Abstract
While humanitarian action is often criticised for its focus on immediate needs in the present, social movements and political activists are usually thought to work towards a different future. With this article, we aim to complicate these clear-cut distinctions. We investigate how grassroots initiatives supporting migrants navigate different temporalities, relating their actions both to the present and to the future. These interwoven temporalities, however, come with ambivalent political effects. Drawing on cases from Belgium and Germany, we show how they range from potentially shrinking grassroots’ power to intervene to opening windows of political possibility. On the one hand, we illustrate how grassroots initiatives in Belgium feel stuck in a temporal dilemma, when they are forced to focus on the present. On the other hand, initiatives in Belgium and Germany have nonetheless engaged in strategies of future-making, trying to bring about more structural changes to migrants’ living conditions.
Keywords
Introduction: ‘The dance of humanitarian emergency’
In February 2018, the co-presidents of the Brussels-based Plateforme Citoyenne de Soutien aux Réfugiés wrote an open letter to their members, raising awareness for the difficult situation they found themselves in. Since the summer of 2017, around 500 migrants trying to reach the UK got stranded in Brussels. While the Federal Belgian police forces tried to arrest, detain and deport those who did not or could not apply for asylum, the Plateforme offered shelter, food, legal information and all kinds of practical support. This grassroots initiative also advocated for a number of more structural solutions, including the creation of a collective reception and orientation centre where migrants would receive legal information and health care in a safe environment, and the activation of the sovereignty clause, which allows EU member states to disregard the Dublin regulation in individual cases. As the Federal government continued its repressive approach, however, the Plateforme’s members grew increasingly exhausted and frustrated. In February 2018, its co-presidents wrote an open letter to its volunteers and the broader public, outlining the dilemmas it was facing in its attempts to tackle the constant ‘emergency’:
We gather everyday around a problem without taking it for granted, we search for solutions to yesterday’s problems. We lose ourselves in details, questions and worries. And we forget, we forget because the emergency takes the lead on all the rest (. . .) We have been in emergency mode for six months, a year, a lifetime. We have ideas and hopes that structures will be created. But what are we really doing to create these structures? We are always too occupied organising the night, the day, and the day and the night. Then, exhausted, in body and soul, by this overwhelming reality, we collapse. It’s the dance of humanitarian emergency every night, 7/7, and we don’t have a choice. We are there, we see it, live it, undergo it, we talk about it and we rejoice in having found a solution to yesterday’s problems. We prepare for those of tomorrow, we review our strategies to organise, our way of communicating, acting, being. (Open letter published by the Plateforme Citoyenne de Soutien aux Réfugiés, February 2018; emphasis added)
This excerpt points out how the Plateforme struggled with a temporal dilemma: on the one hand, it aimed towards more structural solutions, i.e. political change to improve migrants’ precarious situation in the future. On the other, it engaged in humanitarian actions to mitigate some of the most severe effects of an increasingly hostile migration regime in the present. It felt it had no other choice than to do the ‘dance of humanitarian emergency’ by organising shelter, food and legal information for migrants who would otherwise sleep on Brussels’ streets. Yet by doing so, the Plateforme’s coordinators felt they were losing sight of the political causes to migrants’ needs.
What this example illustrates is how grassroots humanitarian actors navigate through different temporalities, relating their actions both to the present and to the future. These temporalities, however, come with ambivalent, sometimes conflicting political effects, as we will illustrate in the course of this article. Drawing on cases from Belgium and Germany, we show how they range from potentially shrinking grassroots initiatives’ power to intervene to opening windows of political possibility. On the one hand, this can result in a temporal dilemma if grassroots humanitarian actors feel stuck in the present due to a hostile political environment, while their endeavour for an alternative future is put on hold. On the other hand, grassroots initiatives also attempt to (re)appropriate their ability to work towards the future, and thereby open up possibilities for more structural social and political change.
Like the Plateforme, some of the grassroots initiatives that formed around the ‘long summer of migration’ in 2015 are still around, offering support to migrants and asylum seekers. Since then, scholars have debated the political ambivalence of these collectives. On the one hand, grassroots initiatives harbour potentials to foster a more egalitarian society, to subvert migration policies, and to strengthen a broader struggle for inclusion, human rights and mobility (Cantat, 2017; Feischmidt and Zakariás, 2019; Fleischmann and Steinhilper, 2017; Sinatti, 2019; Stierl, 2018; Vandevoordt, 2019a). On the other hand, many ‘volunteer’ or ‘makeshift humanitarians’ (Sandri, 2018) constantly risk sliding into the power dynamics associated with giving care to people in need, without tackling the structural causes to migrants’ exclusion (Braun, 2017; De Jong and Ataç, 2017; Ticktin, 2011).
In this paper, we add a temporal perspective to these debates. Our main aim is to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the role time plays in grassroots humanitarian action. Several scholars have called to recognise that time is a ‘subtle but fundamental dimension of humanitarian work’ (Kaler and Parkins, 2018: 1315; Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019) and that scholars should ‘integrate a more explicit time-dimension’ (Brun, 2016: 394) into their research. In social movements, time has also played a crucial but often implicit role: it is through their desire for a better future, that people are mobilised into collective action (Featherstone, 2012; Fournier, 2002; Melucci, 1996). Yet while notions of time and temporality appear to guide both humanitarian and political action, they have so far largely been discussed in separate strands of literature and with rather different understandings of the temporal horizons at play.
On the one hand, scholars working on humanitarian action have argued that there seems little room for reflection on either the future (Brun, 2016) or the past (Malkki, 1995). Instead, humanitarians are thought to govern through an ‘imaginary of emergency’ that de-contextualises suffering from its long-term causes and solutions (Calhoun, 2008). On the other hand, social movements and political activists are usually defined through opposite temporal horizons: by aiming for social, political, cultural and/or legal change, they are thought to work towards a different future. So while a focus on the present is generally regarded as a characteristic of supposedly apolitical humanitarian action, an orientation towards the future is commonly treated as being deeply political. Drawing on recent studies of the temporalities of humanitarian action (Brun, 2016) and prefigurative politics (Swain, 2019; Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero, 2018), we seek to complicate these clear-cut distinctions. This way, we reflect on the hybrid forms of humanitarian and political action that are highlighted in the introductory chapter to this special issue (della Porta and Steinhilper, forthcoming).
We start by scrutinising academic works that have dealt with the temporalities of humanitarian action and forms of collective action considered more explicitly political, such as social movements, solidarity mobilisations and prefigurative politics. We then describe how grassroots initiatives in Belgium have faced temporal dilemmas in manifold ways. Next, we provide empirical examples of how initiatives in Germany and Belgium have actively tried to bring about more long-term changes through different strategies of future-making. By focusing on these two countries, we show that while national and local contexts are crucial to understand grassroots’ initiatives precise temporal orientations and practices, these initiatives also use relatively similar strategies across these contexts. We wrap up with a concluding section on the political dimension of future-making, and we reflect on the questions our findings raise for critical studies of humanitarian action and prefigurative politics.
The Temporalities of Humanitarian and Political Action
To begin with, we scrutinise works that have so far engaged with the temporalities of (a) humanitarian action and (b) action that has been considered political or activist, such as social movements and solidarity collectives. This allows to better understand the role time plays in the political ambivalence of grassroots initiatives supporting migrants.
‘There Is No Future in Humanitarianism’
Many scholars have problematised the ‘imaginary of emergency’ and the tropes of ‘crisis’ underlying much contemporary humanitarian action (Fassin, 2011; Nyers, 2006; Ticktin, 2011). By focusing on alleviating suffering in the ‘here and now’, humanitarians often fail to locate recent events within a longer chronology of man-made causes and effects (Malkki, 1995). As Ticktin (2016: 262) puts it: ‘With this temporal perspective, there is no way to understand events in a larger historical context, no time to think of the past or plan for the future: humanitarianism frames events as sudden and unpredictable’. Famine crises, to give but one example, are often portrayed and responded to as natural crises requiring immediate material responses, even though their deeper-lying causes are often structural, man-made and, above all, political (Calhoun, 2008). And in the context of displacement, migration is often framed as a ‘crisis’ that opens a window of opportunity for governments to pass policy reforms that limit migrants’ rights (Calhoun, 2008). Forced migrants in particular have been widely described as being subjected to a temporal politics that puts their lives on hold. So while refugee camps are often initially conceived of as temporary, they often turn into protracted, urbanised spaces that separate its residents from their surrounding societies (Agier, 2011; Brun, 2010; Malkki, 1995).
In addition, encounters between humanitarians and recipients of aid are often characterised by a concern for recipients’ immediate, physical needs rather than their future aspirations and past trajectories. In ‘There Is No Future in Humanitarianism’, Cathrine Brun (2016) draws on Fassin’s useful distinction between biological and biographical lives to argue that actors offering aid tend to focus on recipients’ urgent, physical needs, rather than their context-dependent social lives. ‘Saving biological lives’, that is, ‘does not entail a future’ but immediate, material action. According to her, many people working professionally in humanitarian organisations feel ‘stuck’ in the present. And while Brun then goes on to show that there is hope for organising these encounters differently, she nevertheless concludes that partly due to the parameters of action determined by the state, ‘there is little room for thinking about futures in the current humanitarian system’ (ibid.: 394).
Other scholars have argued that a temporal focus on the present has become a defining feature of humanitarian action only in the 20th century. Craig Calhoun (2008) and Thomas Haskell (1985), for instance, have emphasised that humanitarian sentiments arose in the 18th and 19th centuries as part of a broader movement that aimed to improve the fate of humanity. Ideas of a better future, characterised by a fundamental equality between human beings, have long guided humanitarians in a variety of sites and struggles: offering universal medical care to wounded soldiers, calls for the abolishment of slavery, colonial missionary work and philanthropy towards the poor in the North. As Calhoun (2008: 76) argues, ‘Humanitarianism took root in the modern world not as a response to war or “emergencies” but as part of an effort to remake the world so that it better served the interests of humanity’. In this sense, the ‘imaginary of emergency’ which came to dominate humanitarian discourses and actions in the (late) 20th century, has itself been a relatively recent, historically contingent phenomenon.
In the last few decades, humanitarian actors seem to have incorporated the future back into their modes of action. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), for instance, has traditionally operated in and around refugee camps where they offer immediate medical services in a setting of crisis. Since the late 1990s, however, MSF has gradually expanded its horizon to include HIV treatments and advocacy for access to affordable drugs. This led the organisation not only to target different actors, such as pharmaceutical companies, states, trade agreements and laboratories, but also to expand its temporal horizon beyond the humanitarian present, and to adapt to the slower rhythms of research, policy-making and advocacy (Redfield, 2013). By expanding its temporal horizons, however, MSF also faced new tensions and dilemmas. Up until then, the organisation’s ethos had been firmly focused on medical relief in crisis settings, which required, above all, a quick and efficient system of mobility, logistics and project-based interventions. By including goals set in the future, the NGO needed to rethink its approach, its practical organisation and its political strategies. This involved a partial shift in political strategy from ‘denunciation’ (bearing witness to scenes of suffering, and denouncing the immediate actions of political actors) to ‘description’ (describing structural causes of epidemics and lack of access to affordable drugs) (Redfield, 2013).
This expanding of the temporal horizons of humanitarian action is a development that is by no means limited to MSF. Many humanitarian organisations have increasingly included long-term goals such as human rights, development, advocacy and resiliency into their work. In their historical review of the field, Barnett and Weiss (2008) argue that this has opened up a fundamental question for humanitarian actors: if they move their sphere of action, what distinguishes them from interest-driven actors like states, corporate lobby groups and non-profit advocacy groups? In other words, from the very moment humanitarian actors shift focus from the present to the future, they risk losing part of their moral aura. Humanitarian actors often derive their moral legitimacy and power to act from responding, in a condition of emergency, to people’s immediate needs regardless of their identities. Focusing on social, political and legal change, however, often requires taking a firm stand against exploitative economics, rights-abuses or exclusionary social policies. As soon as humanitarians do so, they are forced to choose sides and stand in solidarity with those who are exploited (cf. Scott-Smith, 2016). And this, in turn, endangers the principle of neutrality (not taking sides), which these actors use to create a ‘humanitarian space’ where care can be provided to those in need, without interference of powerful political actors. By expanding their temporal horizons towards the future, in other words, humanitarians risk shrinking their space for action.
Political Action as Prefiguration
In contrast to works on humanitarianism, the literature on political activism and social movements often describes such forms of action as being inherently future-oriented. People are thought to be mobilised into collective political action by a discontent with the present, and a desire for social and/or political change in the near or distant future (Jasper, 1998; Milan, 2013). Rather than shrinking their space for action, their future orientation is even described as a necessary precondition in order to bring about transformations in a society. In his seminal book on collective action, Melucci (1996: 1) thus regards social movements as ‘prophets of the present’ who ‘speak before’: they announce the commencement of change and act as harbingers of yet-to-come political and social transitions. Adam (2010: 365) illustrates how social movements move the future from ‘the domain of fate into a realm of action potential’.
Unsurprisingly, then, there is a rich body of work analysing how visions of a better society guide collective political action and social movements. Valérie Fournier (2002: 192), for instance, proposes to read grassroots movements through the lens of utopianism. She argues that utopian thinking ‘undermines [the] dominant understanding of what is possible and opens up new conceptual spaces for imagining and practicing possible futures’. At the same time, she stresses the imperfect nature of utopia, in that it always resists closure and stasis and lives from constant movement and tension. According to Fournier, grassroots movements themselves embody these transformative functions of utopia through their self-governing and self-reliant forms of organisation.
The growing literature on practices and relationships of solidarity has also pointed out how imaginations of the present and the future conflate in the temporal horizons of collective forms of action. For instance, Alexander (2006: 3) argues that there is an important transcendental aspect to solidarity: ‘Solidarity is possible because people are oriented not only to the here and now but to the ideal, to the transcended, to what they hope will be everlasting’. Solidarities are said to be ‘inventive’ of new social relations and thus bring about future social and political possibilities in the present (see Featherstone, 2012: 6; Rakopoulos, 2016). According to these authors, solidarity bridges different temporalities in that it arises both out of present contradictions and certain images of the future.
In social movement studies, the conflation of present and future in collective action has been discussed more thoroughly through the lens of ‘prefigurative politics’. This concept refers to how activists attempt to embody, through their own organisational and individual practices, the social and political relations they hope to achieve in the future (Swain, 2019). Two different types of prefigurative action have been described in the literature, each with a slightly different temporal orientation. Activists rooted in the first type try to align their practices (their ‘means’) with the future they envisage (their ‘ends’) (ibid.). When movements strive towards peaceful social relations, for instance, they refrain from using violent or disruptive strategies to reach that goal. In this conception, the future radiates back onto the present and guides activists’ actions. This way of acting and thinking is generally associated with pacifist and religiously-inspired movements that are influenced by the Christian idea of ‘prefiguration’ (e.g. how ‘figures’ in the Old Testament anticipate the New Testament). However, this type of prefigurative action has been criticised by more radical activists and scholars, partly for its moderate attitude towards immediate change (Gordon, 2018), and partly because it requires a relatively coherent ideology of how the ideal future looks like (Swain, 2019).
The second type of prefigurative action is associated with neo-anarchist thought and with specific practices of anti-hierarchical organisation (e.g. consensus-based decision-making) (Gordon, 2018). Rather than ‘patiently building for the future’ (Holloway, 2010 in Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero, 2018: 4), these activists put more emphasis on immediate social and political change. Processes of decision-making and community-building (‘means’) are seen as a goal in itself (‘end’), which can generate alternative futures that are yet to be determined (Gordon, 2018; Swain, 2019). This approach thus ‘collapses the temporal distance between the struggle and the goal’ (Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero, 2018: 4). It has therefore been termed a ‘presentist prefiguration’, as it ‘privileges the immediate’ and ‘projects the present into the future’, rather than the other way round (ibid.).
This type of prefigurative action in particular has been criticised for focusing too much on their own practices which, if not accompanied with strategies to create broader social and political change, renders them indistinguishable from counter-cultural or lifestyle projects (Swain, 2019; Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero, 2018; Yates, 2015). In that case, a strong focus on the immediate present may distract their attention from broader changes in the future. This might also be the case with more explicitly political grassroots initiatives supporting migrants. Scholars have recently shown how the rise of repressive migration policies has pressured activists into alleviating migrants’ immediate needs in the present, rather than working towards a different future. Due to the perpetuated ‘crisis’ in Greece, for instance, the anarchist ‘solidarian’ movement has been drawn into a gift-giving logic which they had long considered a taboo (Rozakou, 2016). Similarly, in a recent edited collection by Donatella della Porta (2018), several contributions have pointed out how more explicitly political collectives have expanded their repertoire of action to include forms of ad-hoc support as ‘direct social action’ (Zamponi, 2018). Both of these possible implications, however, would complicate the clear-cut distinctions between the supposedly opposite temporal horizons of humanitarian and political action (see della Porta and Steinhilper, forthcoming).
Taken together, a simultaneous focus on the present and the future has often been discussed as a risk, potentially shrinking the power to intervene for both humanitarian and political actors. While the former risk losing their moral aura deriving from their principle to ‘not take sides’ by a focus on the future, the latter risk losing their ability to work towards long-term changes by addressing the needs of the present. Yet, we have also scrutinised works that have provided a more optimistic reading of a conflating relationship between present-oriented and future-oriented action. It might offer a chance for humanitarians not to unwillingly slide into the power dynamics at play. More explicitly political actors might derive a more powerful stance by enacting possible alternatives already in the present. In the remainder of this article, we show how grassroots initiatives supporting migrants in Belgium and Germany navigate this thin line between risks and opportunities arising from their simultaneous focus on the present and the future.
Grassroots Temporal Dilemmas: ‘Searching Solutions to Yesterday’s Problems’
In this section, we illustrate in more detail how grassroots initiatives in Belgium have interpreted their simultaneous orientation to the present and the future as potentially shrinking their power to intervene and resulting in a temporal dilemma: by focusing on the present, they felt they were increasingly losing sight of their striving towards a better future. This perceived temporal dilemma, we suggest, might be prevailing when grassroots initiatives support migrants in a markedly hostile political environment as emerged in Belgium from 2015 onwards at the very least (Vandevoordt, 2019a). Such an environment forces them to focus on the present, while curtailing the initiatives’ autonomy to act towards a self-determined future. As we will explain later in this section, the peculiar political context of our fieldwork in Germany in 2015 was somewhat distinct to the situation in Belgium and brought out the temporal dilemmas less strikingly. In order to illustrate the temporal dilemmas, we thus draw on two Belgian initiatives that the first author of this paper has been conducting ethnographic work with between January 2017 and the present (Vandevoordt, 2019a,b): the Plateforme Citoyenne, which has been confronted with a humanitarian crisis centred on so-called ‘transit migrants’ trying to reach the UK, and the Welcoming Network, which has encountered a housing crisis for recognised refugees and their families (Vandevoordt, 2019a). While both grassroots initiatives have tried to structurally address the causes to migrants’ precarious conditions, a series of social and political circumstances has forced them to focus their efforts on offering ad hoc support in the present.
Since the summer of 2017, a diverse group of migrants trying to reach the UK got stranded in and around Brussels (cf. Collyer, 2010). The view of the Federal Belgian government was simple: either these so-called ‘transit-migrants’ applied for asylum in Belgium, or they left the national territory, whether voluntarily or by force (Vandevoordt, forthcoming). To deter migrants from unlawfully staying on the territory, the federal police launched raids to arrest, detain and possibly deport these individuals. Yet in practice, many proved not to be detainable in the short term, due to lack of formal IDs or due to the principle of non-refoulement. Instead, a cat-and-mouse game took place in which migrants were chased from public parks, train stations and parking lots. Most of those detained were released back on the streets a few days later (cf. Kalir, 2017; Vandevoordt, forthcoming), while those being deported to other European countries, were likely to return to Brussels in a few months’ time (cf. Jaspars and Buchanan-Smith, 2018).
This organised ‘hunt’ for illegalised migrants thus created a ‘humanitarian borderland’ in Europe’s capital (cf. Walters, 2011). A relatively small, constantly changing group of 600 to 1200 migrants lived on Brussels’ streets, facing the constant risk of being chased, detained and deported by the police. The Plateforme Citoyenne became then the largest initiative to offer shelter, food, legal information and social support to this particular group of migrants. While the Plateforme tried to advocate for structural solutions, the humanitarian borderland partly created by the Federal government, constantly forced the organisation into a mode of emergency. It is from this context that their open letter, cited in the introduction to this article, emerged: as an exhausted cry for structural political solutions, rather than purely humanitarian responses.
In a different context, the Welcoming Network (literally Hospitable Network, Gastvrij Netwerk) unites 40 local volunteer groups supporting ‘people-on-the-run’ – the term they use to describe forced migrants irrespective of their legal-administrative status (Vandevoordt, 2019a). All member initiatives work towards the double goal of supporting ‘people-on-the-run’, and trying to induce broader social and political changes that enable their inclusion. The range of support they offer is variegated and targeted both to the present needs and towards more future-oriented changes, mostly directed towards local policy-makers, corporations and civic associations to ensure migrants are effectively included into local communities.
Yet in practice, Flanders’ enduring housing crisis has forced them to focus their efforts on finding accommodation for recognised refugees, thus limiting their temporal horizon and scope of action. Compared to its neighbouring countries, Flanders is characterised by a low share of social housing (6.5%) and high degrees of property ownership (72% overall and 80% in rural areas) (Statistiek Vlaanderen, 2019; Steunpunt Armoedebestrijding, 2019). This creates a structural lack of affordable rental properties, which affects many families with limited budgets and, due to discrimination and migrants’ lack of localised cultural capital, has hit the latter particularly hard (Crisiplatform Wonen, 2017; Vlaamse Woonraad, 2017).
In consequence, local volunteer groups find themselves in a temporal dilemma. In order to address migrants’ urgent needs of finding housing, these groups have to devote most of their time to this exasperating task, even though they want to offer more encompassing support to refugees’ long-term inclusion. Numerous volunteer groups organised sessions through which they contacted landlords, up to 50 per day, trying to convince them to let their property to refugees, usually with little chance of success. This became such an intensive practice that it took centre stage over these initiatives’ attempt to work structurally towards a better future and influence local municipalities’ policies.
Drawing on the recent literature on migrant solidarity, we suggest that similar temporal dilemmas may have emerged especially in other European countries that have put in place hostile immigration policies. At different points in time, scholars have documented how grassroots initiatives have offered material support to migrants that were subject to a politics of deterrence in Hungary (Cantat, 2017), Austria (Rosenberger, 2018), Italy (Zamponi, 2018), France (Davies et al., 2017; Welander, 2019) and Greece. In such a political climate, a similar temporality of crisis is likely to emerge as the one described in this section: even when grassroots initiatives try to work towards migrants’ structural inclusion, they are forced to focus on migrants’ immediate needs in the present, while their simultaneous strive for a better future is put on hold.
During the second authors’ fieldwork in Germany, such temporal dilemmas came out less as explicit and pressing issues for grassroots initiatives. This might partly be explained by the different timing of our fieldwork in the two national contexts. Whereas research with the Belgian initiatives was conducted between 2017 and early 2019 onwards, the examples observed in Germany date back to the migration summer in 2015 and shortly thereafter. Retrospectively, this peculiar context was characterised by a distinctively welcoming attitude towards asylum seekers, being discussed as a German ‘Welcome Culture’ in public and academic accounts (Fleischmann and Steinhilper, 2017; Hamann and Karakayali, 2016; Sutter, 2019). The catchphrase depicted both the extraordinary level of civic engagement and the relatively appreciative stance of the German government towards the newly emerging grassroots initiatives (Fleischmann, 2019). This momentary friendly political environment might contrast to the more restrictive approach towards welcome initiatives that was pursued by the Belgian authorities in the examples described above and that brought out the temporal dilemmas as more pressing issues for the initiatives. From 2016 onwards, the political context in Germany also became gradually more hostile due to different legislative changes such as the so-called ‘asylum law packages’ that circumcised migrants’ rights substantially (Pichl, 2016). Nevertheless, Germany does not seem to have been confronted with the type of humanitarian borderlands and sense of ‘emergency’ that have emerged in places like Brussels, Calais, Paris and Lesvos. This might indicate that grassroots initiatives were partly able to shift their temporal horizon of action more towards the future, for instance, by supporting the long-term social inclusion of recognised refugees (cf. Schwiertz and Steinhilper, forthcoming).
Grassroots Strategies of Future-making
Despite these different national contexts, however, grassroots initiatives in both Belgium and Germany have developed strategies in order to (re-)appropriate and enhance their scope for acting towards their desired future. During our field research in Belgium and Germany, we witnessed numerous examples in which grassroots initiatives engaged in different strategies of future-making – no matter if they considered themselves more explicitly ‘political’, ‘somewhat political’ or ‘apolitical’. In what follows, we describe three such techniques of future-making in more detail. First, our grassroots initiatives employed strategies to disrupt the present. Second, initiatives actively worked towards a desired future through a re-scaling of their demands to different levels of government. Third, grassroots initiatives enacted visions of togetherness and belonging in order to prefigure an alternative future to an exclusive migration regime. As we will show in the following examples, these strategies of future-making point to the transformative potentials of grassroots initiatives supporting migrants: being oriented to the present and the future can thus not only result in a temporal dilemma but also open windows of possibility for long-term social and political changes.
Disrupting the Present
Many of the volunteers we have worked with started their commitment in response to the images of a so-called ‘European refugee crisis’ that circulated widely in the media in the summer months of 2015 (cf. Karakayali and Kleist, 2016). Although they had been primarily mobilised by a humanitarian incentive to provide for the basic needs of suffering asylum seekers and to tackle the perceived emergency situation, many also engaged more critically with long-term political and legal structures. In Germany, commentators argued that the migration summer and its relatively welcoming attitude towards migrants – epitomised by chancellor Angela Merkel’s ‘Wir schaffen das’ – was followed by a ‘long autumn of restrictions’ (cf. Schwiertz and Ratfisch, 2016). For instance, the German NGO Pro Asyl published numerous press statements that raised awareness for the drastic cutbacks in the rights of migrants and asylum seekers since late 2015, such as the rigorous enforcement of deportation orders or the classification of further ‘safe countries of origin’ (e.g. Pro Asyl, 2017).
Many of the German volunteers with whom the second author of this paper has conducted research with and who had started their commitment amidst an ostensible German ‘Welcome Culture’ in 2015 did not hesitate to openly disrupt such policy changes (Fleischmann, 2017). Most tellingly, they developed a repertoire of actions seeking to counteract and interrupt the enforcement of deportations. In the course of their commitment, some volunteers also built personal ties to asylum seekers who originated from countries with low chances of recognition, such as Afghanistan or sub-Saharan African countries. If their beneficiaries’ asylum application was eventually turned down, they frequently considered this decision as unjust, blaming the authorities for counteracting their volunteering activities and sending asylum seekers back to unsafe environments. We witnessed many cases in which volunteers did not accept such decisions and actively interrupted them in order to change the prescribed future for either the affected individual or for all people originating from a certain country of origin (cf. Hinger et al., 2018).
In Belgium, the largest grassroots initiatives were mobilised by a humanitarian imperative and by a more political reaction to hostile migration policies (Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019). In Brussels, for instance, the Plateforme Citoyenne organised counter-marauds to disrupt police raids on so-called ‘transit migrants’. In January 2018, the Plateforme received an anonymous tip about a planned police raid in Maximilian Park. In consequence, it called upon its volunteers and supporters to help their ‘friends’ during the action. By the time the police arrived, all migrants had already left the area. In their place, more than 3000 citizens formed a human chain around the Park. These counter-marauds were then repeated several times over the next few months (Vandevoordt, 2019b; Vandevoordt, forthcoming).
Summing up, in different contexts, grassroots initiatives in both Germany and Belgium have engaged in more disruptive actions seeking to break with the present status quo, while enforcing a different alternative – thus seeking to shorten the distance between present and future.
Re-scaling Policy Change
Quite often, the grassroots initiatives we have worked with felt unable to influence national policies, complaining about how their demands for change were ‘not being heard’ by their governments. In order to manoeuvre themselves out of situations in which they felt ‘stuck’ in the present, grassroots initiatives have tried to re-scale their actions and demands towards different levels of policy-making, from municipalities to the European Union. They have done so by either scaling down or by scaling up their claims. By ‘scale’, we mean the spatial level of policy-making. In order to insert change towards their desired future, some grassroots initiatives have thus shifted by directing their demands towards levels of policy-making other than the national government.
The strategy of scaling down points to the role cities and municipalities can play in promoting solidarity (Agustín and Jørgensen, 2019; Bauder, 2017; Mayer, 2018). In Belgium, the Plateforme has tried to advocate with the Federal government to establish a reception and orientation centre for so-called ‘transit-migrants’. As the Federal government – who has the formal competence over asylum and migration in Belgium – continued its repressive approach, however, the Plateforme successfully negotiated with local governance levels. In December 2017, the Plateforme attracted enough funds from the Region of Brussels, the City of Brussels and some of Brussels’ 19 municipalities to establish their own collective reception centre, where migrants received shelter, food and legal information, to open up a humanitarian hub near the Maximilian Park, which it runs together with Médecins sans Frontières and Médecins du Monde. As we have detailed elsewhere, the city of Brussels thus had a crucial impact on the Plateforme’s ability to expand (Vandevoordt, 2019a).
The Plateforme is by far not the only case that successfully shifted scales to local levels of governance. While the ‘welcoming network’ in Flanders has been unsuccessful to advocate with the Flemish government, some of its local groups have cooperated closely with local municipalities, and, in some cases, were quite successful in influencing their policies (ibid.). Many of the German grassroots initiatives formed in direct cooperation with municipalities and continued to work closely together with them over time (Fleischmann, 2019). In some cases, this entanglement undermined the ability of volunteers to act independently and to also take a critical stance towards local authorities. However, it also opened up more direct possibilities for grassroots initiatives to make their criticisms and demands for a better future heard, for instance, through the regular exchange meetings (so-called Runde Tische) that became established in many municipalities in the course of 2015 and brought together a diverse set of local actors involved in the reception of asylum seekers. Our fieldwork indicated that volunteers often proved to have a strong voice in these settings, sometimes being able to directly influence the decisions of municipalities to their advantage.
Lastly, we also came across several instances, in which local grassroots initiatives were scaling up in order to bring about changes towards their desired future. By this, we mean that they strategically joined efforts with initiatives in other regions or countries, in order to build (transnational) alliances that had a wider outreach. Works on migrant activism and urban solidarities have illustrated how collectives and urban governments have forged transnational alliances and networks in order to speak with a louder voice (Alcalde and Portos, 2018; Heimann et al., 2019; Steinhilper, 2018). In the German context, many local grassroots initiatives have recently begun to join greater networks. Since the notion of the German ‘Welcome Culture’ faded in the course of 2016, resulting in a sharp drop in media attention as well as a less appreciative stance by governmental actors, they have tried to make themselves more visible again. For instance, the Seebrücke (literal translation ‘sea bridge’) formed as an international alliance in 2018, taking actions for a future that guarantees safe passage for asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Since then, volunteers in numerous corners of Germany founded local Seebrücke offsprings. Many of them were able to join efforts with city councils or regional authorities in order to build ‘safe harbours’, declaring to receive asylum seekers who were saved from distress at sea in addition to those mandated by the federal government (Schwiertz and Steinhilper, forthcoming).
In sum, grassroots initiatives also tried to move their desired future closer to the present by re-scaling their actions and demands towards different levels of governance.
Prefiguring Social Solidarity
In the past year, something unbelievable happened: (. . .) When it became clear that state actors were not reacting adequately in order to provide the most basic necessities to the newcomers, hundreds of thousands, maybe even millions of established residents reacted spontaneously and, together with the refugees, built structures of solidarity and understanding (. . .) Beyond established institutions, a broad and transnational process emerged that pointed to a future society in which issues of fair distribution, belonging and social rights are redefined. (Welcome2Stay Conference 2016; own translation; emphasis added)
In early 2016, the Welcome2stay organising committee published a call for contributions, which circulated widely in social media. It called on ‘the movements of welcome, of solidarity, of migration and of antiracism’ (ibid.) to participate in a joint conference in Leipzig. As the above retrospection illustrates, the organisers of the conference rated the extraordinary willingness to support refugees in 2015 also as an enactment of a ‘future society’ characterised by a redefined vision of belonging, social rights and distribution of wealth. The future also played a guiding role at the conference itself, which gathered around 800 volunteers and activists from across the country for self-organised workshops, discussion groups, plenary talks and social activities. It served as a laboratory in order to jointly elaborate visions for a more egalitarian society and to discuss potentials for future joint actions, resulting, for instance, in a series of nation-wide action days.
This example aptly illustrates what we repeatedly witnessed during our fieldwork in Belgium and Germany: from the very beginning, many of the grassroots initiatives that formed in 2015 were also inspired by visions of a better society, trying to prefigure them through their activities in the present (Feischmidt and Zakariás, 2019). To many, this future society was characterised by mutual support, togetherness and hospitality no matter the cultural or national background of origin. This lived alternative also served as an antidote to the right-wing tendencies that continue to be on the rise throughout Europe. Through their immediate actions in support of migrants, they were thus not only responding to immediate needs but simultaneously counteracting hostile sentiments towards migrants and actively building a future alternative in the ‘here and now’.
We therefore believe that grassroots initiatives supporting migrants are also laboratories for experimenting with alternative socialities (cf. Yates, 2015), actively shaping and enacting visions of a more egalitarian and inclusive social order, while creating new ways of relating in migration societies. This chips in with the literature that has pointed out how exceptional emergency situations also inspire ‘exceptional acts of coming together’ (Anderson, 2017: 593). Such moments might mobilise collective forms of action aiming to build a different future and giving rise to new forms of belonging and togetherness (Anderson, 2017; Kleist and Jansen, 2016). Despite responding to the immediate needs of the present, we thus suggest that grassroots initiatives’ actions are often ‘prefiguratively’ enacting ‘concrete utopias’ (Gordon, 2018) beyond existing migration and asylum legislation and state-led migration governance.
One particular way in which they have done so, is by performing and expressing their solidarity with migrants towards a broader public of citizens, media and NGOs. One of the key discourses constantly produced by the Plateforme Citoyenne, for instance, is that they show through their actions that more humane, pragmatic alternatives to the Federal government’s repressive approach are perfectly possible. As the Federal government refused to open a collective centre for stranded migrants, the Plateforme has done so by itself, thereby showing that it is possible to organise in practice. In addition, on its closed Facebook groups, stories of suffering and solidarity are continuously circulated. The Plateforme’s volunteers and coordinators constantly refer to the ability of citizens, while blaming the government for doing nothing but increase migrants’ problems. Some of these stories, such as the example of a single woman in her 90s housing several migrants at her home, are then shared publicly and gathered onto a website called Perles d’Accueil (literally: ‘Pearls of Accommodation’).
All of these examples point to the fact that, by offering humanitarian support, these volunteers enact the solidarity that they feel is lacking from the Federal government, while actively illustrating ways to do so in the future.
Conclusion: Future-Making as a Political Dimension of Humanitarianism
In this paper, we have added a temporal perspective to recent debates on grassroots initiatives supporting migrants (della Porta, 2018; Feischmidt and Zakariás, 2019; Fleischmann and Steinhilper, 2017; Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019). Besides responding to migrants’ needs in the present, many of the grassroots initiatives we have worked with in Belgium and Germany also try to create alternative futures. We have shown how some of these initiatives can feel stuck in a temporal dilemma when the political context forces them to focus on the present, thereby putting their imagined futures on hold. This applies particularly for conditions of closed opportunities for change, i.e. under hostile migration policies. Nevertheless, grassroots initiatives continue to seek ways out of a forced focus on the present: even in the most exceptional circumstances, we find that they still engage in strategies that seek to (re)appropriate the future by disrupting the present, re-scaling policy change and by prefiguring social solidarity. By doing so, they try to work towards a future that has been framed as ‘impossible’ by policy-makers who have put in place hostile migration policies, and reinvigorated a politics of fear (Rigby and Schlembach, 2013). After all, the question of who defines how the future should look like in an age of migration remains a deeply political one.
To conclude, we would like to reflect on the broader questions our findings raise for critical studies of humanitarianism and social movements. With respect to the former, we wonder whether our identified strategies of future-making point to a wider shift in the temporal orientation of contemporary humanitarian action, encompassing both grassroots and more established professional organisations. In recent contributions, scholars have documented how some professional humanitarian actors had similarly tried to shift their focus from the present to the future. Scholars have, for instance, documented a gradual convergence of crisis-centred humanitarian action with long-term development goals (Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Redfield, 2013; Zetter, 2019). Similarly, some NGOs have increasingly turned towards local and urban governance levels to induce more structurally inclusive policies towards forced migrants (Kihato and Landau, 2016). We thus call for inquiries that scrutinise how professional humanitarian actors employ specific future-making strategies that differ from or conflate with the ones we described in this article.
Regarding social movement studies, many scholars have argued to conceive of prefigurative politics as a set of strategies that encompass different, possibly conflicting temporal visions (Swain, 2019; Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero, 2018; Yates, 2015). Yet while scholars have mostly focused on tensions between actors that are part of a particular movement and have identified ‘temporal blindspots’ that can be traced back to their political backgrounds (Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero, 2018), we have described a specific type of temporal dilemma that arises from offering humanitarian support in the context of hostile migration policies. We have also pointed out a number of future-making strategies these grassroots initiatives use and which can be related to the prefigurative practices described in more detail in this literature (Yates, 2015). 1 We suggest that this points to the transformative political potentials of (grassroots) humanitarian action, which has so far not received the attention it deserves from scholars in social movements studies. This article illustrated how humanitarian action can also work as a form of prefigurative politics. We thus call on scholars working on prefigurative politics to take into account more unconventional actors beyond established neo-anarchist or religious-pacifist movements. What emerging or more loosely organised collective actors, for instance, might engage in prefigurative practices? In what unexpected contexts or settings can we observe collective action prefiguring the future already in the present? To answer these questions and to better understand the political ambivalences of collective forms of action, whether humanitarian or more radically activist, we believe it is crucial to incorporate a temporal perspective more systematically.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank their interlocutors at the grassroots initiatives they worked with, as well as Cathrine Brun, Elias Steinhilper and Donatella della Porta for their helpful comments and remarks.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Robin Vandevoordt’s contribution has been made possible by research grants from the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) and the Swiss FDFA Research and Dissemination Fund. Larissa Fleischmann’s contribution has been made possible by research grants from the Centre of Excellence “Cultural Foundations of Social Integration” of the University of Konstanz and the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg.
