Abstract
Russell Ong analyses China’s strategic competition with the United States from the perspective of structural realism. This, Ong states, is the dominant worldview of China’s decision-makers. It leads them to see the international system as a structure in which the major powers are constantly balancing off against other powers as each one aspires to thrive, if not dominate, the international system. As is common to the balance of power theory, the Chinese see the state, rather than the increasingly important transnational actors, as the main actor; and they assume that it is state power that will protect the nation-state and advance its interests. Ong believes that this has led China to overemphasize the military balance of power.
Ong notes the underlying ambivalence in the Sino-American relationship: from the perspective of China, it benefits from cooperation with the United States to confront terrorism and promote international stability, but worries about the United States being ‘the lone superpower’ and embracing such doctrines as pre-emptive war. China’s socio-cultural identity is in ideological competition with the liberal democratic roots of the US identity and its claim to the universality of American values. China’s perception is that the American emphasis on ‘peaceful evolution’ and political rights as human rights poses a political threat to China’s leadership; but rather than pursuing a policy of isolation from liberal democratic values as it did in the past, China has generally chosen engagement and competition with the United States within the international economic system. This has not been easy, as it has had to address serious developmental issues within the context of a decline in China’s economic and financial sovereignty. This makes China far more vulnerable to global financial risk and international economic crises that could lead to political and economic instability.
As with other issues, such as Taiwan, tensions are exacerbated by the fact that both China and the United States see each other in strategic competition for global leadership. Ong misrepresents the Taiwan issue – but he misrepresents it in an identical way to which it has been misrepresented by the US government. For example, he ‘compares Taiwan’s “democracy” in the late 1980s to China’s suppression of student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989’ (p. 68). But Taiwan in 1989 was just one step away from decades of martial law, which ended only in 1988. Opposition parties were still illegitimate and not allowed to engage in open election campaigns. Ong is, in short, far less scholarly in his analysis of China’s relationship with Taiwan. Instead, he becomes an advocate, suggesting that the United States and Taiwan join together to promote democracy and liberal values in Asia, and specifically in China. ‘Democracy promotion’ is, in Ong’s view, a critical part of the strategic competition between China and the United States and threatens the survival of the communist regime. It would also set the stage for a stronger case for Taiwan’s independence, which Ong openly welcomes, seemingly regardless of what would almost certainly be disastrous consequences for Taiwan.
Ong uses the same framework of structural realism to examine Sino-US strategic competition in relationship to Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. His analysis includes the perspectives of these countries as well as American and Chinese perspectives. Therefore he also focuses on the tensions permeating the US alliances with Japan and with South Korea, as well as those tensions created with China by these alliances. China does not want to see Japan’s international standing enhanced, such as would happen were it to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council; and so it resists any efforts by the United States to strengthen Japan or to support a growth in its military role. China therefore focuses on Japan’s military aggression in Asia in the first half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, because China has depended on Japan’s economic aid and investment to develop since it began economic reforms in 1979, it has had an ambivalent economic relationship with Japan. As Ong points out, the Chinese perspective on the US–Japan alliance is riddled with dilemmas, the major one being that it sees the alliance as crucial to the stability of East Asia, and at the same time the source of a threat to China’s security. And similarly, in the case of North Korea, China supports US goals of preventing nuclear proliferation and maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, but does not want the United States to upset the balance of power on the peninsula.
Ong concludes by saying that China needs to adopt a strategy appropriate for a state that is weak compared to the dominant power. In other words, it should avoid conflicts where its core national security interests are not threatened. But Ong then suggests ‘that China should hide its true capabilities and build them up quietly’ (p. 141). This is, perhaps, China’s strategy; and it has become a major concern to the United States and others and exacerbates the perception of a ‘China threat’. Both sides, in Ong’s view, need to work on lessening this sense of strategic competition and focus on the more positive aspects of their relationship.