Social Movements in Iran: How Well Does the Dominant Narrative Work?

Abstract

In this paper, I apply the typical stages of social movements—emergence, coalescence, and institutionalization—to an Iranian environmental social movement. I show how each of the stages does, or does not, play out in the Iranian case, using interview data and documentary analysis. The first two stages of social movements are achieved in the movement. But, due to a centralized state that uses violence and repression, the movement cannot play on the stage of the dominant narrative’s institutionalization. However, the movement is not in decline. I suggest using the idea of “persistence/resistance” for the last stage rather than institutionalization, as institutionalization may be just a form to assure that social movements will persist. There are other cases like this movement around the world, but there is not a specific argument to challenge the limitations of the dominant narrative. My study helps scholars rethink this narrative according to the context of the countries in their research.

Keywords

Iran social movement stages environmental movement emergence coalescence institutionalization

Introduction

Social movements and the narratives around these movements are typically presented as ways of “collective acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority” (Snow et al., 2004: 11). Scholars of social movement research often emphasize certain stages of social movements (also called lifecycles). While movements may differ somewhat, there are several stages always included in the definition: emergence, coalescence, institutionalization, and decline (e.g. Blumer, 1969; Christiansen, 2009; Mauss, 1975; Pullum, 2014; Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004; Tilly, 1978). The lifecycles of social movements in some societies, especially in western countries, is a very valuable framework for understanding social movements. However, social movements are not static and their nature depends on the circumstances. There are many cases in which social movements do not fit into the framework of these stages, and the narratives should directly reflect this reality. So far, there is not a serious argument that directly illustrates this contradiction. In this paper, I apply stages to a social movement in Iran against a proposed dam and water transfer project. I show how the various stages do or do not play out in this case, with a critical view on the dominant social movement narrative. I begin by reviewing the literature on the stages of social movements.

Stages of Social Movements

From Blumer’s view, lifecycles or stages of social movements are “social ferment,” “popular excitement,” “formalization,” and “institutionalization” (De la Porta and Diani, 2006: 150). Scholars have renamed these stages, but their nature remains, and today they are recognized as emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization or institutionalization, and decline. Emergence, the first stage of social movements, is when a social problem or threat is formed (Christiansen, 2009). In this stage, the social problem is addressed and members of the public engage in action (Kries, 2004). In the next stage, coalescence, the participants work through collective action and strategies to mobilize against the situation(s) they believe has caused the problem(s) (Christiansen, 2009; Kriesi, 2004). In the coalescence stage, people become increasingly aware of the social problem and begin to fight it through mobilizing of the public against the problem (Kries, 2004; Moss and Snow, 2016).

With the institutionalization stage, the social movement develops a formal structure (De la Porta and Diani, 2006; Kriesi, 2004; Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004). In this stage, social movement organizations (SMOs) are formed and developed, formally or informally. The organizations may recruit new members, raise public awareness of the issue, and gain resources such as money. Often at this stage, the SMOs can hire staff (De la Porta and Diani, 2006; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Zald and McCarthy, 1987). The last stage of a social movement is decline. This stage happens for reasons such as reaching the movement’s goals, losing the resources, failing to reach the movement’s goals (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Miller, 1999), and government repression (Gamson, 1980; Miller, 1999).

For example, the Aknur study (2014), on the Gezi Park protests in 2013 in Turkey, shows that that specific social movement had gone through the first two stages, but was unable to complete the third stage. The movement was, at first, an environmental reaction to the proposed transformation of a park into a shopping center. Then it developed into a social movement against market capitalism policies of the government and transferring public properties and spaces to private spaces and sections. Many different social and political groups were involved in the protests and were able to improve public awareness about neoliberal governmental policies. However, the movement needed to be more organized and form a high level of organization. Protests failed to reach this stage because of heterogeneous protesters who came from different political and social groups. They could not reach the common goals and form high-level organizations. So, “the Gezi park protests ran out of stream” (p. 314). Although protesters believed they created a “spirit of rebellion against injustices” (p. 317), the study argues that the movement declined because it could not attain the stage of institutionalization or bureaucratization.

While the above are the commonly referred to stages of social movement, they are not without critique. For example, Pullum (2014), using the modern-day Tea Party,¹ argues that institutionalization as a stage does not happen necessarily later in the movement. Pullum shows the historical reasons for the emergence of the Tea Party movement, especially after the election of President Barack Obama. Opponents involved in this movement saw a worsening of the political situation, in their mind, and had widespread discontent. In the second stage, coalescence, they tried strategies of collective action trying to influence people, politicians, and find political allies who also believed that President Obama and his economic policy were harmful to the USA. They used tactics such as entering the Republican Party and becoming involved in the party’s decision-making process. Leadership structures were built at the local level with a president, treasurer, secretary, or committee members, and gradually became institutionalized.

Pullum (2014) believes that “the formalized organizational structures that enabled the rapid growth of the Tea Party were already there; they did not develop relatively late in the movement’s life cycle, as the typical model of mobilization would suggest” (p. 1384). Pullum argues that in the beginning of the movement, the new Tea Party had enough resources to form organizations and hire full-time staff, given the strong connections with politicians and considerable degree of access to policymakers. As she says, “It is an example of a movement that was built with support from bureaucratized organizations. . .. The new Tea Party had considerable resources and access to policymakers” (p. 1382). She continues, “The early national level Tea Party mobilization appeared, to some observers, to come out of nowhere precisely because its pre-existing organizational support and resources gave the movement strong institutionalized support early in its lifespan” (p. 1382). Thus, Pullum challenged the chronological order of social movement stages.

Although some scholars such as Staggenborg (2013) argue, for example, that poor people’s movements in the USA should rely on mass insurgency to reach some goals, including forcing political and economic elites to compromise, they emphasize that organizations have a vital role in helping the social movements keep their aims alive.

In addition, there are new perspectives about social movements, especially in the Middle East (e.g. Bayat, 2013, 2017; Foran, 1994; Tufekci, 2017) that challenge merely understanding social movements from a western perspective. For instance, Bayat shows how unorganized people can challenge power in everyday life. He argues that in Arab uprisings, people were not largely equipped with systematic revolutionary resources. Tufekci (2017) argues that protests in Turkey and in the Arab Spring used organized digital tools and then street protests to challenge social changes. However, there is not a specific argument to address the contradiction of social movement’s stages. Some case studies show that Iranian social movements have been caught in a completely repressive and closed political structure. But it does not appear that there is a specific study that criticizes the dominant narrative and opens a window for new narratives. For example, a comparative study (Moghadam and Gheytanchi, 2010) on feminist campaigns in Morocco and Iran for family law reform shows that Iranian cases were not successful because the campaigns could not work in a political closure. Moroccan feminists had the opportunity “to build a vibrant civil society and institutionalize women’s organizations while Iranian feminists have seen their presses, centers, and NGOs closed down” (p. 282). Moroccan feminists were recognized as a part of the forces for the national polity, while Iranian feminists were recognized as dissidents and then their activities were blocked.

Thus, few studies have challenged the dominant narratives of social movement stages typically presented. Stages of movements, with a strong vision of institutionalization, have been built in conditions or states that do not have direct or severe repression and control. While there are some movements in different parts of the world that do not play in the last stage but still work as social movements, no study has specifically addressed this.

In this case study of a social movement, I apply the dominant social movement narrative to a movement in Iran to illustrate how the stages do or do not play out. I now turn to discussing the background and study methods used.

Study Background and Methods

In recent decades, environmental movements have been formed in different parts of Iran. One of the main reasons for this is the environmental crises (Afrasiabi, 2003). However, it seems that the government essentially controls the environmentalists’ activities, and if they do not follow the interests of the State, they are labeled a “subversive element.” This causes many political problems for activists—that is, being accused of activity against national security—and can result in imprisonment for them and closure of environmental non-government organizations (NGOs; Afrasiabi, 2003). Doyle and Simpson (2006) find that there is a “state-run civil society” with regard to environmental issues that maintains a “tightly apolitical discourse” (p. 11). In contrast, Fadaee’s (2012) studies in Iran discuss the environmental movements in Iran as new social movements that are creating a more democratic atmosphere in the Iranian society.

Although the above studies help researchers to understand the environmental movements in Iran, they do not address the relationship between social, political, and economic relations and environmental issues. For example, researchers did not focus on the economic reasons (if any) behind the environmental protests in Iran. Additionally, none of these environmental studies in Iran focus on the dislocation of local communities and the social environmental movements that have been formed around water problems and livelihood threats in Iran. In fact, few social and economic studies have been conducted on the environmental movements in Iran, particularly from a political economic perspective. The protests for water issues are going to be serious because it is these water issues that are a threat for local people’s livelihood. In 2018, in Isfahan, in one of the most radical practices in Iran, farmers attended a Friday prayer service hosted by the representative of the supreme leader of Iran; turning their backs on the Friday prayer Imam, they chanted “Backs to the enemy, face to the homeland.” It seems that this slogan is given to the national enemy by the army on the battlefield. (“Seday paye Ab” (SPA), 2018, March 16;² Radiofarda, 2018). There have been many street protests in western and central Iran for water issues.

In western Iran, movements have risen in response to the environmental policies and development projects that have caused environmental degradation and social problems. One of these projects is the BeheshtAbad Tunnel Project (BATP) which would transfer 580 million m³ (about 470,213.65 af) of water from the BeheshtAbad River to Iran’s central plateau, particularly for the Isfahan, Yazd, and Kerman provinces. The water would be used for human consumption and industrial uses (Ministry of Energy, Iran Water and Power Resources Development Company, 2016). The BeheshtAbad River, one of the upstream branches of the Karun,³ flows through the Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari (Ch & B) province. The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the project,⁴ which has generated a great deal of protest and resistance, especially in Khuzestan and the Ch & B provinces, because of environmental degradation and social problems.

I used semi-structured interviews and analyzed documents and reports that are related to this project for my data. For interviews, I first identified individuals through searching the resources that discuss BATP, including environmental Telegram⁵ pages and channels that contain arguments, information, and interviews on BATP, such as the SPA/the Sound of Water’s Footsteps⁶ (part of “Zagros e Mehrabaan” (Kind Zagros) campaign, one of the most important telegram groups opposing the water transfer project(, Karun & Karkheh,⁷ Faryad Karun,⁸ and Jolgeh Jonoobi (South Plan),⁹ which are other important environmental groups discussing BATP, the Website of the Khuzestan Province Environmental NGOs Network,¹⁰ which provides information on BATP, the Ministry of Energy website as it is responsible for the project, and online discussions and papers on BATP. Reading these pages and documents allowed me to identify and contact key informants for the study. Each informant interviewed introduced me to other informants (Baker et al., 1992; Creswell, 2013); thus, I began with purposeful sampling and selected additional participants through snowball sampling.

My focus on individuals to interview was on those involved in the environmental social movement (n = 26). This included environmental activists from CH & B, Khuzestan, Isfahan, and Tehran provinces (n = 12), stakeholders such as local farmers (n = 5), environmental specialists and assessors and water experts (n = 5), university professors (n = 2), and local managers who work on water and agriculture (n = 2). I conducted all the interviews over Skype, WhatsApp, and Imo. Each interview lasted between 2 and 2½ h and took place from April through October 2018.

To learn about why this movement was formed (i.e. emergence), I asked participants about their reasons for opposing the water project and why they began to identify this project as a social problem. To address coalescence, I asked about the strategies they have used and activities and ways they have attempted to stop or change the project. That is, I asked about their collective actions and mobilizations to help me understand coalescence of the movement. To analyze the third stage, institutionalization, my questions focused on opponents’ official and unofficial organizations, and also problems, struggles, and issues that they have had when protesting against the project and having collective actions.

I also analyzed documents that provided information on the history of the projects, environmental and socioeconomic impacts of the projects for understanding emergence, mechanisms used to mobilize society for the social movement for understanding coalescence, and organizations, struggles, threats, and problems that opponents have encountered in this case for understanding institutionalization. These documents include the Summary Reports of the Environmental Assessment of Beheshtabad Dam, BATP documents, protest letters and petitions sent to the authorities about the project, and discussions that are available on online Telegram pages/magazine and sites. (Some of these documents are not available for public, but some of those I interviewed provided those documents to me.)

I coded and categorized the interview transcripts and documents numerous times, according to the objectives of this study (Creswell, 2013; Richards et al., 2018). If the coding changed, I returned to check earlier coding to ensure accuracy. Collecting this data in Iran, especially in recent years, is a very difficult task. I, as a researcher, needed to make every effort to ensure that the information of the participants remained confidential. Therefore, interview appointments had to be changed several times. I conducted the interviews in a safe and confidential online atmosphere, and I assigned a pseudonym to all participants. I destroyed any identifying information and reports.

I now turn to my study findings to illustrate the dominant themes that emerged in the findings, as they relate to the three stages of social movements discussed here.

Emergence

Emergence as the first stage of a social movement is where problems appear first. Emergence refers to the time period that an unorganized discontent increases by a few people. Here, I will show how this unorganized discontent has been identified in a specific period. After preliminary design studies in the 2000s for BATP (Samadi Brojeni, 2012; Yazdani Paraee, 2016), many critiques who came from the scientific community were concerned about environmental degradation from the proposed project. Widespread discontent had been formed against BATP through academic studies and reports by environmental activists, experts, and environmental evaluators. As a university professor says, “We arranged a national conference for the water transfer project. . . it helped us to show the problems of these water transfer projects from a scientific view to society.” This conference was held in 2012, National Congress of Inter-Basin Water Transfer (Challenges and Opportunities)¹¹ in Shahr-e Kord University at Ch &B Province, which presented research about water transfer projects, including BATP, and their impacts on natural resources and societies.

In addition, many studies arguing that drought, drying groundwater, springs, and Ganats¹² are the possible results of the water transfer projects have been published (Halabian and Shabankari, 2010; Khakpour, 2012; Khastar Broujeni and Afzali Broujeni, 2012; Nourbakhsh, 2012; Yazdani Paraee, 2016). Opponents have identified that BATP will worsen drought in Iran, is a serious threat to the Karun River (Kiani, 2016) and the biodiversity of aquatic species, and is increasing dust storms. The dust storms are one of the serious crises in western and southwestern Iran (Alibabai Shahraki, et al., 2014; Keramat et al., 2011). In addition, opponents have identified multiple social impacts from BATP, including dispossession of people’s water rights and agricultural lands, increased joblessness of local people, poverty, and ethnic conflicts¹³ (Fatahi and Ali Mohamadi, 2012; Jazayeri Farrsiani, 2012; Khakpour, 2012; Kiani, 2016; Nourbakhsh, 2012; Pirani, 2018; Yazdani Paraee, 2016). As one of the local water managers who works in the agricultural section stated, “We have 200,000 farmers in Khuzestan whose livelihoods depend on water for agriculture. When projects such as BATP transfer the water, their economy will be destroyed, and they will be stuck in poverty.” Moreover, reducing the amount of water in the sources of the Karun River has negative impacts on palm farms. Thus, for the first stage—emergence—environmental and social problems were identified by those involved in the movement.

Coalescence

In the coalescence stage, those in the social movement try to work together to find solutions to the problems. In this stage, participants try to show society that this is a social problem, they can find solution for it, and bring people together for organized activities to engage in collective action (Christiansen, 2009). The coalescence stage is identified through strategies and tactics individuals in the social movement use to achieve organized collective action.

There are various strategies people have used to stop the BATP. Opponents use Telegram pages and channels (detailed previously) to have online group discussions, facilitate collective actions, share information with the public, and raise awareness about the problems of BATP. The internet and other social media are an important tool for sharing opponents’ reports and arguments with the public, and Telegram pages have the highlighted role. SPA, as one of the most active pages, has about 4000 members who daily receive news, data, and arguments about environmental and social issues around BATP. As one opponent states, “We are using Telegram, as a tool to share our opinion, environmental concerns and our reasons to stop these projects with people. Many people can be members of these pages and daily receive news and our arguments.” Another one told me, “If there were not these Telegram pages, people did not know truth about BATP. . . they [Telegram groups] have improved the knowledge of local people and Iranian people in general about the water transfer project.” For example, on 20 September 2017, the Telegram page “Faryad Karun” shared a critical argument of BeheshtAbad and the environmental degradation and social problems that this project can cause for the society, such as drying springs and loss of underground water. It states, “14 villages with a population of 21,150 and 7 cities with a population of 85,353 will be negatively affected by the BATP.” One opponent argues, “Our main role is to show the people the wrong governmental decisions [being made] and their corrupt and negative impacts for people.” Thus, this movement attempts to increase the awareness of society about the project and its impacts.

In another strategy in the coalescence stage, BATP opponents have come together to provide petitions and letters written to Iran’s supreme leader, Iran’s President, and the Ministry of Energy, Parliament, and other authorities, all asking to stop the project. For example, in a letter dated 13 December 2015, 200 members of the city and village councils in Ch & B wrote to the Iranian supreme leader and asked him to stop the project because of the water transfer projects’ huge damages (including BATP) to the Iranian society.

A last collective action that opponents have conducted in the coalescence stage is the street protests in small and large groups. Opponents have organized street protests in Khuzestan, Ch & B, and in front of the parliament building in Tehran. In reference to the protests in Khuzestan and Ch & B, an opponent noted, “There were about six human chains, the longest one was about 10,000 people in 2013. People want to show their opposition.” In these human chains, people protest BATP by holding signs with slogans such as, “Karun life is our life,” and “BATP is Death of Karun” ( DW, Deutsche Welle, Persian, 2013; MehrNews, 2013; SPA, 2016, 2017). On 24 September 2017, the SPA Telegram page warned the government to “stop the water supply projects by the end of the month. Otherwise, thousands of people will join protest rallies.”

The majority of protesters are citizens from villages and cities in Khuzestan and Ch & B, the areas that are most directly impacted by BATP’s environmental degradation. As one opponent mentioned, “They [protestors] are ordinary people; they experienced the environmental problems in their personal life. They know better than everybody what water transfer projects and dams are.” The coalescence stage is consistent with what social movement researchers argue is the second stage, a coming together of collective actions and mobilizing of different social groups around the water transfer problem. People have become aware of the environmental degradation and social problems of BATP and have begun lobbying political officials and elites and participating in social protests.

Institutionalization

In the stage of institutionalization (or bureaucratization), social movement forms formal and informal organizations, often with managers and paid staff.

In this stage, social movements have had some success in that they have raised awareness to a degree that a coordinated strategy is necessary across all of the SMOs. . .. Many social movements fail to bureaucratize in this way and end up fizzling out because it is difficult for members to sustain the emotional excitement necessary and because continued mobilization becomes too demanding for participants. (Christiansen, 2009: 3)

Institutionalization is seen when social movements have gained political power to connect with political elites and form coalitions and organizations. This step is necessary to continue group activities and mobilize (McAdam and Scott, 2005; McCarthy and Zald, 1985; Minkoff and McCarthy, 2005; Staggenborg, 1991). So, the movement gradually changes the policy or brings about social changes with organizational activities (Johnson, 2008; Olzak and Soule, 2009). Indeed, in this stage of social movements, scholars argue on the important role of both formal (Johnson, 2008; McAdam and Scott, 2005; McCarthy and Zald, 1977, 1985; Minkoff and McCarthy, 2005; Olzak and Soule 2009; Staggenborg, 1991; ) and informal organizations. Even when political and cultural changes are achieved, informal organizations are prominent (Baldez, 2003; Desai, 1996; Polanska, 2020; Polanska and Chimiak 2016). Edwards and Marullo (1995) mention that if a movement is incapable of forming an organization, it is unlikely to be able to create social and political changes.

It is the stage that the social movement in Iran cannot play in for various reasons. The overarching reason is the political economy in the centralized state in Iran. The Iranian government controls all information and organizations and uses suppression against social activists and organizations.

I detail each of these below and how they play out in the social movement.

Systematic Restriction of Public Access to Information and Data

Campaigns, specialists, NGOs, and citizens do not have access to most of the information, data, or the BATP plans. Iranian state agencies have defined data surrounding BATP as confidential; therefore, publishing some of these data and information is deemed an illegal activity and would cause problems for activists and environmental groups. There are no public meetings for BATP. People do not have access to any center to get information and data about BATP. An environmental activist emphasizes, “The main issue here is the political economy of the project. The economic practices and political relations are working together in an unclear and undemocratic atmosphere in Iran.” He continues:

There are many private engineering companies and contractors which belong to the Mostazafan Foundation [the second largest commercial enterprise in Iran, controlled by the supreme leadership of Iran], the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Astan Guds Razavii [the richest religious commercial foundation], and other technocrats affiliated with the Kargozaran party [a reformist political party following neoliberalist principles]. These companies are doing all water projects and have earned huge wealth.

Indeed, because of the economic benefits of some groups in these kinds of projects, the centralized state in Iran does not let people have access to a free information flow. For example, one senior environmental expert writes in an article criticizing BATP, “the name of cities that are supposed to receive water [from the transfer] are unclear, so the question is, how this project has been implemented without specifying the target cities and their population growth rates and water needs” (Yazdani Paraee, 2016). One local farmer says, “We do not know anything about the project. This is our water, but we do not have information about the project.” A university professor states, “They [BATP Authorities] do not let us be in the meetings, because they are scared that it brings social problems and protests.” Thus, the inability to get information and have access to plans of the project has made it difficult for institutionalization of the social movement against the BATP, particularly when access to some BATP information and plans is recognized as an illegal action.

Government Constraints and Obstacles to the Formation of Organizations

Most opponents believe that environmental organizations and NGOs have difficulty forming in Iran. Organizations are required to obtain permission from the State and in many cases, the process of permission is extensive. The State, as one opponent says, “would reject the requests of some people, because of meaningless reasons. They do not want people to come together.” The State also controls official organizations’ plans and activities. One environmental activist states:

It is a fact that NGOs in Iran do not have a long history. We do not have enough practice to work in these organizations, as you know, it is because of the history of controlling and dictatorship . . .. We do not learn to work with each other in these NGOs. . . but there are other reasons too. The state wants to control all of these NGOs and does not want any critics on its [state] mismanagement. So, if we have an official organization, if even the state issued a permission, they want to control everything. If you have a critic on their work, they will revoke your permission. So, we try to not have an official organization.

The obstacles to forming an organization around the social movement are noted by this environmentalist in Isfahan who says, “I was a member of two NGOs, today that I am talking with you, none of them have permission to work anymore!” She continues, “The Women’s Society Against Environmental Pollution in Isfahan was an NGO, its branch in Isfahan received national award for environment, but now it does not have permission to work.”

Most opponents argue that controlling environmental NGOs by the State is a threat to the independence of the NGOs. As one opponent argues:

In a short time in Iran, after presidency of Mohammad Khatami, many NGOs had formed in different areas, including environmental issues. But most of them do not exist anymore. They were just a propaganda for reformists in Iran. Most of them [NGOs] had close relations with the State.

There is not any official organization (i.e. institutionalization of the movement) for stopping BATP. One water specialist in Khuzestan says, “In regard to BATP, there is not any official organization, meetings and plans to make connection for us. There is not solidarity between environmentalists.” An environmentalist involved in the social movement says:

We work together and know each other but not in this way, that there was an official organization, office, an official group to have a division labor and specific duty, if you mean this, no we do not have that.

One environmental specialist in Tehran says:

On the one hand, there are big companies and institutions with huge capital and power, on the other hand, there are environmental activists who are repressed and are not allowed to form even a small organization. . ..This is an unequal war.

In general, either the organizations cannot form, or if they do form, they have difficulty being independent from the State, making institutionalization, as it is typically defined, extremely difficult.

State Suppression

The third factor contributing to inability to institutionalizing the social movement is State suppression. Activities, social groups, and organizations are not safe and are under government pressure. Their activities are met with intense police crackdown. In recent years, the government political and security pressures on environmental activities and environmental issues have intensified. For example, in 2018, a group of environmental specialists who worked in the Persian Wildlife Heritage Foundation were detained and charged with spying or other national security crimes. One of them, a professor in a university, died suspiciously in prison (Guardian, 2018; Radio Free Europe, 2019). While gathering data for this study, participants stopped or changed the appointments of the interviews several times with me because they believed it was a dangerous time to even talk with me about environmental projects. This is evident in many groups. So, because of this atmosphere, the opponents cannot organize groups and organizations. As one activist stated, “Everything is illegal, everything is a threat against national security, they [State] do not let us have a planned gathering or periodic meetings. They attack people, beat and arrest people.” In Iran, the political risk of organizational activity is very high. An environmental activist in Khuzestan says, “I was arrested just because I participated to provide a petition. . . they said I am against the national security of the country.” Another opponent says, “People are scared to work in this atmosphere.” One environmental specialist says, “There were some groups that would work against the project, but they were suppressed or threated and ended! Even in Ch & B two years ago they killed a young man, Mr Nadri, in the protests.” One environmental activist in central Iran says, “These threats do not let us form a social network, our groups are local, small and private.” One activist says, “They are afraid of any organization. . . so, we cannot form any organization, they will stop us with violence.” The intimidation and repression atmosphere against citizens can be seen in this part of talking with a local farmer, “The country is in Akhoond’s hands [Islamic cleric]. They do not respond to people, if you talk [make the opposite to them] they make a hard time for you!” There is also a lot of violence against ordinary people who participate in the protests. In some protests, the police have shot people; on 19 July 2016, a local person was killed and many were injured or arrested in a street protest against water transfer projects in Ch & B (DW, Deutsche Welle, Persian, 2016; Khabaronline, 2016).

Moreover, a majority of opponents believe that the judicial system is unresponsive to the people and supports interests of the specific groups doing the suppression. As one opponent says, “The judiciary system benefits from these projects too, it is a part of corruption in Iran. This system is suppressing us.” In one case, residents of Ch & B province protested in 2016 against water transfer projects and the Court sentenced 78 of them to imprisonment and flogging in 2019 (Persian BBC, 2019) for protesting.

In addition, many opponents interviewed for this study argue that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have a role in the water project, creating security problems for the opponents. The IRGC is an armed military force, founded after the Islamic Revolution on 22 April 1979 by the order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This army has a duty to defend the Islamic government in Iran. However, the IRGC also has a role in the energy industry and water projects (Gewirtz, 2010; Majidyar, 2018; Ostovar, 2016; Robin, 2011), including BATP. This, then, creates an atmosphere of military power around BATP and opponents can be seen as threats to the national security, and therefore used as justification for the secrecy of the project. The IRGC has enough political power to suppress any opposition and bring serious threats to the opponents. As one opponent emphasizes, “The IRGC is controlling BATP . . . They are not accountable to anyone. . . if people want to criticize it, they are quickly suppressed.” Another mentions that, “They [State] want to silence any voice or protest in order to reach their trade in natural resources. . . these projects make a lot of money for them.”

For all the above reasons, people cannot have official or unofficial organizations, and thus, the institutionalization stage, as typically defined, is not achieved. Because of a centralized state that uses instruments of violence and repression, the environmental social movement does not play on the institutionalization stage, as portrayed in the western narratives of social movement stages. Yet, while this movement has not achieved institutionalization, it has not stopped.

Some opponents have created digital networks that enable users to communicate with each other by posting information, comments, arguments, messages, images, etc. to organize public resistance. One of the leaders of an environmental campaign against water transfer says, “Campaigns are more independent than NGOs because they do not need permission from the state.” Moreover, as one administrator of an environmental Telegram page/magazine says, “With Telegram, we can make a group, the phone numbers can be unknown, we can have a secret chat. So, it helps us to have almost a safe atmosphere.” Indeed, this movement intentionally does not enter this stage because of the government’s severe suppression. The movement can be more independent and radical when they do not play on the stage of institutionalization.

In addition, the environmental degradation and socioeconomic problems of this project and other water projects, combined with the State suppression, together intensify discontent for those involved in the social movement. For example, on 1 March 2019, after the arrest of an active member of Zagros-e-Mehraban campaign, the campaign, through a letter addressed to the Iranian leaders, sharply threatened the society’s ruling groups. They stated their requests would be more than just stopping these projects. In a part of the letter,¹⁴ they said the movement opposing water transfer will go beyond environmental requests and it will be “a civil movement to provide violated civil rights for people in the Zagros.” The Environmental Telegram Page of “Faryad Karun” has repeatedly raised the issue of poverty in Khuzestan and Ch & B provinces, believing the poverty is related to social injustice in Iran and water projects such as BATP, and they warn the government that this poverty will lead to an uprising.

The movement also has potential to join other movements in Iran. On 24 June 2019, after the announcement of a court order against a student activist who attended social protests on poverty in Iran in 2018, the SPA¹⁵ declared that she is one of the founders of Student Protest Performance in the University of Tehran protesting the transferring of Karun water, united in solidarity with the student movement, and asked all activists and social, environmental, and student organizations to object to this ruling. Moreover, this movement is supporting and participating in some other protests that are organized by the labor movement or teachers. For example, in one case, some members of this movement supported and participated in the protest of the Ahwaz Steel workers (e.g. SPA 29, 27, and 15 December 2018) and Haft Tappeh Sugarcane Agro-Industry workers’ protests (e.g. SPA, 27 April, 24 February 2019), which are two of the serious labor protests in Iran. One of the members of Zagros-e-Mehraban (Kind Zagros) Campaign mentions that “Some members of the campaign are also members of the Central Council of the Teachers’ Association.” Thus, the data shows while institutionalization does not occur, the movement does not decline, but rather gets radical and joins with other movements that identify other social problems in Iranian society.

Discussion and Conclusion

In the first stage of social movements, emergence, opponents have addressed BATP negative impacts as serious threats for nature and society. They detailed BATP’s different detriments in environmental and socioeconomic dimensions. The movement highlighted threats of the project, including drought, negative impacts on the ecosystem of the Karun River, problems for water rights of the local people, and creation of unemployment and poverty. The BATP was considered by opponents as a project that was for the benefit of the few, while causing many economic and social problems for the society.

In the second stage, coalescence, the opponents came together to take collective actions to stop the project. They sought to improve the society’s awareness of the environmental and socioeconomic consequences of the water projects. Given the BATP authorities systematically hides BATP plans or decisions and impacts of the project, one of the main strategies of the social movement in the coalescence stage has been increasing the awareness of the BATP negative impacts to the social public. Given the BATP systematically hides BATP plans or decisions and impacts of the project, one of the main strategies of the social movement in the coalescence stage has been increasing the awareness of the BATP negative impacts to the social public. The social movement members use collective action strategies to stop the project, such as sending protest letters and petitions to authorities, and organizing of street protests, which have brought thousands of people in the streets to protest against BATP.

Thus, as was shown, the first two stages of the social movement are consistent with the dominant narrative about social movement stages. It is at the third stage—institutionalization—that this narrative no longer works. For various reasons, this movement needs to travel a different route than institutionalization. The majority of opponents believe security forces are a serious threat for their movement. Environmental activists have faced serious legal charges, as the State calls them a threat to the national security. The social movement under State repression cannot organize official organizations or have paid staff or work on connections with political elites or with other coalitions. Even their formal and informal activities can be considered a crime. However, although this movement has not entered the stage of being institutionalized, it is assisting and connecting with other movements. Government repression did not end it, but rather widened the discontent, enabling the movement to continue. Indeed, the social and environmental issues of these projects are still serious threats to Iranian society. The government repression has caused new problems for the local people and the environmental activists. The repression develops discontent, which produces social protests and social movements.

Predictably, this movement will not decline, but instead become more radical, join with other movements, and identify other social problems aside from environmental problems. The movement may also increase the people’s requests and voice in the society, while it does not go from the final stage of dominant narrative of social movement theory. The environmental movements against BATP were developed because of the water projects’ environmental degradation. They were not intended to relocate political power, but instead focused on protecting nature and society from the water projects’ negative impacts. However, because local people’s livelihoods are threatened— because of dispossession of people water—it is possible for this movement to go in a different way. Although this movement is not institutionalized, it is assisting and connected with the other movements. Government repression has widened the discontent rather than ending it, so the movement has its functions.

It can be said that instead of forming formal or informal organizations, this movement is an amorphous group that sometimes considers itself the children of the Kind Zagros. Sometimes, it is called protesters of Ch & B and Khuzestan against water issues; sometimes, it introduces itself as the Kind Zagros campaign and publishes official statements in cyberspace. Their various Telegram channels present daily information, news, analysis, and strong propaganda. As for the street protests, they call themselves the Water Transfer Opposition Movement.

Due to the widespread dissatisfaction in the Iranian society and the livelihood problems that these projects have created for the people, this movement has the ability to accompany the people in different ways. This movement has ties with various organizations, institutions, and groups. However, it does not establish a lasting relationship. Also, the power agents cannot recognize these ties to break them. So, it does not lose its force under severe repression. It also reduces the cost for the activists. It has been able to advertise in cyberspace and use it when needed on the street. Telegram pages allow them to hide, but be active and keep the resistance lively. In this stage, a group of known and unknown people who are acting against the project at the right time have kept the protest stable. This is the reason why the project has been stopped for more than 17 years. Some well-known members have paid for political expenses, including imprisonment. In other words, their sudden attacks in all available spaces have caused the stability of this movement and the recruitment of forces from other movements for environmental protests. However, they do not form any formal or informal organizations or networks.

Therefore, it seems that “persistence/ resistance” as the third social movement stage can be more practical than institutionalization. Institutionalization is a form of persisting; in other cases, we might face different forms of persisting. I designed one of these forms for the Iranian case. This case shows that some social movements do not need institutionalization to persist.

BATP environmental movement may be in the situation that Foran (1994) argues about other Iranian social movements, as persistent, but fragile resistance. As Tufekci (2017) argued about Arab Spring, this social movement may be more radical. Environmental movements are new movements in Iran that are not only identity movements, but also have close relations to economic issues, poverty, ethnicity, and other political issues. It seems that this kind of movement could be one of the most serious social movements for the future of Iran.

This study shows that western centrist narrative of social movement stages does not always play out in other societies. While the typical framework of stages of social movement has been valuable in understanding the social movements, future research should focus on different political economies, especially in nondemocratic western countries, to examine how the stages of social movements truly play out. The study also shows how the dominant narrative of social movements needs to be reworked and rethought according to different situations. There are other cases such as this movement in different parts of the world, and the narratives of the stages of social movement should directly reflect this reality. The situation of this Iranian social movement could be replicated under some semi-closed political systems. So, we need a dynamic definition of the stages of social movements, according to the political, economic, and social conditions of different societies.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I am very appreciative of Dr Peggy Petrzelka for her guidance and support throughout this research. Also, I wish to thank all participants who allowed and trusted me for these interviews.

Declaration of Conflicting Interest

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

The author(s) disclose receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: this research was supported by a grant from the School of Graduate Studies at Utah State University.

ORCID iD

Elham Hoominfar

Notes

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