An Experimental Study of Voluntary Nonprofit Accountability and Effects on Public Trust,Reputation,Perceived Quality,and Donation Behavior

Abstract

Voluntary accountability carried out by nonprofit organizations seeks to ensure organizational adherence to financial and ethical standards beyond legal regulations, thereby sending signals of quality and trustworthiness. Yet, insights into whether and how different forms of voluntary nonprofit accountability influence the public’s attitude are limited, and recent calls emphasize the need for further empirical investigation. Building on the combination of three different research streams, this article presents a conceptual framework that distinguishes between four forms of (voluntary) nonprofit accountability within the theoretical context of the principal-agent theory. In an online experiment with 407 participants, the author demonstrates that externally certified voluntary accountability demonstrates higher reputation and perceived quality among nonprofit organizations, but not relating to donation behavior (relative to the other accountability conditions). Internal voluntary accountability has no effect, whereas no accountability is associated with less public trust, reputation, perceived quality, and donation behavior (compared with legal minimum accountability).

Keywords

voluntary nonprofit accountability public trust reputation perceived quality donation behavior

Stakeholders of nonprofit organizations face a dilemma, as they cannot easily observe the organizations’ behavior and quality of provided services (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). That is, nonprofit organizations often provide services that are highly intangible and of which the quality is difficult to evaluate, which causes uncertainty among stakeholders (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). An increasing number of nonprofit scandals affirm this uncertainty, threatening public trust and the reputation of nonprofit sectors worldwide (Bekkers, 2003; Slatten, Guidry, & Austin, 2011). Against this background and regarding the need for collecting funds, improving nonprofit accountability has garnered much global attention (Buchheit & Parsons, 2006). Specifically, voluntary nonprofit accountability is emerging (including financial reporting, compliance with codes of conduct, and accreditation), intended to send signals of high quality and trustworthiness to an increasingly skeptical public (e.g., Gugerty, 2009; Parsons, 2007; Saxton, Kuo, & Ho, 2012). This is particularly true for countries such as Germany where nonprofit organizations must provide information regarding the use of funds to financial authorities but are not obliged to report publicly, and uniform accounting formats such as in the United Kingdom or the United States are lacking. Any form of comparability is thus made considerably more difficult.

It follows that nonprofit organizations around the globe have adopted voluntary accountability initiatives and activities that go beyond legal minimum accountability. CARE International’s high standards of accountability, for example, have been widely recognized as exemplarily. CARE reports various organizational documents annually in accordance with Accountable Now reporting guidelines that are impact-focused, responsive to stakeholders, and promote transparency. CARE is further a signatory of various accountability commitments, as well as internationally accepted humanitarian standards and codes of conduct. Similarly, UNICEF regularly discloses financial statements publicly, and complies with internal codes of conducts (UNICEF’s global information disclosure policy). UNICEF further became signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative such that the organization complies with certain accountability standards and is reviewed by an industry (international aid) association. Moreover, the German association of UNICEF is accredited by an independent external organization with the DZI Seal-of-Approval. Given the absence of an official certification or accreditation system in the European Union or Germany, a range of different third-party seals and certifications exist to externally prove the transparency and quality of nonprofit organizations. In Germany, the DZI is one of the most important organizations to examine nonprofit organizations in a fee-required process for the use of their funds. The DZI Seal-of-Approval is a nationwide recognized certificate indicating the organization’s high accountability and quality. The latter (external certification and accreditation) is a particularly strong form of voluntary accountability in the nonprofit sector.

However, notwithstanding the fact that many nonprofit organizations implement accordant accountability initiatives and activities, research on its effectiveness from a marketing and fundraising perspective is limited, and recent publications emphasize the need for further investigation (e.g., Feng, Neely, & Slatten, 2016; Ebrahim, 2010; Slatten et al., 2011). Slatten et al. (2011) call for “empirical analysis to ascertain if . . . organizations that obtain accreditation actually enjoy higher donations and/or are more successful in achieving the organization’s objectives” (p. 124). And Feng et al. (2016) encourage further research on the utility of accreditation and external certification.

Against this background, this study contributes to current research in three main ways. First, voluntary nonprofit accountability initiatives that go beyond legal minimum regulation have gained substantial importance over the past two decades. In this vein, a variety of studies have been published to investigate the emergence, development, and design of these initiatives (e.g., Prakash & Gugerty, 2010; Slatten et al., 2011), with regard to specific country contexts (e.g., Anheier, Hass, & Beller, 2013) as well as their financial and nonfinancial outcomes (e.g., Feng et al., 2016; Parsons, 2007). Although almost all studies highlight the importance of voluntary accountability in terms of creating a favorable public response, the nonprofit stakeholder perspective has been somewhat neglected (Sloan, 2009). That is, uncertainty exists if and how voluntary nonprofit accountability actually influences public’s attitude, and evidence on its relationship is limited (e.g., Bekkers, 2003; Feng et al., 2016). Building on principal-agent theory (e.g., Ross, 1973; see also Bies, 2010; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010), this article argues that voluntary nonprofit accountability effectively shapes public’s attitude in terms of higher public trust, reputation, perceived quality, and donation behavior. In the nonprofit context, agency problems arise when stakeholders have limited information about the organization’s behavior and the quality of provided services, such as donors’ knowledge of how funds are used (Bies, 2010; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). It follows that stakeholders then face uncertainty regarding the organization’s trustworthiness and the quality of provided services (Bekkers, 2010; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). In this vein, voluntary nonprofit accountability offers a type of insurance for stakeholders, attesting that the organization acts as expected and funds are allocated appropriately (Bies, 2010; Slatten et al., 2011). Different forms of voluntary nonprofit accountability are therefore expected to influence public’s attitude by reducing uncertainty among stakeholders.

Second, most scholars approach the topic of voluntary accountability from a conceptual and theoretical perspective. From the few studies that have empirically analyzed its effects and benefits, Buchheit and Parsons (2006) and Parsons (2007) were among the first to investigate the effects of voluntary nonfinancial disclosures and other voluntary accounting information in a nonprofit setting. Whereas Buchheit and Parsons (2006) confirm the greater transparency but no increased actual donation behavior, Parsons (2007) judge the nonfinancial disclosures to be useful for making a donation decision. Bekkers (2003) and Feng et al. (2016) provide first empirical evidence for the benefits of externally certified voluntary nonprofit accountability in terms of a favorable public response toward nonprofit organizations, including increased donation behavior. Considering the need for more empirical research (Ebrahim, 2010; Slatten et al., 2011), this study empirically investigates accountability in the nonprofit sector employing a between-subjects experimental design that allows for examining multiple levels of (voluntary) nonprofit accountability simultaneously.

Third, most scholars investigate external certification and accreditation including the awarding of seals of approval only. External certification and accreditation is considered a strong form of voluntary accountability because an external industry association, other nonassociation member, or independent third-party organization (“watchdog”), rather than an internal authority, reviews a nonprofit organization’s compliance with certain quality and transparency standards (Cnaan, Jones, Dickin, & Salomon, 2011; Gugerty, 2009; Slatten et al., 2011; Szper & Prakash, 2011; Willems, Waldner, Dere, Matsuo, & Högy, 2017). Considering the different voluntary accountability initiatives and activities in the nonprofit sector, investigations of weaker forms of nonprofit accountability have yet been neglected. Particularly, insights into the effectiveness of internal voluntary nonprofit accountability, which mainly implies internal monitoring of the organization’s financial reporting without external evaluation, are lacking (Gugerty, 2009). In practice and in contrary to the adoption of voluntary accountability activities, many nonprofit organizations merely implement the legal minimum standards to remain tax status. Moreover, because of recent cases of organizational fraud and mismanagement in the nonprofit sector, some organizations have been exposed as not complying with certain quality and transparency standards. Because of its growing practical relevance as well as related costs to the disclosure of accountability information (Slatten et al., 2011), determining the effects of different forms of voluntary nonprofit accountability is important. Precisely, the aim of this study is to investigate if organizations adopting stronger (voluntary) nonprofit accountability activities (independent variable) obtain higher degrees of public trust, reputation, and perceived quality, and more successfully collect donations (dependent variables).

In the next section, this article outlines three research streams―nonprofit accountability, nonprofit marketing, and quality management―to develop the conceptual framework and specify the underlying hypotheses. Within the theoretical context of principal-agent theory (e.g., Ross, 1973), this study thus provides a multidisciplinary approach and empirically tests public response to different forms of nonprofit accountability in an experimental design. After presenting the empirical results, this article discusses the findings and provides some practical recommendations to help nonprofit managers successfully shape public’s attitude to improve marketing and fundraising outcomes.

Voluntary Nonprofit Accountability

Literature Review

This article builds on the combination of three research streams that are relevant for the development of this study’s conceptual framework. The first stream explores nonprofit accountability, and particularly voluntary accountability as part of a broader governance context in the nonprofit sector (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Voluntary nonprofit accountability programs and initiatives seek to develop common standards across nonprofit organizations by regulating nonprofit governance, fundraising, and management (Gugerty, 2009). In this vein and depending on each country’s legal regulations, a variety of different codes of conduct, self-regulation systems, and certification and accreditation schemes have evolved as tools for supporting good governance in nonprofit sectors worldwide (e.g., Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). A key distinction between corresponding initiatives and activities is whether they are internally or externally applied within organizations (Gugerty, 2009). Voluntary accountability activities differ accordingly in terms of the strength of verification, and signal quality and trustworthiness to a varying degree to the public (Gugerty, 2009). Weaker forms of voluntary accountability are internal in nature, and include activities that do not verify compliance at all, or those that monitor the organization’s financial reporting without any evaluation, resulting in mainly internal monitoring. Organizational self-certification in the form of compliance with specific standards, yet without detailed review, is a slightly stronger but still weak form of voluntary accountability (Gugerty, 2009). Stronger forms are external in nature and comprise of reviews by industry associations, peers, or nonassociation members. The strongest voluntary accountability form is considered an independent third-party review and a corresponding certification and accreditation process, including the awarding of a “seal of approval” (Cnaan et al., 2011; Gugerty, 2009; Szper & Prakash, 2011; Willems et al., 2017). The strength of this accountability form stems from the fact that an independent, external organization reviews the quality of the nonprofits’ processes and programs (Slatten et al., 2011).

The second research stream is associated with the field of nonprofit marketing. With an increasingly tighter environment competing for donors, grants, and partnerships, nonprofit organizations have adopted more commercial business practices to improve their strategic performance (Salamon, 2012). Nowadays, the nonprofit sector is characterized by a high market orientation, and most organizations seek to create favorable perceptions among stakeholders and build relationships with them (Boenigk, 2014). Within this context, nonprofit marketers increasingly implement voluntary accountability initiatives and activities. These activities have the potential to function as marketing cues that shape public’s attitude toward the organization by reducing uncertainty among stakeholders (Akdeniz, Calantone, & Voorhees, 2013). It follows that voluntary nonprofit accountability has emerged partly as an effort to redeem the reputation of the nonprofit sector and its organizations, in response to scandals and exaggerated claims of performance (Ebrahim, 2010).

The third research stream relates to quality management in nonprofit organizations. Quality (service) management has gained particular importance as competition and homogeneity among services, as well as technology-induced market transparency, have all dramatically increased in recent years. Moreover, services compared with goods are characterized by their intangibility and their credence qualities. It follows that service quality is often difficult to observe, which gives rise to high uncertainty among stakeholders. This is especially true for nonprofit organizations such as international relief and environmental organizations, where donors and the beneficiaries of services differ greatly from one another and are separated by large distances, reinforcing uncertainty among stakeholders (Bekkers, 2010; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Partly inspired by a proliferation of quality labels and seals of approval in manufacturing and food industries worldwide (Moussa & Touzani, 2008; Slatten et al., 2011), nonprofit organizations are increasingly interested in signaling high quality (Ortmann & Svítková, 2007). It follows that voluntary nonprofit accountability (and external certification and accreditation in particular) is one phenomenon that is gaining importance (Ortmann & Svítková, 2007) and improving quality management in organizations in which services and their quality are the most difficult to observe.

Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

Based on the three streams discussed above, a conceptual framework is derived that forms the basis of analysis in this empirical study. The conceptual framework shown in Figure 1 distinguishes between externally certified, internal, legal minimum, and no (voluntary) nonprofit accountability, depending on the organizations’ compliance with quality and transparency standards. Externally certified (including the awarding of a “seal of approval”) as well as internal voluntary nonprofit accountability both go beyond legal minimum regulations and are thus voluntary by nature. Legal minimum accountability is intended for all nonprofit organizations to maintain nonprofit status. No nonprofit accountability is further integrated into this study to account for effects of potential misbehavior of nonprofit organizations that do not meet the legal requirements. Within this context, this study argues that (voluntary) nonprofit accountability influences public’s attitude to a varying degree, depending on the strength of the accountability activity. That is, the stronger the nonprofit accountability activity, the more positive is the expected effect on public’s attitude. The outlined framework accordingly tests four effects on public trust, reputation, perceived quality, and donation behavior (Hypotheses 1 to 4). Following, this article discusses the underlying rationale for the agency-based framework and derives the specific hypotheses.

Figure 1.

Conceptual framework.

Public trust

Public trust is of principal significance in the nonprofit sector. Due to the nondistribution constraint, according to which nonprofits are not allowed to distribute profit to private parties, the very existence of nonprofit organizations is assumed to be based on their greater trustworthiness (Hansmann, 1980). Given that nonprofit organizations’ behavior and the quality of provided services is difficult to observe and results in uncertainty, the nonprofit character of the organization alone should accordingly provide signals of trustworthiness to the public (Bekkers, 2003). Yet, recent cases of fraud and mismanagement in the nonprofit sector have challenged the notion of inherent trust in nonprofit organizations, so that scholars doubt the power of the nondistribution constraint to successfully avoid adverse effects of these scandals (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Within this context, both scholars and practitioners agree on the relevance of (voluntary) nonprofit accountability. Slatten et al. (2011) argue that “the adoption of standards for ethical and accountable behavior may provide the solution [to the climate of shaken public trust in the non-profit sector]” (p. 114), and Ebrahim (2010) argues that “[a]t its core, accountability is about trust” (p. 101). Bekkers (2003) provides first empirical evidence of the positive relationship between externally certified nonprofit accountability and public trust. By means of correlation analyses, he shows that donors that are aware of a Dutch accreditation system subsequently have greater trust in nonprofit organizations than those who are not; the results might be a first indication of potential causal effects of nonprofit accountability activities on public trust. According to principal-agent theory, voluntary nonprofit accountability thus has the potential to reduce uncertainty among stakeholders and influence public trust as follows:

Hypothesis 1: A stronger (voluntary) nonprofit accountability activity has a greater positive effect on public trust than a weaker activity.

Reputation

The reputation of nonprofit organizations, similar to public trust, has been threatened by nonprofit scandals as it is influenced by agency problems. According to Prakash and Gugerty (2010), “[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the negative reputational effects of a few ‘bad apples’ are beginning to undermine the reputation of the sector as a whole” (p. 23). Consequently, voluntary accountability among nonprofit organizations has emerged through efforts to redeem the reputation and credibility of the nonprofit sector where governments lack the capacity for effective regulation (Ebrahim, 2010; Lloyd, 2005). Scholars accordingly highlight the strengths of voluntary nonprofit accountability, with externally certified accountability in particular, in terms of higher legitimacy and favorable organizational reputations (Bies, 2010; Willems et al., 2017). The underlying rationale is that voluntary accountability activities can produce a collective benefit for all organizations implementing the activities in terms of generating credible information about their quality, typically by showing their compliance with certain standards (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Thereby, the strength of the voluntary accountability activity and corresponding costs fundamentally influences the reputation (Ortmann & Svítková, 2007; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Building on this notion, the study hypothesizes the following:

Hypothesis 2: A stronger (voluntary) nonprofit accountability activity has a greater positive effect on reputation than a weaker activity.

Perceived quality

Because nonprofit accountability activities are expected to function as signals of quality, the concept of perceived quality is integrated into this study. The underlying rationale relates to the fact that nonprofit organizations provide services that are highly intangible, often difficult to observe, and characterized by their credence qualities (Gugerty, 2009; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). The resulting uncertainty among stakeholders gives rise to the emergence of quality signals in the form of voluntary compliance with accountability standards (Bekkers, 2010; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Although empirical evidence into the actual impact on quality is limited, Ortmann and Svítková (2007) argue that externally certified accountability activities can act as a viable quality assurance mechanism in nonprofit organizations. Gugerty (2009) goes beyond external certification and accreditation and states that voluntary accountability programs in general “have the potential to provide a signal of quality by setting high standards and fees and rigorously verifying compliance” (p. 243). Therefore, this study predicts the following:

Hypothesis 3: A stronger (voluntary) nonprofit accountability activity has a greater positive effect on perceived quality than a weaker activity.

Donation behavior

Beyond a more favorable cognitive and affective attitude toward nonprofit organizations adopting voluntary accountability activities, there is evidence that the public actually rewards these organizations with additional funding (Bekkers, 2010; Slatten et al., 2011). Although little is known about the effects of weaker nonprofit accountability activities (such as internal ones) on donation behavior, few studies confirm the relevance of stronger ones such as external certification and accreditation. For example, Bekkers (2003) finds that donors who know about the accreditation system tend to donate more money to charitable causes. Bekkers (2010) confirms his findings and shows that nonprofit organizations complying with certain accountability standards attract more donations compared with organizations that do not. In a recent study on the benefits of certification for nonprofit organizations, Feng et al. (2016) further show that the Standards of Excellence® Certification (USA) is associated with increased public support and a favorable public response to the certification process. Szper and Prakash (2011) in a study on charity watchdog ratings, however, find that changes in charity ratings tend not to affect donor support to these nonprofit organizations. Cnaan et al. (2011) show that third-party organizations have potential to particularly influence engaged and large donors. Building on principal-agent theory, which points to reductions of uncertainty among donors, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: A stronger (voluntary) nonprofit accountability activity has a greater positive effect on donation behavior than a weaker activity.

Research Methodology

Procedure and Research Design

To achieve full transparency, I report how I determined my sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the study (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). To test the hypotheses, a between-subjects experimental design was conducted. Based on the aforementioned considerations as well as nonprofit practice, four conditions reflecting the four different forms of (voluntary) nonprofit accountability were designed to assess the corresponding effects. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.

To avoid undesirable effects concerning participants’ familiarity and prior knowledge of specific brands, a hypothetical nonprofit organization named VisionAID was developed; this procedure ensured equal experimental conditions among all participants. VisionAID was presented as a humanitarian aid organization operating internationally, considering that uncertainty among stakeholders is most prevalent in contexts where the organizations’ donors and beneficiaries differ significantly and are separated by large distances (Bekkers, 2010).

The experimental structure was identical for all conditions. Participants from each condition were provided with general information about the vision and aim of VisionAID as well as information on the organizational accountability, namely, its quality and transparency standards. To not unintentionally vary other variables and overload participants (Koschate-Fischer & Schandelmeier, 2014), the information was designed to be precise and brief, yet containing all relevant information. Although the general information on VisionAID was identical among all conditions, information relating to the organization’s accountability fundamentally differed. To further exclude undesirable effects beyond the variations of the independent variable, each condition’s basic structure and design was essentially equal and varied only by a few words; see Online Appendix II.

In the first condition, participants were provided with the strongest form of voluntary nonprofit accountability, namely, externally certified accountability including accreditation and awarding of “seals of approval.” That is, participants were told that VisionAID voluntarily complies with externally certified quality and transparency standards that go beyond legal regulation and include accreditation by an independent third-party organization. In addition, it was said that VisionAID holds a recognized seal of approval that certifies the organization is responsible and transparent in the handling of donations, which is a significant characteristic of accreditation. The seal is not the German DZI Seal-of-Approval but a fictitious one to create equal conditions among the participants of this condition.

Condition 2 refers to internal voluntary nonprofit accountability, which is a weaker form of voluntary accountability. The paragraph on accountability was designed to say that VisionAID has internal quality and transparency standards. Participants were told that VisionAID voluntarily complies with such internal standards, and thereby goes beyond the minimum legal regulation. Internal accountability is considered weak given that the internal institution of VisionAID (rather than an independent external one) verifies compliance without external review (Gugerty, 2009; Slatten et al., 2011).

In the third condition, participants were told that VisionAID’s quality and transparency standards are in accordance with legal minimum standards. It is important to note that almost all organizations in the nonprofit sector comply at least with legal minimum accountability standards to maintain nonprofit tax status. Yet, huge differences between each country’s accountability and governance standards exist, and the strength of legal regulation varies tremendously. For example, legal regulation is not as strong in some Western European countries compared with the United States, where nonprofit organizations are required to provide annual reports according to “Form 990” (Internal Revenue Service [IRS]; Anheier et al., 2013). Although the range of legal minimum standards varies among countries, organizations have nonetheless the potential to voluntarily comply with additional standards beyond legal regulation (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010).

In the fourth condition, participants were offered no nonprofit accountability. This condition fundamentally differs from the other three conditions considering that organizations not complying with any accountability standards are most often exposed, for instance, within the scope of a scandal (Slatten et al., 2011). Given the increasing number of scandals in the nonprofit sector and related negative impacts, the potential effects of no nonprofit accountability is accordingly included in this study. As such, the paragraph on accountability was designed to say that VisionAID has no quality and transparency standards. More comprehensive information was then provided regarding VisionAID’s noncompliance with standards.

Pretest

Given the limited previous empirically supported insights on voluntary nonprofit accountability, a pretest with 102 participants was conducted. The pretest results revealed three main insights. First, the manipulation check, as further detailed below, was successful in confirming that the various conditions sufficiently differed from each other. Therefore, the same manipulation check was used in the main study. Second, initial results indicated that the different forms of (voluntary) nonprofit accountability influenced the dependent variables distinctively, so these variations of the independent variable were also used for the main study. Moreover, because scholars have highlighted the relevance of seal of approval logos and visual illustrations within the context of external certification and accreditation, a fifth condition was initially tested. This condition only differed from Condition 1 in terms of the presence of a seal of approval logo. A t test between the logo-absent and logo-present conditions revealed no significant difference relating to the dependent variables. Therefore, both subconditions were merged into one single condition for the main study (Condition 1) with one logo-absent and one seal-present version. This still offered the possibility to control for potential logo effects.

Manipulation Check

To test the effectiveness of the variation of the independent variable, a manipulation check was conducted. In doing so, a dichotomous variable for the type of quality sign was created. Cross-tabulations were then conducted using this variable (“According to the description, with which quality and transparency standards does VisionAID comply with?”) and responses to the manipulation check—VisionAID has . . . (a) no quality and transparency standards, (b) legal minimum quality and transparency standards, (c) internal quality and transparency standards, (d) externally certified quality and transparency standards, (e) I don’t know. This procedure is consistent with other manipulation checks on the validity of quality standards, focusing on seals and certifications (e.g., Atkinson & Rosenthal, 2014).

The results show that 73.93% of the participants answered this question correctly. It follows that respondents well remembered the exact information received, suggesting that the conditions fundamentally differ from one another. Therefore, the manipulation was successful, χ²(12; N = 407) = 611.82; p < .001, and further analyses on how variations of the independent variable influence the dependent variables are feasible. To depict reality, all participants including the ones that did not answer the manipulation check correctly were further considered.

Data Collection and Sample

The online experiment was launched in March 2016 in cooperation with the research laboratory of the university. The highest ethical standards were maintained at any time during the elaboration of this study, and they were followed as prescribed by the ethical guidelines of the university, and the research laboratory itself. Participants were mainly students enrolled at the university. Given that individual difference variables are not focus of this research experiment, students are particularly suitable due to the high homogeneity of this group (e.g., Koschate-Fischer & Schandelmeier, 2014). On behalf of the research laboratory, recruitment messages including the online link for participation were sent via email. Potential participants were invited to participate in an online experiment in the area of nonprofit marketing that is part of a research project; marketing was chosen over accountability to avoid undesirable experimental effects. Moreover, information was given regarding the length of the questionnaire and that all collected data are handled strictly confidentially and for scientific purposes only. As thanks for participation, potential participants were informed about the chance to win an Amazon voucher for 50 Euros, as they would be entered into a lottery; the distribution of the 10 vouchers was entirely random.

In total, a sample of N = 407 participants was collected (see Appendix I; response rate: 12.18%). They were split by gender, with 175 (43.00%) men and 232 (57.00%) women. Their age varied between 18 and 53 years, with a mean age of 25.91 years, and the majority of participants (74.69%) had a monthly net income lower than 1,000 Euros. Moreover, 217 participants (53.32%) donated money to charitable causes in 2015, and the mean donation amount was 39.64 Euros.

Measurement

After reading information about VisionAID and its accountability activities (Conditions 1-4 depending on the research group), participants answered a short questionnaire. By combining the respective conditions with the four corresponding dependent variables, this study tests the hypothesized effects of (voluntary) nonprofit accountability on public’s attitude. The survey was laid out as follows: The experimental manipulation came first, followed by the donation allocation. The manipulation check came next, followed by questions regarding public trust, reputation, and perceived quality. Finally, control variables and socio-demographics were measured. It was important to test the donation allocation prior to the manipulation check due to the high sensitivity of donation behavior for the purpose of this study. The manipulation check immediately followed due to the fact that experimental variations also have limited effects over time (e.g., Koschate-Fischer & Schandelmeier, 2014). In total, completion of the survey took participants an average of 7.5 min.

To assess public trust, reputation, perceived quality, and donation behavior toward VisionAID, four dependent variables were integrated in the survey. Public trust (α = .94) and reputation (α = .92) were operationalized with three, and six items, respectively, utilizing a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored by strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (7). Perceived quality was measured by two items (α = .94; Erdem & Swait, 2004). A standard procedure of the university research laboratory further incentivizes student participation with an Amazon voucher lottery. This study utilized and adapted that procedure in accordance with Winterich, Mittal, and Aquino (2013) to assess donation behavior. Participants were told they could choose to donate any portion of their potential winnings in 10 Euros increments, ranging from no donation/50 Euros Amazon voucher to 50 Euros donation/no voucher. The dependent variable resulted in the amount (if any) of the 50 Euros allocated as a donation to VisionAID and included the following options: 0 Euros, 10 Euros, 20 Euros, 30 Euros, 40 Euros, and 50 Euros. To not influence participants’ donation behavior, participants were assured that their decision to donate would not influence their chances of winning.

Because VisionAID was developed only for the purpose of this study, participants who chose to donate were asked at the end of the survey if, upon winning, they would like to donate to an equivalent German nonprofit organization—CARE Deutschland-Luxemburg—or rather receive the full Amazon voucher. CARE was chosen as it highly equals VisionAID in its organizational vision, goals, and work focus. Despite the similarity of both organizations, 32 out of 174 participants (18.4 %) decided to receive their gains in the form of an Amazon voucher although they initially chose to donate to VisionAID. Overall, 142 participants (81.6 %) agreed on the procedure.

Control variables

To identify public opinion toward accountability standards in general, the survey included questions regarding the participants’ general attitude toward the importance of quality and transparency standards, and relating to external certification and accreditation including seals of approval in particular. In addition, participants rated the credibility of seals of approval. Moreover, the study controlled for people’s attitudes toward humanitarian aid given that VisionAID was introduced as a humanitarian aid organization.

Results

Prior to hypotheses testing, a descriptive analysis was conducted, and the average values were calculated to form the scale composites. Appendix I contains a list of all measurement items and variables, including the means and standard deviations. The Cronbach’s α values of the dependent variables exceed the recommended threshold value of .70, indicating high internal consistency among the corresponding variables. A check of the z values for skewness and kurtosis revealed that the data regarding public trust, reputation, and perceived quality was sufficiently parametric. Therefore, the conduction of variance analyses is appropriate, in particular if violations are modest (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). In contrast, for donation behavior, the assumption of a normal distribution was contradicted resulting in the adoption of a nonparametric test. Finally, a post hoc power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed high statistical power (>0.90) of the experimental design for each of the dependent variables.

To test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, three one-way between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted, and Welch and Brown–Forsythe tests, respectively. For public trust, F(3, 403) = 33.25, p < .05; reputation, F(3, 403) = 34.98, p < .05; and perceived quality, F(3, 403) = 46.57, p < .05; results reveal significant differences among the experimental conditions. Because Levene’s test did not verify homogeneity of variance for public trust (p < .05), but for reputation and perceived quality (p > .05), both Games-Howell and Tukey tests were chosen for post hoc comparisons. The tests revealed significant differences among the mean scores of each dependent variable between most conditions; see Table 1. The superscripts show the results of the post hoc analyses, that is, which variables are significantly different among the conditions. If the superscripts for one condition are equal among the variables, the mean values of these conditions do not differ significantly. For example, Condition 4 (external certified nonprofit accountability) shows the superscript “a” for public trust meaning that this condition significantly differs from all other conditions. For public trust, the Games-Howell test further indicated that internal nonprofit accountability differs only significantly from external certified nonprofit accountability. Internal nonprofit accountability is significantly different from external certified nonprofit accountability and no nonprofit accountability, and external certified nonprofit accountability differs significantly from internal nonprofit accountability and no nonprofit accountability. Yet, given the nondifference between the external certified and legal minimum nonprofit accountability conditions, Hypothesis 1 is not fully supported by the data. For both reputation and perceived quality, Tukey tests revealed the existence of three subconditions (p < .05) consisting of (a) external certified nonprofit accountability, (b) legal minimum and internal nonprofit accountability, and (c) no nonprofit accountability. Consequently, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported by the data.

Table 1.

Mean Scores and Differences Among the Experimental Conditions.

Dependent variable	Total	Condition 4	Condition 3	Condition 2	Condition 1
	Total	No	Legal minimum	Internal	External certified
	. . . (voluntary) nonprofit accountability
	(N = 407)100%	(n = 105)26%	(n = 101)25%	(n = 105)26%	(n = 96)23%
Public trust	3.71 (1.61)	2.57 (1.32)^a	4.02 (1.47)^b,c,d	3.83 (1.63)^b,c	4.51 (1.33)^b,d
Reputation	3.02 (1.31)	2.11 (1.16)^a	3.20 (1.17)^b	3.08 (1.21)^b	3.76 (1.12)^c
Perceived quality	3.47 (1.46)	2.33 (1.31)^a	3.65 (1.16)^b	3.59 (1.34)^b	4.38 (1.21)^c
Donation behavior	1.65 (0.98)	1.34 (0.83)^a	1.84 (1.12)^b	1.63 (0.88)^b	1.81 (0.99)^b

Note. Displayed are the mean values; standard deviations in brackets; all experimental conditions are significant (p < .001).

a, b, c, d

Mean values that share superscripts are not significantly different (p < .05).

To test Hypothesis 4, a Kruskal–Wallis test was conducted for nonparametric data. The test revealed a significant statistical difference among the conditions, χ²(3; N = 407) = 24.69, p < .05. To reveal where differences between the conditions occurred, pairwise comparisons using Mann–Whitney tests were carried out. Pairwise comparisons among external certified, internal, and legal minimum nonprofit accountability revealed no significant differences. In contrast, Mann–Whitney U was found to be 3,448.50 (Z = −4.49, p < .05) for Condition 4 compared with Condition 1, 4,303.00 (Z = −3.29, p < .05) compared with Condition 2, and 3,747.00 (Z = −4.25, p < .05) compared with Condition 3. It follows that the no nonprofit accountability condition significantly differs from all other conditions, while no significant differences exist among the legal minimum, internal, and external certified nonprofit accountability condition. Based on these findings, Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed. Figure 2 shows the mean scores of the dependent variables with respect to the four experimental conditions.

Figure 2.

Mean scores of public trust, reputation, perceived quality, and donation behavior by experimental condition.

Further Results

Beyond hypotheses testing, the difference among the logo-absent and logo-present version of Condition 1 (external certified nonprofit accountability) was investigated, that is, whether a seal of approval logo makes a difference among the four dependent variables. Although the logo-present version tended to have higher mean scores, the four t tests between both subversions revealed no significant differences (p > .05) for all dependent variables. Moreover, noteworthy are the relatively high mean values of 5.37 for attitude toward humanitarian help, and 5.92 for attitude toward accountability standards. The mean value of credibility of seals of approval is 4.17. In neither case did the participant’s attitude affect the findings.

Discussion

Overall, the key findings of this study reveal considerable differences among the four (voluntary) nonprofit accountability conditions, whereas certain nondifferences provide additional insights that need to be considered. Precisely, people ascribe nonprofit organizations with externally certified quality and transparency standards higher levels of reputation and quality (see also Ebrahim, 2010; Gugerty, 2009; Ortmann & Svítková, 2007). Accredited organizations also seem to be more trusted compared with organizations with only internal standards. However, although the external certified nonprofit accountability condition has a higher mean value compared with the legal minimum condition, the results reveal no statistical difference so that actual effects of higher voluntary nonprofit accountability (compared with the legal minimum) cannot be fully supported, and shall be interpreted with caution. Finally, accredited organizations do not obtain more donations than nonaccredited ones. This might stem from the fact that to stimulate donation behavior, further factors need to be considered.

Bekkers and Wiepking (2011a) as well as Sargeant, Ford, and West (2006), for example, point out to the importance of factors such as awareness of need, values, or costs and benefits. Bekkers and Wiepking (2011b) further reveal a range of socio-demographic characteristics including religion, education, and age that have potential to influence public trust and donation behavior toward nonprofit organizations.

Moreover, nonprofit organizations that voluntarily comply with internal accountability standards do not enhance public’s attitude compared with organizations that only follow legal minimum standards. This might be due to the fact that in terms of addressing issues of uncertainty in the nonprofit sector, internal and nonindependent institutional accountability (compared with a peer or third-party organization) sends less credible signals to the public (Gugerty, 2009). Besides, the mean scores found for this condition are lower compared with the legal minimum condition among the public’s attitude; although this effect is not significant, it might provide some tendencies regarding potential mistrust of organizations setting up their “own” accountability standards. This finding is supported by Ebrahim (2010) who states that “self-regulation also runs the risk of becoming a compliance response if the adopted standards are weak, pro forma, and do not actually improve behavior” (p. 117). Finally, organizations that do not comply with any quality and transparency standards score lower in terms of public trust, reputation, perceived quality, and donation behavior. This finding thus supports earlier claims in nonprofit literature considering that bad accountability is greatly reflected in the organization’s image and drops in donations (Bekkers, 2003; Slatten et al., 2011).

Research Implications and Study Limitations

This study’s experimental design offers a new perspective on how different voluntary nonprofit accountability initiatives and activities influence public’s attitude. It thereby holds substantial contributions and implications for researchers; limitations of the study additionally provide avenues for further research. Specifically, this article broadens the field of research in three main ways. First and in line with other studies (e.g., Bekkers, 2003; Feng et al., 2016), this study provides initial empirical and experimental evidence that through implementing (voluntary) accountability activities, nonprofit organizations can influence public’s attitude. Considering that voluntary accountability is gaining ever more appeal within nonprofit sectors worldwide, scholars should consequently build on this study’s findings and conduct further empirical analyses and experiments (including additional mediator and moderator variables such as occurrence of nonprofit scandals). Nonetheless, when investigating donation behavior in the context of experimental or hypothetical environments, respondents tend to be more generous; according limitations shall be reflected upon interpreting accordant findings. Moreover, despite the advantageousness of using student samples in experimental contexts, other samples should be considered to exclude bias leading to false conclusions for the general public. Finally, although validity and reliability measures of the instruments used in this study have been accurate and widely supported by literature, future research should give particular attention to content validity aspects, particularly for the constructs perceived quality, attitude toward accountability standards, and attitude toward humanitarian aid, or consider using multiple-item scales.

Second, this study empirically investigates two main forms of voluntary nonprofit accountability, internal and externally certified accountability, for the first time. It thereby builds on rather broad categories within the corresponding literature (Lloyd, 2005). Yet, given the many faces of voluntary nonprofit accountability, such as the varying strength of initiatives, scholars should subsequently conduct further investigations. Furthermore, legal accountability rules and regulations vastly differ among different countries, and more empirical investigation is needed within the context of different countries. Finally, this experiment created a fictitious nonprofit organization and 10 participants (2.46%) were unable to assess VisionAID sufficiently to decide on a donation based on the information given. This is particularly true for assessing the organization’s perceived quality based on the rather limited information provided in each condition. Few participants required a more comprehensive description of the organization to assess the organization and make a donation decision. Despite this, considering the large number of participants that did decide to donate to VisionAID (n = 174; 42.75%), the information provided appears to be sufficient for an evaluation and a respective donation decision. However, further investigation could study actual existing organizations and external accreditation and certification systems.

Managerial Implications

This study provides bases for some useful recommendations relating to decisions on accountability activities. A key recommendation is that nonprofit managers that do not yet carry out voluntary accountability activities should thoroughly evaluate whether to implement such activities. Expressly, voluntary nonprofit accountability is often associated with high expenses and costs (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010) and might not always be worth it; particularly considering that nonprofit sectors worldwide consist mainly of smaller and medium-sized organizations that do not have the capacity to comply with voluntary accountability standards beyond legal regulations.

Specifically, for accredited organizations, this study provides evidence that externally certified voluntary accountability is worth the costs in relation to higher reputation and perceived quality. Noting that no significant differences exist regarding donation behavior compared with the legal minimum condition, organizations that have the ability, however, must subsequently include additional activities other than voluntary accountability to promote donation behavior. Mechanisms such as awareness of need or organizational values as well as socio-demographic and psychographic factors need to be considered when developing accordant fundraising strategies and measures. In contrast, organizations that adopt internal voluntary accountability standards should carefully evaluate whether they continue to take on the additional costs associated with this compliance given that no significant effects on public’s attitude occurred compared with the legal minimum condition.

This study’s findings ultimately provide evidence for the potential of voluntary accountability to prove financial and ethical integrity, and thus, send signals of the nonprofit organization’s quality and trustworthiness. In the context of nonprofit scandals and demanding donors as well as technology-induced market transparency and the difficulty of assessing the quality of nonprofit services, the topic of voluntary nonprofit accountability is ever more gaining in relevance. Against this background, this study has been an attempt to sensitize organizations to manage the balancing act between satisfying stakeholder needs and proving financial and ethical integrity, and considering increased resource costs that come with improving nonprofit accountability. As such, voluntary nonprofit accountability is no panacea but needs to be considered among a range of other important factors to successfully enhance the public’s attitude and eventually promote donation behavior. This initial approach should hopefully stimulate and contribute to future discussions about voluntary accountability in nonprofit organizations and its effects.

Footnotes

Appendix

Appendix I.

Measurement Items and Descriptive Analysis.

		N	%	M	SD
	Socio-Demographic Characteristics	407	100
Age	18–24	167	41.03
	25–29	169	41.52
	30–39	62	15.32
	>40	9	2.22
Gender	Female	232	57.00
	Male	175	43.00
Monthly net income	No income	10	2.46
	<450 euros	120	29.48
	450–999 euros	184	45.21
	1,000-1,999 euros	70	17.20
	> 2,000 euros	6	1.48
	Missing responses	17	4.18
Donation Behavior	Donation in 2015 (in Euros)	217	53.32
	No donation in 2015	190	46.68
Dependent Variables*:
Donation Behavior (Winterich, Mittal, & Aquino, 2013)
Donation choices were: 1 = No donation/50 Euros voucher		233	57.25
2 = 10 Euros donation/40 Euros voucher		117	28.75
3 = 20 Euros donation/30 Euros voucher		38	9.34
4 = 30 Euros donation/20 Euros voucher		11	2.70
5 = 40 Euros donation/10 Euros voucher		1	0.25
6 = 50 Euros donation/no voucher		7	1.72
Public Trust (Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2008) (α = 0.94)
I trust this nonprofit brand to always act in the best interests of the cause.				3.55	1.67
I trust this nonprofit brand to conduct its operations ethically.				3.86	1.69
I trust this nonprofit brand to use donated funds appropriately.				3.73	1.77
Reputation (adapted from Sarstedt & Schloderer, 2010) (α = 0.92)
VisionAID is an organization I can identify with.				3.08	1.66
VisionAID is an organization I would miss if it no longer existed.				2.20	1.40
I regard VisionAID as a likeable organization.				3.57	1.63
VisionAID is a top nonprofit organization in its market.				3.11	1.53
As far as I can imagine VisionAID is recognized world-wide.				3.10	1.51
I believe that VisionAID performs at a premium level in the field of humanitarian aid.				3.07	1.55
Perceived Quality (Erdem & Swait, 2004) (α = 0.92)
The quality of VisionAID is very high.				3.38	1.52
In terms of overall quality, I’d rate VisionAID as follows:				3.56	1.50
Control Variables
Attitude towards Accountability Standards (α = 0.68)
In general, I find quality and transparency standards important for fundraising organizations.				6.12	1.28
In general, I find external quality and transparency standards such as seals of approval and certification by third-party organizations important for fundraising organizations.				5.71	1.28
Credibility of Seals of Approval (Moussa & Touzani, 2008) (α = 0.94)
I can trust a seal of approval that it certifies what it claims.				4.13	1.50
Seals of approval come from recognized institutions.				4.16	1.35
Seals of approval are honest.				3.93	1.46
Institutions that award seals of approval have good intentions.				4.09	1.40
Institutions that award seals of approval have undergone a serious test before awarding.				4.16	1.44
A seal of approval gives me confidence.				4.52	1.57
Attitude towards Humanitarian Aid (α = 0.77)
VisionAID operates in a field (humanitarian aid), which I regard as important.				5.60	1.41
VisionAID works on the solution of a socially relevant problem.				5.14	1.55

Note. M = mean; SD = standard deviation; α = cronbach’s alpha; * for mean scores per experimental condition see Table 1.

Acknowledgements

I thank Silke Boenigk, Jurgen Willems, Jutta Schrötgens, Larissa Sundermann, and Marcel Mayr (University of Hamburg) for their valuable feedback in developing this study. Moreover, I would like to thank Sebastian Späth (University of Hamburg) as well as the three reviewers for their constructive feedback, and great contribution, to the high quality of this study.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online.

Author Biography

Annika Becker is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Hamburg and a project coordinator of a refugee study orientation program. She obtained her PhD in 2016 at the Chair of Management of Public, Private and Nonprofit Organizations at the University of Hamburg, Germany. Her main research interests are in the area of nonprofit marketing and branding, trust and accountability in nonprofit organizations, and refugee services management.

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