More than Members: Market Revitalization in the Building Trades

Introduction

At their peak, unions represented over 30 percent of the American workforce; today, only 12 percent – and a mere 7 percent of private sector workers – are union members (Western and Rosenfeld, 2011). Given de-unionization’s role in increasing income inequality (Western and Rosenfeld, 2011) sociologists have been intensely interested in the labor movement’s attempts to rebound (Cornfield and McCammon, 2004). Sociologists conceptualize labor revitalization as a multifaceted process which “…consists of the initiatives conceived, developed and taken by labor organizations to redefine their relations with workers, employers, and the state” (Cornfield and McCammon, 2004: 16). Within this framework, sociologists have identified and explored a legion of revitalization strategies currently or previously employed by the labor movement. Most sociological research, however, focuses on efforts within the service industry, ignoring revitalization attempts of unions in other industries, especially the building trades. This lack of research is a major oversight given that the building trades are geared towards representing contingent workers (Cobble, 1991), an increasingly common job structure (Kalleberg, 2011). Moreover, like their service sector counterparts, many building trade unions actively engage in revitalization efforts. In fact, several of the most active organizing unions in the AFL-CIO hail from the building trades (Hurd et al., 2003).

Successful new member organizing, however, is not enough to revitalize the building trades according to recent scholars who argue organizing workers is not the same as organizing work in the construction sector. Weil (2003) theorizes that, in order to revitalize, building trade Locals must engage in comprehensive market recovery programs that simultaneously expand membership and market capacity. This is accomplished through four pathways: increasing the market share of existing union contractors, creating new union contractors, organizing non-union contractors and decreasing the market share of non-union contractors. Each of these pathways, according to Weil, help Locals regain lost power by expanding their control of work.

Placing Weil’s theory within the sociology of labor revitalization helps to advance our understanding of revitalization by recognizing that success necessitates more than changing relations with specific actors; it requires reshaping markets. Unfortunately, Weil’s theory currently suffers from several limitations. First, Weil largely ignores the important role macro-economic conditions play in the success of market recovery efforts. While Weil mentions economic downturns briefly in reference to new member organizing, he does not address how economic downturns, like the Great Recession, limit the effectiveness of his comprehensive market recovery strategies. Second, when encouraging Locals to expand market share he does not consider the problem of inter-union competition. While market expansion can be achieved at the expense of other unionized workforces, poaching work from other unions does not increase the overall power of the labor movement. Finally, Weil fails to confront the problem of cost differentials between union and non-union workforces. In many construction segments, Locals struggle to compete because the relatively high cost of their labor prices them out of the market. In light of these limitations, I re-theorize Weil using the case of metro-Detroit’s International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 58 to expand our understanding of the obstacles that the building trades, and other occupational unions, confront in revitalization efforts.

Sociology of Labor Revitalization

The sociology of labor revitalization conceptualizes union revitalization as a multifaceted process which ‘consists of the initiatives conceived, developed and taken by labor organizations to redefine their relations with workers, employers, and the state’ (Cornfield and McCammon, 2004: 16). Previous research has identified a legion of revitalization strategies currently employed by the labor movement, including labor management partnerships (Eaton et al., 2004), direct worker ownership (Wheeler, 2002), Central Labor Councils (Acuff, 1999), community coalitions (Armbruster-Sandoval, 2005; Nissen, 2004), worker councils (Fine, 2006), cross-national partnerships (Bronfenbrenner, 2007; Burawoy, 2009; Seidman, 2007), and union democratization and social movement unionism (Collom, 2003; Cornfield and McCammon, 2004; Lévesque et al., 2005). Arguably, however, the most important strategy is new member organizing (Bronfenbrenner, 1998; Burawoy, 2008; Voss and Sherman, 2000). ¹

Proponents of new member organizing argue labor revitalization depends on organizational transformation that supports ‘organiz[ing] new members, using a wide variety of confrontational tactics, including massive street demonstrations, direct action, worker mobilization, sophisticated corporate campaigns, and circumvention of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)’ (Voss and Sherman, 2000: 304). Within this framework, researchers analyze the obstacles, processes and results of union organizing, and the organizational concomitants of successful organization (Bronfenbrenner, 1997, 1998; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2004; Lopez, 2004). Most sociological research, however, as stated earlier, focuses on revitalization efforts within the service industry, ignoring the revitalization efforts of union in other industries, especially the building trades.

Building Trades Revitalization

Several characteristics of the building trades make them important for sociologists of labor revitalization. First, construction remains one of the largest economic sectors in the USA. Construction has a long history of union power and, in contrast to other traditional union strongholds, is at less risk of being offshored (Blinder, 2006; Crawford, 2009). Second, the building trades historically functioned outside of the NLRB’s organizing process (Milkman, 2006), giving them a vast tool-kit from which to draw revitalization strategies (Swidler, 1986). Finally, many construction unions maintain traditional craft structures, also known as occupational union structures, geared towards representing contingent workers (Cobble, 1991), an increasingly important characteristic given the rise of the contingent workforce (Kalleberg, 2011).

Occupational union structures stand apart from other organizational models, like business and social movement models, by taking responsibility for human resource services like benefits, hiring halls, and training programs. Hiring halls in occupational unions consist of a common labor pool from which multiple contractors can hire workers. A common labor pool necessitates the interchangeability of workers, which is accomplished through formal training programs. With the union managing many of the human resource functions, workers have transferable benefits and employers can avoid many administrative costs.

Unfortunately, the construction industry suffered a dramatic decline in unionization – falling from its 1950’s peak density of almost 50 percent to its current 13.1 percent density (Allen, 1988; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011), making it one of the hardest hit sectors. In efforts to reverse this trend, the building trades experimented with many revitalization programs, including new member organizing (Belman and Smith, 2009; Condit et al., 1998; Grabelsky, 1995; Northrup, 1993,1997; Rabourn, 2008). In fact, several of the most active organizing unions in the AFL-CIO hail from the building trades, with the IBEW counted among the top three (Hurd et al., 2003). The success of the IBEW is, in part, attributable to the implementation of the Construction Organizing Membership Education Training (COMET) program, which was designed to overcome member resistance to organizing by helping members understand why organizing is necessary for the future of the trade (Grabelsky, 1995). ²

While the IBEW’s organizing program succeeded in unionizing thousands of previously non-union electricians, Weil (2003) theorizes organizing is not enough within the building trades. Weil observes that construction sector union density is measured by the amount of unionized work, not the proportion of unionized workers. He warns that if market share is not expanded in revitalization efforts, organizing members becomes risky, especially during economic downturns. Placing Weil within the sociology of labor revitalization advances our understanding of labor revitalization by recognizing that revitalization means more than simply changing relations with certain actors (Cornfield and McCammon, 2004), it means actively engaging with and reshaping markets to expand the unionized market share.

For over a century, the building trades have pursued economic and political policies to reshape markets and promote the use of unionized workers (Belman and Smith, 2009). The most effective programs, historically, are apprenticeship programs and hiring halls which offer employers an ample supply of skilled workers who are often more productive than their non-union counterparts (Allen, 1984). More recently, the building trades engaged in other economic pathways designed to maintain union density including prevailing wage laws, job subsidizing and Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) (Belman and Smith, 2009; Northrup, 1993, 1997; Weil, 2003). Many unions also participate in promotional efforts attempting to convince end-users to hire unionized labor (Weil, 2003).

Weil (2003: 33), however, argues many of these past efforts ‘do not in themselves lead to expanding market share.’ Instead, it is hoped that these activities will result in one of four outcomes which do affect market share. These outcomes include:

Each of these outcomes, Weil argues, cannot be realized through the implementation of stand-alone policies. Instead, Locals must embrace suites of ‘interrelated policies … adopted together rather than individually (or even sequentially) in order to achieve optimal results’ (2003: 33, emphasis in original). Weil identifies four major comprehensive market recovery strategies – one for each of the market expansion outcomes – comprised of unique suites of recovery efforts, policies, and programs.

Strategy 1 – expanding the market share of existing union contractors – consists of focused promotion, private and public bidding efforts, and apprenticeship and training programs. Strategy 2 – the creation of new union contractors – consists of public sector bidding efforts, business assistance and market recovery assistance. Strategy 3 – converting non-union contractors into union contractors – consists of identifying key markets and contractors, bottom-up organizing efforts, top-down organizing efforts and developing public bidding strategies and providing targeted assistance for the recently converted. Finally, Strategy 4 – decreasing the share of non-union contractors – consists of corporate campaigns, political activity, and bottom-up organizing.

Locals, according to Weil, cannot simultaneously engage in all four of these market recovery strategies. Instead, Locals should decide which strategy to pursue based on their ‘strategic position’. Locals must understand the construction market within their geographical jurisdiction, their control over different segments of the market, the market position of their contractors and competitors, and any vulnerabilities or opportunities. Using this information, Locals can decide which market segment to focus on and which outcome, and corresponding strategy, best fits that segment.

Despite advancing our understanding of revitalization in the building trades, Weil’s theory of comprehensive market recovery strategies suffers from several limitations. First, Weil does not adequately address how macro-economic conditions play into comprehensive market recovery strategies or into the strategic positions of Locals. Economic downturns are only mentioned in passing in reference to why the newly organized must be assured employment. Second, he fails to discuss inter-union competition within different market segments. In so failing, he overlooks the fact that market expansion for one union does not necessarily expand the power of the labor movement. Instead, it can be accomplished through the poaching of work previously done by other unionized workforces.

Third, Weil fails to fully recognize the importance of union and non-union cost differentials in market recovery. Cost concerns are almost completely absent from Weil’s analysis. While Weil does suggest that profit margins are a major factor preventing current contractors from expanding into new markets, he treats profit margins more as a constant of different market segments (e.g. small scale vs large scale construction) instead of as the result of labor cost differentials. The only instance where Weil directly mentions labor costs is when he uses prevailing wage laws to encourage Locals to focus on public sector construction instead of the small scale private construction segment – a segment seen by many as necessary for the building trades to capture if they are to revitalize (Rabourn, 2008). Since none of Weil’s comprehensive market recovery strategies directly address project cost differentials, they are extremely limited in their ability to overcome this major obstacle to market expansion.

I illustrate the above limitations using the case of IBEW Local 58. Local 58 was chosen as a site to study construction revitalization for several reasons. First, it represents skilled electrical construction workers. All sectors of our economy depend on electricity, but electrical work is extremely dangerous, so unskilled workers are wary to work with electricity. Representing a highly valued commodity in our society gives Local 58 a powerful market-based lever for union resurgence.

Second, even though concessions have been made, Local 58 successfully maintains many of its benefits, including an above average wage (over US$30 an hour), pensions, an annuity, unemployment sub pay, and insurance. Furthermore, workers are entitled to an overtime rate of time and a half after the state mandatory 40 hours a week and after 8 hours per day. All Saturday work is time and a half and Sunday is double time. The relatively high labor costs associated with these wages and benefits, however, means that project cost concerns are very important for the future of the Local.

Finally and most importantly, Local 58 actively tries to regain its lost power. To achieve this goal the Local engages in comprehensive market recovery programs within several market segments. These practices, however, have failed to adequately revitalize the Local due, in part, to the limitations discussed above. While Strategy 1 – expanding the market share of current contractors – helped maintain Local 58’s position in its traditional market niche of large commercial and heavy industrial construction, this niche is on the decline due to macro-economic and technological changes. Moreover, expansion within this market segment brought the Local into competition with other unionized workforces, not just non-union ones. Market expansion outside of the large commercial and industrial market has been limited, largely because of substantial cost differentials between union and non-union contractors. The failure to achieve sustainable market expansion is especially important given the fact that Local 58 pursued Strategy 3, bringing in an estimated 1000 new members and numerous contractors. The organizing was so successful that Local 58 is considered one of the most successful organizing Locals in the IBEW (Ethan, Local official and organizer). Nevertheless, in the context of the Great Recession and a declining large commercial and industrial market, the failure to expand market share combined with the large expansion of membership stimulated member opposition to many revitalization strategies, especially new member organizing, and towards the IBEW more broadly.

Through a re-theorization of Weil (2003), the experience of Local 58 contributes to the sociology of labor revitalization in several ways. First, it demonstrates the necessity for occupational unions to take an active part in shaping markets to ensure the future employment of their members. Second, it explores a variety of obstacles that occupational unions face when attempting to shape markets and engage in comprehensive market recovery strategies, including large cost differentials, technological change, general economic conditions, competition with both union and non-union workforces, labor market flooding, and member resistance. Third, the experiences of Local 58 demonstrate how when occupational unions fail to shape markets in such a way as to ensure their membership employment, not only does revitalization not occur, but the failure cultivates member resentment towards revitalization efforts, new members, and the union itself. Altogether, the case of Local 58 reformulates Weil’s theory by showing how the policy suites currently associated with his comprehensive market recovery strategies will fail to achieve the intended outcomes without directly addressing a variety of market conditions, most importantly cost differentials. Not only should market conditions inform which market segments and outcomes to focus on, they should also determine which policies need to be included within the comprehensive market recovery strategies if those outcomes are to be achieved.

Data and Methods

Data for this project include semi-structured interviews with 20 respondents associated with Detroit’s IBEW Local 58 which I conducted in person, transcribed and thematically coded by hand. Using snowball sampling, I spoke to current electricians, former electricians, telecommunication workers, union business agents, apprenticeship instructors, electrical contractors, representatives of the Southeastern Michigan Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA), and the business development agent hired by Local 58 and the Southeastern Michigan Chapter of NECA, achieving a stratified purposeful sample. Conversations with each of my respondents lasted, on average, two to three hours. The shortest recorded interview lasted one hour while the longest lasted six hours. Follow up interviews were conducted with respondents as the need arose. Internal documents, letters, pamphlets, and the websites of Local 58, NECA and its members were also analyzed to verify the accuracy of the information I gathered during my interviews. These data were analyzed looking for union revitalization strategies. Strategies were identified by looking at discussions on different practices the Local and members take part in to increase union membership, increase their proportion of job contracts or otherwise improve their market position.

Local 58

Local 58 primarily represents two types of electrical construction workers: Journeymen Inside Wiremen (JIW) who are full electricians and Journeymen Telecommunication Workers (JTW) who work on sound and information transfers and cannot work with more than 120 volts. Local 58 represents its members during contract negotiations, on the jobsite via a system of stewards, and, in contrast to most non-construction unions (see Cobble, 1991 for an exception), by also serving as a human resources department which co-sponsors the selection and training of new apprentices through the Joint Apprenticeship Training Center (JATC) and manages the Local’s benefits and employment systems. The apprenticeship program combines classroom work with on the job training over a five-year period for JIW and three year period for JTW. Once members ‘turn out’ they can continue their education through a variety of classes offered through the JATC. These courses allow members to brush up on old skills, become proficient, licensed or certified in new areas, or earn their Master’s license.

Along with co-sponsoring the JATC, Local 58 manages a benefits system which includes a pension program, an annuity, unemployment sub pay, and insurance. More importantly, the Local uses a hiring hall to manage the employment system. Construction is a very cyclical market. Jobs are often extremely short term (only the longest projects take over a year) and require a fluid labor force. This fluidity is, in part, achieved by the union’s management of ‘the book’. The book is the list of all IBEW members looking for work inside the Local. Centralizing the hiring process benefits both workers and contractors. Contractors gain access to an ample skilled labor force, which is crucial in a cyclical market where demand for labor continuously expands and contracts. Workers, on the other hand, are benefited because it simplifies the search for work and, since those who have spent the longest continuous period on the book get priority status for job calls, workers can more equally share the burden of unemployment. ³

It is important to note that the vast majority of members in Local 58, and the electrical construction industry as a whole, ⁴ are white men. Historically, the Local selected new apprentices from a ‘friends and family network’, leading to a predominance of white males. While they remain underrepresented, apprentice selection has expanded over the past several decades to include groups traditionally excluded from the trades like minorities and women (Fletcher and Gapasin, 2008; Moccio, 2009; Paap, 2006; Sugrue, 2004). Unfortunately, previous research has shown that more open apprentice selection is not enough to solve deep seated exclusionary and discriminatory policies. Even when these groups gain access to union and non-union training programs, they continue to face a plethora of obstacles that limit their economic opportunities (Moccio, 2009; Paap, 2006; Royster, 2003). One of the major factors limiting economic opportunity is that the networks of minority workers are less effective at creating employment opportunities than those of white workers (Royster, 2003). Moreover, even when minorities and women are able to find employment they continue to face open discrimination on the jobsite, often in the form of extremely hostile work environments (Paap, 2006). Combined, these factors mean that, even in the best case scenarios when they have access to training programs and find employment, women and minorities have high exit rates from skilled blue collar occupations (Moccio, 2009). Therefore, despite some progress, racial and gender relations continue to be an issue for the entire construction sector and Local 58 more specifically (Fletcher and Gapasin, 2008).

Local 58’s Strategic Position

Local 58, as with the other building trades unions (Thieblot, 2002), maintains a significant presence on heavy industrial and large commercial projects. This type of construction is right in Local 58’s wheelhouse; these jobs require quality work done in a timely manner. ⁵ Due to the environmental conditions on many of these jobsites (e.g. caustic, flammable, etc.), the need for quality work outweighs many cost concerns. Moreover, work done slowly or incorrectly means huge profit losses for construction end-users. Therefore, customers are willing to pay higher, ‘union’, labor costs. As a result, Local 58’s main competitors in this market segment are other unionized workforces, not non-union ones. This competition often takes the form of jurisdictional disputes between different craft unions; however, in auto-related work, Local 58 also competes with in-house electricians represented by the United Auto Workers (UAW). While recent technological and organization changes (discussed below) have allowed non-union workforces to develop a presence in this field, the vast majority of onsite installation continues to be done by unionized workers.

Local 58 traditionally finds 40–50 percent of its work in auto-related areas. This work occurs when new plants are being built and during scheduled line changes. During shutdowns, electricians regularly work 12-hour days, seven days a week. Many electricians embrace this available overtime, using the income to provide for themselves and their families during regular periods of unemployment. Outside of automotive work, other large industrial projects are considered giant windfalls for Local 58. For example, during the recession of the late 1970s and 1980s, the Belle River power house was built. This job required over 1000 electricians, many of whom worked steady for several years (which is extremely rare in construction).

Unfortunately, this niche is not as beneficial as it once was, for several reasons. First, fewer projects take place. While construction work itself is resistant to offshoring (Blinder, 2006; Crawford, 2009), due to globalization and deindustrialization, there is not as much heavy industrial and large commercial construction being performed. Moreover, when work occurs in these traditional strongholds, the Local must contend with new organizational realities (see Whitford, 2005), most importantly the drive for flexibility which has reduced the amount of work required (Appelbaum el al., 2003; Macduffie, 1995; Womack et al., 1990).

With the introduction of flexible production techniques, instead of each vehicle model having its own dedicated line, multiple models are built on the same line. This is accomplished by replacing the traditional manufacturing line with automated robot cells. The primary work done during a shutdown is the reconfiguration of the conveyer system (i.e. making it longer, adding stops, etc.). In the past, a conveyer system could run for miles with hundreds of controls scattered throughout it. These controls were hardwired in by electricians and required installing conduit, running wires and terminating the devices. A single control panel could take up to a month to complete.

Automated robot cells, in contrast, are designed and built offsite by vendors who often use cheap non-union labor. Onsite, electricians merely assemble the robot cells. Except for emergency shutoffs, these new systems are controlled by programmable logic controllers (PLCs), not relay logic. This means electricians do not hardwire in a logic system. Instead, controls are established via software by a PLC programmer. This type of production process gives the manufacturer much more flexibility. Flexibility for the manufacturer, however, means less work for electricians and other construction trades. Instead of having to do a line change in four different plants for four different vehicles, one line change is performed in one plant which assembles four different models; it now only takes a push of a button to switch which model is being produced, not months of work.

Another change limiting the benefits of this traditional niche is that even when work takes place, it requires less manpower due to the introduction of enabling (Rifkin, 1995) and deskilling (Braverman, 1974) labor-saving technologies. Enabling technologies usually take the form of new tools. For example, battery power tools replaced corded power tools which replaced manual tools and manlifts replaced scaffolding. Deskilling technologies, in contrast, usually take the form of new materials like prefabricated cables (‘plug and play’ cables) and junction boxes (‘mod boxes’), which eliminate many core tasks electricians perform like hardwiring terminations and conduit bending. These seemingly small changes have dramatically reduced the manpower required. One electrician estimates that with the introduction of new technologies he is 10 times more productive than in the past. Owen, a JATC instructor, estimates that with the drive for flexibility and the introduction of new technologies the time to complete a major line change has gone from 6–8 months to 6–8 weeks.

Work in Local 58’s traditional niche continues to exist, but it is no longer enough to maintain its membership. One contractor explains. ‘Faster [projects] means less guys doing it. Less guys doing it means less work for the union. Less work for the union means smaller unions.’ With the introduction of flexible manufacturing techniques and labor-saving technologies, Local 58 must look beyond its traditional niche. In the next section I discuss the programs Local 58 has implemented to increase its power in light of these changes.

Large Commercial and Heavy Industrial Construction

Local 58 engages in a variety of market recovery efforts geared towards maintaining and expanding its presence in heavy industrial and large commercial construction. As mentioned above, these projects are not as beneficial as they once were. Local 58, however, is attempting to counteract this by increasing the amount of work they perform whenever these projects do occur. In order to do this, Local 58 chose to primarily utilize Weil’s Strategy 1 – increasing the market share of existing contractors. Since Local 58 already has established relationships with many of the major end-users in this market segment, promotional activities, while present, were not the key to expanding market share. Instead, Local 58 focused on training programs to help the bidding process of current union contractors and the marketability of individual workers. In contrast to Weil’s proposed strategy, Local 58 also found it necessary to adopt several cost reduction programs to further ensure access to work. While promotion, training, bidding and cost reduction programs are riddled with shortcomings when they stand alone, together they complement each other and become more effective.

As will be seen, the efforts of Local 58 within the large commercial and industrial market segment highlight several major shortcomings of using Weil’s Strategy 1 for revitalization. For instance, cost concerns, which are largely ignored by Weil, were a driving force behind many of Local 58’s actions. Moreover, attempts to further expand market control in these highly unionized sectors meant competing with other unionized workforces, not just non-union ones. Training electricians in new areas does allow Local 58 to compete with some non-union employers, but it also allows them to compete for work traditionally done by other unionized craftsmen. Therefore, while Weil’s first route towards market recovery can coincide with reducing market share of non-union contractors (Strategy 4) and increasing the overall share of unionized construction work, it can also be accomplished by poaching work from other unionized workforces. As a result, expanding the market share within the Local does not necessarily mean expanding the market share of the labor movement as a whole.

New Segments: Residential and Developing Markets

Utilizing similar strategies to those discussed above, Local 58 is attempting to increase the market share of existing union contractors within new market segments. Due to the low union density in the targeted sectors, these efforts rarely bring Local 58 into competition with other unions, avoiding one of the major limitations faced in the large commercial and industrial segment. Nevertheless, Weil’s strategy continues to face several obstacles in these markets, the most important of which continues to be cost.

Expanding Membership without Expanding Markets

As Weil’s theory suggests, the failure of Local 58 to substantially expand its market share in new markets is especially important in light of a recent, large scale, membership expansion. During the 1990s, Local 58 embraced the call for new member organizing. Employing a variety of methods, including stripping – where individual employees are organized without organizing the entire firm (Condit et al., 1998) – and top-down organizing, Local 58 brought in approximately 1000 previously non-union electricians and numerous contractors. One contractor estimates that Local 58 currently has 6500 electricians, so an additional 1000 members is quite substantial. This organizing was intended to strengthen Local 58’s market position in two ways. First, it reduced the number of non-union competitors and the amount of work they performed. Second, organizing increased the ranks of Local 58 during a labor shortage caused by the construction boom, allowing the union to staff more projects than otherwise would have been possible. There was such a call for skilled electricians at the time that, even after allowing travelers and retirees to work in the Local, the hiring hall was considered to be a ‘rotating door’. Electricians could leave an employer one day and pick up a call with a new employer the next. One electrician even bragged about having two employers in the same day. Therefore, organizing not only weakened the market position of non-union contractors, but also strengthened the Local’s market position during an economic boom.

Organizing was no doubt beneficial in the short run; however, there is a perception that the Local ‘overorganized’. ⁷ ‘Overorganizing’ occurs in construction because, unlike in other industries, organizing workers is not the same thing as organizing work. Jobsites are short term and transient. A unionized contractor agrees to abide by the Local’s rules and hire through the hiring hall, nevertheless, signing such a contract does not guarantee future work. If an organized contractor goes out of business, the employees maintain their union status and remain in the common labor pool. Therefore, while the number of contractors, jobs and employees needed regularly expands and contracts, the labor pool does not. This led many respondents to argue that the Local brought in too many workers for the amount of work available, especially in light of Local 58’s failure to expand outside of its shrinking traditional markets. When the construction boom of the 90’s gave way to a recession, the increased labor pool, which was once a blessing, became a curse.

In 2001, Local 58 members logged nine million work hours. In contrast, in 2009 they only worked three million. Local 58 lost around 15 percent of its contractors and had almost 2000 electricians unemployed, with many of these electricians waiting as long as two years to go back to work. Normally, members receive up to nine months of unemployment subpay and, as long as they work at least 300 hours during the year, are eligible for insurance benefits. Taking responsibility for the welfare of so many unemployed workers means the Local’s funds being hit by increasing payouts during a period of fewer contributions. While the financial burden to the Local is causing strain, a more important strain has been put on the Local: the resurgence of member opposition to organizing. Almost every one of the arguments against organizing that Grabelsky (1995) developed COMET to confront has gained a foothold in Local 58.

First, there is a view that by increasing the common labor pool by roughly 1000 members, the economic downturn is affecting the Local more than it should. Previous authors write off the fear that organizing will lead to increased unemployment and insecurity (Condit et al., 1998; Grabelsky, 1995); however, it seems that this fear became a reality in Local 58. Of course the organizing did not cause the economic downturn, but it did expand the labor pool which meant more unemployed members and longer periods of unemployment.

Second, there is a perception that, by avoiding the apprenticeship program, many of the organized members lack solidarity. A common discourse among ‘traditional’ members (members who went through the Local’s apprenticeship) often revolves around the idea that organized members possess less solidarity than traditional members because they were never socialized into the union. Traditional members are socialized during their apprenticeship, an apprenticeship circumvented by organized members. While Grabelsky (1995) argues that the process of organizing will create the solidarity, traditional members in Local 58 argue that this never happened. This is most likely due to the reliance on stripping and top-down organizing which avoid the prolonged recognition battles that create solidarity.

Exemplifying these concerns, traditional members often spoke of their belief ⁸ that organized members work for non-union contractors when they cannot find work through IBEW contractors – one of the risks Weil (2003) warns us about. Jake, a traditional electrician, states that:

The problem with the non-union guys is that they come in, take advantage of the benefits, pension, money. And when the layoffs came, instead of going back to the union hall and waiting your turn and living on your unemployment and sub pay they would collect unemployment and sub pay, shoot out and go back to work for their non-union people under the table. So they would be double bubbling. They would get this chunk of money and back to what they used to do and do the scab on the side. Now it’s like, ‘What the hell?’ and as soon as their jobs came back in the hall they’d go back to the hall and go off to the next poor contractor that – so here it is, you get this back and forth stuff. Not all guys do that, but there are plenty that do. It’s gaming the system. It doesn’t pay taxes, doesn’t do a lot of things. It’s not fair.

Double-breasting is a serious accusation. By gaming the system, these workers take advantage and undermine the union in two ways. First, they accept a degraded pay scale. If skilled workers are willing to work for a fraction of the union wage (mostly because they are subsidized by union unemployment sub pay), the Local has a difficult time setting the wages of skilled electricians. Second, by offering the contractor access to their skills at this lower pay rate, non-union contractors are able to bid jobs at a fraction of the cost that union contractors can, thus making it more difficult for the unionized contractors to receive contracts and help the union sector recover during a recession.

While traditional union members have been known to double-breast, the unemployed members I spoke with did not view this as a legitimate course of action to solve their financial strain. Only one traditional electrician that I spoke with admitted to searching for work in the non-union sector:

I looked outside the union and the guy wanted to pay me $10 an hour to install it. I can’t work for that little. I’d need to pay for daycare. Plus he wanted to make me a 1099 – so I’d have to pay for my own healthcare and I’d be an independent contractor. (Peter, traditional member for 14 years)

As can be seen, while he had searched in this sector, he was unwilling to work at the degraded pay scale that it offered. The more common response to long term unemployment by traditional members was leaving the electrical field altogether (by retiring or going back to school for another career) or leaving the construction sector and working as a unionized maintenance electrician. Both of these routes are seen as more legitimate because they do not compete with their brothers.

The third concern about organizing focuses on the qualifications of organized members. Though these complaints included wondering whether the organized would even meet the minimum qualifications to enter the apprenticeship, the more serious complaint is that many organized members lack the skills necessary to perform the work done in the Local.

A lot of people they brought in were not very qualified and, you know, they would bring in people that only did house alarms and send them out on blast furnaces. People get hurt like that. We brought in too many people like that that weren’t skilled. Not saying we didn’t bring in any good ones, but too many that didn’t have the proper skills. (Peter)

Since the organized workers were integrated into the Local based on years experienced and not skills learned, traditional members wondered if they really had comparable skills. When traditional members complained to management that an organized worker was unable to perform a task, management would simply tell them to train the organized.

People are pissed off because these guys come, especially these unskilled guys, coming in and we are all making the same money. What pisses a lot of people off is if you bitch about it the foreman says ‘Teach him.’ Why the fuck should I have to teach him. I went through four years of apprenticeship and made not very much money for four years and these guys are coming off the street making journeyman wages and I have to teach them now? (Carl, traditional member, 32 years experience)

Like there is a guy on the job now … He organized in … A nice enough guy, [but] no electrical license. So now our hall is sending him to school. And now he’s applying to get his electrical license, the state of Michigan won’t give him an electrical license because he never had his schooling. So now our hall is, him and maybe a dozen other guys, are sending him to school once every two weeks to get his hours. Really? So now what is the guy? A journey-apprentice? (Lucas, traditional member, 20 years experience)

Traditional members resent needing to train the organized journeymen. They think it is unfair that the organized receive journeyman wages while being trained like an apprentice. However, if these organized members are not trained, this may have serious repercussions for the future of the Local. The hiring hall depends on the interchangeability of workers. If a large portion of the membership lacks necessary qualifications, they are no longer interchangeable.

To rationalize why contractors keep less skilled workers on the payroll, traditional members argue that the combination of less solidarity and fewer skills encourages organized electricians to overlook union work rule violations. A statement by Peter best portrays this sentiment: ‘Sometimes those people [organized members] will compromise on the job to keep their job. They aren’t skilled but will bend the rules so the contractor will keep that guy instead of the guy who wants to go by the book.’ Therefore, a contractor may keep a less skilled electrician on the job because, while that worker is less productive, profits can still be made by violating official and unofficial work rules.

My data does not speak to whether these concerns are legitimate and it is likely that many of these perceptions are partly attributable to the conservative and traditionally exclusive nature of the skilled trades. However, even if these complaints are not legitimate, the simple fact that these perceptions exist speaks to the lack of solidarity that traditional members feel towards organized members. Traditional members even set themselves apart from the organized through outward signs of their apprenticeship. Carl explains that:

some of the young guys that are a little, they aren’t even that radical, but some will put in – every apprenticeship class has a number. Anybody who was an apprentice knows their number. Now the young guys will have that printed on the side of their helmet.

He goes onto explain that if traditional members doubt whether a worker went through the apprenticeship,

they will ask [them] ‘What class were you in?’ [If they get the response:] ‘I didn’t go through the program.’ [they reply:] ‘Oh you have no class.’

Another common jab is to call those who have gone through the apprenticeship program ‘academy guys’. This phrase, however, is often used to mock the apprenticeship training itself, not just to separate traditional and organized members.

Many of my respondents admitted the division between organized and traditional members is exacerbated due to the current economic crisis. As Carl explains, when the organizing began ‘people were pissed off’; however, ‘work was pretty good, so it wasn’t a huge factor … If everyone was working [now] that [still] would be a small factor, but not now, now there is a division.’ Carl and several other members compared the organizing of the 1990s to prior organizing drives to emphasize this point. Those organized before the 1990s were largely ‘accepted’ by traditional members. While organized members were still given ‘shit’ back then, my respondents said it was more lighthearted. Moreover, there was not a concern about a lack of skills with these workers, partly due to a more selective screening process. Carl recalls working ‘with a lot of them who were super good wiremen.’ Jake, a traditional member with 35 years of experience, expresses a similar sentiment with regard to their solidarity, saying that those organized before the 1990s were for the most part ‘very grateful’ and had even more solidarity than many traditional members because ‘they knew what it was like on the outside.’

It should be noted that the divide between traditional and organized members does not seem to stem from differences in ethnicity, nor from citizenship status. Throughout all of the conversations on organizing, no concerns about the ethnic background or the citizenship of organized members were ever raised. This is surprising given the fact that electricians in Local 58 do not hesitate to identify these traits when discussing traditional members. It is likely that these concerns are not raised simply because the organizing campaign did not dramatically change the demographic makeup of Local 58. While I lack quantitative data at the Local level, the electrical construction industry as a whole never experienced the mass influx of minority workers that other construction trades experienced. Therefore it seems unlikely that organizing could have significantly altered the demographic makeup of Local 58 and caused this opposition.

Nevertheless, by ‘overorganizing’ the Local, the solidarity that used to exist between the organized and the traditional membership has all but disappeared. In fact, this ‘overorganizing’ has even led traditional members to question the IO, critically viewing it as ‘a dues collecting organization. They want a body count’ (Peter). They perceive that the push to organize was motivated by greed for more dues, so the IO was unconcerned about the quality of workers being brought in or whether the Local could handle such a large labor pool. The Local’s current leadership has also been questioned for following through with this organizing. Many thought that the leadership had done so only for political reasons.

Conclusion

Organizing is one of the most important routes towards labor movement revitalization. Building trade unions, however, must grapple with the fact that organizing construction workers is not the same as organizing construction work. Advancing the sociological understanding of labor revitalization, Weil (2003) theorizes that building trade Locals must engage in comprehensive market recovery programs that reshape markets and expand market share. Weil’s strategies for expanding market share, however, fail to address several of the major obstacles facing unions. I begin addressing these limitations of Weil’s theory using the case of IBEW Local 58.

Local 58 maintains a large presence in large commercial and heavy industrial construction. Unfortunately, this market can no longer sustain Local 58’s membership. In an attempt to expand work opportunities for its members, Local 58 engaged in comprehensive market recovery programs geared towards its traditional large commercial and industrial market and new markets. While these programs have helped maintain its position in its traditional niche, they often brought Local 58 into competition with other unionized workforces – limiting the success of overall labor movement revitalization. Moreover, Local 58 largely failed to establish sustainable expansion into new markets due to a variety of obstacles, the most important of which is cost. This failure to expand market share is vitally important in light of Local 58’s organizing activities and the Great Recession, which combined to stimulate member opposition to revitalization efforts, Local leaders and the IO.

One of the most powerful rallying cries of the opposition was ‘overorganizing’. Members felt that the Local flooded the labor pool by organizing too many members for the amount of work available. When the construction boom of the 1990s led into an economic collapse, thousands of members faced long term unemployment. Many of the concerns about organizing identified by Grabelsky (1995) became a reality in the eyes of traditional members. Organizing did lead to a greater number of unemployed members and longer periods of unemployment. This in turn meant a larger drain on Local resources. Moreover, with the use of organizing strategies like stripping, the organized never went through a solidarity creating experience, like a recognition battle or a union apprenticeship. Finally, there was also a resurgence of concerns about the skills of the organized. While many scholars write off concerns about organizing as being conservative, we must not do so. These concerns, especially those about increasing unemployment, are legitimate in occupational unions like Local 58. This is why organizers within the building trades and other occupational unions that represent contingent workers must focus on bringing in new members and new work. If they do not, they risk economic competition between union members and creating a relationship of distrust between the union and its members.

Overall, the case of Local 58 expands our understanding of labor revitalization in several ways. First, it demonstrates the problem of inter-union competition and market expansion efforts within markets with high union density. Occupational unions within highly unionized sectors often find themselves directly competing for work with other unionized workforces. Labor movement revitalization will not occur if these unions expand market share by poaching work from one another – making the situation somewhat analogous to a zero sum game. In efforts to expand market share within these sectors, it is essential that Locals replace inter-union competition with cooperation. Second, as work becomes increasingly scarce, it is necessary for unions to expand beyond their traditional markets. The case of Local 58, however, illustrates how established non-union sectors can be extremely difficult to break into for the building trades due to relatively large cost differentials and lack of experience working in these sectors. In essence, Locals have to confront the conflict between relatively good working conditions and economic competiveness in sectors they no longer have the power to significantly influence. It is possible that the inter-union cooperation previously mentioned may prove beneficial to expanding market share within these market segments. Finally, this article demonstrates how failed market expansion makes organizing extremely risky for occupational unions. When members cannot be guaranteed work – a fundamental responsibility of occupational unions – they can become hostile to newly organized members, revitalization efforts, and the leadership of the Local and the IO.

Many questions about Local revitalization and comprehensive market recovery remain unanswered. First, there is a gap in our understanding of the comprehensive market recovery strategies available outside of the construction industry. Are similar processes and obstacles at play in non-construction sectors? Second, while occupational unions are threatened by the specter of overorganizing, most unions are not. Therefore, future research should analyze how non-occupational unions benefit from and use comprehensive market recovery strategies. These programs may prove vital in other traditional union strongholds – like manufacturing – that are at risk of being offshored (Blinder, 2006). Third, the role of the state in comprehensive market recovery strategies remains largely unexamined. The building trades have a long history of engaging with state actors to ensure work opportunities and high standards in the construction industry. In this sense, the building trades are very sensitive to policy changes, especially those relating to prevailing wages. At the same time, however, the building trades also have a long history of existing without state support (Milkman, 2006), so they may be more likely than industrial unions to resist the damaging effects of anti-union policies, like the increasingly common Right to Work laws. Comprehensive market recovery may be the key to union survival in light of the increasingly hostile political environment in the USA. Similarly, additional research should also be conducted on how economic conditions influence revitalization strategies at the Local level. It is likely that revitalization efforts relating to changing relationships with specific actors are most effective in expanding Labor’s power during economic booms, but that market-oriented strategies become much more important during economic downturns like the Great Recession.

Finally, research must be performed on the role that race and gender play in comprehensive market recovery strategies. Unfortunately, the industry in which Local 58 exists is almost completely dominated by white men so the role that these relations play could not be adequately analyzed in the current study. Local 58 no doubt benefits from the similar ethnic and gender statuses between its members and industry leaders, but it is unclear what exact role these status similarities play in comprehensive market recovery. What challenges do occupational unions in more diverse industries face that Local 58 has avoided? These questions must be answered if we are to understand the complex process of labor revitalization and empower workers in the USA.

The labor movement is in turmoil, struggling to regain its lost power. This article points out the complex nature of revitalization at the Local level. Many Locals cannot afford to merely rely on organizing for revitalization. Locals must simultaneously pursue multiple revitalization pathways, without knowledge of which, if any, will rebuild their lost power. Nevertheless, comprehensive strategies can benefit from the complementary nature of many revitalization strategies. In order to succeed, though, Locals must overcome many obstacles in their revitalization efforts. The threat of inaction, however, is great so Locals must find and develop multi-pronged revitalization campaigns while overcoming such obstacles.