Taiwan Strait détente and the changing role of the United States in cross-Strait relations

Abstract

Détente in the Taiwan Strait has raised questions about the United States’ role in future cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, Washington welcomes and encourages peaceful interactions across the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, however, it is increasingly concerned about Beijing gaining more control of the dynamics and direction of future cross-Strait relations. As some US analysts suggest, if Taiwan drifts towards closer relations with China, Washington has to reconsider its national interests. US anxiety over Taiwan is further aggravated by its perception of a rising and more assertive China in the Asia–Pacific region, as reflected by the emerging debate on US Taiwan policy and its overall strategy towards China. The role of the United States in cross-Strait relations is undergoing some adjustments as Washington ‘pivots’ its strategic focus to Asia and as its relations with China become more salient in its Asian policy. In the long run the rivalry between Washington and Beijing in Asia would eventually have a negative bearing on cross-Strait relations.

Keywords

abandoning Taiwan China–US–Taiwan relations détente Taiwan Strait US Taiwan policy

Cross-Strait relations entered a new cycle of peace and development when the Kuomintang returned to power in Taiwan in 2008. Since then Taipei and Beijing have ‘normalized’ and steadily improved relations across the Taiwan Strait. There is no doubt that the present cross-Strait détente is taking its hold and will endure in the foreseeable future. It is amazing to see that the two sides have worked out a new framework of substantive dialogues and exchanges over the last four years. Taipei and Beijing, through the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS 海峡两岸关系协会) and Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF 海峽交流基金會) and party-to-party channels, have conducted talks and negotiations on socio-economic exchanges and signed 16 agreements, ranging from direct links in transport and flight, public health, food safety, and tourism to a comprehensive trade liberalization agreement – the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) – which was signed on 29 June 2010. Regularized and institutionalized cross-Strait dialogue, involving officials from both governments, helps to sustain strong and stable cross-Strait economic and personnel exchanges. Mutual perceptions are also changing. Cross-Strait détente, based on the ‘1992 consensus’, has created valuable room for manoeuvre for both sides to accommodate mutual concerns surrounding difficult issues such as ‘international space’ and political dialogue. The two sides have halted vicious competition for diplomatic recognition in the international arena. Although it is still unclear as to how long the present cross-Strait détente will last and whether the two sides of the Strait can elevate their relationship to new heights based on a more permanent peace accord, the momentum of cross-Strait détente is likely to continue and expand to encompass more society-to-society exchanges and socialization activities.

Détente across the Strait has given rise to questions about the role of the United States in future cross-Strait relations because of Washington’s influence on the status quo. When cross-Strait relations are shaky, both sides of the Strait seek Washington’s support, which makes the United States a crucial balancer between Beijing and Taipei. When both countries are on good terms, Washington has the leverage to facilitate stability or spoil the prospects for good relations. With cross-Strait détente now in place, what is the US perception of the current cross-Strait relationship and what is its policy towards future developments in cross-Strait relations? Generally speaking, the Obama administration welcomes and supports the present détente in cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, we hear that Washington ‘encourage[s] both Taiwan and the [People’s Republic of China] to continue their efforts to expand and develop their peaceful ties’.¹ On the other hand, some US analysts are increasingly concerned with the trend of Beijing gaining more control of the dynamics and direction of future cross-Strait affairs.² As the cross-Strait relationship stabilizes, is Washington adopting a hands-off policy? Does the Obama administration’s support for the signing of ECFA mean that Washington will allow economic dynamism to drive the direction of cross-Strait relations? If both sides of the Strait are on good terms, does that mean that Washington is less needed by Taipei and Beijing or that Washington’s influence on cross-Strait relations is declining?

While China and Taiwan experience a détente in bilateral relations, a debate about US Taiwan policy is emerging in the United States.³ This debate touches on some hot issues, such as whether Washington should abandon Taiwan, terminate its arms sales to Taiwan, and what it should do to strike a balance between its China policy and its Taiwan policy. More importantly, the debate cuts into the core of US policy towards Taiwan: what are the United States’ real national interests in the Taiwan Strait and what should the strategic vision of the policy on Taiwan be in the context of coping with China’s rise in Asia Pacific and on the global stage?

This article addresses two issues concerning the United States’ role in future cross-Strait relations. The first issue concerns the timing and crux of the current US debate about its Taiwan policy. I argue that although Washington welcomes the ECFA and other cross-Strait exchanges that help to mitigate the danger of war across the Taiwan Strait, there is actually an increasing uneasiness and anxiety in Washington about the future of cross-Strait relations. As cross-Strait relations continue to improve, more people inside the Beltway begin to feel uncertain about how US interests could be best served in the future. Cross-Strait détente and especially the possibility of Taipei and Beijing coming to terms in a peace accord have prompted policymakers in Washington to think more about future US interests and policy towards Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. The debate on US Taiwan policy is also closely linked to a broader strategic debate on how to deal with China’s rise and the implications for the United States in the Asia–Pacific region. China’s rapid ascent poses questions for US strategists on how to cope with the ensuing challenges. As such, we must understand the competing views in the Taiwan policy debate, such as ‘appeasing a rising China’, ‘abandoning Taiwan’, and ‘rebalancing against China rising’, within the broader context of international relations in the Asia–Pacific region.

The second issue is related to possible changes in the China–US–Taiwan triangular relationship. Although the United States remains a pivotal player in future developments, it chooses to lean back from more involvement in current cross-Strait interactions. But the question is to what extent Washington will support cross-Strait détente? If Taipei and Beijing continue to ‘normalize’ their relations, Washington’s role will be further marginalized. For Beijing, it has long sought to ‘de-internationalize’ cross-Strait relations and to insulate cross-Strait relations from US influence and Sino-US relations. Beijing is trying to reduce the influence of the United States in cross-Strait relations by pressuring Washington to terminate its arms sales to Taiwan or at least change the rules of the game in US sales of arms to Taiwan. So how successful the current cross-Strait détente will be depends on the extent to which the triangular framework is transformed and the extent of change in Washington’s role.

I argue that although Taiwan is no longer a flashing issue for leaders in Beijing and Washington, it remains a significant factor that influences Sino-US strategic relations. New dynamics and a trend of bifurcation in the triangular relationship are evident, and one bad bilateral relationship does not necessarily affect the other bilateral relationship. Ma Yingjiu’s (Ma Ying-jeou) policy towards the mainland and cross-Strait détente has removed a major threat to the two bigger players in the triangular relationship. Although the two big powers do not need to worry about Taiwan for the moment, regime change and domestic politics in Taiwan will always be a concern for Beijing and Washington. Moreover, if Sino-US relations turn bad, it will also adversely affect future developments in cross-Strait relations. A stable and healthy relationship between China and the United States is in everbody’s interest. If Washington and Beijing find ways to cooperate on a host of pressing global issues – from climate change to financial stability and nuclear non-proliferation – the two big powers would manage the Taiwan issue better than if they are engaged in a head-on strategic competition. Yet, as China makes a rapid ascent in Asia and in world affairs, the United States is increasingly concerned with a more ‘assertive’ and even ‘arrogant’ China. Rising Chinese power, solid performance during the global financial crisis, and increasing international influence have led the Obama administration to reconsider its Asia and China policies. Instead of centralizing its Asia policy on China, the Obama administration is now shifting towards ‘embedding’ its China policy in its Asia policy with a new ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy to consolidate its alliance and check the rising Chinese influence in Asia. Although Taiwan is not quite in this Asian ‘strategic rebalancing’ game yet, it could be brought back to the centre of confrontation between the United States and China in the future.

Cross-Strait détente and its implications for the United States

The United States has strong interests in sustaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait in its dealings with Beijing over a range of economic, political, and security issues. Tensions and confrontations between Taipei and Beijing from the mid-1990s to 2008 increased the danger of war and were profoundly contrary to US national interests. Washington prefers leaders in Taiwan who can manage ties with Beijing in such a way that minimizes friction and reduces the probability of military conflict.⁴ And by all measures, the current Ma Yingjiu administration’s mainland policy and cross-Strait détente serve US interests well.

The current cross-Strait détente can be traced back to the ‘Five Points Common Vision’ (五项共同愿景) agreed upon by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Hu Jintao and the then Kuomintang leader Lian Zhan (Lien Chan) in 2005, when the latter led a Kuomintang delegation on an unprecedented visit to the mainland 56 years after the civil war. The common vision called for the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue as set out in the 1992 consensus as well as further expansion of economic and social exchanges. Yet the 2005 Common Vision was just a party-to-party platform, and it was not until Ma Yingjiu’s election victory and the Kuomintang’s return to power in 2008 that it could be put into practice. After the Kuomintang government assumed power in May 2008, cross-Strait relations were jump-started and quickly became ‘normal’.

The current cross-Strait détente is built on two cornerstones – dialogue and exchange. With respect to dialogue, the two sides, based on the expedient 1992 consensus, have managed to find ways to overcome the political impasse and move forward with more substantive talks while not being bogged down by disputes over sensitive political issues. Based on their past historical experience, the Kuomintang and Beijing governments were quickly reconnected, through the CCP–Kuomintang channel, after Ma Yingjiu was elected in 2008. On 12 April 2008, two weeks after winning the presidential election, Ma Yingjiu sent Xiao Wanchang (Vincent Siew) (Vice President-elect) to meet President Hu Jintao at the Boao Forum (博鳌亚洲论坛). Ma conveyed his message in a very Chinese way – in a 16-character maxim: ‘Face the reality, pioneer a new future, shelve controversies, and pursue a win-win solution’ (正视现实、开创未来、搁置争议、追求双赢). On 28 May, at a meeting with Kuomintang Chairman Wu Boxiong (Wu Po-hsiung), Hu Jintao reciprocated in a similar fashion: ‘Build mutual trust, shelve controversies, seek common ground, and jointly pursue a win-win solution’ (建立互信、搁置争议、求同存异、共创双赢). Both sides agreed to ‘shelve controversies’ and pursue a ‘win-win solution’.⁵ Undoubtedly, the current cross-Strait détente is built on an implicit but practical compromise and understanding of ‘one China’ formulated in the 1992 consensus, with mutual opposition to Taiwan’s independence as the common denominator.

During Li Denghui’s (Lee Teng-hui) and Chen Shuibian’s (Chen Shui-bian) terms of office, there was a paradigm shift with regard to the political foundation of cross-Strait relations. Moving away from the Kuomintang’s original position, Li Denghui redefined the cross-Strait relationship as ‘special state-to-state’ relations. Chen Shuibian went further by stating that although ‘Taiwan and China stand on opposite sides of the Strait, there is one country on each side’.⁶ After the 2008 election, much to Beijing’s satisfaction, the Ma Yingjiu government returned to the Kuomintang’s original policy of cross-Strait relations, which is based on the ‘one China constitution’ (宪法一中). According to Ma, cross-Strait relations are not state-to-state relations, but a special kind of relationship between two regions within a country (两岸特殊关係). Ma’s policy shift brings cross-Strait relations back to the post-Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) period of détente between the two sides from 1990 to 1994. During that period, the two sides, through ARATS and SEF, held the first round of substantive talks in Singapore in 1993. With an ambivalent oral consensus in Hong Kong in 1992, the two sides agreed that there is only one China and the meaning of one China is subject to individual interpretation. This does not oblige Beijing to officially recognize the legal status of the Republic of China (ROC), nor is Taipei subject to the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

In his inaugural speech, Ma Yingjiu laid out basic elements of his government’s mainland policy. These elements include: the Three No’s – that is, no unification, no independence, and no use of force (不统、不独、不武); mutual non-denial; a legalist approach to ‘one China’ under the ROC constitution; and a gradual and measured approach in cross-Strait dialogue (tackling easy issues first, then the difficult ones; economic issues first, then political ones). On the mainland’s side, the policy of peaceful development in cross-Strait relations was actually first formulated in the CCP’s 17th Party Congress in October 2007. After Ma took up office, Hu Jintao further elaborated his peaceful development policy in more detail. On 31 December 2008, in his ‘Six-Point Proposal’ (胡六点) for future developments in cross-Strait relations, Hu called for a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement, more political dialogue to enhance mutual trust and even confidence-building measures, and ways to accommodate Taiwan’s aspiration to international space, in addition to further strengthening economic and cultural ties between the two sides. Of course, Hu embedded the new proposals in the one China principle. But what is more important in Hu’s Six-Point Proposal is that Beijing is not in a hurry to push for immediate unification and that the CCP implicitly recognizes that unification is at best a distant prospect. Although there are two de facto governments, the status quo does not denote the partition of China. Beijing is willing to be patient as long as peaceful development prevails and eventually paves the way to ending political antagonism and reunification.

Where exchange is concerned, the progress so far has been incredible. The two sides have agreed to put in place more comprehensive economic exchange and social engagement through increasingly institutionalized schemes. More comprehensive exchange serves the interests of both sides. To Beijing, such exchanges and comprehensive engagement will penetrate into Taiwanese society, including some ‘deep green’ areas in the south, which helps to reshape the image that the Taiwan public has of the mainland. With regard to Taipei, exchanges and cross-Strait economic ties bring more business opportunities and help to boost Taiwan’s sluggish economy after eight years under Chen Shuibian’s leadership. The two sides have signed 16 agreements in the last three years on issues ranging from direct flights, shipping, food safety, combating crime, tourism, and investment, through the SEF–ARATS channel. More and more government officials from both sides have directly participated in negotiations, which bestows on ARATS–SEF talks the nature of government-to-government negotiations. A larger number of government agencies from both sides have established direct contacts and negotiation channels. In May 2010, tourism liaison offices were established in Beijing and Taipei as branches of China’s Cross-Straits Tourism Exchange Association and Taiwan Strait Tourism Association, respectively. This was the first time that the two sides established permanent offices in each other’s capital city. The most significant breakthrough was the ECFA, which was signed on 30 June 2010 in Chongqing after two years of negotiation and hard work.

Dialogue and exchange are two interdependent processes mutually reinforcing each other. The former is much more difficult than the latter. We have seen much stronger ‘exchange’ than ‘dialogue’ in the current rapprochement. Cross-Strait dialogue and common understanding can lay the foundation for comprehensive exchanges across the Strait, and they can define the political meaning of the relationship. While the expansion of the scope of exchange has brought ‘real tangible economic benefits’ to people on both sides, the political impasse remains rigid. Taiwan’s long-standing efforts to gain a seat at the table of international organizations bore fruit when the World Health Organization officially invited Taiwan to participate in the World Health Assembly as an observer in May 2009. More international space for Taiwan requires more progress in mutual trust and confidence building.

By and large, the US government holds very positive views of the current cross-Strait détente. Officials in Washington are pleased with the reduction of tension and with stabilizing interactions across the Strait. They are of the opinion that the current trend would work well for longer-term US interests in the region. In response to new developments, Washington has officially expressed its support for the new rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait, and applauded the ECFA and the new lines of communication developing between Beijing and Taipei. In the Joint Statement issued after President Hu Jintao’s state visit to the United States on 19 January 2011, the US government stated that it ‘supports the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other fields, and to develop more positive and stable cross-Strait relations’.⁷

The US position just described is based on the assumption that stability and security across the Taiwan Strait would serve US interests in the Asia–Pacific region better than any other non-peaceful scenarios. More stable and comprehensive engagement and economic integration across the Strait would reduce the risk of conflict, in the event of which the United States is likely to be dragged into a war it does not want. Moreover the United States is keen to avoid a situation that may seriously damage US–China relations.

Washington may not have a pronounced preference as to which party (the Kuomintang or Democratic Progressive Party [DPP]) is in power in Taiwan, but its preference for cross-Strait peace and stability is apparent. When DPP’s Chen Shuibian was in office, his government made several provocative moves – such as altering the names of government institutions in order to symbolically sever Taiwan’s ties with China and holding a referendum which sought to gain admission into the United Nations under the name of ‘Taiwan’ rather than ‘Republic of China’ – for domestic political reasons. These moves dramatically escalated the level of tension across the Taiwan Strait. Chen’s provocation not only threatened to destabilize the United States’ relationship with China, but also increased the risk of war, which Washington saw as potentially endangering US interests in Asia Pacific.⁸ In response, the G. W. Bush administration made it clear that it ‘oppose(d) any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Straits’ and that it ‘would be opposed to any referenda that would change Taiwan’s status or move towards independence’.⁹ The US government has rarely made such strong statements on Taiwan’s affairs.

Cross-Strait détente also creates economic opportunities for the United States. By signing the ECFA, Taiwan’s and China’s markets will be open to trade and investment. As Taiwan liberalizes its economic relations with the mainland, economic relations with other trading partners, including the United States, could also be liberalized. The implementation of the ECFA’s early harvest list and negotiations on full-scale trade liberalization create opportunities for other East Asian countries and the United States to engage in free trade negotiations with Taipei. Whether the ECFA will help to restore US–Taiwanese trade and investment talks for the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement remains to be seen.

‘Strategic anxiety’ and the emerging US Taiwan policy debate

New dynamics in cross-Strait relations have created both opportunities and challenges for Washington’s Taiwan policy. If the focus of its Taiwan policy was on preventing cross-Strait crises and military conflicts when the DPP was in power in Taiwan, the United States is becoming uncertain about the direction it should take now that relations between Beijing and Taipei have improved under Ma Yingjiu. A stabilized cross-Strait relationship and Ma Yingjiu’s non-confrontational mainland policy are welcomed by Washington. The US government can now afford a more hands-off approach in cross-Strait relations and not worry about being dragged into a war it does not want with China. However, there is growing anxiety in Washington about its Taiwan policy and future relations with China. On the one hand, the United States is pleased to see a return to peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, and it even encourages more positive cross-Strait dialogue. But on the other hand, Washington’s community of strategists is becoming increasingly anxious about the future direction of cross-Strait relations and how the rapprochement between Taipei and Beijing will change the dynamics in the China–US–Taiwan triangular relationship.

More importantly, the current debate and discussion on US Taiwan policy is not just about Taiwan per se. Rather, it is unfolding within a bigger debate in the United States about the rise of China and the challenges it poses to US strategy in the Asia–Pacific region. The Taiwan issue is embedded in a broader context of a rising China and future strategic challenges to the United States. That is why many people argue that Washington should get its China policy right ahead of its Taiwan policy.

The United States and China share mutual mistrust over each other’s strategic intent.¹⁰ China views the United States’ actions as attempts to contain the rise of China and as meddling in territorial disputes between China and its neighbours. The United States regards China’s rapid ascent and growing military might as a potential security threat to Washington’s dominant role in the Asia–Pacific region. Beijing is seen as trying to drive the United States out of Asia. The nature of the challenge that China poses does not lie in the fact that China is a growing economic power with 1.3 billion people, but that it is a rising socialist power with a successful development model and cultural values that are different from the West’s. The Chinese challenge is quite unlike that posed by the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. Thus how to respond to such a challenge is a major issue in US strategic debates, and different strategic depictions of the Chinese challenge have led to contending views on future adjustments of US Taiwan policy. Four contentious issues are discussed here.

Taiwanese and US grand strategy

The current US anxiety about the rise of China and Taiwan touches upon core strategic issues: how to cope with rising Chinese power and future scenarios of US–China strategic rivalry in the Asia–Pacific region. Two contending approaches – realist and liberalist – have been proposed to meet the China challenge. Liberalists argue that the liberal international order can accommodate China’s rise and that China is constrained by economic interdependence and membership in international institutions. Actually China has more incentives to work within the US-led liberal international order, and while it is easy to join the order, it is difficult to overturn the established order.¹¹ In contrast, realists believe that China’s growing economic and military strength will impel Beijing to pursue its interests more assertively (including future actions with regard to Taiwan). So in order to maintain balance in the regional order, the United States and its allies need to counter the rise of China. If optimistic liberals and pessimistic realists occupy the two extremes of the strategic spectrum, Charles Glaser proposes a midway strategy that will not bring big power relations back to a parallel with the Cold War stand-off between the United States and Soviet Union. Glaser contends that power politics can induce a manageable peace and accommodate rising powers. Established powers should give up that which is of secondary value in order to satisfy a rising power that places inordinate value on such things. It is in this respect that Taiwan is relevant to future US grand strategy vis-a-vis China’s rising power. Glaser argues that Washington should readjust its Taiwan policy to reassure China of its strategic intent of non-containment and non-threat. In doing so, Washington and Beijing should be able to fashion an arrangement through mutual concessions, and thus fend off future war. In return, Washington can expect to enlist Beijing’s support in guaranteeing the existing international system and as a stakeholder in the present world order.¹²

Glaser’s thesis of ‘abandoning Taiwan’ has triggered waves of criticism about his vision of US grand strategy and Taiwan policy. Many mainstream Taiwan scholars in the United States strongly disagree with Glaser’s thesis. Nancy Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, for example, argue that while good relations with China are vital for the United States and future international order, it is questionable, and maybe even harmful, whether sacrificing Taiwan would improve US–China relations. They assert that conditions are not ripe for such a change and that Washington should neither abandon nor reduce its commitments to Taiwan, but strengthen them instead.¹³ Moreover, many argue that US regional policy in East Asia is closely linked to its post-war Taiwan commitment. If Washington decides to abandon Taiwan, it will lose credibility in the eyes of its Asian allies, which will lead to the collapse of its alliance system and leadership role in Asia. Although there is no consensus emerging from the debate, the grand strategists do not seem to be winning the debate, and mainstream views in the US policy community are set on keeping the status quo of the United States’ commitment to Taiwan.

Should Washington worry about growing imbalance in cross-Strait relations?

Is maintaining a cross-Strait balance the goal of US policy? Sutter argues that officials in Washington are becoming agitated about future trends in cross-Strait relations and East Asian international relations. On the one hand, the US government is hopeful that the present cross-Strait détente will continue and that the two sides should make progress in ways that serve the interests of both Taiwan and the United States. But on the other hand, Washington is increasingly concerned about an ever-growing ‘imbalance’ across the Taiwan Strait. According to Sutter, this growing imbalance is a major concern for future US policy as it will increasingly consolidate Beijing’s economic, diplomatic, and military advantage and dominance over Taiwan, and cross-Strait détente will move in a direction that is not in the interest of the United States.¹⁴ Sutter’s alarming view reverberates within the Beltway. It raises questions about the imbalance and the likely policy implications for US Taiwan policy.

Is the current cross-Strait relationship off-balance? Sutter’s view, based on consultations with policy experts inside and outside the US government, is that the longstanding notion of a US-fostered balance in the Taiwan Strait is no longer viable. With a much stronger power position, Beijing can now assert more influence over Taiwan. Given its ever-stronger influence, Beijing sees little incentive to make sensitive concessions to accede to Taiwan’s requests unless Taipei makes concessions on more fundamental issues. Sutter believes that cross-Strait power realities and trends also pose a broader challenge to the longstanding US policy goal of maintaining a balance of power and influence in cross-Strait relations favourable to Taiwan and US interests and under Washington’s influence.¹⁵ Sutter criticizes President Obama’s policy on Taiwan, which according to him is overshadowed by US interests in forging more pragmatic and positive relations with Beijing. Sutter recommends a review of US Taiwan policy and a robust renewal of US support for Taiwan to counter what he sees as adverse trends towards greater asymmetry between Taiwan and mainland China.

However, Sutter’s notion that Washington’s policy goal is to maintain a balance of power and influence in cross-Strait relations favourable to Taiwanese and US interests is misleading. His concept of balance is not clear and even confusing. Another question is whether maintaining a balance of power and influence by Washington is a means or an end in itself. This is similar to the realist argument that power is both a means and an end. Richard Bush argues that Washington’s main goal has always been the preservation of peace and security, not the maintenance of the balance of power, in the Taiwan Strait. In his view, the United States does not take sides where peace and security in the Strait are concerned. Both the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations worried that China and Taiwan might inadvertently slip into a conflict through accident or miscalculation, and so they employed the approach of ‘dual deterrence’ to preserve peace. To this end, Washington has warned Beijing not to use force against Taiwan, and it has even reassured Beijing that it does not support Taiwan’s independence. By the same token, Washington has warned Taipei not to undertake any political action that might provoke China to use force, and it has conveyed the reassurance that it would not sell out Taiwan’s interests for the sake of maintaining its relationship with China.¹⁶

Is the United States selling out Taiwan’s interests?

Obama critics from the right argue that Washington is selling out Taiwan’s interests for the sake of strategic relations with Beijing. They find that the Obama administration’s policy on Taiwan lacks consistency and credibility. Blumenthal, for example, asserts that inconsistency in Washington’s Taiwan policy has made the United States less credible and reliable in the eyes of the Taiwanese, and thus has created unnecessary dilemmas for Taiwan’s democratically elected leadership. Blumenthal argues that Washington has not rewarded Ma Yingjiu with more bilateral incentives to increase Taipei’s international status, nor has it provided more arms to deter China’s military coercion. Moreover the Taiwanese public is actually perplexed by Washington’s policy. In their view, if Taipei is considered too provocative towards Beijing, Washington will twist its arm, and if Taiwan reconciles with Beijing, Washington will neglect the island.¹⁷

Obama critics from the centre argue that the current US policy hurts long-term US interests. They claim that by supporting the current trends Washington is retreating from its traditional policy of maintaining effective leverage over cross-Strait relations and that US attention and interest with regard to Taiwan are on the decline domestically and internationally. As a result, the level of support for Taiwan on Capitol Hill and in the US government is diminishing. To make things worse, the US government is demonstratively less supportive of Taiwan’s quest for more international space and it seems to provide more reassurance to Beijing than to Taipei.¹⁸

Growing uncertainty about future cross-Strait reconciliation

Another source of anxiety for the United States in their policy on Taiwan is their perception of prospects of cross-Strait reconciliation. People in Washington have cause for concern about the future direction of cross-Strait relations and the declining ability of the United States to exert influence or apply brakes to the process. The current cross-Strait rapprochement has generated positive effects – tangible and intangible – and it is likely to have some spill-over effects on future political dialogue between the two sides. Although it is not clear what the current rapprochement will achieve and whether it will eventually lead to dialogue on core political issues, preparations and explorations for political dialogue and confidence-building measures are under way. One such example is a delegation from the mainland led by Zheng Bijian which visited Taiwan in November 2009. In October 2011 President Ma Yingjiu stated that Taiwan may consider a peace accord with the mainland if the people of Taiwan agree and if there is sufficient trust between the two sides.¹⁹ To Washington, a cross-Strait peace accord may not be an immediate concern but what is worrying is that Washington is kept in the dark about what is going on across the Taiwan Strait. The possibility of being sidelined in major political issues concerning Taipei and Beijing is an unpleasant prospect for US policymakers.

The reason why Washington is not so concerned about a breakthrough in cross-Strait political dialogue is apparent. Many people in Washington believe that cross-Strait détente should not be regarded as an inexorable and irreversible movement towards political reconciliation and unification. A peace accord is not likely to materialize in the near future. The two sides have enough problems to work on at present, and a peace accord is really on the back burner. For example, Richard Bush believes that under the current Taiwanese democratic system, despite its problems, any fundamental change in Taiwan’s relationship with the mainland will require a broad political consensus. Taiwanese leaders would certainly apply caution when dealing with politically sensitive issues concerning national sovereignty and security.²⁰ Bush is right about high expectations on both sides when it comes to political negotiation. In Beijing’s eyes, Ma Yingjiu’s policy is not totally satisfactory, but it is acceptable. Since Ma Yingjiu cannot and will not change the Three No’s policy in the near future, talks on the political impasse are a long shot. There are no other better alternatives but to continue taking a step-by-step and ‘economics first, politics later’ approach. The mainland can do little to change the dialogue agenda or to exert pressure on Taipei to accelerate the pace. Chinese leaders are clear about the ultimate goal of eventual reunification, and that peaceful development is a transitional stage or interim phase towards that ultimate goal. But they also clearly understand that it is premature to talk about that goal at the current stage of peaceful development.

Searching for a new balance among different policy objectives?

The emerging policy debate on Taiwan has refocused attention on how to balance US Taiwan policy and its future grand strategy in order to cope with the rise of China in the Asia–Pacific region. Policy debate leads to new thinking, and new thinking prepares for policy adjustments. Washington’s policy towards cross-Strait relations is becoming more nuanced as the United States pursues multiple policy objectives. The goal in its Taiwan policy centres on maintaining peace and security across the Taiwan Strait and a favourable status quo that best serves US interests. The implementation of this policy requires a balancing act and at times dual deterrence tactics. For a long time, Washington’s Taiwan policy has mainly focused on how to prevent war and conflict, and it was worried that the situation of mutual distrust and fear might cause Taiwan and/or China to miscalculate, leading to a conflict that would likely involve the United States.²¹ To prevent such a vicious spiral of mutual fear from escalating into war, Washington has to use its leverage to interfere and defuse the crisis, if necessary. When Chen Shuibian consistently pushed the envelope despite warnings from the two big players in the triangular game, Washington had no choice but to rebuff him. Washington’s snubbing Chen Shuibian clearly showed its bottom line and, consequently, even created a tacit alignment with Beijing. Ma Yingjiu’s government has reversed Chen’s confrontational policies and pursued closer ties with China. In Washington’s view, when tension is low, Beijing and Taipei should be able to take more responsibility for managing their relations, and Washington can step back from ‘hands-on’ involvement in cross-Strait relations.

Is Washington becoming more detached from the management of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait? The answer is ‘no’. David Shear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has summarized the Obama administration’s Taiwan policy as follows:

We do not support Taiwan independence.

We insist that cross-Strait differences be resolved peacefully and according to the wishes of the people on both sides of the Strait.

We welcome active efforts on both sides to engage in a dialogue that reduces tensions and increases contacts of all kinds across the Strait.

We are opposed to unilateral attempts by either side to change the status quo.

We are fully committed to meeting our obligations in the Taiwan Relations Act, including making available to Taiwan articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence.²²

In the changing regional and cross-Strait environment, the management of US Taiwan policy has become more nuanced while its fundamental goals remain the same. Most US policy elites would consider abandoning Taiwan unthinkable, but they accept that future US interests would be best served by encouraging peaceful engagement and dialogue between Taiwan and the mainland. Despite new dynamics across the Strait as well as the new strategic environment, the United States is not likely to change its long-term Taiwan policy. Most US policymakers still believe that the status quo serves US interests well, but how to manage the status quo in favour of the United States requires more wisdom. Sea changes in cross-Strait relations have not fundamentally altered US policy goals in the Taiwan Strait.

Having said that, while Washington is not changing its policy on Taiwan in a fundamental way, this does not mean that the United States is not making partial adjustments to the policy. The current debate on Taiwan is not going to lead to a major policy overhaul, but policy adjustments at the operational level are already under way. The US policy of arms sales to Taiwan is an example.

For a long time, US arms sales to Taiwan have been a serious problem in Sino-US relations and US policy towards Taiwan. Despite the August 17 Communiqué, Washington has continued to sells arms to Taiwan according to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA stipulates that ‘the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability’.²³ For the United States, the arms sales, in addition to strengthening Taiwan’s defence and cross-Strait security, also indicate the level of political support from Washington. Over the last three decades, the United States has sustained arms sales to Taiwan as a way of strengthening US–Taiwanese relations. For Beijing, US arms sales to Taiwan are a clear violation of the Three Joint Communiqués issued by China and the United States. Since the August 17 Communiqué of 1982, China has sought to restrict US arms sales to Taiwan, if not completely stop the sales.

The last 30 years have seen changes in the geo-strategic environment as well as tension surrounding US arms sales to Taiwan. As China gains status, it has become less and less tolerant of American sales of arms to Taiwan. Every time Washington decides to sell arms to Taiwan, China reacts strongly and makes the cost of such arms sales increasingly higher for Washington to bear. Retaliatory measures taken by the Chinese have included the suspension of military-to-military relations, cancellation of diplomatic talks, and possible penalties on US corporations that provide arms to Taiwan. Although the pattern of the arms sales game is likely to continue – that is, China increases its military posture towards Taiwan and then Taipei asks Washington for arms; Washington sells them; and Beijing is compelled to denounce the sales – Beijing has begun to put increasing pressure on Washington. From the perspective of power politics, Chinese sentiments about unabated US arms sales to Taiwan are changing. In the past, many Chinese elites accepted that it was a done deal when China was weak; now that China is getting strong it should no longer tolerate arms sales indefinitely. So Washington should pay more heed to Beijing’s objections to US sales of arms to Taiwan.

The United States faces the dilemma of balancing its obligations as spelt out in the TRA, which strengthens Taipei’s bargaining power vis-a-vis Beijing and future US–China relations. Apart from obligations in the TRA to which the United States is bound, other justifications are becoming less convincing if not totally meaningless. Nobody now believes that the sale of arms will restore military balance across the Strait. Washington’s contention that it makes Taipei more comfortable and confident in its negotiation with the mainland is beginning to sound less convincing. Before President Reagan agreed to sign the August 17 Communiqué with Beijing, on 14 July 1982 he sent James Lilley, who was then the head of the American Institute in Taiwan, to reassure Taipei. These verbal reassurances have come to be known as the ‘Six Assurances’, which affirmed that Washington would not ‘set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China’ and that it would not ‘hold prior consultations with the PRC’ on arms sales to Taiwan.²⁴ It is becoming increasingly difficult to live up to these promises. When US Defense Secretary Robert Gates was asked about the future of US arms sales to Taiwan during his visit to Beijing, he responded that ‘while the US cannot promise not to make further sales, the US might reconsider military support to Taiwan in the future’.²⁵ He further elaborated that it would be an evolutionary and long-term process depending on the reduction of tension across the Taiwan Strait.

Subtle policy adjustments raise the question of how Washington will keep its promise as specified in the Six Assurances to Taiwan.²⁶ The first two assurances are about arms sales, the fourth is about the Taiwan Relations Act, and the rest of them concern the US position on future cross-Strait dialogue. With reference to the US position, can Washington still afford to maintain its hands-off approach? There are increasing calls within the Washington policy community to revisit the Six Assurances.²⁷

US ‘pivot to Asia’ and the future of the China–US–Taiwan triangular relationship

Historically, the China–US–Taiwan triangular relationship has been considered an asymmetrical triangle in which the United States is the strongest and Taiwan the weakest among the three players. When cross-Strait relations are marked by tension, Washington is much needed by the other two, which yields influence in the triangle. The past antagonistic relationship across the Taiwan Strait has provided Washington ample opportunities to interfere and exercise power as the pivot player in the triangle. However, this pattern seems to be changing as new dynamics characterize cross-Strait relations, among which include China’s rapidly rising power and changing Sino-US relations.

One of the major changes in the triangular relationship is the growing bifurcation of three bilateral relationships. One bad bilateral relationship does not necessarily make the other bilateral dealings bad. As cross-Strait relations improve, it seems to be a win-win-win situation for all three players in the triangular relationship. Yet, as the two sides across the Strait mend relations, the United States’ influence in the triangle is clearly declining. The antagonism between Taipei and Beijing used to be a constant variable in the triangle, and in some way it determined how the game in the triangular relationship played out. Now with substantive improvements in cross-Strait relations, the danger of conflict is considerably reduced, if not completely eliminated. The two sides of the Strait are moving from confrontation to cooperation and comprehensive engagement. This new situation has dramatically reduced Washington’s influence in the asymmetric triangle. The United States can no longer forcefully constrain either Taipei or Beijing as the two sides engage each other more positively and make some structural changes in their relationship. As the level of mutual confidence between Taipei and Beijing increases, it affects the level of trust in Washington.

China’s intention is to further insulate cross-Strait relations from US influence as Beijing becomes less patient with Washington’s continuous meddling in cross-Strait affairs. China’s increasingly strong reactions to US arms sales to Taiwan serve as a clear statement that it wants to further neutralize US interference and influence in cross-Strait relations. As for Taiwan, Ma Yingjiu’s government seeks a triple win for Taiwan, China, and the United States. Caught between Beijing and Washington, Ma’s mainland policy aims to reduce cross-Strait tensions while simultaneously reinvigorating the partnership between Taipei and Washington. Yet Taiwan is walking a tightrope, trying to make both Beijing and Washington happy. If neither of them is happy or if Beijing and Washington are on bad terms, Taipei will be in trouble.

A stable and healthy Sino-US relationship is instrumental to stable improvements in cross-Strait relations. If Washington needs Beijing’s support on a host of pressing world issues – from climate change to financial stability and nuclear non-proliferation – the two big powers will manage their relationship better if they are not strategic competitors. If the Sino-US relationship is strained, cross-Strait relations will be affected. As the saying goes, when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.

While Sino-US relations are not adversely affecting cross-Strait relations at the present time, China’s rising power and the impact on its relations with the United States and the subsequent changes in Asia–Pacific international relations would be the major variables driving changes in the triangular relationship in the long run. The growth in Chinese military power has an increasingly strong bearing on the United States’ role in cross-Strait relations. Greater anti-access and area-denial capabilities on the part of the Chinese in the Taiwan Strait can frustrate, if not completely stop, US attempts to support Taiwan in case of conflict. The projected increase in the power and capacity of the People’s Liberation Army considerably raises the costs of US military intervention in the Taiwan Strait. In some ways this makes Taiwan feel more vulnerable and increasingly uncertain of US military support, should such conflicts arise. China’s growing power also makes politicians and elites in Taiwan question the necessity and utility of US security guarantees and its own defence spending.

As China becomes more prominent, it will be a challenge to manage a good relationship with the United States. Both countries had a good start in bilateral relations when Obama took office in January 2009, but the relationship quickly turned sour after a series of events in 2010. The United States sold arms to Taiwan in February 2010, which prompted a strong Chinese reaction and the suspension of military-to-military exchanges with Washington. Chinese leaders were upset by Washington’s lack of respect for China’s ‘core national interests’ as mentioned in the Sino-US joint statement during President Obama’s visit to China in November 2009. Then followed differences between the two countries over reactions to the Cheonan incident in March 2010, US–South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea in August 2010, US air and sea reconnaissance missions close to China’s borders, the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, and territorial issues in the South China Sea. The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia policy is viewed by Beijing as a ‘strategic encirclement’ of China, and since the policy was announced in the fall of 2011 it has triggered a new round of strategic rebalancing in the Asia–Pacific region as well as Sino-US strategic rivalry.

As relations between China and the United States become constrained, mutual distrust is one outcome. In Washington’s eyes, the Obama administration has shown conciliatory gestures to Beijing by downplaying human rights, elevating China’s role in the G-20, and proposing the G-2 concept. But such gestures of ‘strategic reassurance’ were not reciprocated by China in the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues. In the United States, there are rising concerns about a more assertive and even arrogant China, fuelled by nationalist voices and by China’s rising power and solid performance during the global financial crisis.²⁸ Such perceptions of the threat posed by China are also spreading widely in East Asia and are shared by US allies in the region. Seen from a Chinese perspective, Washington is using the developments in 2010 to make a ‘return to Asia’ and to strengthen its alliances to contain the rise of China in Asia.

A bad Sino-US relationship is likely to affect cross-Strait relations in the long run. When relations across the Strait are comparatively stable and peaceful, people question why Washington wants to rock the boat by selling arms to Taiwan. From Washington’s perspective, arms sales to Taiwan must be seen in light of the broader US strategy in the Asia–Pacific region. In facing the challenge of a rising China, leaders in Washington feel compelled to undertake strategic measures to sustain US dominance in the region. The United States needs to restore and maintain strong ties with traditional and new allies, and partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India. Of course, Taiwan is also an important player in the region, which Washington cannot ignore. The United States’ traditional alliance system built in the Cold War has started to show signs of instability as Beijing’s regional influence grows. So, arms sales to Taiwan could serve as a needed reassurance to the region that the United States will not abandon its friends in Asia.²⁹

Rivalry between China and the United States is the main driver of strategic reconfiguration in Asia and in US relations with other Asian countries. The US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns argues that as China’s role in world affairs grows, it is important to keep the relationship with China on a productive track. But ‘good China policy is necessarily embedded in good Asia policy’.³⁰ Washington will have to be careful in balancing its relations with China on the one hand and with its allies on the other. In order to reassure its allies, Washington needs to remain committed to the region, and its arms sales to Taiwan is seen as an indicator of its commitment to security in the Asia–Pacific region.³¹

Conclusion

The United States’ role in cross-Strait relations is undergoing change, but it will take a longer than expected time for any real changes in the fundamentals of its Taiwan policy to emerge. The current changes are minor adjustments at the operational level. Reflecting the trend is the emerging debate on US Taiwan policy and its strategy towards the rise of China and cross-Strait relations. In some ways the current debate resembles the strategic debate in the early 1970s on opening up to China, in which contentious arguments from proponents of the US grand strategy as well as from global politics weighed in the debate. As Gilley argues, if Taiwan’s drift towards closer relations with China (a phenomenon of ‘Finlandization’) is clear and irreversible, Washington has to reconsider its national interests in future cross-Strait relations.³² Such anxiety is also reciprocal. Washington’s unease about a rapidly rising China in Asia is matched by Beijing’s suspicion of Washington’s possible moves that might stir up confrontation again and torpedo future cross-Strait relations. This conspiracy theory is popular in the media.

Sino-US relations and cross-Strait relations cannot be separated. As Washington makes a high-profile return to Asia, its relationship with China is being reconstructed, and Washington does not lack the will to reassert itself in cross-Strait relations. The Chinese are getting more alarmed by Washington’s return to Asia and its strengthening alliances in Asia to contain the rise of China. Both China and the United States are not exactly sure of each other’s strategic intentions. Many Chinese believe that Washington’s return to Asia is aimed at containing China’s rise or at least diminishing its influence in the region. Many Americans believe that China is seeking to erode US influence in Asia and eventually drive it out of the region. Mutual mistrust would have a negative bearing on cross-Strait relations as the latter can never be completely insulated from Sino-US relations.

Footnotes

Notes

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