Abstract
To many in China, their country’s rise is not simply a hard power phenomenon; China’s new weight in international affairs demands that it also innovates culturally to offer new global norms to the world. Thus in recent years many prominent Chinese scholars have invested significant time and resources into searching for, or attempting to define, a distinctly Chinese approach to theorizing international relations. One of the potential sources often cited as a foundation for such an approach is China’s long and rich history of political theorizing and political/cultural leadership. This article considers one of the key contributions to that debate from a Tsinghua University scholar, Yan Xuetong. Despite his rejection of the ‘China school’ project, Yan has invested significant resources in a project that seeks to apply pre-Qin thought to contemporary international politics. Through a careful reading of this work, the article reveals a compelling narrative about China’s future rise. It argues that through discursively linking pre-Qin classical texts with China’s modern rise, Yan Xuetong is using China’s past to write its, and the world’s, future. The article critically engages with this future Yan is narrating, and considers some of the implications it might have for China and the world.
Keywords
Over the past two decades, ever-increasing numbers of Chinese scholars have been working towards the establishment of a specifically Chinese way of doing international relations research, which includes building China’s own theoretical framework for international relations. This phenomenon, of seeking Chinese-style solutions to wider social problems, is widespread across academic research in China, particularly in the field of international relations. This follows wider trends that have seen scholars around the world critiquing Western dominance of international politics and its theories. Many of these scholars have sought knowledge of the international from non-Western sources in order to broaden and deepen our understanding of world politics. China’s leading international relations scholars have responded with discussions of how China might contribute to this work by creating its own school of international relations theory or bringing its own unique perspectives to international politics. 1
Many contributors have identified ancient Chinese thought or ‘traditional culture’ as one of the potential sources for developing a ‘Chinese school’ of international relations. 2 One of the most systematic and sustained contributions to the study of ancient Chinese thought and its application to contemporary international relations theory has come from a leading Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong. This is surprising since Yan denies both the possibility and necessity 3 for establishing China-specific theories of international relations, clinging instead to realist notions of the universal applicability of international relations theory. 4 Nevertheless, Yan and many of the researchers working alongside him have invested significant time and resources into the study of ancient Chinese philosophy, specifically that originating from the pre-Qin era, 5 and its relevance to contemporary international politics.
Unlike the many ‘Chinese school’ proponents, whose research on traditional Chinese thought aims to create a China-specific international relations theory, 6 Yan’s project claims instead to ‘enrich’ existing theories of international relations with insights from ancient Chinese ideas about world order. 7 His project is more about strategy than about theory: he is concerned with what pre-Qin thought means for today, especially as regards ‘the great undertaking of China’s rise’. 8 This focus on China’s ‘rise’ means that Yan’s work is concerned not just with China’s present but also with its future; specifically, its future role in world politics. Yan is searching for lessons from ancient Chinese thinkers which can be applied to China’s current situation and which help to answer the question of how China might rise and what this might mean for the world. The question of whether China will rise has, for Yan, already been answered. Yet the manner in which China’s rise will be achieved and the potential outcomes for China and for the world are questions that remain unanswered. Yan argues that pre-Qin thinking on inter-state politics provides insight and inspiration for answering these questions. By discursively linking pre-Qin classical texts and the notion of ‘China’s modern rise’, 9 Yan and the others who have contributed to his project are using China’s past to write its, and the world’s, future.
Debates concerning China’s rise have tended to be framed by a ‘revisionist/status quo’ dichotomy; 10 as a choice between a China that will learn to conform with and participate in the existing international order or one that will increasingly challenge that order with potentially destabilizing outcomes. I argue in this article that Yan’s work on pre-Qin thought is attempting to create a counter-discourse to these more prominent narratives about China’s rise in the world: a discourse that creates new possibilities for China’s future beyond the revisionist–status quo choice offered by most other scholars. Yan draws on pre-Qin notions of virtue, personal responsibility, political power, and different types of world leadership, to tell a story of a rising China that, according to Yan, will be neither revisionist nor status quo. Throughout this work, Yan continues to deny the need for a specifically Chinese approach to international politics. However, the narrative this project creates is one in which China’s future, indeed the world’s future, is not Western but rather one that is distinctively Chinese.
I begin with a brief overview of Yan’s work on pre-Qin thought and attempt to draw out Yan’s narrative of rising China as informed by the pre-Qin texts he studies. I then set out the ways in which Yan, and others involved in his pre-Qin project, use a particular reading of pre-Qin thought to argue that the future will see China rising to become a different kind of hegemon in the world; one that relies on morality and personal virtue rather than military or economic might. I conclude by considering briefly the ways in which Yan’s narrative deals with the issue of opposition and what this means for the future that he is discursively creating.
Resurrecting the past: Yan Xuetong and pre-Qin thought
Yan Xuetong is a key strategist and public intellectual who is influential both with China’s policymakers and its opinion-makers in the mass media; he was also named one of the world’s top 100 public intellectuals in 2008. 11 He began searching for perspectives on inter-state relations from the pre-Qin era with his colleague Xu Jin in 2005. 12 They published their first major study on classical Chinese thought in 2008, 13 bringing together excerpts from pre-Qin era texts which, they argue, address issues of inter-state politics. It features selections from the original texts with introductory notes, translations into modern Chinese (to aid understanding), and questions for further consideration. The aim was to give readers inspiration and allow them to deepen their understanding of contemporary international politics. 14 In the past two years, Yan has published a second volume with Xu, 15 as well as a number of articles on the subject. These later works have taken a more analytical approach to pre-Qin thought, focusing on particular texts or philosophical traditions and applying them to contemporary international ‘realities’. Yan’s most recent contribution brings many of his earlier essays, and those of his critics, to an English-speaking audience for the first time. 16
Yan’s work covers the thinking of seven key pre-Qin philosophers 17 – Guanzi, Laozi, Kongzi (Confucius), Mengzi (Mencius), Mozi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi – as well as a number of classic texts from the period, including Strategies of the Warring States (战国策), Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals (吕氏春秋), and the Book of Rites (礼记). Yan chooses to focus on texts originating from the period preceding unification under the Qin dynasty, because, he argues, inter-state relations during that time closely resemble contemporary international politics. 18 According to Yan, the pre-Qin era was characterized by the existence of many small states competing for influence in an anarchic system, which mirrors his understanding of the current international order. 19 This period is also seen by many as the height of Chinese philosophy, and the works produced are significant because of the sustained influence they had on politics in the Chinese empire over the two millennia that followed. 20
From Yan’s work it is clear that the perspectives offered on inter-state relations and visions of world order expressed in these pre-Qin texts are diverse and often contradictory. Yan argues that the significant differences amongst the scholars of the pre-Qin era is another reason for the futility of searching for a ‘Chinese school’ of international politics; since there is no single school of thought that can be called ‘Chinese theory’. 21 Nevertheless, a critical reading of Yan’s work, and that of the other scholars included in his pre-Qin project, reveals a number of key themes that, taken together, form a convincing narrative about China’s future rise; a narrative that claims a distinctively Chinese future for the world and a significant role for the Chinese state in bringing that world into being.
This narrative attempts to provide an alternative to both the status quo and revisionist renderings of China’s, and the world’s, future. It begins with the premise that China’s rise, though now inevitable, will also be peaceful. That China’s rise will not threaten the stability of the existing international system; that it will, in fact, lead to greater global stability. This is because China will become a different kind of world power from the hegemonic model currently embodied by the United States. It will rely not on military or even economic strength but on a political power that is rooted in notions of personal morality and virtue. China’s presence as a new kind of world leader will reshape world order in a peaceful and harmonious way. In the analysis that follows I will demonstrate how certain readings of pre-Qin classics are deployed by Yan and his colleagues to legitimize and sustain this narrative of China’s future in the world. I conclude by investigating some of the implications of this future for the world.
Global leadership: A new kind of hegemony
According to Yan, the rise and fall of states is a constant topic for international politics, 22 and is therefore found in both pre-Qin writings and contemporary theories of international relations. Yan’s view of the rise and fall of powers is similar in many ways to that employed in revisionist/status quo debates, seeing power and international standing in relative terms. 23 Contending for hegemony is thus the core issue of many pre-Qin works and, in Yan’s opinion, the core issue of international politics. 24
However, despite adopting a zero-sum approach to the rise and fall of states in world politics, Yan argues that China’s rise will in fact be peaceful. 25 According to Yan, China will rise peacefully because it will follow a different model of world leadership. He argues in many of his essays that there are at least two distinct models of political leadership for great powers found amongst the philosophical writings of the pre-Qin era. While Western theories of world politics speak only of hegemony (ba 霸) in the international system, pre-Qin texts introduce the possibility of a different model of leadership, that of ‘true kingship’ or ‘humane authority’ (wang 王). 26 The concept of wang leadership is more commonly translated as ‘true kingship’ or ‘sage king’; however, in Yan’s most recent book the translators have chosen instead the term ‘humane authority’ because ‘obviously, Yan is not arguing for the reestablishment of a monarchical system led by one sage who would save the world with his moral goodness’. 27 I have opted to continue to use the more common translation of true kingship, which is used by Yan himself in his English-language articles, because I am reluctant to agree with the translators’ assertions about Yan’s narrative. I argue that Yan’s account of China’s rise and the new world order it will bring about is in many ways reflective of the definition of true kingship which the translators wish to avoid.
According to Yan, Guanzi was the first of the pre-Qin thinkers to raise the possibility of different types of hegemony, or different types of global leadership. In Guanzi’s view, hegemonic leadership (ba) is founded on power, whereas true kingship is founded on both power and morality. 28 Guanzi did not, however, see hegemony and true kingship as completely opposing terms; but rather he saw establishing hegemony as one step in the process towards the ultimate goal of establishing true kingship. 29 Later scholars, however, recognized a fundamental difference in the nature of wang and ba leadership. 30 According to Xunzi, for example, there are three possible types of state: true kingship, hegemon, and tyranny (qiang 强), which embody three alternative approaches to inter-state relations: ‘wang means to lead the world; ba to wield hegemony in certain areas of the world; and qiang to exert greater power than other states’. 31 From the time of Mencius onward the differentiation between wang and ba had become one of the fundamental concepts in Chinese people’s discussions about politics. 32 What sets apart the positive value of true kingship from the negative one of hegemony is the ethical or moral requirement necessary for its attainment. Becoming a true kingship state requires not just high moral standards but higher moral standards than any other country. 33
Guanzi, 34 Laozi, 35 Xunzi, 36 and Mengzi 37 all write that world leadership cannot be gained through force (武力). The route to true kingship begins, instead, with winning the hearts of the people. 38 Many of the pre-Qin thinkers opposed expansionary war as a means of gaining world leadership. Even under the circumstances of the early Spring and Autumn period, where every year a new war would break out, Guanzi advised the rulers of the time to avoid over-reliance on force and to rely instead on forming alliances and mutual support. 39 The opposition to offensive warfare is most evident in the writings of Mozi, and this is again picked up in Yan’s study as an example for today’s China to emulate. Mozi’s philosophy centred around 10 key concepts, including that of feigong (非攻), which did not signal opposition to all war but rather to so-called ‘wars of conquest’. 40 Thus a rising China, for Yan, shuns the use of force as a tool to gain hegemony, aiming instead to become a true kingship power in the international system.
Political power: Setting a moral example
To achieve the status of true kingship in the world, a state should therefore not be reliant on military or even economic might but rather on a type of political power that stems from a state’s virtue or morality (variously defined). Yan argues that the major difference between contemporary international relations theory and much pre-Qin writing lies in their respective definitions of power, or more accurately the value they place on different elements of state power. Yan, like most realist theorists, sees power as some function of economic, military, political (and possibly cultural) power possessed by a nation-state in the international system. Drawing on a variety of pre-Qin sources, Yan offers different configurations of that function but does not challenge the underlying assumptions about the nature of power as something that can be possessed, increased, lost, or gained.
Political power, Yan argues, is seen by all pre-Qin scholars as the foundation or cornerstone of national power or strength. 41 There was, Wang argues, a general understanding among thinkers of the time that, while military power was not completely irrelevant, ‘political power was the linchpin in a country’s rise or fall’. 42
In some of the analyses included in Yan’s project, political power is referred to as soft power. For example, Xu cites Mencius’s theory that different types of state rely on different types of power: a wang country needs only soft power, but a ba country is reliant on a combination of both soft and hard power. 43 Yan, however, criticizes his colleagues for using the language of soft power, arguing that soft power, as it is understood in contemporary international relations theory, is not the same as the political power pre-Qin thinkers point to. Drawing from his work on Xunzi, he argues that contemporary understandings of soft power do not distinguish between cultural and political elements: political power, as understood by pre-Qin thinkers, emanates from the leader of a state. 44 For Confucius, all politics are the king’s politics, 45 while Xunzi argues that ‘what makes a country secure or endangered, good or bad, is determined exclusively by its ruler and not by others’. 46 Mencius and Mozi bring in the possibility that it is in the implementation of correct (just) policies that that political power is located. 47 Nevertheless, the common thread consistently highlighted by Yan is the notion of morality or virtue. For example, Guanzi argues that a country’s political power is determined by the capability of its leaders: ‘A good ruler selects competent ministers; a ruler without morals will lead his country to ruin.’ 48 Here a good ruler, who gains success, is contrasted with a bad ruler, who is without morals. Laozi too stressed the necessity for a virtuous ruler: ‘Rulers must be sages, ones with the exemplification of Dao (道) and the manifestation of De (德).’ 49 The importance of personal morality is often extended beyond the leader to the ministers he selects. In Strategies of the Warring States, the moral character (品德) and leadership ability of a ruler and his ministers is the core of political power. 50 Ministers must therefore be selected on merit, 51 where once again good is equated with having a high moral standard. 52 It is this emphasis on morality that sets pre-Qin political power apart from contemporary notions of soft power which Yan is somewhat sceptical of, seeing it as far more instrumental in nature.
What’s more, Yan’s narrative tells us that not only does the superior moral quality of a wang state’s ruler guarantee good governance in his state, but that his influence reaches beyond the state to ensure the stability of the system as a whole. 53 As a true kingship state, therefore, China’s leaders will set a moral example not just for the Chinese people but for the whole world. In Yan’s rising China narrative, therefore, the party-state is assigned the role of moral leader for the new world order, a role that, as we will see further, involves showing others not just how to behave in the world but how, and who, to be.
Opposition, difference, and cultivating harmony
The story Yan’s project tells is one whereby China will become a world power; but a true kingship power not a hegemonic one. In this tale, China’s political power, based largely on the responsibility and moral virtue of its individual leaders, will peacefully bring about a new, and better, world order. Yan argues that this new, harmonious world order can be brought about ‘through voluntary submission rather than force’. 54 However, as I will demonstrate, Yan’s future is one whereby peace and harmony must be cultivated or actively constructed in a manner that precludes opposition and subsumes difference into sameness.
Drawing from Mencius, Xu argues that a true kingship’s power of attraction lies not in wealth but in political ideas and in the model it can provide for societal development. 55 Likewise, Yan argues that, for China to become a true kingship state, its strategic goal must be ‘to present to the world a better social role model’. 56 Yan, and others, argue that there is already some evidence of China filling this role in the world. They point to growing support for the idea of a ‘Chinese model’ of development or a ‘Beijing Consensus’, which has been claimed as an alternative to the Western neoliberal model of industrialization for developing countries today. 57 So far China’s success in presenting an alternative has been restricted largely to a model for economic growth. Yan claims that as a true kingship country, China must also become a model of moral leadership in the world.
While Yan argues that other countries will be drawn to follow the Chinese model ‘through voluntary submission’, his narrative also creates an active role for China in bringing this new world order about. As Xunzi writes, a wang state must take the lead and make itself an example. 58 What this means for China’s future, according to Yan, is that Deng Xiaoping’s principle of ‘hide one’s capabilities, bide one’s time’ is no longer appropriate for China. He argues that one day in the future, when China becomes a leading power with global influence, it will have a responsibility to the rest of the world to act accordingly. He argues that much of the chaos in world politics after the end of the First World War was due to the failure of the United States to assume its correct role as a leading country in the world. Therefore, while China will not become another US-style hegemon, it must consider its long-term responsibility to the world. 59 Yan also counsels against adopting Laozi’s notion of wuwei (无为), understood here as non-action or inaction, since it precludes an active role in shaping world order. 60
According to Mencius, a wang state does not force its ideas onto others in the international system but rather is able, through publicizing its own success, to attract other states to imitate or follow. 61 Indeed this strategy is arguably already apparent in Chinese foreign policy approaches: for example, major events such as the Beijing Olympics in 2008, 62 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010, 63 as well as the establishment of Confucian Institutes across the world, 64 all promote China as more than simply an economic model for the rest of the world to follow.
From Yan’s narrative then, we see that the world is brought into a new harmonious state when other countries imitate or follow China’s example. Yan’s notion of ‘voluntary submission’ requires adopting the Chinese model in order to guarantee success; submission, therefore, requires Others to become more like the Chinese self. Thus amongst the consequences of Yan’s rising China narrative is a view on ‘Otherness’ that advocates conversion rather than coexistence. The excerpts of pre-Qin thought selected by Yan and Xu offer several options for dealing with difference in the world. Of them, the Confucian view, represented by such concepts as tianxia yijia (one family under heaven, 天下一家) and Great Harmony (datong 大同), and Mozi’s ideal of universal love (兼爱) are given prominence by Yan in his selection of texts and so are considered here.
The chapter by Piao Bingjun, which Yan includes in Thoughts of World Leadership and Implications (王霸天下思想及启迪), directly relates Hu Jintao’s key foreign policy concept ‘Harmonious World’ to Confucius’s Analects, giving us a key insight into what a Confucian view on difference might mean for China’s and the world’s future. He argues that the best way to understand the establishment of a harmonious world is with the Confucian idea of cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and pacifying the world (修身、齐家、治国、平天下). This means that a wang ruler (sage king) ‘brings peace to the world’ (平天下) by first ‘cultivating his own moral value’ (修身), then the moral values of those he rules over. The method that the sage king relies on for bringing about peace in the world is jiaohua (教化), where jiao means to teach or educate and hua to change or transform. 65 Therefore, ‘when properly inspired, everyone will want to be good and act in the correct way’. 66 The world is pacified by transforming the people to become like the king. Callahan critiques a similar logic at work in Zhao Tingyang’s popular work which presents the ancient concept of tianxia (天下) as an alternative for contemporary world order. He argues, ‘Its approach to an ethical world order encourages a “conversion” of difference, if not a conquest of it.’ 67 The highest form of ethical society in Confucianism is, according to Piao, Great Harmony, which is also sometimes referred to as tianxia yijia. In such a society ‘people make no distinction between them and us’ (不分彼此) and the final goal of the Confucian datong is summed up in the phrase ‘where all the world are like brothers’ (四海之内皆兄弟也). 68 Thus, the result of the Confucian datong is that otherness is transformed into sameness.
Mozi presents an even more radical approach, based on his notion of universal love that, nevertheless, is remarkably similar to the Confucian notion just discussed. For Mozi, all people have different opinions; therefore, when individuals act purely out of self-interest and rulers act only in the interests of their own nation, conflict arises. 69 Peace is attained by unifying diverse opinions and instilling mutual love. This is achieved through multiple layers of government: where a local leader is benevolent, he is able to unify all the opinions of his village and that village is stable. Likewise, if the ruler of a state is also a benevolent leader, he can unify the opinions of all the local leaders and through them the people. The emperor, if benevolent, unifies the opinions of state leaders and through them all the people. 70 The example of the morally superior emperor radiates through many layers of government such that people’s very preferences are changed to be in line with those of heaven. Liu argues that ‘what Mozi hoped to accomplish, then, was not merely behavioral reform, but a psychological transformation of all people’. 71
In both pre-Qin narratives, difference is transformed into sameness, through an appeal to a morally correct example, which all people will learn to follow. Their preferences are shaped to be one and, as a result, there is harmony in the world. This involves not just a radical reordering of people’s preferences but the construction of new identities, such that all become part of ‘one world, [with] one dream’. 72 The future Yan’s pre-Qin project narrates is one whereby the world is made peaceful, and harmony is constructed through demonstrating the superiority of the Chinese way and actively encouraging others to imitate it. Yan’s ‘true kingship’ is therefore not so far away from the definition the translators of his most recent work have tried to avoid: ‘of a monarchical system led by one sage who would save the world with his moral goodness’. 73
Yan claims that, by drawing on pre-Qin thought, he can offer an alternative to revisionist or status quo renderings of China’s future in the world. For Yan, what sets China’s rise to power apart from that of rising European powers in the past is that it will be achieved through a process of peaceful evolution rather than violent upheaval. Yet this process, of harmonizing the world, requires the complete erasure of difference in the world. It requires the creation of new identities such that all belong to the new harmonious world order, leaving little room for those who may not wish to belong.
Conclusions: A very Chinese future?
Yan’s pre-Qin project is certainly not the only example of scholars drawing on visions of China’s past to write its future. 74 What Yan is claiming to do with his pre-Qin project is quite different to what, for example, Qin Yaqing aims to achieve by studying Chinese philosophies and traditions. Qin, the Chinese school’s most vocal proponent, identified ancient Chinese thought and traditions as just one of a number of sources for the creation of a Chinese school. The goal of Qin’s research is quite clear: to create a distinctive Chinese theory of international relations and pre-Qin thought is of instrumental importance in achieving this goal. Yan argues that Chinese scholars should not waste time trying to create a specific Chinese school and should focus instead on contributing ideas to existing theoretical frameworks which, if ‘correct’, will attract global attention and join the mainstream. 75 Nevertheless, despite their competing approaches, both Yan and Qin ultimately are asking questions about Chinese identity. Qin identifies the problem of ‘the relationship between China and international society’ as the core problem that will become the basis of a Chinese school of international relations, 76 whilst Yan’s pre-Qin project is, as I have argued, primarily concerned with China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and what China’s role in the world is and should be in the future. The Chinese school debate is thus largely about Chinese identity now and into the future.
Yan’s work on pre-Qin thought, and the narrative that underlies it, is of particular significance because of his key role in Chinese academia and the ongoing ‘Chinese school’ debate. Despite his insistence to the contrary, Yan’s pre-Qin thought project represents a significant contribution to the search for a Chinese school of international relations theory. As Callahan notes, ‘Yan is using the resources of Tsinghua’s Institute for International Studies to train PhD students, hire new staff, and edit national and international journals to produce and distribute the results of this research project in both Chinese and English.’ 77 His standing in the field of international relations in China and his position within Tsinghua University ensure that Yan’s perspectives will substantially influence debates about the nature, scope, and direction of international relations research in China. Through his pre-Qin project, he is demonstrating that Chinese philosophy is applicable across time and space, and that the unchanging wisdom of Chinese culture or, as Liu Jiangyong describes it, the ‘inner secret’ of the Chinese people, 78 can be utilized to bring about a new and better future for the world: a future that, as Yan paints it, is distinctively Chinese.
The future that Yan and his colleagues describe is just one of many competing and interconnected futures being discursively created by Chinese intellectuals today. Yet, to the extent that it influences and shapes wider debates in Chinese research on international relations, it must be taken seriously and its consequences fully explored. I hope this article has gone some way to beginning such an effort but for now, at least, the future is uncertain.