Taiwanese women in China: Integration and mobility in gendered enclaves

Abstract

While much research on migration and China focuses on the overseas Chinese, this research will instead analyse the migration of Taiwanese to China. This article uses data gathered in Dongguan and Shanghai in 2004–5 with follow-up interviews in 2008–10 to study the migration experiences of Taiwanese in China and to illustrate how class affects the migration of the privileged. Despite the diverse backgrounds of the female respondents considered in this article, most of them had a higher socio-economic status than the Chinese people they encountered. Because of the difference in social class, the respondents were reluctant to mix with locals. The ensuing sense of alienation has partly caused the respondents to identify themselves as less Chinese than before moving to China.

Keywords

class gap lifestyle migration social mobility Taiwanese women in China

While there is abundant research on migration and China which focuses on the overseas Chinese, little attention has been paid to migration into China. Research findings as well as news from the press suggest that most people moving into China are professionals exploring business opportunities. In 2010, it was estimated that around 600,000 people moved to China from countries in the West and around 1,000,000 from Taiwan. Most of the Western and Taiwanese migrants are well educated and are employed by foreign, including Taiwanese, firms.¹

There is, however, even less literature on Western professionals and Taiwanese moving to China than there is on the overseas Chinese.² Although the Taiwanese in China are by no means the largest group of non-Chinese residents, their migration experiences are under-researched. Most research on the Taiwanese in China has concentrated on the relocation of firms and the potential influence of such relocation on cross-Strait relations. Until recently there has been little research that explores the daily experiences of migrants.³ Such limited research suggests that most Taiwanese migrants have little intention of settling down in China, in spite of having lived there for several years.⁴ While most Taiwanese migrants are ethnically Chinese, they do not tend to mix with the local Chinese people. In view of the role of Taiwanese migrants in cross-Strait relations, it makes sense to explore the nature and extent of their interaction with the locals.

This article discusses the gap in socio-economic status between Taiwanese migrants and local Chinese people, a gap which hinders their interaction. While the respondents are of different social standing in Taiwan, most of them occupy the higher levels of the social strata in China.⁵ Upward mobility initially encourages migrants to move, but it discourages them from associating with local society after they move. Most migrants spend their daily life with other affluent migrants and keep their interaction with the local people to a minimum, so that they are like ‘birds living in a golden cage’. The initial sense of upward mobility gradually turns into loneliness and depression.

Since Sorokin expounded his theory on social mobility, the concept has been treated narrowly, with an overwhelming emphasis on vertical movements between occupational positions. With the development of methodology, most studies on social mobility have concentrated on data collected in a particular country, and other forms of social mobility such as moving up through moving abroad have been ignored. If upward mobility can be easily achieved in nearby countries, it is reasonable to assume that people who are relatively rich in capital will move abroad.⁶ ‘Moving up through moving out’ is often ignored in mainstream studies, but it will be addressed in this article. Our focal points are the respondents’ pre-migration expectations and post-migration experiences with regard to socio-economic status. Before exploring the respondents’ expectations and experiences, we will review the literature on the migration of those who are privileged as well as the migration of Taiwanese to China.

International migration

Although population movement between countries is not new, research on international migration often focuses on labour migrants moving from poorer to richer countries. Most studies suggest that people move abroad for a better life, which is defined in terms of obtaining economic benefit overseas or escaping the economic pressure at home.⁷ From this perspective, affluent people moving from more to less developed countries are often regarded as tourists or foreigners. Their movement is viewed as tourism rather than migration. However, this migration/tourism dichotomy may be problematic. Some people move abroad to travel but they do not return for years.⁸ These affluent border-crossers are sometimes referred to as privileged migrants, which illustrates their high socio-economic status in the host country, or as lifestyle migrants, which indicates their search for something meaningful.⁹

Lifestyle migration: Privileged people on the move

The migration and experiences of privileged migrants as far back as Europeans in Africa during colonial times has been studied.¹⁰ More recent studies have explored the long-distance migration of European expatriates or professionals and their family members to the Middle East and Asia,¹¹ the short-distance emigration from Britain, Japan, and Singapore to nearby countries,¹² and periodic visits to particular foreign destinations.¹³ According to these studies, most migrants initially visit the host country just as tourists or language students, without planning to stay long term. After staying in the host country for a short period of time, they discover that their capital and skills are valued more highly in the host country. They are attracted by the prospect of a promising career or a better quality of life abroad. Therefore, a short-term visit is gradually extended into long-term residency. This type of migration should not be understood merely as making more money overseas, but as having a certain type of life which is unavailable at home.¹⁴

Although these migrants move away for various reasons, most of them possess the cultural capital of the dominant class (such as language, professional skills, and cultural interests) of the host country. Because of the hierarchical relationship between countries, the cultural capital of the sending country is usually highly valued in the receiving country. Therefore, it is not difficult for these people to obtain jobs with a higher salary as compared to their local counterparts. As a result, they often have a higher socio-economic status than most other people in the receiving country. Such a status distinguishes these affluent border-crossers from conventional labour migrants. From this perspective, the migration of privileged people is not merely a movement across a geographical border because of economic incentives, but it is also a form of upward mobility. In social terms, most privileged migrants are ‘upgraded’ in the host country, but few of them have a strong intention of settling down overseas. Most of them still think of their residence in the host country as a short-term stay even if they have lived abroad for many years.

Apart from this sense of being socially upgraded, these migrants also search for something special in the host country, an indication that lifestyle migration partially involves the cultural context. This expectation often derives from their knowledge of or previous travelling experience in the host country. Not only is the cultural context a pull factor, it also impacts on the actions of migrants after migration.¹⁵ Because most lifestyle migrants are relatively affluent and have certain cultural expectations of the host country, they prefer to participate in certain activities with other affluent people (usually other affluent migrants) rather than become involved in the ordinary affairs of local society. Therefore, these migrants are sometimes described as birds living in a golden cage, people living in expat bubbles, or outsiders in the host country.¹⁶

Most studies on lifestyle migration have concentrated on the experiences of men. Women in these studies are usually discussed as spouses of male migrants, but not as independent individuals. Although most female lifestyle migrants are well educated (and often have their own career in their home country), they are not encouraged to have a proper career or to engage in local society. Without a career or social life, most of them spend their time with other privileged migrants. Therefore, they are sometimes described as ‘trailing spouses’.¹⁷ While their male partners have more opportunities to consolidate their career after migration, these female migrants are pushed into traditional gender roles as mothers and/or wives.

Two studies on single women (British women in China and Japanese women in Singapore) show a pattern similar to that of affluent male migrants. Through moving to less-developed countries, single women obtain more opportunities to follow their own career and to change their life. However, they also face difficulties in maintaining or pursuing romance or relationships with their male compatriots. Owing partly to this difficulty, most eventually give up their career overseas and return home.¹⁸

Taiwanese in China: Living with limited integration

As already mentioned, current studies on lifestyle migration concentrate on migration from the West to the East. There is little research on lifestyle migration from the East or within the East, except for a few fragmentary studies on the migration of Japanese and Singaporeans.¹⁹ While the socio-economic development of Taiwan is, in general, more advanced than China’s, the presence of Taiwanese migrants in China is often considered the result of firm relocations in traditional industry, not as a phenomenon of population movement. Therefore, research on Taiwanese migrants in China is often referred to as studies on Taiwanese business overseas (台商研究).²⁰ ‘Making money to get rich’ is the main reason why more than a million Taiwanese have moved to China. How Taiwanese migrants interact with the local Chinese population is generally overlooked in these studies.

Two recent publications discuss the interaction between Taiwanese migrants and Chinese society.²¹ The first by Deng Jian-bang explores the hierarchical relationship between Taiwanese employees – usually working as high-ranking managers – and their Chinese colleagues – usually working as lower-ranking staff – at the same firm. Because of this hierarchical structure, the interaction between Taiwanese migrants and their Chinese colleagues is limited. A second study by this author discusses their interaction after work. Most Taiwanese migrants have little interest in associating with Chinese people even if they both live in the same neighbourhood.²² Both the publications mentioned discuss the expat bubble, often referred to in other studies of lifestyle migration, but how this bubble is formed has not yet been discussed.

At the time of writing in 2011, two Taiwanese celebrities had recently married rich Chinese businessmen they had met in China. Because most intermarriages across the Strait occur between Taiwanese men and Chinese women living in Taiwan, this news (of marriage between Taiwanese women and Chinese men living in China) sparked a lot of discussion in the press.²³ Although married women are often referred to as shaonainai (少奶奶), which literally means people who are rich and do not have to worry about their daily life,²⁴ there is little research on their migration experiences, and in particular on how they deal with a life without the prospect of a career in China. By analysing these women’s experiences, this article also addresses the question of how the expat bubble of Taiwanese migrants is formed.

To sum up, the limited studies on the lives of Taiwanese migrants discuss a form of lifestyle migration. Most Taiwanese migrants are relatively rich or highly educated, which distinguishes them from local people. It is not clear how wealthy or knowledgeable the Taiwanese migrants are, but it is clear that they are more affluent than most of the Chinese people around them. It is also clear that most Taiwanese migrants have little intention of becoming involved in Chinese society, even when they have been living in China for some time. This article examines how this invisible segregation has come about by looking at the experiences of female Taiwanese migrants.

Case studies

In the literature reviewed, segregation between migrants and local people is evident. While the segregation in conventional studies on labour migration usually results from the ‘ethnic gap’ between poor migrants and local people in general,²⁵ the segregation in the case of lifestyle migration is attributed to the presence of a ‘class gap’ between affluent migrants and ordinary local people.²⁶ Most affluent migrants (such as Europeans in Asia) in earlier studies are those from countries which are ethnically very different and it is not clear whether the segregation arises from a difference of class or ethnicity. Since most Taiwanese are ethnic Chinese, we can concentrate on the potential influence of the class gap on migration.

Most research on lifestyle migration pays little attention to the experiences of women, in particular married women. By analysing the experiences of married Taiwanese women, we aim to obtain more understanding about the role of class in migration and its potential influence on identity.

Although it is estimated that more than a million Taiwanese live in China, few of them are officially registered with the local government. Without knowing the size of the population, it is impractical to do statistical sampling. Therefore, most research on the Taiwanese in China is based on estimates from incomplete quantitative data or limited interviews in selected Taiwanese firms in coastal China.²⁷ As there are three Taiwanese schools in China and all three are located in Dongguan and Shanghai – an indication of the highest concentration of Taiwanese residing in China – it made sense to target Taiwanese migrants in Dongguan and Shanghai for research.²⁸ Maximum variation sampling enabled us to sample for heterogeneity and diversity of perceptions and experiences of Taiwanese women in China.

Our case studies when put together offer a picture of gendered enclaves. The informants varied in age, education, marital status, length of working experience in Taiwan, and length of stay in China. In addition to interviews with selected respondents, the author joined in activities conducted by various organizations such as the Taiwanese Businessmen’s Dongguan School, the Hua Dong Taiwanese School, the Dongguan Taiwanese Business Association, the Kunshan Taiwanese Business Association, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the local government, and Tailian (a civic association affiliated with the Taiwan Affairs Office). Activities sponsored by these organizations offered the author a good opportunity for participation, observation, and interaction.

As well as the interviews and ethnographical research in 2004–5, the author kept in contact with the informants by email, phone, and MSN and visited them in 2008–10 in order to follow up on earlier research. In total, the cooperation of 22 informants in Dongguan and Shanghai was obtained.

Of the 22 respondents, 8 were married and 14 were single; in 2004–5 they were aged between 19 and 55 years. All had more than 14 years of school education, which is not unusual in Taiwan but is considerably more than the average length of schooling for Chinese on the mainland. The respondents were college students, self-employed, dependants, expatriates working for Taiwanese firms, and employees of Chinese firms. When the author met them in 2004–5, the respondents had lived in China from at least six months to several years, and in some cases for more than 10 years.

While all the respondents had more than 14 years’ education, no more than 4 per cent of the people living in Guangdong (and less than 12 per cent in Shanghai) had received the same length of education.²⁹ Therefore, it is not surprising that all the respondents had a certain socio-economic status (even when they did not have a full-time job) within the local Chinese society. This privileged status is unusual in conventional migration but is quite typical in lifestyle migration.

As stated earlier, most Taiwanese migrants in China are also ethnic Chinese. They are relatively resourceful and hold a higher social status than most local Chinese. This situation was often discussed in the popular narratives in the early 2000s,³⁰ and it was also well known to all the respondents even if they had no connection with China before their move. For this reason, all the respondents to some extent expected to enjoy special advantages and/or a better quality of life in China. Although this expectation in part motivated them to move to China, it also induced a snobbish attitude towards Chinese society. The respondents usually treated the Chinese people they encountered as inferiors unless the information they received indicated otherwise. Respondents’ post-migration experiences even challenged their initial assumption about ethnic affinity across the Strait; eventually, most respondents began to identify themselves as less Chinese or as ‘Chinese with less Chineseness’. By illustrating the respondents’ pre-migration expectations and post-migration experiences, we may understand the effect of class on migration.

Motivation to move: From ordinary to something special

The first question often posed in migration studies is why people decide to move. The most common explanation is that people have economic incentives for moving. As discussed earlier, most studies on Taiwanese in China indicate that Taiwanese migrants move to China mainly for the economic rewards. This is not surprising since Taiwan has struggled economically while China has experienced dramatic economic growth since the late 1990s.

Making money was a reason given by all the single female respondents. However, only one married female respondent gave the same reason. The other seven married women all said that the aim of their migration was to be reunited with their husband who was already working in China. So the married and single respondents generally moved for different reasons. Despite this difference, all respondents reported that they expected little difficulty in settling down in the new environment. Why did all respondents initially regard moving to China as only a little more difficult than moving between cities in Taiwan? What do they have in common beyond money or family members in their pre-migration expectations?

For the married respondents, their husband had already moved to China as an expatriate high-level manager or as an entrepreneur with his own business enterprise before the late 1990s. As their husband already had a stable career, these married respondents felt little pressure or concern about the possible costs of migration. Those without a career in Taiwan stated that before they actually moved they were teased by their friends that they were going to be a shaonainai. Those who already had their own career in Taiwan said that they regarded moving to China as a good chance to take a break and lead a comfortable life. Although these married respondents were aware that they might not be a shaonainai or have a cosy life, they all agreed that the prospect of a comfortable life lessened their worries about migration to some extent. This expectation of enjoying oneself a little is a common finding in previous studies on the spouses of European expatriates in Asia.³¹ The married respondents did not move purely for the sake of a family reunion, but were also attracted by the idea of a comfortable life overseas.

Although all the single respondents initially said that their migration was the result of economic concerns, there was a difference between the two groups of singles. Those aged over 30 in 2004–5 had some years of working experience (for example, as middle-level administrative staff in firms or as bosses of small businesses) in Taiwan, but they felt that they were trapped in a career which was ‘not so encouraging’, as some of them put it. With information gathered from friends or their own experiences while travelling in China, they inferred that their limited education and work experience were relatively richer than those of most Chinese and that they might have opportunities to pursue their own career in China. This expectation of a second chance encouraged them to give up their ‘so-so’ business or career and move to China. Our respondents’ expectation of doing something special with limited resources is similar to findings of previous studies on young Europeans in Asia.³² Migration is a strategy enabling people to find more promising career paths.

The other six respondents were under the age of 30 in 2004–5. All of them had 12 to 14 years of school education and limited or no work experience in Taiwan. With moderate education and limited work experience, it was difficult for them to obtain good jobs in Taiwan. According to a respondent, her move to China was the result of feeling that ‘without a proper job [in Taiwan], I feel like shit’. Their relatively higher educational qualifications brought them a higher status in China, and they secured well-paying jobs in Dongguang or Shanghai through family and social connections.

An expectation of enjoying/doing/being something special was clearly mentioned by all the respondents. To these respondents, migration to China is not just a geographical relocation: it is also upward mobility. In spite of different backgrounds, they expected an improvement in their personal and/or professional status after the move. Such an expectation of upward mobility to some extent explains why the respondents hardly worried about migrating, and it also confirms the findings of studies on social mobility. The opportunity for upward mobility may influence people to change their behaviour or life plan. To people with certain resources, moving to another country is not just moving out geographically, but moving up strategically.³³ Although the host societies (Dongguan and Shanghai in the late 1990s/early 2000s) were less developed than the sending society (Taiwan) in the same period, the respondents easily found pathways for moving up and becoming ‘somebody’ after the move. Because this sense of upward mobility is based on the contrast with local people, it also makes them less willing to associate with the Chinese after migration. This ‘life in the bubble’ will be illustrated further.

Life in China: Lonely at home

How are the lives of Taiwanese women after migration? While Taiwanese men in China are sometimes teased about enjoying a life in ‘paradise’, a reference to their casual affairs with Chinese women,³⁴ the author found that female respondents in both cities experienced a strong sense of loneliness. Although the respondents had anticipated a comfortable life, they eventually realized that being a shaonainai was not what they expected because as some put it, ‘life is not only [about] eating and shopping all day’. Another respondent who was a high-ranking manager in Taiwan but worked as a bank clerk in Shanghai talked about the life of a Taiwanese woman she knew, ‘I am lucky [to have this job] … A Taiwanese mother with kids is working at a Taiwanese firm as a phone operator. Her pay is only RMB 2500 per month, but she is very happy.’ Both remarks illustrate the respondents’ lack of fufilment they experienced in China. Although they had been well educated in Taiwan, they had few opportunities to work in their ideal job in China.

Stories about being a phone operator were not openly discussed, but were often privately mentioned among the Taiwanese migrants the author encountered in both cities. During fieldwork, the author was often asked questions by the Taiwanese he met such as ‘How did you get this job [a part-time teacher in a Taiwanese school]?’ and ‘Can you help my friend Mrs X [to get a job like yours]?’ In the beginning, the author was surprised and replied that his pay as a part-time teacher was low and that Mrs X would therefore not be happy with it. Their response was that Mrs X was the wife of a busy entrepreneur, who felt lonely at home and wanted to get a job to occupy her time and to socialize with other Taiwanese. These various Mrs Xs were all well educated with work experience (for example, as schoolteachers, nurses, and middle-level administrative staff at firms) in Taiwan, but they could not obtain similar jobs in China. They cared little about the salary but more about those with whom they could work. Without such a job, it is difficult for them to lead a new social life. So it seems that being a shaonainai is another way of being a lonely housewife at home.

To these married women, a proper job does not mean working hard and making money, because all of them expected to enjoy themselves in China. Working with other Taiwanese in order to make new friends is more important than making money or following one’s own career per se. This finding challenges the assumption that the life of migrants is mainly preoccupied with economic struggles and concerns,³⁵ but is in line with previous studies on women who participate in lifestyle migration. While their husband had a successful career, our married respondents cared more about associating with other migrants than about making money and pursuing a career. While it is reasonable for them to socialize with other migrants from the outset, they did not make an effort to associate with local Chinese people and gain more local knowledge.

Barrier to integration: Unwilling to ‘move down’

The author’s long-term acquaintance with the respondents has given him some insight into their lives before and after migration. As mentioned earlier, most of the respondents were ordinary ladies who worked in an office or who were conventional housewives in Taiwan. They did not cultivate their cultural taste in Taiwan but in China after they had landed a job or had become shaonainai. As Bourdieu suggests, people moving up from lower/middle to middle/upper status are likely to display a high level of cultural taste. They regard their cultural interests as an expression of their class status and as a means of distinguishing people with whom they should or should not associate.³⁶ Since most Chinese are not able to send similar signals of cultural taste, they are not regarded by the respondents as potential partners for romance or for deep friendship.

To most respondents, social disparity is not only expressed by a gap in buying power (economic capital), but also a gap in cultural taste (cultural capital). The respondents treated their consumption at Starbucks and Western-style restaurants with piano bars in the evenings or weekends not just as part of their normal recreation, but also as a way to enrich and display their cultural taste. Although they developed their cultural predilections after migration, these were also partially ‘internalized’ as part of their habits and expressed in other forms on various occasions. The respondents not only took their practice of this internalized knowledge as a sign of status, but they also used it as a way of assessing the status of Chinese people. Some Taiwanese men told the author that the Chinese women they encountered were like ‘a lady [carrying] a Louis Vuitton handbag but spitting out the sugarcane bagasse while walking on the street’. The respondents laughingly referred to the Chinese men they encountered as ‘dressed in formal attire squatting on the pavement’ or ‘wearing a lousy T-shirt driving a BMW’. In their view, the gap between themselves and Chinese men is a result of a difference not just in buying power, but also in cultural tastes and habits in daily life.

Although these statements are cruel, they reflect how respondents perceive socialization between migrants and natives. The respondents’ very awareness of a high status and the cultural capital that goes with it hinders them from associating with local Chinese people. To the respondents in Dongguan and Shanghai, this gap is encountered on many occasions. Although each incident may be minor, various incidents taken together cause a subtle difference to become a substantial one. Therefore, the respondents had little intention of associating with Chinese people unless they were told something special about a certain Chinese individual and this was confirmed in advance.

Conclusions

While previous studies show that the Taiwanese in China have little intention of becoming involved in Chinese society, this article attempts to discuss how this alienation is formed. While there is only a small difference in ethnicity between Taiwanese and Chinese, class appears to be the critical factor that determines interaction between them. While the expectation of upward mobility encourages Taiwanese to migrate to China, the perception of being superior to the Chinese discourages Taiwanese from becoming involved in Chinese society. Our findings suggest that future studies on migration should pay more attention to the effect of class.

While most migration studies highlight the importance of economic incentives and the barrier posed by the ethnic gap, this article stresses the influence of class disparity in migration. While conventional low-skilled workers move for limited economic rewards or to improve their chance of survival, we suggest that privileged people move out for the opportunity to move up. To these affluent people, migration is not only the geographical process of moving but also opens up avenues for upward mobility.

Since Sorokin published his theory on social mobility, the concept has generally been treated in terms of vertical movements between occupational positions within one country. Although Sorokin discussed horizontal mobility, the interconnection between geographical and social mobility received relatively little attention. With the development of methodology, most studies on social mobility concentrate on the quantitative aspects of data collected in certain countries. Although this ‘survey paradigm’ makes social mobility research a highly specialized and technical field, it also cuts off the observation of other dimensions of social mobility, such as moving up by moving to other countries.³⁷ If upward mobility may be easily achieved in nearby countries, it is reasonable to expect that people with sufficient capital will move abroad. However, this feature of moving up through moving out remains unexplored in mainstream studies of social mobility.

While research on social mobility remains ethnocentric, research on migration ignores the influence of class factors. Conventional migration research is mainly based on the characteristics of migrants from Europe in the United States. In this paradigm, the process of incorporation is usually viewed through the framework of assimilation, which is embedded in nationalism and the idea of alignment with ‘one state, one society’. Therefore, the ethnic gap between immigrants and the host society is usually regarded by default as the crucial factor for explaining the integration barrier. However, migration nowadays is becoming more diverse. Immigrants from the same country but with different social statuses may have different experiences; immigrants from different countries but with the same social status may have similar experiences,³⁸ which necessitates research on the influence of class.

The present article has provided an opportunity to combine research on social mobility and migration. It also affords an observation of the role of class in migration, especially when migrants are not low-skilled labourers. To people with a certain level of resources and skills, moving to countries where one will be highly valued may be a shortcut to upward mobility. This phenomenon is analysed in our discussion of the expectations of respondents (from being ordinary workers/housewives to enjoying/being/doing something special). However, this expectation of moving up also gives rise to problems. Although it is easy for migrants to move and lead a comfortable life, it is difficult for them to really appreciate their life in the host society.

Lifestyle migrants are people trying to move up and move out at the same time. Although it is easy for them to move abroad, it is difficult for them to have their mind at rest overseas. This ‘easy to move, hard to settle down’ experience means that they belong neither to the host nor to the home country, but rather have an identity betwixt and between. It is easier to define these migrants in terms of who they are not rather than who they are. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that most of these migrants keep on moving between their host and home countries.

Since most Taiwanese are also ethnic Chinese, this study is able to isolate the influence of class on migration and to examine how class influences migrants’ ethnic identity. We found that the class gap between the respondents and local people not only inhibited the respondents’ intentions of associating with them, but even challenged the respondents’ identity as ethnic Chinese. While the respondents anticipated that their migration to China would not pose problems (partly because of the ethnic affinity across the Taiwan Strait), the ensuing social alienation resulted in a disorienting situation which caused respondents to fundamentally reconsider their ethnic identity. By comparing our findings with studies on Westerners in China, we obtain a better understanding of how seriously such social alienation may affect the identity of migrants despite ethnic affinity.³⁹

Our respondents’ experiences reported here are more complicated than those of migrants from a conventional Western country with little ethnic similarity to China. Conventional foreigners may have developed an impression of the country they are moving to through the mass media and personal experience, but their perceptions of the host country may not become clear until they have actually spent a length of time there. The distance in geography and culture between conventional foreigners and the host country helps the former to accept what they encounter in the host country, with a little bewilderment. It is akin to Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. No matter how strange the events that occurred to Alice when she was in Wonderland, there was no hurry for her to analyse them deeply. For most conventional foreign migrants, there is little pressure to worry about all the experiences they have encountered unless they have acquired a certain level of local knowledge. No matter how much they may dislike what they encounter, they perceive the host country as a foreign country with little relevance to their identity.

However, the respondents’ image of the host country was different. With a rich knowledge of Chinese culture and history, they easily accept the many traditions and customs that conventional foreign migrants may find strange. What affected the respondents in this study were the subtle differences that most conventional foreign migrants would not perceive. Their knowledge before migration and the geographical proximity between Taiwan and China mean that it is difficult for the Taiwanese migrants to simply accept what they encounter as they might in a completely foreign culture. Over the course of time, most respondents keep their interaction with the locals at a certain level without further acquaintance. They tend to integrate into the host society in public but to retain their own identity as ‘not locals’ in private. This is why migration as described here does not lead to more understanding and acceptance, but instead to a formal and detached relationship.

Apart from class disparity, another complicating factor is the assumption of ethnic affinity. The respondents’ initial assumptions about their ethnicity were even challenged. The respondents changed their relationship with the Chinese from considering them as brothers to look after (or look up to) to thinking of them as brothers only in name. They tended to regard themselves as ethnically detached from the Chinese, as Chinese with less Chineseness. If Taiwanese migrants in China are given a crucial role in the cross-Strait relationship in the coming years, it is doubtful whether they will support the political parties or candidates proposing more political integration. This change of perception confirms what some anthropologists suggest: ethnic boundaries are not based upon objective differences between groups but on the subjective perceptions developed after interactions between the groups. Ethnicity is, after all, about relationships, not facts.

Footnotes

Notes

References

Beaverstock

Jonathan

(2002) Transnational elites in global cities: British expatriates in Singapore’s financial district. Geoforum 33(4): 525–38.

Benson

Michaela

(2011) The British in Rural France: Lifestyle Migration and the Ongoing Quest for a Better Way of Life. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bertaux

Daniel

Thompson

Paul

(1997) Introduction. In: Bertaux

Daniel

Thompson

Paul

(eds) Pathways to Social Class: A Qualitative Approach to Social Mobility. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1–31.

Borjas

George J.

(1999) Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bourdieu

Pierre

(1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cai

Fang

(2004) Renkou laodong lüpishu (Green book of population and labour). Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Callaway

Hellen

(1987) Gender, Culture and Empire: European Women in Colonial Nigeria. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Carroll

Lewis

(1963) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and through the Looking Glass. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Chen

Bin

(2000) Yimin Shanghai (Moving to Shanghai). Taipei: Shangxun.

10.

Chen

Bin

(2000) Wo de Shanghai jingyan (My experiences in Shanghai). Taipei: Shangxun.

11.

Coles

Anne

Fechter

Anne-Meike

(2008) Introduction. In: Coles

Anne

Fechter

Anne-Meike

(eds) Gender and Family among Transnational Professionals. London: Routledge, 1–20.

12.

Colic-Peisker

Val

(2008) Migration, Class, and Transnational Identities: Croatians in Australia and America. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

13.

Croucher

Sheila

(2012) Privileged mobility in an age of globality. Societies 2(1): 1–13.

14.

Croucher

Sheila

(2009) The Other Side of the Fence: American Migrants in Mexico. Austin: University of Texas Press.

15.

Daidanai (2002) Jimo de taishang taitai (Lonely wives of Taiwanese businessmen) (2002) http://forum.fashionguide.com.tw/post_list.php?topic_id=424480, accessed 15 September 2012.

16.

Deng

Jian-bang

(2002) Jiejin de juli: Zhongguo dalu taizichangde hexin dalu yuangong yu taishang (Intimate distance: Taishang and core Chinese workers in Taiwan-invested companies on the Chinese mainland). Taiwan shehuixue (Taiwanese sociology), no. 3: 211–51.

17.

Deng

Jian-bang

(2009) Chixude huijia: da Shanghai taiji jingli renyuande yiju shenghuo (Continuous homecoming: The migrant life of Taiwanese management personnel in Greater Shanghai). Taiwan shehuixue (Taiwanese sociology), no. 18: 139–79.

18.

Elliott

Brian

(1997) Migration, mobility, and social process: Scottish migrants in Canada. In: Bertaux

Daniel

Thompson

Paul

(eds) Pathways to Social Class: A Qualitative Approach to Social Mobility. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198–229.

19.

Erickson

Robert

Goldthorpe

John H.

(1993) The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies. New York: Oxford University Press.

20.

Fechter

Anne-Meike

(2007) Transnational Lives: Expatriates in Indonesia. Surrey: Ashgate.

21.

Gordon

Milton

(1964) Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press.

22.

Holdsworth

May

(2002) Foreign Devils: Expatriates in Hong Kong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

23.

Jacoby

Tamar

(2004) Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What It Means To Be American. New York: Basic Books.

24.

Kasinitz

Philip

Mollenkopf

John H.

Waters

Mary C.

(eds) (2004) Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

25.

Keng

Shu

Schubert

Gunter

(2010) Agents of Taiwan–China unification? The political roles of Taiwanese business people in the process of cross-Strait integration. Asian Survey 50(2): 287–310.

26.

Keng

Shu

Lin

Rui-hua

Schubert

Gunter

(2012) Taishang de qiyuan, fazhan yu hexin yiti (Studies on taishang: Originality, development, and core issues). In: Keng

Shu

Lin

Rui-hua

Schubert

Gunter

(eds) Taishang yanjiu (Taishang studies). Taipei: Wunan, 3–51.

27.

Kirkwood

Deborah

(1984) Settler wives in Southern Rhodesia: A case study. In: Callan

Hilary

Ardener

Shirley

(eds) The Incorporated Wife. London: Croom Helm, 143–64.

28.

Korpela

Mari

(2009) When a trip to adulthood becomes a lifestyle: Western lifestyle migrants in Varanasi, India. In: O’Reilly

Karen

Benson

Michaela

(eds) Lifestyle Migration: Expectations, Aspirations and Experiences. Surrey: Ashgate, 15–30.

29.

Xin

(2011) Taiwan nüxing jia dalu fushang chengchao? (New trend of intermarriage? Female Taiwanese celebrities and rich Chinese businessmen). http://big5.huaxia.com/tslj/cfht/2011/12/2705458.html, accessed 15 September 2012.

30.

Lin

Ping

(2009) Cong juzhu kongjian kan Taiwanren dui Zhongguo dalu dangdide rentong (Do they mix? The residential segregation of Taiwanese in China). Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan (Taiwan political science review) 13(2): 57–111.

31.

Lin

Ping

(2010) Wo de meili yu ai’chou: zai Zhongguo dalu de danshen Taiwan nüxing (Home alone: Single Taiwanese women in China). Renkou xuekan (Journal of population studies), no. 41: 111–51.

32.

Massey

Douglas S.

Arango

Joaquín

Hugo

Graeme

Kouaouci

Ali

Pellegrino

Adela

Taylor

J. Edward

(1993) Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal. Population and Development Review 19(3): 431–66.

33.

Massey

Douglas S.

Arango

Joaquín

Hugo

Graeme

Kouaouci

Ali

Pellegrino

Adela

Taylor

J. Edward

(1998) Contemporary theories of migration. In: Massey

Douglas S.

Arango

Joaquín

Hugo

Graeme

Kouaouci

Ali

Pellegrino

Adela

Taylor

J. Edward

(eds) Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 17–59.

34.

Oliver

Caroline

(2008) Retired Migration: Paradoxes of Ageing. London: Routledge.

35.

Ono

Mayumi

(2008) Long-stay tourism and international retirement migration: Japanese retirees in Malaysia. In: Yamashita

Shinji

Minami

Makito

Haines

David W.

Eades

Jerry S.

(eds) Transnational Migration in East Asia: Japan in a Comparative Focus. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 151–62.

36.

O’Reilly

Karen

(2000) The British on the Costa del Sol: Transnational Identities and Local Communities. London: Routledge.

37.

O’Reilly

Karen

Benson

Michaela

(2009) Lifestyle migration: Escaping to the good life? In: O’Reilly

Karen

Benson

Michaela

(eds) Lifestyle Migration: Expectations, Aspirations and Experiences. Surrey: Ashgate, 1–14.

38.

Portes

Alejandro

Rumbaut

Ruben G.

(2001) Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

39.

Shen

Hsiu-hua

(2008) The purchase of transnational intimacy: Women’s bodies, transnational masculine privileges in Chinese economic zones. Asian Studies Review 32(1): 57–75.

40.

Sorokin

Pitirim Aleksandrovich

(1927) Social Mobility. New York: Harper.

41.

Taiwanren zai dalu (Taiwanese in China) (2001) ERA TV.

42.

Thang

Leng Leng

MacLachlan

Elizabeth

Goda

Miho

(2002) Expatriates on the margins: A study of Japanese women working in Singapore. Geoforum 33(4): 539–51.

43.

Total number of foreigners in China (2011) Shanghai Daily, 30 April. http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/print.asp?id=470347, accessed 15 September 2012.

44.

Tremayne

Soraya

(1984) Shell wives in limbo. In: Callan

Hilary

Ardener

Shirley

(eds) The Incorporated Wife. London: Croom Helm, 120–34.

45.

Tzeng

Rueyling

(2010) Cultural capital and cross-border career ladders: Western professional migrants in Taiwan. International Sociology 25(1): 123–43.

46.

Willis

Katie

Yeoh

Brenda

(2003) Gender, marriage, and skilled migration: The case of Singaporeans in China. In: Piper

Nicola

Roces

Mina

(eds) Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 101–20.

47.

Willis

Katie

Yeoh

Brenda

(2008) Coming to China changed my life: Gender roles and relations among single British migrants. In: Coles

Anne

Fechter

Anne-Meike

(eds) Gender and Family among Transnational Professionals. New York: Routledge, 211–32.

48.

Yeoh

Brenda

Khoo

Louisa-May

(1998) Home, work, and community: Skilled international migration and expatriate women in Singapore. International Migration 36(2): 159–86.

49.

Yeoh

Brenda

Willis

Katie

(2005) Singaporean and British transmigrants in China and the cultural politics of ‘contact zones’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(2): 269–85.