One form of altruism is the voluntary provision of public goods. Theories of altruism based on the public goods model, however, lead to false predictions of giving only by the very wealthiest members of large groups and of dollar-for-dollar crowding out of private giving by government spending. In this article, donors are assumed to care about the provision of a private good to members of a recipient group. The model is shown to be consistent with widespread giving and less than complete crowding out.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy
. (1996). Giving USA. New York: Author.
2.
Abrams, B.
, & Schmitz, M. (1984). The crowding-out effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions: Cross-section evidence. National Tax Journal, 37,563-568.
3.
Andreoni, J.
(1988). Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 35,57-73.
4.
Andreoni, J.
(1989). Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1447-1458.
5.
Andreoni, J.
(1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving. Economic Journal, 100, 464-477.
6.
Barro, R.
(1974). Are government bonds net wealth?Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1095-1117.
7.
Baumol, W.
, & Baumol, H. (1981). Book review. Journal of Political Economy, 89,425-428.
8.
Becker, G.
(1974). A theory of social interactions. Journal of Political Economy, 32, 1063-1093.
9.
Becker, G.
(1981). A treatise on the family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
10.
Bergstrom, T.
, Blume, L., & Varian, H. (1986). On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 29,25-49.
11.
Bernheim, B. D.
(1986). On the voluntary and involuntary provision of public goods. American Economic Review, 76, 789-793.
12.
Clotfelter, C.
(1985). Federal tax policy and charitable giving. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
13.
Comes, R
, & Sandler, T. (1984). Easy riders, joint production and public goods. Economic Journal, 94,580-598.
14.
Day, K.
, & Devlin, R. A. (1993). The payoff to work without pay: Volunteer work as an investment in human capital (Working Paper No. 9310E). Ottawa, Canada: University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
15.
Hausman, D.
, & McPherson, M. (1993). Taking ethics seriously: Economics and contemporary moral philosophy. Journal of Economic Literature, 31, 671-731.
16.
Independent Sector.
(1986). Dimensions of the independent sector (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
17.
Independent Sector
. (1996). Giving and volunteering in the United States. Washington, DC: Author.
18.
Kingma, B.
(1989). An accurate measurement of the crowd-out effect, income effect, and price effect for charitable contributions. Journal of Political Economy, 97,1197-1207.
19.
Menchik, P.
, & Weisbrod, B. (1987). Volunteer labor supply. Journal of Public Economics, 32,159-183.
20.
Morgan, J.
, Dye, R, & Hybels, J. (1977). Results from two national surveys on philanthropic activity. In Commission on private philanthropy and public needs [Research Papers] (Vol. 1, pp. 157-323). Washington, DC: Treasury Department.
21.
Musgrave, R.
(1959). The theory of public finance. New York: McGraw-Hill.
22.
Roberts, R
(1984). A positive model of private charity and public transfers. Journal of Political Economy, 92, 136-148.
23.
Rosen, H.
(1992). Public finance (3rd ed.). Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin.
24.
Steinberg, R.
(1987). Voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federalist system. American Economic Review, 77,24-36.
25.
Stiglitz, J.
(1988). Economics of the public sector (2nd ed.). New York: Norton.
26.
Sugden, R.
(1985). Consistent conjectures and voluntary contributions to public goods: Why the conventional theory does not work. Journal of Public Economics, 27,117-124.
27.
Tresch, R.
(1981). Public finance: A normative theory. Plano, IX: Business Publications.
28.
Warr, P.
(1982, October). Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity. Journal of Public Economics, 19,131-138.