Domestic Factors Behind China’s Megaprojects

State Fragmentation and Ambiguity

There is a general (mis)perception among many China watchers that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an autocratic state with a one-party rule where authoritarian leaders hold absolute power and their decisions are implemented across the country without resistance (for ‘mis-perception’, also see Yu, 2018). This simplistic view overlooks various competing actors and their internal tricks within the Chinese system (Zeng, 2020). It is argued that contrary to the general perception, China is not a unitary state where leaders can wield absolute authority. Instead, China is a ‘fragmented authoritarian’ state in which various national, subnational, provincial, local, financial bodies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) possess influence in their domains. These actors, without defying the central government’s policies, interpret and respond to national policies in a way that suits their interests. It is correct that the state is central in the Chinese system; as Ye (2020) observed, ‘it is the system that consists of political leaders, national bureaucracies, local governments, and SOEs in a complex and interactive web of roles and relationships’ (p. 11). This perspective is endorsed by other scholars (Mertha, 2009; Wong, 2021).

Given this state fragmentation, Chinese leaders deliberately adopt ambiguity in the announcements and developments of megaprojects. As a general practice, top leaders provide broad and ambiguous concepts, leaving room for multiple interpretations. The process of filling ideas with meanings occurs subsequently. This has become a norm in China’s political system and manifested in the projects discussed in this article and others not mentioned here (e.g. the New Socialist Countryside Construction (NSCC), a project of the Central Chinese government that was aimed at the promotion of rural development in China in the mid-2000s, the New Development Bank (NDB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank).

How does this ambiguity work? Leaders’ vague policy statements invoke discussions among policy circles, provincial and local governments, SOEs, intellectuals, and other stakeholders. Projects with international implications draw responses even from foreign entities. In the process, vague ideas receive ‘intellectual support’ and feedback from various stakeholders and evolve into concrete strategies (Zeng, 2020: 5). All projects discussed in this paper followed this pattern. For instance, when Xi Jinping first proposed the BRI in 2013, it was a vague concept with neither a clear definition nor a blueprint; the BRI evolved over some time with domestic and international input (Zeng, 2020: 79). Similarly, the CSFM was put forward as an ambiguous concept and was gradually filled with meanings. This ambiguity in policy announcements allows domestic and international actors to become involved and interpret projects according to their interests. The central government, in return, receives necessary feedback from the bottom and reshapes ideas accordingly (Zeng, 2020: 136). According to Zhan and Qin (2017), the ambiguity ‘reduces higher authorities’ accountability for policy failures, increases the chances of adoption, reduces the prospects of conflict, and secures public support for a proposed policy’ (pp. 149–152). Given China’s colossal size and cross-regional diversities, the unitary system with an extensive political hierarchy and ambiguous policies allows multiple interpretations and flexible implementations, serving both top-down and bottom-up implementation.

The SMG

Ye (2020) constructed the SMG framework to explain the rationale of the WDP, the CGG, and the BRI. She argued that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) primarily strives for political stability through economic growth. China’s nationalist strategy is rooted in domestic politics, while China’s system operates at three levels—broadly defined. At the top, elite leadership formulates national strategies in the form of mega-projects during crises. Since megaprojects require vast mobilization, they resorted to political rhetoric and invoked nationalism. At the second and third levels, subnational actors such as provincial governments, SOEs, local governments, and other stakeholders operate. The latter two levels self-interpret national strategies and implement them in a way that suits their interests—without jeopardizing national goals. China’s system operates both top-down and bottom-up in a reinforcing way.

The context in which the WDP, the CGG, and the BRI were developed can help in locating the role of domestic factors. In the late 1970s, China, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, introduced reforms and began to open up the country to the outside world. These reforms, which were greatly beneficial, also brought inequalities and globalization to China’s doorstep. Under these reforms, China allocated huge resources that were primarily spent on the development of coastal areas. Over the years, the coastal areas progressed rapidly, while Western regions lagged far behind by most indicators. This created a vast disparity between the two (Yu, 2018: 225). In coastal China, a new class of entrepreneurs emerged, while the Western regions remained merely suppliers of labor and raw materials.

Along with growing disparities, some parts of the Western regions, especially Xinjiang and Tibet, have been facing sporadic separatism, which was accelerated by the Afghan War (1979–1988) and the emergence of the Central Asian States on ethnic grounds. By the 1990s, China had acquired adequate finances due to economic growth in the preceding two decades. Addressing the issue of disparity and separatism through economic development became so important that Chinese leaders launched the WDP against its economic feasibility (Ye, 2020: 57). ¹ Other scholars seconded the view that addressing the grievances of local populations and inequalities was a key consideration behind the launch of this project (Lin and Chen, 2004; Naughton, 2004: 253–265; Tian, 2004).

Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao continued the WDP with a slight modification by reorienting its focus from economic development to addressing social issues. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the central government pumped massive stimulus packages to the Western regions to accelerate its implementation (Ye, 2020: 62–69). President Xi incorporated the WDP into the BRI. China’s emphasis on the speedy development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), one of the six corridors being developed under the BRI, was to open up the Western regions to the outside world (Ali, 2022).

In 2000, China started the CGG with two objectives in mind. First, reforms in SOEs should be introduced to develop their international competitiveness. China was negotiating for entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which required structural changes in SOEs. At that time, Chinese SOEs had a reputation for corruption and a lack of innovation and technologies. Reforms were also necessary, as the SOEs were the main instrument of the central government to carry out the industrial policy, to keep control of the market economy, and, most importantly, were the prime source of revenue (Ye, 2020: 30–31). Despite SOEs’ advantages of sheer size and official patronage, they had remained ‘short of global business exposure and corporate governance’ (Yu, 2018: 225). President Jiang Zemen, one of the architects of the CGG, expressed his dismay on it. The Chinese authorities, under the CGG, pushed SOEs to pursue growth-oriented strategies to increase competitiveness, learn adaptability, and test their abilities internationally (Ye, 2020: 40). Second, as a result of reforms and opening up by the mid-1990s, China began to face economic stagnation, industrial overcapacities, sluggish exports, and the slowing of foreign direct investment (FDI). Thus, the central government intervened to change the situation.

Reforms in SOEs under the CGG brought positive results domestically but remained unsuccessful internationally for two reasons. First, despite efforts to internationalize SOEs, their ‘close association and somewhat submissive relationship with the CCP and the Chinese government’ proved a major impediment to their overseas businesses (Yu, 2018: 230–231). Second, the reforms were driven by China’s domestic politico-economic conditions, which were incongruent with international institutions and the environment. Chinese SOEs continue to face challenges internationally even today.

In the third project discussed in The Belt Road, the author explained the domestic conditions that led to the launch of the BRI from the perspective of the SMG. A background can help in understanding the role of domestic conditions in shaping it. As Xi Jinping was preparing for the power corridor in 2012, the country faced several challenges. China was under domestic and international limelight due to the crackdown on Bo Xilai (Broadhurst and Wang, 2014). Rampant corruption had become such a big challenge that outgoing President Hu Jintao termed it dangerous for the party and the state (Branigan, 2012). This prompted Xi to launch an anti-corruption drive targeting both flies and tigers.

On the economic front, China’s exports were declining, and its industries faced large-scale overcapacity. While the central government’s revenue increased in the postreform decades, its expenditures grew correspondingly. According to Ye (2020), ‘Economic downturns in such a fiscal system mean challenges for specific technocrats to address and grave dangers to the stability and operation of the government as a whole; hence, the whole political system needs to be mobilized to respond’. Moreover, Xi promised to eliminate poverty from the country by 2030. This required additional resources that could only be attained by maintaining over a 6% growth rate.

The rise of militancy was another underlying reason. China, which significantly protected itself from the consequences of the War on Terror (WoT), began to face terrorism in the late 2000s and early 2010s. In the Urumqi riots in July 2009, nearly 197 people were killed. In reaction to these killings, a high-ranking al-Qaeda member asked Uyghurs from the restive Xinjiang to wage Jihad against China. In July 2011, fatal attacks took place in Kashgar. The pattern of violence indicated that those attacks were carried out directly either by foreign terrorists or by locals trained by them. In May 2014, two car bombings in Urumqi left 43 people dead (Potter, 2013). Instability had become such a big challenge that for the first time, domestic security outlays approved by the 2012 National People’s Congress (NPC) exceeded defense (Broadhurst and Wang, 2014: 157). For the ruling CCP, internal stability was the foremost priority and was directly linked to economic development. These conditions contributed to China’s launch of the BRI (Ye, 2020: 3).

The BRI is an ongoing project whose ultimate outcome would be clear in the long run. Anticipating its future outcome, Ye (2021) argued in her latest study that since the BRI was planned and motivated by China’s national economic priorities and diplomacy, as long as those motivations did not fundamentally change after the COVID-19 pandemic, the BRI is likely to continue with a more or less similar pace (p. 194). The following section reviews three projects from the perspective of ‘slogan politics’.

Sloganeering Politics

Zeng (2020) conceptualized ‘political slogan’ as a framework to explain the rationale of the NTGPR, CSFM, and BRI (he termed them slogans), all introduced by the Xi Administration. He traced the origin and the use of slogans in China’s history and argued that political slogans were not merely empty rhetoric; they carried concrete measures and were part of the policy process. Chinese leaders used slogans for multiple purposes, such as a response to crises, for political communication, for mass mobilization, to motivate action, for power assertion, to test loyalty, as a propaganda tool for mass persuasion, and as a call for intellectual support (Lu, 1999; Nianxi, 2009; Song and Gee, 2020; Yang-Xiong and De-Fang, 2011; Zeng, 2020). Most often, slogans were coined for domestic consumption.

In the post-1949 period, the CCP used slogans to eulogize Mao’s role, expecting the public to repeat those slogans to demonstrate their loyalty (Zeng, 2020: 22). Slogans such as ‘long live Chairman Mao’, ‘let Mao Zedong’s thought control everything’, and ‘loyal to the party, loyal to the people, loyal to Chairman Mao, and loyal to Mao Zedong’s thought’ were part of China’s national discourse in Mao’s lifetime and were used for myth creation of his personality (Lu, 1999: 498). Mao’s successor continued the tradition. For instance, Hua Guofeng introduced ‘two whatever’ that China would resolutely uphold Mao’s decisions and instructions. Deng Xiaoping was critical of Mao’s policies. He introduced ‘seek truth from facts’, emphasizing reason, science, and reforms rather than blind followership. President Jiang Zemin coined the ‘Three Represents’, which stressed the advancement of China’s productive forces, culture, and core interests. Jiang’s slogan was included in the CCP’s constitution (Mohanty, 2003). Hu Jintao introduced ‘socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ and his signature slogan, the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’. The latter emphasized ‘scientific development’, ‘putting people first’ in government policies and establishing a ‘harmonious society’ (Xing, 2009). Although the nature of slogans changed from personality-centric (during the Mao period) to policy-oriented (since reforms), they continuously revolved around domestic politics. In the 21st century, Chinese leaders took another shift and started testing slogans on the international stage. NTGPR, CSFM, and BRI are its manifestations. From the perspective of ‘slogan politics’, these projects were driven by domestic compulsions, as discussed below.

The NRGPR first emerged in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. At that time, some Chinese scholars stressed the need for greater cooperation between China and the United States to address global issues jointly. However, a majority was skeptic about China’s ability for such a role, and the idea was dropped at least for the time being (Zeng and Breslin, 2016). As Xi assumed power a few years later, he recalibrated China’s capabilities and considered it ready for a greater international role (Zeng, 2020). Xi formally proposed the NTGPR in his summit with US President Barack Obama at Sunnylands in June 2013 and proposed long-term cooperation on the win–win model (Board, 2018). Xi expected the United States to treat China equally and share the global leadership role with it.

From the outset, Washington showed a lukewarm response to the NTGPR partly due to its ambiguity and partly due to Washington’s unwillingness to regard China as an equal power. This demotivated Beijing, which almost stopped mentioning the NTGPR in interaction with the United States (Wertime, 2017; Zeng, 2020) and started referring it in relations with other countries such as Britain, Russia, and India (Xiao, 2021).

Another important slogan of Xi with an external orientation was CSFM, which he first introduced during the 18th National Congress of the CCP in November 2012. Unlike the NTGPR, it was devoid of geopolitical connotations. Therefore, it was easier for the Chinese authorities to promote it internationally. The CSFM remained China’s active policy objective to date. According to Zeng, by approximately 2018–2019, Xi had raised the CSFM at well over 100 international events as well as at the bilateral level. For Xi, the NTGPR, CSFM, and BRI were his political legacy and contributed to the CCP and China (Zeng, 2020). The PRC has inscribed the CSFM in the CCP’s and the PRC’s constitutions.

From the outlook, these slogans, especially the NTGPR and the CSFM, appeared external-oriented. However, the Chinese leadership wanted their global success as a propaganda tool for domestic consumption. A positive US response to NTGPR, for instance, could be portrayed at home as recognition of China-under-Xi as an equal power—although it did not happen (Wertime, 2017). As Zeng (2020) observed,

In the Chinese domestic arena, [an] enthusiastic global response can be easily interpreted as evidence of China’s rising global significance and leadership. It helps to enrich the propaganda narrative about the revival of China brought about by the CCP leadership . . . . In other words, the positive global response to Chinese slogans provides concrete examples to support the CCP’s narratives about China’s national rejuvenation and thus significantly enhances its domestic political legitimacy. . . . This global attention also grants both the top leader and the Chinese government greater international legitimacy to consolidate their power domestically (pp. 3–4).

Overall Assessments of Books

These books contributed to the field in different ways. First, they fill the void in the literature. Despite a plethora of work on China’s megaprojects in recent decades, little attention has been given to studying the role of domestic factors. Second, these books highlighted two significant but overlooked aspects of China’s political system: ‘state fragmentation’ and ‘ambiguity’ (also referred to as ‘vagueness’ and ‘soft opening’) in policy making. Understanding these aspects provides deeper insight into China’s political systems.

Third, both books made a conceptual contribution to the field. The SMG and ‘slogan politics’ are innovative frameworks to explain how China’s political system works. The SMG elaborated how the state and the market have reinforced each other in China for economic development and political stability without political changes in China’s political system. For future research, the SMG model could be tested in less developed cities in China and other countries with state-controlled economies to determine its broader applicability. Similarly, the ‘slogan politics’ framework explained how Chinese leaders used rhetoric for various political purposes. As mentioned before, in a notable shift, China started to expand the use of slogans from the domestic to the international stage. This expansion offers opportunities for analysts to examine the outcome of these slogans.

Finally, these books were based on years of meticulous work and field trips of the authors. They are rich in primary and secondary sources. At a time, fieldwork in China is becoming increasingly difficult (due to tightening political control and COVID-19), authors’ experiences, data collection techniques, interview methods, and the use of sources, especially in Chinese, can guide future researchers. Undoubtedly, these books made a significant contribution to the discipline of Chinese studies in general and to China’s political economy and political system in particular. Most significantly, these books underlined the central role of domestic factors in China’s policies.