Generational Succession in American Giving: Donors Down,Dollars Per Donor Holding Steady But Signs That It Is Starting to Slip

Abstract

Comparing two generations at the same point in their life cycles, four decades apart, indicates that average giving to charitable organizations (not including congregations) by Baby Boom families has remained roughly in line with the level of giving done by the Greatest and Silent generations, but that average giving by GenX and Millennial families is lower. All three generations exhibit the confluence of two divergent trends: lower percentages who give large amounts, but among families who do give large amounts, levels of giving compared with donors in previous generations are similar if not higher. The two divergent trends also characterize giving to religious congregations. Although “dollars per donor holding steady or up” describes Millennial, GenX, and Baby Boom families compared with the Greatest and Silent generations, when the former three generations are compared with each other, there are some indications that average giving among donors is starting to slip.

Keywords

generational succession in American giving comparing the giving of different generations at the same point in their life cycles average giving to charitable organizations Millennials GenX Baby Boom families compared with the Greatest and Silent generations

Introduction

Western democracies rely on charitable organizations to provide public goods to degrees that differ across countries (Anheier & Salamon, 2006). In countries placing more emphasis on government provision of public goods, it is necessary to build majority political support to effect a change from the current provision level of public goods in either direction, up or down. Without political action, the public good provision level does not automatically change. In contrast, in countries relying more heavily on charitable organizations, such as the United States (e.g., see Brown, Einolf, & Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2015), generational succession can automatically affect public good provision: if a previous generation is followed by a rising one whose voluntary giving is less, then all else equal the level of public goods provided by charitable organizations will be lower. In such countries, it is important for charitable organizations to anticipate the direction of generational succession in giving so that they can respond. Accordingly, there is intense interest in the giving patterns of rising generations (e.g., Bhagat, Loeb, & Rovner, 2010; Center on Philanthropy, 2008; Charities Aid Foundation of America, 2015; Eisenberg, 2013).

Despite the importance of, and interest in, knowing how generational succession is affecting giving, there is little evidence about succession. This is because evidence about succession requires data measuring the giving of a previous generation at a point in time decades ago when they were at ages in their life cycle that match the ages at which a rising generation is today. Although the Philanthropy Panel Study (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2015) has measured the giving of American families since 2001, data measuring the giving of previous generations are scarce. To our knowledge, the only attempt to use such data from the United States was by Wilhelm, Rooney, and Tempel (2007) who found that giving to charitable organizations by the Baby Boom generation in 2000 when they were ages 35 to 49 was in line with the level of giving done by previous generations in 1973 when they were 35 to 49, but that giving to religious congregations was lower. However, there is no corresponding evidence describing America’s current rising generations: Generation X and the Millennials. Also, it is not known whether giving to charitable organizations by the Baby Boom since 2000 has remained in line with previous generations, or not.

There is reason to think that American Millennial and GenX families may be departing from the giving pattern seen in the Baby Boom and previous generations. In the United Kingdom, soon after policy makers signaled a desire to shift away from government provision of public goods toward more reliance on charitable organizations (Brindle, 2010), Smith (2012) found that smaller percentages of people in rising generations were giving to charitable organizations than in the generations they were following (see Cowley, McKenzie, Pharoah, & Smith, 2011, for more details). For example, in 2010, the percentage among GenX people ages 30 to 44 who had given to a charitable organization in the past 2 weeks was 25%, compared with 34% among people from the Silent generation (and the first few years of the Baby Boom) in 1980 when they were 30 to 44.

This article describes generational succession in American giving using the National Study of Philanthropy to measure the giving of American families from the Greatest and Silent generations in 1973 and seven waves of the Philanthropy Panel Study to measure the giving of families from the Baby Boom, GenX, and Millennial generations over 2000-2012. The ages of the 1973 generation are aligned to the ages of the generation in the 2000s so that the giving of both generations is measured at comparable ages in their life cycles. We analyze giving to charitable organizations whose primary purposes are helping people in need, health, education, youth and family services, international aid, the environment, the arts, and community improvement. Giving to religious congregations is analyzed separately. There are four main results. First, giving to charitable organizations by Baby Boom families has remained roughly in line with the level of giving done by the Greatest and Silent generations four decades ago. Second, and in contrast, giving to charitable organizations by GenX and Millennial families appears to be lower. Third, these results emerge from the confluence of two divergent trends: the percentage of families who give large amounts (by which we mean over US$600, roughly speaking) is much lower in the Baby Boom, GenX, and Millennial generations compared with what it was in the Greatest and Silent generations, but among Baby Boom, GenX, and Millennial families who do give large amounts, the level of giving is in line with donors from previous generations, if not higher. In other words, the description of generational succession in giving to charitable organizations appears to be “(the number of) donors down, dollars per donor holding steady or up.”

Fourth, giving by all three rising generations to congregations is lower. Once again, however, this result emerges from the same confluence of two divergent trends donors down, dollars per donor holding steady or up.

Relative to Wilhelm et al. (2007), our contribution is to present comparisons across five generations, instead of just two. For the United States, these comparisons are the first generation succession results describing GenX and the Millennials. A second contribution relative to Wilhelm et al. (2007) is that we present results about percentages in each generation who donate and the average amounts given by donors. It is this contribution that leads to our “donors down, dollars per donors holding steady” conclusion. Relative to Smith (2012), our contribution, in addition to the American context of course, is to separately analyze giving to charitable organizations and giving to congregations. The evidence from the United Kingdom also indicates “donors down, pounds per donor up,” suggesting that this pattern of generational succession is broader than a single country context. We return to this in the “Discussion” section.

The results are significant for practitioners. Of course, practitioners are well-aware that the giving patterns of GenX and Millennials are important, but our results suggest that practitioners can anticipate that giving levels from these rising generations may not be in line with what they have been expecting. More importantly, and we hope more helpfully, the results provide some indication about a successful practitioner response. The results suggest that a response based on encouraging current donors to give more may be unrealistic because current donors are already giving at the same or higher levels than donors from previous generations. A response based on the difficult work of engaging new donors may be the best path forward. Finally, the results also contribute to the larger literature describing generational succession in a range of attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Hout & Fischer, 2014; Taylor, 2014).

Theory and Literature Review

Numerous events combine to influence a generation’s ethos, its attitudes, and behavioral patterns. Wars, economic distress, and political crises—shocks to the society—influence a generation’s ethos long after the events themselves have passed. The response to shocks by society and its institutions, and whether that response is deemed successful or not, further influence generational ethos. Generational theory links these events, shocks, and responses to attitudes and behaviors that are seen as emblematic of the generation’s ethos. In this section, we describe generational ethos as we see it, and discuss how it might connect to generational patterns in charitable giving.

The defining events of the Greatest generation (born 1927 and earlier) were the Great Depression and World War II. Both were cataclysms of such magnitude that it is hard to imagine how the generation could have come through without a socially unified response. Although the years of suffering were harsh and long, the federal government’s responses were eventually deemed a success: the Depression was overcome; the War was won. And institutions were created, such as Social Security and a strong military, that realistically held out the promise that the country was better-prepared should the future bring cataclysms of similar magnitude. Unifying to achieve common purposes, and having confidence that institutions could achieve those purposes, understandably became part of the Greatest generation’s ethos. Putnam (2000) relates a similar narrative.

The benefits of common purpose and institutions also became part of the Silent generation’s (born 1928-1945) ethos. The Silent generation’s childhood and adolescent formative years were the years just described, plus the subsequent prosperity years of the 1950s. By no means were the 1950s free of conflict or worry, but the Silent generation came of age having experienced directly, or been told stories about, how common purpose and institutions brought their parents through the Great Depression and World War II. The prosperity the Silent generation experienced for themselves backed that up. Evidence indicates that compared with the generations to follow, the Silent generation had, and has, high confidence (trust) in institutions, such as the federal government, organized religion, the military, education, and the scientific community (Twenge, Campbell, & Carter, 2014). Putnam (1995) referred to both generations, Greatest and Silent combined, as the “long civic” generation: “substantially more engaged in community affairs and substantially more trusting than those younger than they” (p. 675).

Events to follow worked against the formation of common purpose and confidence in institutions among the people born in the Baby Boom (1946-1964). The federal government led the country into war in Vietnam and was unable to overcome economic instability in the 1970s. Confidence in government and political institutions were further undermined by the Watergate scandal. During this time, the percentage of people placing a high emphasis on autonomy of thought rose from 45% among people born in 1900 to 65% among people born 1945 and after (Hout & Fischer, 2014). Indeed, protest movements working against established institutions became central to ending the war and achieving progress in civil rights. The percentages participating in the institutions of civic life—such as writing a letter to a newspaper, attending a public meeting, serving as a committee member for a local organization, and so on—were much lower in the Baby Boom than was the case in earlier years among the Greatest and Silent generations (this claim is based on lining up the ages at which participation is being measured in Putnam, 2000). Evidence indicates confidence in institutions to be at a low among the Baby Boom (Twenge et al., 2014). Increasing autonomy of thought (Hoge, Johnson, & Luidens, 1994), many churches’ opposition to the anti-war and civil rights movements (Bogaski, 2014; Hadden, 1969; Marsh, 1997; Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2014; cf. Hoge et al., 1994), and opposition to changing attitudes about abortion, extra-marital sex, and recreational drug use among many, though not all, in the Baby Boom (Putnam, Campbell, & Garrett, 2010) weakened confidence in religious institutions.

This changing generational ethos, begun in the Baby Boom, continues to take hold among GenX (born 1965-1980) and the Millennials (born 1981 and after), two generations that are less distinct from each other, than are the distinctions between the Greatest, Silent, and Baby Boom generations. The government response to the September 11 attack—wars in Afghanistan and Iraq begun when the Millennials were adolescents and the oldest GenXers were only 36—has yet to produce a definitive resolution, and no end is in sight. The response to the 2007 Great Recession—which hit the Millennials when they were just entering the labor force and GenXers when they were still in the first half of their working years—was a success compared with the counterfactual depression that could have happened (Blinder & Zandi, 2015), but a failure in terms of communicating that success (Blinder, 2013). Not surprisingly, confidence in institutions remains low among GenX and Millennials relative to the Greatest and Silent generations (Twenge et al., 2014). In addition, there is weaker confidence in the specific institution that embodies the Greatest and Silent generations’ confidence in government: Social Security (35% of GenX and 42% of Millennials think they will receive zero retirement dollars from the program; Taylor, 2014). The percentage of Millennials anticipating zero dollars from Social Security has recently risen to 51% (Pew Research Center, 2014).

Autonomy of thought remains highly valued among GenX and Millennials, and accompanying this are increases in self-centeredness (specifically, narcissism; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Keith Campbell, & Bushman, 2008) and decreases in empathic concern for others (Konrath, O’Brien, & Hsing, 2011). Participation in the institutions of civic life is even lower, at least among GenX (see Putnam, 2000; Millennials were too young to be included in this analysis). Confidence in religious institutions continues to weaken, as reflected in the rising percentage of Millennials who have no denominational preference—35% compared with the Baby Boom’s 17% and the Greatest generation’s 8% (Taylor, 2014). This weakening confidence in religious institutions is in part a reaction to conservative religious institutions becoming politically more assertive in opposing changing attitudes about sex (Hout & Fischer, 2002, 2014; Putnam et al., 2010; Taylor, 2014), and in part because Millennials were raised by the Baby Boom, many of whom had already lost confidence in religious institutions (Hout & Fischer, 2014). Putnam (2000) again offers a similar narrative: although time and money pressure, suburbanization, commuting, television, and other electronic entertainment have contributed to declining civic engagement, the main explanation is generational succession.¹

Previous evidence connecting generation-to-generation change in ethos—changing from common purpose toward increasing autonomy, lower confidence in government, organized religion, and other institutions—to change in behavior has been based primarily on participation: declining number of group memberships (Putnam, 1995), voting (Putnam, 1995), religious preference (Hout & Fischer, 2014; Taylor, 2014), and attendance at worship services (Putnam, 2000; Wilhelm et al., 2007). In terms of giving behavior, this would seem to imply a decline in participation—the percentage who give to charitable organizations—though not necessarily a decline in the average amounts given by those who do choose to donate. It may be that participation in giving reflects underlying engagement, and among the engaged from one generation to the next, donations are little changed. This is in line with pattern described in the “Introduction” section: “number of donors down, but dollars-per-donor holding steady.”

Data and Method

Our method is to compare giving by people of the same age, but from different years (hence from different generations), adjusting for inflation and real income growth. In this section, we provide a basic overview of the data and method (full details are available in the online appendix).

Generations and Life Cycle Stages

The National Study of Philanthropy describes the giving of American families in 1973 (Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1977). The seven biennial waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 2001-2013 describe the giving of American families every other year, 2000-2012 (Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 2015). Both studies measure American giving to a comprehensive set of charitable organizations. Among recent studies, only the Panel Study measures giving at the top of the distribution well enough to permit comparison with the National Study (Wilhelm, 2007).

Our approach is to define generational cohorts based on working-age people (ages 25-60) in the 1973 National Study and compare them with same-aged people in the Panel Study during 2000-2012. Specifically, we compare National Study 36- to 60-year-olds—members of the Greatest and Silent generations (1928-1937)—with Panel Study respondents aged 36 to 60—members of the Baby Boom. We refer to people aged 36 to 60 as being in middle and senior adulthood.

For our analysis of Millennials and GenX, we compare National Study 25- to 47-year-olds—members of the Silent generation plus the first three Baby Boom years (1946-1948) and last two Greatest generation years (1926-1927)—with Panel Study respondents aged 25 to 47—Millennials and GenX. We refer to people aged 25 to 47 as young and middle adults.

We selected these particular age ranges (25-47 and 36-60), and allowed them to overlap, to achieve two objectives subject to a constraint. Our first objective was to keep the age ranges wide (23 years for the young/middle adults and 25 years for the middle/senior adults). We want wide age ranges to maximize statistical power in light of the National Study’s relatively small sample size (N = 1,649) which becomes yet smaller upon any splitting into subsamples by age. Narrower age ranges would lead to loss in precision. Our second objective was to keep the age ranges fixed between 1973 and 2000-2012. This is obviously necessary for comparisons between generations that hold constant the position in the life cycle. Pursuing these two objectives—fixed age ranges that are wide enough to deliver power—implies some mixing of generations within the fixed age ranges. Therefore, we constrained our pursuit of the two objectives by requiring that the mixing of generations remain relatively inline with the theory developed in the “Theory and Literature Review” section. For example, the age range 36 to 60 during 2000-2012 yields only Baby Boomers (no mixing of generations at all) and in 1973 mixes members of the Greatest and Silent generations. This mixing is relatively inline with the “Theory and Literature Review” section theory in that the Greatest and Silent generations are much more similar to each other than either are to the Baby Boom. Readers interested in results with essentially no mixing of generations can find them in the online appendix, where such results suggest qualification or nuance to the results presented below for 25- to 47-year-olds and 36- to 60-year-olds, we will point that out.

Measuring Giving

The Panel Study queries giving separately by nine purposes of charitable organizations: helping people with basic needs, youth and family services, health, education, combined appeals, community, cultural, environmental, and international, as well as a “mop-up”/”other” category. In Study 1, we aggregate all of this into one category called giving to “charitable organizations”; some may prefer the label “non-profit organizations,” and we have no objection to that label. Study 2 is about giving for religious purposes/spiritual development. This is measured with a question that focuses the respondent’s attention on giving primarily not only to congregations but also to TV and radio ministries. We refer to these amounts as giving to “congregations.”

In the National Study, a skip pattern in the questionnaire has implications for how we can compare its data with those from the Panel Study. National Study respondents were first asked if they had given anything to a religious or other charitable organization. If “yes,” then a second question asked if that were more than US$100. If the answer to that second question was “no,” then all subsequent questions about giving were skipped. Only if the answer to the US$100 question were “yes” did subsequent questions determine (a) whether the person gave specifically to charitable organizations, (b) whether the person gave specifically to religious congregations, and (c) the separate amounts given to each of (a) and (b). To maintain comparability across the National and Panel Studies, we follow Wilhelm et al. (2007) and artificially impose this same information restriction on the Panel Study respondents.

Method

Continuing to follow Wilhelm et al. (2007), amounts given in 1973 dollars from the National Study are adjusted forward to 2012 to account for both inflation and real income growth. For example, the inflation/real growth adjustment for 36- to 60-year-olds from 1973 to 2012—a factor of 6.16—yields an amount that reflects expectations of what the giving of 36- to 60-year-olds in 2012 would look like if all that had changed were inflation and real growth. In short, those expectations, and our results, are about generational succession in giving as a percentage of income available to each generation, even though we present the results in dollar terms to ease discussion. We adjust the Panel Study data similarly, and express all results in 2012 terms.

We report estimates of giving averaged across all members of a generational cohort, including both donors and non-donors, just as in Wilhelm et al. (2007). In addition, we extend their work by presenting estimates of percentages in each generation who give and the average amount given by the donors. Here again, the National Study’s skip pattern has implications for the comparisons we can carry out. For a donor in the National Study who gave less than US$100, we do not know for sure whether the person gave to charitable organizations because he or she could have donated only to religious congregations. However, if the donor gave more than US$100, then we do know the amounts they gave separately to charitable organizations and congregations. Hence, in the National Study, we can estimate the fraction of people who both (a) gave to charitable organizations and (b) who gave large amounts (more than US$100) to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined. Again, we impose this same information restriction on the Panel Study respondents: continuing with the comparison with 36- to 60-year-olds from 1973, we estimate the fraction of Panel Study 36- to 60-year-olds who both (a) gave to charitable organizations and (b) who gave more than US$616 (US$100 [1973 dollars] times the 6.16 adjustment factor) to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined.

A second extension is that we examine two “near-term” generation-to-generation comparisons: Millennials compared with GenX in young adulthood and GenX compared with the Baby Boom in middle adulthood. Because these comparisons do not require the National Study, we can compare the percentages who give any amount, not just large amounts, to charitable organizations (or to congregations), and the average amounts given by them. To distinguish these near-term comparisons from those involving the 1973 National Study, we will refer to the latter as “long-term” comparisons.

We present weighted averages, just as in Wilhelm et al. (2007). The National Study weights adjust for the high-income oversample. The Panel Study weights adjust for attrition and mortality over time. A third extension relative to Wilhelm et al. (2007) is the greater precision in the Panel Study estimates due to our use of seven waves from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We pool the seven waves, and calculate clustered standard errors.

Results

Study 1: Charitable Organizations

In Table 1, we begin with the long-term generation-to-generation comparison in Panel 1. Row 1 column 1 indicates that 25- to 47-year-olds in 1973 on average gave US$624 (in 2012 terms) to charitable organizations. The estimate in column 2 indicates that average giving among people ages 25 to 47 in the 2000s (Millennial young adults and GenX young/middle adults) is US$443. The difference in column 3 indicates that the Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults are giving US$180 less than would have been expected based on the US$624 estimated average giving of those in 1973 at the same point in their life cycle, mostly members of the Silent generation (to ease discussion, we will refer to this group simply as the “Silent generation”). The US$180 difference is precisely estimated (two-sided p = .005).²

Table 1.

Giving to Charitable Organizations.

Panel 1. Long-term generation comparison.
	Giving	Silent^a	Millennial/GenX	Difference	Greatest/Silent	Baby Boom	Difference
		(1)	(2)	(3) =(2) – (1)	(4)	(5)	(6) =(5) – (4)
		Young and middle			Middle and senior
		Adulthood (ages 25-47)			Adulthood (ages 36-60)
(1)	Average by all households	624	443	−180***^b	932	880	−52
(1)	Average by all households	[516, 731]	[380, 507]	[−305, −55]	[773, 1,091]	[778, 981]	[−136, 241]
(2)	Fraction who give large amounts^c	0.45	0.28	−0.18***	0.51	0.44	−0.07***
(2)	Fraction who give large amounts^c	[0.42, 0.48]	[0.26, 0.29]	[−0.21, −0.14]	[0.48, 0.54]	[0.42, 0.46]	[−0.10, −0.03]
(3)	Average among those in row (2)	1,369	1,591	222	1,828	2,002	174
(3)	Average among those in row (2)	[1,163, 1,576]	[1,383, 1,799]	[−71, 515]	[1,562, 2,094]	[1,787, 2,217]	[−168, 516]
Panel 2. Near-term generation comparison.
	Giving	GenX	Millennial	Difference	Baby Boom	GenX	Difference
		(1)	(2)	(3) =(2) – (1)	(4)	(5)	(6) =(5) – (4)
		Young adulthood (ages 25-31)			Middle adulthood (ages 36-47)
(1)	Average by all households	250	159	−92***	736	623	−113
(1)	Average by all households	[204, 297]	[127, 190]	[−148, −36]	[634, 838]	[512, 733]	[−264, 37]
(2)	Fraction who give large amounts^d	0.21	0.17	−0.04***	0.42	0.35	−0.07***
(2)	Fraction who give large amounts^d	[0.19, 0.23]	[0.14, 0.19]	[−0.07, −0.01]	[0.39, 0.44]	[0.32, 0.37]	[−0.11, −0.03]
(3)	Average among those in row (2)	1,179	917	−262**	1,770	1,802	31
(3)	Average among those in row (2)	[985, 1,373]	[769, 1,065]	[−506, −19]	[1,550, 1,991]	[1,505, 2,098]	[−338, 400]
(4)	Fraction who give any amounts.	0.49	0.37	−0.12***	0.61	0.56	−0.05***
(4)	Fraction who give any amounts.	[0.47, 0.51]	[0.34, 0.40]	[−0.16, −0.08]	[0.59, 0.64]	[0.53, 0.59]	[−0.09, −0.01]
(5)	Average among those in row (4)	510	427	−83	1,202	1,109	−94
(5)	Average among those in row (4)	[418, 603]	[350, 504]	[−203, 37]	[1,043, 1,362]	[917, 1,300]	[−343, 155]

Note. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are in parentheses. Influential observations are not included in the estimates of average giving by the Silent and Greatest/Silent generations. Influential observations are included in the estimates of average giving by the Millennial, GenX, and Baby Boom generations. Influential observations are defined to be giving amounts above US$50,000 in 2012 terms. The number of influential observations for giving to charitable organizations that are not included: Greatest/Silent middle and senior adults—two.

Also includes 1926-1927 of the Greatest generation and 1946-1948 of the Baby Boom.

The US$180 appears to be one dollar off from the difference US$624 − US$443 because of round-off error. This happens several times throughout the paper.

“Who give large amounts” means those who give US$100 or more in 1973 terms to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined. In 2012 terms, that is US$589 for young and middle adulthood (columns 1 and 2) and US$616 for middle and senior adulthood (columns 4 and 5).

“Who give large amounts” means those who give US$100 or more in 1973 terms to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined. In 2012 terms, that is US$513 for young Millennial adults (column 1), US$566 for young GenX adults (column 2), and US$589 for GenX and Boomer middle adults (column 4 and 5).

p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Row 2 presents percentages who give to charitable organizations (and who give large amounts to charitable organizations and religious congregations combined): this percentage is down 18 points among Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults (column 3), and is precisely estimated (p < .001). Hence, donors down. In contrast, row 3 suggests Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults who do give large amounts and who give to charitable organizations are, if anything, giving higher amounts (+US$222, p = .138) than expected compared with the Silent generation in 1973. Although the +US$222 is notable in magnitude, it is not precisely enough estimated to claim two-sided statistical significance; accordingly, we make the weaker claim that dollars per donor are holding steady, if not up.³

Results for Baby Boom–middle/senior adults (columns 4-6) begin with a difference: average giving is essentially in line with expectations (−US$52, p = .585) based on the Greatest/Silent generation middle/senior adults in 1973. However, seven percentage points fewer are giving to charitable organizations (and giving large amounts, p < .001). And again, among those donors, average amounts given are, if anything, higher (+US$174, p = .319). Donors down. Dollars per donor holding steady if not up.

Panel 2 presents “near-term” generation-to generation comparisons of giving to charitable organizations. Row 1, columns 1 to 3 indicate that Millennial young adults are giving less on average (−US$92, p = .001) than did GenX young adults. Row 2 indicates that the percentage of Millennial young adults who give to charitable organizations (who give large amounts) is four points lower than the percentage of GenX doing the same as young adults (p = .005). Such Millennial donors are giving US$262 lower amounts, on average, than did the comparison GenX young adults (p = .035); this is in contrast to the +US$222 “dollars per donor holding steady” result seen in Panel 1 row 3. Hence, while the Millennial–GenX young adulthood comparison still indicates “donors down,” there is evidence that dollars per donor are starting to slip.

Rows 4 and 5 step back from conditioning on donors who give large amounts, a condition required in Panel 1 by the National Study skip pattern, to consider donors of any amounts (over US$25). Despite removing the “large amount” condition, the results parallel those from rows 2 and 3 results: the percentage of Millennial young adults who give to charitable organizations is 12 points lower than the percentage of GenX young adults who did so (p < .001), and among Millennials who give, the average amount given is US$83 less. Although a two-sided test of the −US$83 cannot be rejected, a one-sided test of “holding steady or up” can (p = .089).

In Panel 2, row 1, columns 4 to 6 indicate that GenX middle adults are giving US$113 less on average than did the Baby Boom in middle adulthood (p = .139). The GenX percentage who give to charitable organizations (and who give large amounts) is seven points lower than was the case among Baby Boom middle adults (p < .001), but the amounts per donor are essentially the same (row 3). Row 4 removes the “large amount” condition to show that the GenX percentage giving to charitable organizations is five points lower than in the Baby Boom (p = .008). The average amount given per donor is US$94 less among GenX donors (row 5; p = .460).

Study 2: Congregations

Table 2 presents results about giving to congregations. In Panel 1, row 1 column 3 indicates that, on average, Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults are giving US$412 less than would have been expected based on the giving to congregations by the Silent generation in young and middle adulthood back in 1973 (p < .001). A qualifying nuance to this result is that while it certainly applies to GenX middle adults, it applies with less force to young adults, both Millennial and GenX.⁴ Despite this qualification, reading down column 3, the pattern is again donors down (by 18 percentage points, p < .001) and dollars per donor up (US$170) or in line with expectations (because the +US$170 is not statistically significant, p = .368). Column 6 indicates qualitatively similar results among the Baby Boom in middle and senior adulthood: on average US$284 less giving to congregations than expected compared with Greatest/Silent adults at the same point in their life cycle in 1973 (p = .018). The percentage who donate to congregations (and who give large amounts to charitable organizations and congregations combined) is lower by nine percentage points (p < .001), but the average giving of those donors is in line with expectations (the +US$33 is small in magnitude; p = .886). Donors down. Dollars per donor holding steady if not up.⁵

Table 2.

Giving to Congregations.

Panel 1. Long-term generation comparison
	Giving	Silent^a	Millennial/GenX	Difference	Greatest/Silent	Baby Boom	Difference
		(1)	(2)	(3) =(2) – (1)	(4)	(5)	(6) =(5) – (4)
		Young and middle			Middle and senior
		Adulthood (ages 25-47)			Adulthood (ages 36-60)
(1)	Average by all households	1,013	601	−412***	1,552	1,268	−284**
(1)	Average by all households	[883, 1,143]	[526, 676]	[−562, −262]	[1,364, 1,740]	[1,127, 1,408]	[−519, −49]
(2)	Fraction who give large amounts^a	0.41	0.23	−0.18***	0.47	0.38	−0.09***
(2)	Fraction who give large amounts^a	[0.38, 0.44]	[0.21, 0.24]	[−0.22, −0.15]	[0.43, 0.50]	[0.36, 0.40]	[−0.12, −0.05]
(3)	Average among those in row (2)	2,464	2,633	170	3,339	3,373	33
(3)	Average among those in row (2)	[2,213, 2,715]	[2,361, 2,905]	[−200, 539]	[3,023, 3,656]	[3,043, 3,703]	[−491, 424]
Panel 2. Near-term generation comparison.
	Giving	GenX	Millennial	Difference	Baby Boom	GenX	Difference
		(1)	(2)	(3) =(2) – (1)	(4)	(5)	(6) =(5) – (4)
		Young adulthood (ages 25-31)			Middle adulthood (ages 36-47)
(1)	Average by all households	461	383	−78	1,073	715	−359***
(1)	Average by all households	[379, 542]	[290, 476]	[−201, 46]	[935, 1,212]	[603, 826]	[−537, −181]
(2)	Fraction who give large amounts^a	0.18	0.15	−0.03*	0.36	0.28	−0.09***
(2)	Fraction who give large amounts^a	[0.15, 0.20]	[0.13, 0.18]	[−0.06, −0.002]	[0.34, 0.39]	[0.25, 0.30]	[−0.12, −0.05]
(3)	Average among those in row (2)	2,523	2,474	−49	2,968	2,590	−378
(3)	Average among those in row (2)	[2,166, 2,880]	[1,943, 3,004]	[−687, 590]	[2,640, 3,295]	[2,258, 2,921]	[−844, 88]
(4)	Fraction who give any amounts	0.31	0.23	−0.08***	0.46	0.38	−0.08***
(4)	Fraction who give any amounts	[0.28, 0.33]	[0.20, 0.26]	[−0.11, −0.04]	[0.43, 0.49]	[0.35, 0.41]	[−0.12, −0.04]
(5)	Average among those in row (4)	1,498	1,673	175	2,324	1,867	−457**
(5)	Average among those in row (4)	[1,258, 1,737]	[1,303, 2,043]	[−266, 615]	[2,052, 2,596]	[1,604, 2,130]	[−835, −78]

Note. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are in parentheses. The number of influential observations for giving to congregations that are not included: (a) Silent young and middle adults—one; (b) Greatest/Silent middle and senior adults—three. See Table 1 for additional notes about influential observations.

See the notes in Table 1.

p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Panel 2 presents the “near-term” generation-to generation comparisons. Row 1 column 3 indicates that Millennial young adults are giving to congregations US$78 (p = .219) less than expected compared with GenX young adults, three percentage points less likely to give to congregations (and give large amounts), and among those donors US$49 less (ps = .063, .881). Rows 4 and 5 step back from conditioning on the donors who give large amounts and indicate eight percentage points fewer giving to congregations (p < .001), but among donors, US$175 more on average (p = .436). Overall, we see this as evidence of donors down, but dollars per donor holding steady (the −US$49) or perhaps up (the +US$175).

Continuing in Panel 2 and reading down column 6 indicates qualitatively similar results for the GenX–Baby Boom middle adulthood comparison, for the most part, although the magnitudes of the differences are much larger than in column 3. In row 1, GenX middle adults are on average giving to congregations US$359 less than did Baby Boom middle adults, nine percentage points fewer give to congregations (and give large amounts; p < .001), and among those donors giving is US$378 less (p = .112). Rows 4 and 5 indicate that eight percentage points fewer GenX middle adults give to congregations (p < .001), and among these donors average giving is US$457 less than Baby Boom donors to congregations (p = .018): “donors down” and evidence that dollars per donor are also down.

Discussion

The results indicate that Millennial and GenX young and middle adults, as a group, are giving to charitable organizations less than expected compared with (mostly) Silent generation young and middle adults from 1973. In contrast, Baby Boom adults, both middle and senior, are giving to charitable organizations in line with expectations based on their Silent/Greatest generation counterparts in 1973. Both of these results, despite their difference with respect to each other, arise from two unambiguous trends: the percentage of donors is down, while the dollars per donor are, at a minimum, in line with expectations, if not higher. Turning to the near-term generation-to-generation comparisons, the evidence indicates that the first of these trends—donors down—is continuing. However, the second trend—dollars per donor holding steady or up—is starting to slip among Millennial young adults: this is clearly the case among large donors, and among all donors, recall that a one-sided test of “holding steady or up” can be rejected.

Giving to congregations is down among both Millennial/GenX–young/middle adults (however, recall the possible qualifications to this result mentioned for young adults) and Baby Boom middle and senior adults, compared with their 1973 Silent generation counterparts. Again, the confluence of two divergent trends produces these results: the percentage of donors is down, while the dollars per donor are in line with expectations if not higher. Turning to the near-term generation-to-generation comparisons, once again the evidence indicates that the first of these trends—donors down—is continuing, but the second—dollars per donor holding steady—is starting to slip among GenX middle adults.

The Baby Boom results indicate that the main result from Wilhelm et al. (2007)—that on average giving to charitable organizations was in line with the giving done by previous generations, but that giving to congregations was lower—continues to hold as the Baby Boom cohort has aged. The “donors down” result across all generational groups is similar to Smith’s (2012) finding from the United Kingdom. This suggests that generational succession in terms of lower percentages who give appears to be a wider phenomenon than in just the United Kingdom or the United States alone. And it indicates that generational succession is largely about how a gap within each generation between families that donate and families that do not is changing. Hence, a central question for future research is to understand the characteristics describing the missing donors within each generation.

There are two limitations to these results that are important to keep in mind. First, the Millennials in this study are in their very first years of young adulthood, just establishing their own households apart from their families of origin, and doing so in the midst and aftermath of the Great Recession. Therefore, what we have reported here about Millennial giving may not be an indication of their future giving behavior as they move into middle adulthood years, years that also will be further removed from the Great Recession.⁶ Second, our results about “typical” American families do not necessarily pertain to the top 2% (Wilhelm et al., 2007). Although we do not know one way or the other, it is possible that giving by the top 2% is counterbalancing some of the patterns we have described. Future work is needed to address these limitations.

The pattern of results is in line with “Theory and Literature Review” section’s description of generational ethos changing from common purpose toward increasing autonomy and toward lower confidence in institutions. Of course, other explanations are possible, such as rising inequality or demographic change, and these suggest areas for future research. For instance, women are playing a more prominent role in terms of earning income and making financial decisions within couples: Do the patterns reported here play out differently for single women and men, and within couples using different decision-making approaches to charitable giving?

The results have two implications. First, conceptually, the results remind us that, while stability in overall averages often is implicitly taken as absence of change underneath, it is not necessarily so. There are many counterexamples in the present results. Even the direction of change in the average does not imply the same directions of change for the percentage who donate and the dollars per donating family—counterexample: Millennial/GenX–young/middle adult giving to charitable organizations (Table 1, Panel 1). Even a “no change” in a simple average does not indicate the absence of change when income and wealth are controlled for—counterexample: most of our results about average giving being in line with (or lower than) expectations would have been lower than (or more dramatically lower than) expectations had it not been for rising incomes and wealth in the Baby Boom and GenX generations (Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions are available in the online appendix).

Second, the results alert practitioners in charitable organizations that the average giving of GenX and Millennial families is lower relative to expectations based on previous generations. Our results that dollars per donor are in line with expectations, if not higher, suggest that a response based on trying to persuade already donating families to donate more will not be successful. A successful response needs to be based on understanding the reasons why the percentages of GenX and Millennial families who donate are down. Because the percentage of Baby Boom families who donate also is down, the question may not be “why are percentages of donors among the Baby Boom, GenX and Millennial families down?” but rather might be “why were percentages of donors among the Greatest and Silent generations up?”

Finally, we close with a caution. All too often, results along the lines that we have presented here are used explicitly, or implicitly, to criticize the giving behavior of the group found to be giving lower amounts. Such use is not helpful, because it gets in the way of understanding the reasons why the results are occurring. It should be kept in mind that young and middle-aged adults in the 2000s are facing different circumstances than faced by previous generations. For instance, a GenX middle adult in our study (born 1970) has a 61% chance of earning more income than his or her parents, dramatically lower than the 92% chance a Silent generation middle adult (born 1940) had of doing the same (Chetty et al., 2016). It may be that lower income expectations (relative to one’s parents) and lower confidence in Social Security has made young and middle-aged adults more hesitant in their present day giving behavior. Work to understand the reasons why can help practitioners take those realities into consideration as they build relationships with GenX and Millennial families. Criticizing their giving behavior instead of working to understand it is an obstacle to building those relationships.

Conclusion

Using two data sources collected four decades apart, this article has provided evidence about generation-to-generation change in giving. Among Baby Boom families, average giving to charitable organizations is in line with expectations based on previous generations four decades ago. Among Millennial and GenX families, average giving is lower. Although these patterns of generation-to-generation change are different among the Baby Boom and Millennial/GenX, they share in common two underlying trends: the percentage who donate are down, while the dollars given by families who do donate are in line with expectations if not higher. Donors down, dollars per donor holding steady or up. Donors down/dollars per donor holding steady or up also describes giving to congregations.

When we turn to “near-term” generation-to-generation change, a difference relative to the results just described begins to emerge: while there is still strong evidence of “donors down,” there are signs that “dollars per donor steady or up” is starting to slip. In other words, there is evidence that dollars per donor are starting to fall among Millennial young adults giving to charitable organizations and GenX middle adults giving to congregations.

These results suggest that maintaining levels of charitable giving, and in turn the public goods charitable organizations provide with those funds, will require the difficult work of understanding why the percentages of donors are down, and using that understanding to expand the number of new donors. Because dollars per donor are holding steady or up, we think there is little room to maintain levels of charitable giving in the face of declining percentages who give, by encouraging current donors to give even higher amounts. That said, a careful eye should be kept on dollars per donor, because the “near-term” results suggest that may be starting to slip.

Finally, the results suggest that underneath the seemingly unchanging level of American generosity—giving to charitable organizations plus congregations as a percentage of disposable personal income has remained approximately at 2% year in and year out over the four decades of the present study (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2016)—important dynamic changes are underway.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary Material, onlineAppendix_NVSQ – Generational Succession in American Giving: Donors Down, Dollars Per Donor Holding Steady But Signs That It Is Starting to Slip

Supplementary Material, onlineAppendix_NVSQ for Generational Succession in American Giving: Donors Down, Dollars Per Donor Holding Steady But Signs That It Is Starting to Slip by Patrick M. Rooney, Xiaoyun Wang, and Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to Una Osili for many discussions and for suggesting that they characterize the results as “donors down, dollars per donor holding steady,” René Bekkers for helpful suggestions, and participants at the 45th ARNOVA Conference session on “Generation gaps, social media use, and implications for fundraising” for their comments. More than the usual thanks go to Jimmy Han for helping them produce some of the results and helping with technical aspects of the project.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The collection of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data used in this study was supported by the National Science Foundation under award number 1157698 and the National Institutes of Health under grant number R01 HD069609. Major support for the collection of the Philanthropy Panel Study data was provided by the Atlantic Philanthropies, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, The John Templeton Foundation, The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, and Fidelity Charitable Investments. The collection of the National Study of Philanthropy data was sponsored by the Commission of Private Philanthropy and Public Needs.

Notes

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Author Biographies

Patrick M. Rooney is a professor of Economics and Philanthropic Studies, as well as executive associate dean for academic programs at Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy (IUPUI). His research and teaching interests are finding the determinants of philanthropy and the effects of public policies on philanthropy.

Xiaoyun Wang is a PhD candidate at IUPUI. Her research interests are community philanthropy and community foundations.

Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm is a professor of Economics at IUPUI and an affiliate professor in the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. His research interests are in the social science of prosocial behavior.

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