack of discussion of poverty, economic policy, and minorities, formed their own NGOs to focus on issues of greatest priority to them (Khan, 2001; Weiss and Gilani, 2001).

The women’s movement greeted with some enthusiasm the return to democracy after Zia’s death in 1988 and the election of Benazir Bhutto, as Bhutto was much more supportive of women’s participation. During her tenure she solicited the input of NGO activists in the lead up to the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (September 1995) and the development of a 20-year National Plan of Action for Women (NPA) to implement the Beijing Platform of Action. Bhutto held two incomplete terms from 1988 to 1990 and 1993 to 1996. Her government was dismissed before the NPA was finalized. Concrete gains for women were limited especially in the failure to repeal the Hudood Laws, although CEDAW was signed under her leadership (Shaheed, 2010).

The rapid turnover in governments, with three different governments and a three-month caretaker government during the five-year review period of 1995–2000, interrupted the continuity of policy directions and implementation of initiatives for women (United Nations, 2000). Nawaz Sharif, a political heir to Zia al Huque, held office from 1990 to 1993, and then again from 1997 to 1999. His tenure fostered a more hostile environment toward women’s issues, and backsliding greatly overshadowed the progress made in the former period of Bhutto (United Nations, 2000; Weiss, 1999). The 1990 laws of Qisas (retribution) and Diyat (compensation) first proposed under Zia in 1984 were passed, representing further Islamization of the criminal justice system. These laws allow women to be killed in the name of honor without penalty (Amnesty International, 2005; Jahangir, 2000; Shaheed and Hussain, 2007).

During the 1990s Pakistanis experienced increased disillusionment with the government and political process, due to institutional decay, widespread financial corruption, and spiraling ethnic, sectarian, and religious violence (Khan, 2001; Weiss and Gilani, 2001). In this atmosphere, an army coup led by General Pervez Musharraf toppled the Sharif government in October 1999 without notable public resistance. This ushered in what is noted as an interesting and contradictory period for the women’s movement. Musharraf articulated a vision of ‘enlightened moderation’ for Pakistan and assured the Pakistani people that his was not an obscurantist religious agenda. However, contradictions in his domestic, regional, and international policies became apparent (Haqqanni, 2005; Zia, 2009).

Musharraf publicly declared his support for women and passed a number of laws to address gender violence. Pakistan’s Penal Code began to recognize honor killings as premeditated murder in 2006. Under his leadership, women gained unprecedented rights in terms of political representation in Parliament and appointments in the federal cabinet, and he set in motion a series of reforms to promote women’s rights consistent with globalized norms (Weiss, 2009).

For years a key demand of women activists was the repeal of the Hudood Ordinances in order to conform to CEDAW. There had been little progress in this regard until Pervez Musharraf’s government began to refocus on the issue of women’s empowerment. In 2006, The Women’s Protection Act amended the Hudood Ordinances and reformed the most controversial parts. Rape laws were placed under the penal code and the requirements for victims to produce four male witnesses or expose the victims to prosecution for adultery were eliminated. It is a positive step forward; women’s rights advocates continue today to demand total repeal of this law and other discriminatory legislation (Jilani and Ahmed, 2004; Shirkat Gah, 2007).

At the same time, Musharraf made his infamous accusation regarding a high profile gang rape of Mukhtaran Mai, as a case in point that women cry ‘rape’ every time they want to gain visa/asylum to Canada (Zia, 2009). It was also during these years that women increasingly started observing the hijab, a form of veil not widely practiced in Pakistan in the past and piety movements have gained strength (Daily Times, 2005).

Religious political parties that began as pressure groups now wield greater influence (Haqqani, 2004). Increasing violence and insecurity fueled by the growth of fundamentalism began to impact on women’s participation in activities outside the home, including education, and contribute to an increased vulnerability of groups that support women’s empowerment and human rights (Amnesty International, 2010; Shirkat Gah, 2007; UN News Center, 2009). Militant campaigns launched by armed groups have denounced contraceptives, polio vaccination, and girls’ education as un-Islamic; girls’ schools and NGOs have been attacked and health workers have been murdered (Shirkat Gah, 2007; Zia, 2009).

The last year of Musharraf’s regime was marked by a severe crisis of legitimacy that came to a head in 2007 when General Musharraf decided to suspend the Chief Justice because he feared Pakistan’s Supreme Court would raise legal barriers to his re-election as president. This was a surprise that revived hope at a time when most people were alienated from the system and cynical about leaders, as Pakistan’s judges have usually been acquiescent in the past (Ali, 2007). Musharraf then declared a state of emergency in which thousands of political activists were jailed and the media were gagged. This provoked a mass movement, known as the lawyer’s movement, unlike anything seen in recent years. It called for the restoration of the judiciary and removal of the state of emergency (Ali, 2007). Adding to the volatility of the circumstances, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on 27 December 2007 after departing from a rally, two weeks before the scheduled general election of 2008, where she was a leading opposition candidate. On 18 August 2008 Musharraf resigned from the post of President under impeachment pressure from the coalition government. He was succeeded on 6 September 2008 by Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto’s widower, who was elected as Pakistan’s 11th President.

Defining Gender Violence

Shaheed and Hussain (2007), Shaheed and Warraich (1998), and Zia (1998) provide accounts of the development of the movement against gender violence in Pakistan as situated in relation to concurrent debates in women’s movements in other parts of the world. The Zia period had a defining impact on the working dynamics of the women’s movement; the ensuing reaction to the new forms of legalized violence against women by the state was unlike many countries,’ especially in the west, where groups focused on interpersonal violence. Notably, the notion of women’s rights as human rights and the violence as ‘crimes against women’ emerged in this political context, years prior to the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights Declaration that ‘women’s rights are human rights’ (Shaheed and Hussain, 2007).

Although the movement was not formed for the express purpose of addressing violence against women, the connections between violence against women and human rights became clear in a context of the oppressive laws that were responsible for increased violence against women and constant new proposals to rescind women’s rights and curtail their spaces. Violence against women by the state and in the private sphere moved onto the center stage of activism and became a central issue because of the brutal violations of rights that emerged. The case of Fehmida and Allah Bux was the first to lead to a guilty verdict under the new Hudood Ordinances, and sentences of 100 lashes and stoning to death, respectively. This catalyzed the Women’s Action Forum (WAF) into action and marked the beginning of women’s activism on violence against women in Pakistan (Shaheed and Hussain, 2007; Shaheed and Warraich, 1998). Shortly thereafter, a teenage rape victim, unable to provide the necessary evidence to support her case, became the first woman to be flogged under the laws. These acts of violence against women were clearly articulated as constituting violations of women’s human rights to safety and security. Women’s rights campaigns labeled these as criminal acts that needed to be recognized and addressed as such. Public events were conducted in Urdu rather than English (language used by educated elites) so as to mobilize a broad base. A popular WAF slogan declared ‘equal punishments but unequal rights – what justice is this?’ (Shaheed and Hussain, 2007: 75).

Until the end of the Zia regime, the movement was largely cut off from international movements and the UN processes. Regional links were most significant, leading to the identification of common problems such as stove burnings. The militarized state, although viewed as a key perpetrator of both legal and illegal violence, was not seen as the root cause of violence against women. Rather, this was clearly attributed to patriarchal structures in society. The conceptualization of violence began to widen with increased awareness of the interconnectivity of different forms of violence against women that encompassed both individual acts of physical violence and systemic and structural violence, and psychological violence (Shaheed and Hussain, 2007). During the 1990s the focus continued to increase on domestic violence, especially honor killings and rape. As a result of the Fourth World Conference for Women in 1995 Pakistani feminists connected to the burgeoning international debates on violence against women and global human rights standards (Jahangir, 2000; Jilani and Ahmed, 2004; Shaheed and Hussain, 2007).

Scope of Gender Violence in Pakistan

Pakistan is a strongly patriarchal society where male power manifests itself in a high incidence of domestic violence. Gender violence is estimated to take place in as many as 80–90 percent of the households in Pakistan (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Gender violence in Pakistan takes a variety of forms, some of which are common across cultures such as marital violence, including verbal abuse, hitting, kicking, slapping, rape and murder, and economic and emotional abuse. Other forms of violence are rooted in traditional practices that continue under the guise of social conformism and religious beliefs such as so-called ‘honor killings’, forced marriage, child marriage, exchange marriage, death by burning (stove deaths, which are presented accidents), acid attacks, and nose cutting (a form of humiliation and degradation). Women are also raped and abused while in police custody which further deters many women from reporting crimes against them.

Pakistan is also a diverse country with great disparities in social development. The nature and degree of women’s oppression widely varies and is dependent on the intersections of social class, region, and rural/urban location. In the rural and tribal settings local customs often prevail over national law and patriarchal structures are much stronger. Patriarchal social norms are embodied in strict codes of behavior, rigid gender separation, family and kinship patterns, and a strong ideology linking family honor to female virtue which is used to maintain control over women (Moghadam, 1992).

Method

This article is based on research conducted in 2008–09 with women’s activists at two prominent women’s NGOs in Lahore, Pakistan, building on previous research conducted in 2006. Ethnographic research methods were used including in-depth interviews with ten activists, including two founders of the organizations, and eight staff members who occupied various roles in the organization at the time. Interviews were supplemented by immersion into the program’s activities and opportunities for observation as well as numerous informal interviews. In order to complement the ethnographic material, archival research through national and international press coverage, legal documents, and other resources was conducted.

An open-ended, semi-structured interview protocol with broad general questions about the current status of their work and their environment for activism provided the respondents freedom to address the issues of most importance to them. All respondents provided written consent to be interviewed (consent forms were also translated into Urdu). Three of the subjects waived the right to confidentiality due to the fact that they are internationally known public figures in the area of human and women’s rights and are frequently interviewed in the media, so that there is no risk involved in revealing their identities. The PI in this study is non-Pakistani, non-Urdu speaking, although closely connected with the country through marriage. The data collection was assisted by a bilingual assistant. Five interviews were conducted in English and Urdu because some respondents felt greater ease in shifting to Urdu to elaborate on the issues. The remaining interviews were conducted in English. One interview (in English) with a key representative was conducted as a phone interview because she was out of the country at the time.

The data were transcribed and reviewed using the analytical method of constant comparison (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). First, the researchers read through all the transcribed material with the objective of identifying common themes; second, the themes were coded; third, data were searched for similar instances of the same phenomenon, so categories and patterns could be identified. These were further refined into the major thematic categories. The transcripts were read and analyzed by two researchers in order to ensure trustworthiness of the findings.

Inside Women’s NGOs: A Secular Human Rights Philosophy

The study participants are women’s rights activists who work within two prominent interdependent women’s NGOs in Pakistan: AGHS, Pakistan’s first all-female legal aid practice (named with the first initials of the original founders), and Dastak women’s shelter. The shelter was created by the law firm in 1990 when it was determined that their clients’ extremely vulnerable circumstances demanded an organized proactive system for women’s protection such as a shelter.

The history of the last 30 years of the Pakistani women’s movement is embodied in the leadership of these organizations who have a long association as members of the Women’s Action Forum (WAF). WAF is a pressure group formed in 1980 in reaction to the dictatorship which led to the birth of many women’s rights groups and resource centers. While the organizations do not identify explicitly as feminist, no contradiction is perceived with the goals of feminism and their organizational philosophy. The organizations remain closely linked with the human rights origins of the women’s movement in Pakistan because the oppressive laws and conditions that affect women also affect many other marginalized groups. This philosophy is articulated by one of the founders:

Women’s rights cannot be promoted in isolation. These are a part of other human rights issues and the women’s rights movement necessarily has to be affiliated and has to draw support to other social and political movements in the country and that is how to gather support for any advocacy that you do.

A secular human rights agenda is apparent in their staff composition, the scope of their services and clientele, and the focus of their activism. Principles such as freedom of movement and women’s rights to life, liberty, and security and other protections under the law, such as that no person should be prevented from doing that which is not prohibited by law, are operationalized in their policies and procedures. They not only defend the rights of women, children, and religious minorities in Pakistan, but also address human rights issues related to religious freedom and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. They defend those charged under the blasphemy laws or unjustly prosecuted through other discriminatory laws such as the Hudood laws, and women’s human rights, such as the right to choice in marriage. At the time of this study, about half of the women were being assisted because they needed protection after exercising their right to choice of a marriage partner and a number of women were escaping forced marriage. Several Muslim women had violated Islamic law by marrying non-Muslims.

A human rights approach also promotes the full range of women’s legal and social rights and the right to live free from violence. These principles contravene prescribed female roles that confine them to the domestic sphere and commonly held notions of the type of knowledge that is appropriate for women. In contrast the service approaches of the State shelters treat women as wrong-doers and in need of controls, rather than as women requiring assistance.

You know the public and what they think about the shelter homes. It is not an easy thing to be done. The government runs the shelter homes called Dar-ul-aman, where they remain inside, under lock and key. They can’t meet anybody without the permission of the court, without the permission of their lawyers. It is just like a jail. But there is a difference, in our organization, they are free to go, which is freedom of movement; it’s a right to everybody. There is lots of opposition, lots of criticism ‘why do you allow women to go out?’ I said, they have the right to go out… . we give them environment where they are physically and mentally fit to think, to choose the right decision, to go in a right direction.

In contrast, a human rights framework prepares women for employment, future independence, and the ability to ‘stand on their own feet’. Their programs address hitherto taboo subjects such as sexuality and reproductive health and fortify women with knowledge of their rights in marriage and the family. Flyers posted throughout the shelter announce awareness and skills training programs, film screenings, and cultural outings. Photos and products made in various skills training programs, such as tie-and-dye and candle-making are also displayed. In the year 2008, nine skills trainings such as candle-making and tie-and-dye classes, 20 awareness trainings, and theatre and art workshops were provided. Women are also offered work within the shelter’s kitchen or the on-site school to enable them to accumulate savings and gain marketable skills. These opportunities are rare in other shelter settings.

Accounts of the women’s movement in Pakistan have noted the upper and middle class, urban, and educated professional status of activists. ¹ Movement opponents also characterize them an elite group of westernized women who are out of touch with the problems facing the majority of Pakistani women. Organizing women across class and social locations poses many challenges in Pakistan. The risk of arrest, stigma, and family alienation that may result from public activism is more easily borne by women who have the advantage of social and political connections to the elite class of Pakistan. Nevertheless, consistent efforts to mobilize women across class and location have produced some positive results, and the actual movement composition is more nuanced.

While the founders and key leadership of the organizations are upper class educated professional women, the activists represent a diverse spectrum of ages, educational, religious, and class backgrounds that are reflective of the organization’s pluralistic secular human rights orientation. Several staff members are minorities (Christians or members of minority Muslim sects). Educational attainment and class background vary, with several women coming from working class backgrounds. Incorporating principles of individual as well as collective empowerment that are characteristic of feminist organizations, about half of the activists interviewed were recruited through their involvement in the movement or their work in other organizations such as the YWCA. The organization placed priority on hiring several women because of their family circumstances (widowed, orphaned, and without male breadwinners). The feminist ethos of empowerment is evident in their work to develop staff as well as involve former clients in the movement.

The women who use their services are generally less advantaged women from lower income brackets. The majority of the women come from the more rural areas and towns where social norms are more conservative than in urban areas. The shelter also provides for their children (males over 10 are not accommodated) and about 20 children were observed at the shelter at the time of the study. The women served are mainly unemployed housewives with limited human capital such as educational attainment (no literacy or completion of primary school) and work experience outside the home. Since violence affects women of all backgrounds, there are exceptions, and a small number of college graduates and masters degree holders use their services, as well non-nationals who may need assistance while in Pakistan.

Struggle and Uncertainty: An Unstable Political Field

Pakistani women’s activists operate in a complex and volatile political and cultural landscape and changing political field for action. An initial study took place during the final year of the Musharraf regime. In the beginning, Musharraf had attained power with little resistance, because of his modern, ‘secular’, and liberal credentials. His regime became increasingly fractious over time because of his suspension of the Constitution and increased rights violations. This follow up study took place after Musharraf’s resignation and a tumultuous year fraught with demonstrations, arrests of activists, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, with the entrance of a new government headed by her widower Asif Ali Zardari in 2008.

The period since the return to a civilian government had left the women with some dashed hopes that some tangible improvements for women would emerge. The current government is very preoccupied with a host of other priorities and inherited a variety of intersecting political, economic, and security concerns. A consensus among the women interviewed was that the return to democracy had changed very little with regard to their work or the level of support they receive. This was no surprise and expectations were modest. They largely operate outside the established order of the political field and instead are often working in the alternative, oppositional protest field to avoid co-optation or pressure to conform to changing political agendas. The notion of struggle is acknowledged as a matter of fact and as integral to their mission, as well as something in which they must continually engage: ‘There have not really been too many changes in the past two years. We were struggling before, and we are still struggling, for our rights.’

The death of Benazir Bhutto lowered morale throughout the country, especially for women who saw her as a role model and symbol of women’s achievement. Among this group she represented some hope for an improved environment for women’s rights. In an effort to gather input from women’s groups regarding strategies for improving women’s status in Pakistan, Bhutto met with these activists five days prior to her assassination. By their accounts, she exuded greater confidence and commitment to confront women’s issue more forcefully and this added to the sense of loss.

Zardari’s failure to honor his promise to reinstate the deposed justices was openly criticized. ² The lawyers’ movement sparked the energies and hopes among a broad base of the population, including these women’s rights activists. Key leaders at AGHS were arrested for participation in the mass demonstrations as part of the struggle to demand a separation of powers between the state and the judiciary and uphold the rule of law. They participated in the weekly demonstrations and other actions, which are viewed as significant in broadening civil society and building support for the women’s movement.

Disastrous economic policies, exacerbated by a series of leaders, have also changed the dynamics of the political field. The current economic downturn was seen as diverting the attention of the government and general population from women’s issues. An unprecedented hike in the price of basic staples and shortages of gas, electricity, and water aggravated daily living conditions. There was no electricity for as much as 12 hours a day due to ‘load shedding’. Patriarchal relations are clearly viewed as the primary root cause of gender-based violence, yet violence is also exacerbated by the harsh social conditions affecting the population.

One has to remember, we are a poor country. The majority of our people are poor, illiterate and then secondly, don’t forget there is a recession. There are no jobs so the imbalance is automatically going to increase… . No money, no way to run your house … the friction and fights start because of these domestic problems.

Ground Realities: Rising Threats and Terrorism

Threats, both ideological and physical, have been commonplace and are a constant ground reality confronted by women’s activists in Pakistan. Their efforts to shift gender power imbalances enrage many people among a number of societal sectors. At various points threats have emanated from the State through threats to close the shelter, and officials demonstrate ambivalence regarding the shelter’s policies. Religious leaders, the public, and the families of the women who seek their services have often been hostile to them on the grounds that they are encouraging loose morals and rebellious behavior of women and intruding into the ‘private’ sphere of the family. All of the women, especially the higher profile leaders who take very public stances, engage in public acts of protest, have been arrested, received death threats, and faced hostile propaganda and intimidation as a result.

It was notable that the increased strength of religious parties that has been accumulating since the 1980s shifted the balance of power in the political field. While a few of the activists initially minimized the effect of the increased violence in society (characterized as terrorism by them) on their movement work and feel that women’s activists in the more remote provinces are much more constrained by these factors, the specter of extra-state violence emerged consistently as a key issue tainting the field for women’s activism. According to the shelter director:

Terrorism has spoiled the whole environment. There is no change in the work, no change in the team but it’s hitting us psychologically. That’s terror – we are most psychologically affected by this. It has made the struggle harder.

The crisis worker voices that terrorism has ‘stopped the struggle’ because it has affected so many facets of women’s lives. The ‘common people’ who used to join them on the roads to protest and attend rallies now feel afraid. Women’s rights may not be considered a necessary struggle by women at the present time when confronted with daily violence, lack of food, and lack of water. She likened the situation to one of wartime:

Terrorism has affected the women, the mothers. Just like during the time of war, women lose their loved ones. Similarly women are losing their husbands, their children, brothers, or fathers. So at the end this adds to their suffering, emotionally and financially. ³

She also identified spillover effects of terrorism on the society that carry over to NGO workers, noting the growing intolerance of diversity or dissent:

I think people’s attitudes have changed. People have no tolerance in them anymore. I used to get threats in the past, but now the threats have become more severe. I can feel the intensity of the threats and I have to take them more seriously.

These activists have taken very public stands on a host of issues beginning with public protests in defiance of martial law and the Hudood Ordinances. The organization has also been accused of exaggerating problems, sullying the image of Pakistan abroad and pandering to western agendas. Questioning tradition, culture, and religion stirs backlash as they speak out about the discriminatory laws such as qisas and diyat, honor killings, and forced marriages. The activists reject the use of culture and religion to deny women’s rights and respond to accusations of ‘westernness’ by pointing out that they base their demands for change on the lived experiences of the women they interact with on a daily basis. An organizational leader responds to their critics:

I would be embarrassed if there were things happening in this country and nobody was speaking about it… . Our primary target when we speak out is the society and the state here. It is my right; it is my duty and my responsibility not only to air the problem, that is only half the struggle, but also to make sure to find collective responses for it.

A host of recent threats and near disasters was described. Many emanate from families angered that the organization empowers their daughters and wives to claim rights. The crisis worker recently received threats that she would be raped and her children killed. A husband claiming to be affiliated with a fundamentalist group threatened to bomb the shelter because his wife refused to reconcile and was helped to repatriate back to her country of origin in Eastern Europe. The shelter warden was nearly shot in an incident at the court where she was assisting a woman who was seeking a divorce against family wishes. This research team observed a harrowing incident when the staff organized a speedy clandestine exit strategy from the law office (hiding a woman client on the floor of the van covered with a dupatta, a traditional garment) to avoid an angry group of male family members that was gathered in front of the building. Armed guards were observed surrounding the entrances to the law firm and the shelter. Accustomed to operating within the protest field, the shelter workers are proud of their ability to withstand the threats of violence and emphasize that this does not deter them. A local saying was used as a metaphor:

We have this saying here in Punjabi… When the dog barks, it does not stop the people from taking the route. People are still going to take the same route even if the dog is going to continue to bark.

Advocacy and Activism: A Weak State and Rule of Law

Over the years the organizations expanded their focus within their political field, broadening their networks and forging new alliances within the women’s movement domestically, regionally, and internationally. They envision building a social movement with their service programs as part of it. Efforts to organize women at the grassroots level are sustained through a Paralegal Program that trains cohorts of women who then educate and advocate for other women in their communities. Public actions such as mixed gender marathons in Lahore were organized in 2006 in defiance of a ban on such races. The first marathon encountered attacks from hardline religious parties and was stopped by police, with the arrests of many activists. Later human rights activists in Lahore succeeded in holding a Marathon for Civil Liberties without disturbance.

Over time, their activism has increasingly become oriented toward negotiating in the courts, legal system, and other state institutions. Skills developed through oppositional tactics and protests have been calibrated toward lobbying for legislative change and improved policies. AGHS has gained a reputation for creating important case law through landmark constitutional cases, particularly in the area of women’s rights. Public awareness and debates of critical women’s issues have flourished as a result of high profile legal cases covered extensively in the media. For example, the 1996 ‘Love Marriage Case’ (Jamal, 2006) handled by AGHS confirmed the right of a majority age woman to marry without the approval of a wali, or guardian and established an important legal precedent. Another 2005 case brought to light the problems of rape and abuse of women in police custody and the failure of the state to protect the rights of rape victims. Sonia Naz, a 24-year-old mother of two registered a complaint against the Faisalabad police, claiming that they demanded a bribe from her husband and kidnapped him when he refused to pay. She was later kidnapped by the superintendent of the Faisalabad police and beaten and raped in retaliation. Legal assistance was provided by AGHS, who brought her story to the media in Pakistan and launched an international campaign that pressured the Musharraf government to finally arrest the accused police officers.

The state’s failure to assume ownership of its human rights commitments and to enforce the rule of law is a seen as a significant obstacle to women’s progress that limits the impact of the organizations’ services. Recently passed legislations criminalizing honor killing and outlawing harmful traditional practices such as vani (a practice where families trade young women in order to resolve disputes with other parties) have limited effectiveness and were perceived as ‘good only on paper’. There is still great impunity for crimes against women because ‘just passing the bills doesn’t make it things happen itself’. The Women’s Protection Bill of 2006 failed to fully repeal the Hudood Ordinances, leaving women vulnerable to continued incarceration or harassment through spurious legal charges.

The failure to enact the 2009 Domestic Violence Bill was another hindrance. Women have been lobbying for several decades to pass such a law that criminalizes domestic violence as a mechanism to curb the pervasive culture of tolerance. The bill was opposed by the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) on the basis that it would push the divorce rate up in the country. It passed unanimously in the National Assembly but lapsed after the senate failed to pass it within the time frame required. The law is characterized as another casualty of current political crises:

That’s a very unfortunate example of the kind of panic that this government is in and really how positive things aren’t really developed… . There were too many things happening and attention was deflected. The Senate didn’t make it a priority and certain obstructionists were able to take advantage of that… . As I said, I don’t think it was a very strong bill. At the same time, it was something we could live with. We could try and work on it to get some of the gaps filled and we had our own agenda around it for the follow ups. Of course the basic tool has to be in our hands… . It will probably go through again but it again means more delay.

Optimism was expressed about a proposed bill against sexual harassment that is believed to be stronger legally than the Domestic Violence Bill. Sexual harassment, especially in public spaces, has intensified due to conservative religious propaganda. It is hoped that the Sexual Harassment Bill will not meet the same fate as the Domestic Violence Bill. ⁴ Without clear legal standards and penalties for violence against women, the police, who are cited as frequently being obstructive and in many documented cases perpetrators of violence against women in their custody, will continue to minimize complaints or refuse to act in a timely fashion:

A domestic situation means no help from the police. And what is domestic violence? No choices, forced marriage, no right to divorce, beatings. So when you come out and say she is the victim of domestic violence, what’s the big deal? It’s very normal.

One of the founders explains the rationale for state-oriented efforts as part of their strategy in spite of the contentious relationship:

There have been so many attacks against this shelter by non-state actors as well as the state itself. Actually, we exist despite the state. The measures that we have forced the state to take for the protection of women – all have been a struggle. It has not been easily won. But as I have said before, I have a firm belief that the state has a responsibility to give protection. Non-state institutions of civil society cannot provide that kind of protection without state cooperation. So the state is always the primary source of protection. I insist that the state fulfills that responsibility and I will always insist on it.

At this stage no one is satisfied with the pace of change but they remain committed and hopeful with a focus on broadening the movement, strengthening legal protections and remedies for women, and expanding services. The crisis worker, who was recruited through the paralegal program and engaged in activism for 15 years, summed up their outlook: ‘wherever there is struggle, there is hope’.

Creating Change: One Step Forward, One Step Back ⁵

In the political field in Pakistan, steps forward are continually undermined by steps backward. Still, women’s resistance to oppression is found in many places and in many forms. Strong consensus emerged that their outreach, educational efforts, and positive reputation result in changes that are also visible on the micro-level since more women are coming forward to claim their rights. They were unequivocal that there was change in the demeanor and confidence with which they are approached by women who are described as ‘bolder’, ‘not timid anymore and know their rights and how to fight for them’. In some cases, unlike in the past, women’s families support rather than ostracize their daughters, such as in the case of an abduction and gang rape of an 18-year-old college student. In a case of child sexual abuse, a mother risked stigma to come forward and won her legal case against the perpetrator. For the first time in the shelter’s experience, two openly lesbian women came forward for services.

Still, extreme cases of violence against women are a stark reminder of the huge variance in circumstances among women in Pakistan, especially in rural areas, and of the magnitude of what still needs to be accomplished. Several activists spoke of a particularly disturbing recent case of a young Christian woman locked in her home with an animal harness by her family because she wanted to marry the man of her choice. She was recovered by members of the media and brought to their shelter.

A few months prior it had come to light that five women were buried alive in an ‘honor killing’ in a remote region of the province of Baluchistan. Since the late 1990s, activists of these organizations had been instrumental in bringing these crimes to the forefront and agitated for religious leaders and the State to publicly repudiate these crimes as un-Islamic and illegal. During interviews in 2006 it was expressed that they had turned a corner and that it would be difficult to for any official to publicly defend honor killing. ⁶ A senator from Baluchistan defended these killings as ‘centuries-old traditions’ declaring them as a custom that he would ‘continue to defend’ (Waraich, 2008).Women’s rights protesters, including women from Dastak and AGHS, gathered outside parliament and government buildings in Lahore calling for his removal from office.

Staff of the organizations continue to struggle with a number of constraints, especially the lack of living and income generation options that makes rehabilitation and resettlement of the shelter residents a serious difficulty. A recently initiated Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) provides women in extreme poverty with disbursements of $1,000 rupees (roughly $15 USD) but members of staff doubt the program’s effectiveness because it is simply far too little and difficult to access. Women who make the difficult decision to leave violence continue to encounter a strongly patriarchal ‘mindset’. They are forced to choose between stigma and poverty with independence or ongoing violence. The training coordinator elaborates:

When they have decided to live alone, I think that’s the struggle really starts … you can say that you have started a war against society… . The threat of being abused is much more raised actually, when you decide to live on your own. Basically, this society is not so protective of women … if you don’t have a man present, a brother in your home; that means you are free for everyone. So I think that’s the biggest issue now and I say for next fifty years that will be the biggest issue.

Efforts to raise funds to purchase a building complex and develop a comprehensive skill trainings center and a hostel for working women are ongoing. Autonomy from the state and other co-opting bodies create funding challenges, but these challenges have contributed to the organizations’ resilience over the long run. One leader sums up:

I think what I like to say is that the shelter has had its share of problems and the threats against us have not diminished. The very process of demonstrating that we can survive the attacks is very indicative of the strength of the organization and has contributed to the credibility. I do believe that there has been this change really despite the weaknesses of the State and despite these religious elements, but because now the public believes in this project. I think that people really now understand that this organization is there to stay.

Discussion: Eliminating Gender Violence: Struggle and Hope

The activists’ narratives describe a complex, uncertain political field within which their movement is shaped by situational and historically specific processes. Pakistan’s historical-political and social dimensions reveal a long history of foreign government interference, autocratic rule, and the rise of extra-state militancy, all of which structure the possibilities for action. Continual crises in state–society relations, political turmoil, and near total breakdown of democratic processes have led these organizations within the women’s movement to position themselves in the protest field, largely outside of and in opposition to the state (Basu, 1992). Pakistan’s women’s movement is characterized by what Ray (1999) terms a fragmented political field, with a heterogeneous political culture and dispersed distribution of power that enables political autonomy of women’s organizations. Politically autonomous women’s groups are able to set more explicitly feminist agendas and are not pressured to subordinate women’s interests to other issues as they might in a hegemonic field dominated by strong political parties or organizations that leave little political space (Ray, 1999). Limited engagement with and dependence on the state and political parties, which in Pakistan are weak and often unrepresentative of women’s interests, has also contributed to some of its successes (Basu, 2005). Women’s organizations have been able to focus more centrally on gender, especially issues of violence (Basu, 1992; Molyneux, 1985). As these activists emphasize, independence from state and political party affiliation leaves them free to critique injustices, pressure for action, and avoid co-optation.

A significant insight that emerges from this research lies in how the political field led the movement to adopt a human rights framework and to define violence against women as a violation of human rights early on, prior to any involvement with the transnational feminist movement. From the beginning the women’s movement in Pakistan has been associated with the human rights movement and many activists function in both realms. Early conceptualizations made by Pakistani women regarding women’s rights and human rights foreshadowed the global debates that emerged later during the 1990s as a result of involvement in the Beijing Conference.

In the context of repressive, authoritarian rule, claims for women’s rights to security were key elements of their framework for action and served to articulate women’s experiences of violence and subordination. The promulgation of regressive laws and incarceration of rape victims, brutal punishments such as whipping and flogging, and threats of stoning and laws of evidence that reduced the value of women’s legal testimony, were obvious violations of women’s human rights to life, health, and security of women and articulated as constituting crimes against women (Shaheed and Hussain, 2007).

Furthermore, unlike feminists’ experiences in other parts of the world, Pakistani women’s rights activists never had to convince the human rights movement of the need for the inclusion of women’s concerns in the agenda of all human rights organizations (Friedman, 1995; Okin, 1998). Rather, women were among the first articulating public opposition to the martial law regime, and civil society activism regarding human rights in the early to mid-1980s was driven by these women activists who were among the founders of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (Jahangir, 2000; Keddie, 1988).

The use of a secular rather than Islamic framework of these particular activists is another critical way in which the movement in Pakistan has differed from other women’s movements in the Muslim world. This engenders many consequences for their work. Maintaining a secular framework has become increasingly difficult in the current environment of shrinking liberal, secular space and fundamentalism is a very important ‘ground reality’ that NGOs in Pakistan have to negotiate (Jafar, 2007). Debates over the roles and rights of women and which interpretation of Islam should play in society have intensified (Weiss, 2009). Jafar’s 2007 study of NGOs across the country found that few organizations today can embrace a wholly secular orientation. These organizations, based in a major city, are among the few that do so.

Controversy over secularism, human rights, and feminism tie into the complex relationship of local women’s movements to larger forces such as the nation’s colonial past, as well as current pressures arising from globalization and other geopolitical tensions. Attempts to delegitimize feminism and women’s activism are made through claims that they seek to erode local culture through the promotion of western individualism and anti-Islamic values (Jamal, 2006; Weiss, 2003). These accusations also resonate because of historical and geopolitical events that shape the political field, such as Pakistan’s role as a proxy of the US to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which propped up the Zia regime and facilitated the growth of political Islam. The aftermath of September 11 and anger over American military actions in the region further stokes apprehension about western imperialism. American interventions accentuate West vs. Islam strains in post-9/11 Pakistan and lends a certain political credibility and legitimacy to faith-based feminism as the alternative to a larger imperialist, US-sponsored, westernized women’s rights discourse (Charania, 2007; Helie-Lucas, 1993; Jamal, 2005; Zia, 2009).

Narayan (1997: 5), speaking from the Indian feminist experience, notes the contradictions in charges of westernization that are used to insinuate that feminist politics are ‘inauthentic’ and ‘irrelevant’. Social changes in local contexts are labeled in selective and paradoxical ways as ‘westernized’ rather than intra-cultural phenomena stemming from women’s lived experiences. Parallels are evident in the Pakistani activist experiences. Such criticisms obscure the fact that the movement evolved within the social and political conditions of Pakistan based on issues that affect many women, especially lower income and poor women. Their agenda for action is firmly derived from the experiences of the women who stream into their offices seeking justice and the approximately 2,000 women and children who have resided at the shelter since its inception.

In spite of the challenges, a secular human rights framework is perceived as essential by these women’s movement leaders. Women’s rights and human rights are best promoted and protected in an environment of secular thought and secular institutions. They make the distinction that secularism is not about negating religion in people’s lives or imposing western ideals and values; it is about separating the state and religion and maintaining space for diversity (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2008).

An Islamic feminist framework, which relies on progressive interpretations of Islam as their grounding of arguments for women’s rights is seen as limiting (Weiss, 2003; Zia, 2009). This strategy has also been critiqued for subsuming the feminism part of Islamic feminism as a lesser appendage of the Islamic component. There is also lack of consensus regarding what interpretations of Islam should empower the state, what constitutes women’s rights, and questions as to whether there is an inherent gender hierarchy in Islam (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2008; Weiss, 2009). In the experience of the organizations in this study, women’s attempts to invoke their rights within a religious framework often end up in ‘endless debates with no clear solutions’ and have resulted in gains for women that are either partial or temporary, stopping short of full equality for women.

Additional shifts in ideological positioning within the women’s movement threaten to further marginalize secular voices and are changing the dynamics of the political field for activism. In an environment of increased religious revivalism and faith-based women’s movements, some women’s activism has gone in a more conservative direction. Political parties are competing for support among women and religious fundamentalists or political parties have entered mainstream politics to mobilize women to advance their agendas which are often anti-women (Zia, 2009). For example, in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), women’s shelters were attacked as western inspired initiatives that encouraged adultery and obscenity and women activists of the religious parties were at the forefront and complicit in such campaigns (Zia, 2009). NGOs must increasingly consider the political and religious sensibilities of the communities in which they work or find themselves at risk.

Further shifts in the political field for women’s activism have influenced the direction of the organization’s strategies. During the 1980s the women’s movement was inwardly focused, mainly on activism and protest against the military dictatorship, and had minimal engagement with the transnational women’s movement. Restoration of a democratic government marked a turning point. Autonomy has enabled them to be receptive to changes external to the field such as international feminism and human rights movements. Over time activism became more directly linked to and engaged with international arenas which are used as a reference point and arbiter to pressure the State (Ray, 1999). Women’s activists also assumed greater roles as consultants to the state institutions and political parties. The National Report for the Beijing Conference and the National Plan of Action for Women were largely attributed to input by women’s groups and the ratification of CEDAW was a direct result of the pressure mounted by women (Zia, 1998). The Fourth World Conference for Women in 1995 in Beijing fostered important international alliances and connections with global feminist networks. The organizations’ influence and power has been strengthened by international recognition of their human rights work. Currently two of the founders hold positions at the United Nations.

New strategies have been used to influence government and policy makers that involve limited engagement and collaboration with the State and mainstream institutions on key issues. Some activism became less street-oriented, more diffused, and affiliated with a wider range of networks (Shaheed, 2010). Activists began to cooperate and dialogue with parliamentarians and politicians through participation in advisory committees and working groups. Efforts are directed toward expansion of legal rights and holding the State accountable for the protection of rights.

The struggles and successes narrated by these activists reveal how these conditions provide the fields in which women’s participation takes place in a variety of forms, some overt and others more subversive. These women’s organizations have been highly visible and active in mobilizing even through periods of repressive regimes, with active protests, campaigns, and strategic use of cultural resources such as the media to amplify the debates and educate the public. They have broken the silence on taboo issues such as rape, divorce, and women’s right to control their sexuality and choice of partners. But what is perhaps most subversive, is the social and legal activism that promotes a critical awareness among women of rights and options, providing the laws and tools to help women examine their own situations and life choices. This is at the heart of much of the rage directed against them, as women now also find new sources of support and safe spaces that build their strength to question and challenge their families and other institutions that contribute to their oppression.

Conclusion

This study situates the work of Pakistani feminists within the global movement with implication for the women’s movements in broader contexts beyond the experiences of these two organizations. The theoretical model of fields enables a deeper understanding of the worldwide variation in feminist concerns, goals, and strategies and how organizations are intertwined with their location and interaction with their political field (Ray, 1999).

While these organizations constitute an important voice in the progressive arena, they are not the sole voice of the Pakistani women’s movement, which is dispersed throughout the country mostly in urban areas, including many autonomous groups, feminist and service oriented NGOs, and social welfare organizations. Some scholars have been critical of the process of ‘NGO-ization’ in India and Pakistan and question its democratizing potential. In their view, as neoliberal and market-oriented ideologies are increasingly embraced, a proliferation of NGOs enables the state to shirk its responsibilities in the areas of health care, education, welfare, and other public services (Jafar, 2007). As a result, civil society organizations, and specifically NGOs, become overburdened with providing public services, and their transformative potential is minimized (Bari and Khattak, 2001; Kamat, 2002). Nonetheless, within the field of Pakistan, typified by the weakness of civil society and the repressive capacity of the state, others view the women’s movement NGOs as essential for the defense of human rights and minority rights (Jafar, 2007; Weiss, 1999, 2003). In spite of some of the limitations of donor-funded activism, funding for NGOs has been a critical resource that has sustained and facilitated women’s activism in ways that would otherwise have been impossible and has altered the power dynamics within the political field to the benefit of women. We concur with these scholars that civil society organizations such as these, based on human rights principles, play an indispensable role as voices of opposition to injustice and as representatives of women’s interests in Pakistan.