Abstract
John Mearsheimer has compared China’s attitude towards the South China Sea to the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. Mearsheimer does not accord international law much weight and certainly does not regard it as determinative of political outcomes. But many observers of China’s disputes in the South China Sea look to international law for rules and processes that could facilitate peaceful resolution of the disputes. In doing so they are variously puzzled, bemused, and/or angered by China’s assertion of the nine-dash line (南海九段线). This article draws more broadly on the literature on the Monroe Doctrine, viewing the doctrine as: a unilateral pronouncement of foreign policy; representing resistance; embedded in domestic as opposed to international law; and an assertion of legitimate regional hegemony. Through applying the analogy of the Monroe Doctrine, the article seeks fresh insights into China’s legal position in relation to the South China Sea and into the significance of the nine-dash line in terms of international law.
Keywords
China’s legal position in relation to the South China Sea, 1 has long been regarded as ‘ambiguous’. China rejected moves by the Philippines to submit their bilateral dispute to third-party dispute resolution and has rejected the 2016 ruling of the Tribunal constituted to hear the matter. This apparent lack of support for established processes of international law designed to achieve fair and peaceful outcomes represents something of a puzzle both for those comparing China’s behaviour here with its actions in respect of other areas of international law, and for those looking for practical solutions to regional tensions. John Mearsheimer has expressed no surprise, however; from his perspective China is behaving in relation to the South China Sea just as we would expect of a rising power. Although not engaging directly with the dimension of international law, Mearsheimer has drawn an analogy between China’s behaviour in relation to the Yellow, East and South China Seas and the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine of the United States.
This article uses the Monroe Doctrine analogy specifically to seek insights into China’s position in international law in relation to the South China Sea. A realist perspective tends to project pessimistic futures, while calls to resolve conflicting positions on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) at present appear rather fanciful. An application of the Monroe Doctrine analogy to China’s stance in relation to its claims in the South China Sea suggests the possibility of a broader range of outcomes. In particular, this article concludes by suggesting the possibility that, rather than embrace an application of existing international law or reject all rules-based outcomes, China might at some future point in time seek to superimpose a new legal regime on the South China Sea.
China’s maritime disputes and international law
The rise of China has led to considerable speculation regarding whether it is status quo or revisionist in its ambitions. 2 Until relatively recently, China appeared respectful towards, and supportive of, an international political, economic, and legal order from which it has itself benefitted. China is an active participant in the World Trade Organization, has been defensive of the United Nations Charter prohibition on the use of force, and is an active participant in the panoply of international treaty regimes, including those on human rights. Closer to home, however, it is China’s actions in the Yellow, East and South China Seas that are potentially a litmus test of China’s attitude towards international law. Sam Bateman has referred to these disputes as a ‘wicked problem’ because of their inherently complex and seemingly intractable nature. 3
Unlike other states that base their claims to the Spratly Islands or other features in the South China Sea on specific geographical features and their adjacent waters, China claims sovereignty over virtually all of the South China Sea. Of the various South China Sea claims, China’s are not only the most extensive but the most ambiguous.
4
China set out its legal position in a communication to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf dated 7 May 2009. China stated: China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map). The above position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, and is widely known by the international community.
5
Robert Beckman explains the legal ambiguity of the first sentence: The first phrase suggests that China is claiming sovereignty only over the islands and their ‘adjacent waters,’ which could refer to the territorial sea – a position that is consistent with UNCLOS. The reference to ‘sovereign rights and jurisdiction’ in the second phrase, however, involves language that UNCLOS uses to refer to the coastal state’s rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ [exclusive economic zone] and on the continental shelf. The phrase ‘relevant waters’ is not a legal term of art. If read together with the reference to the map, it could mean that China was claiming sovereign rights and jurisdiction over all the maritime space within the nine-dash line.
6
China has resisted pressure to be more specific as to the exact nature of its claims – it has not, for example, published the coordinates of the nine dashes or detailed their basis in international law. 7 The evidence since 2009 from, inter alia, China’s actions in respect of contracts for oil exploration is that China is not only claiming sovereignty over the islands and their territorial seas but asserting that the islands are entitled to exclusive economic zones and continental shelves – and, indeed, asserting rights, jurisdiction, and control over the resources in and under all waters inside the nine-dash line (南海九段线). 8 Notably, when leading Chinese international law scholar Bing Bing Jia developed legal arguments in support of China’s position, he drew in particular on customary international law, at the same time emphasizing that he was not advancing a government position per se. 9
The nine-dash line has tended to evince amusement, bemusement, or anger on the part of international lawyers used to viewing UNCLOS in terms of a ‘constitution for the oceans’. Rosalyn Higgins commented in 2013, for example, that ‘the Chinese “nine-dash line,” the legal nature of which seems not fully developed by China, would present some interesting novel arguments [if the International Court of Justice were to hear a case]!’
10
The US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Danny Russel, observed in congressional testimony in early 2014 that any claim by China not based on claimed land features ‘would be inconsistent with international law’,
11
while a report by the US Department of State of December 2014 concluded: unless China clarifies that the dashed-line claim reflects only a claim to islands within that line and any maritime zones that are generated from those land features in accordance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the LOS Convention [UNCLOS], its dashed-line claim does not accord with the international law of the sea.
12
Foreshadowing recent developments, Jonathan Charney in 1995 considered it unlikely that China’s claim to virtually the whole South China Sea would be recognized by an international court or tribunal. 13 According to Charney, many of the features would likely be found to be rocks rather than islands, meaning that they do not generate zones beyond the territorial sea and perhaps the contiguous zone. 14
The South China Sea Arbitration
In July 2011, the Philippines sought China’s agreement to take a case concerning the South China Sea sovereignty disputes to the International Court of Justice. China did not agree. 15 Then on 22 January 2013 by note verbale, the Philippines gave China written notification under Article 287 and Article 1 of the UNCLOS Annex VII and the Statement of Claim in order to initiate arbitral proceedings ‘to challenge, before an UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral tribunal, China’s claims to sovereignty and sovereign rights over areas of the South China Sea and the underlying seabed within the so-called “nine-dash line”, and to clearly establish the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines over its maritime entitlements in the West Philippine Sea under UNCLOS’. 16
On 19 February 2013 China formally stated its opposition to the institution of proceedings. 17 In the face of China’s refusal to participate, the arbitral tribunal on 11 July 2013 adopted a set of draft rules of procedure and invited the parties to comment by 5 August 2013. On 1 August China stated that it was not going to participate in the proceedings. On 26 August 2013 the arbitral tribunal adopted the rules of procedure and fixed 30 March 2014 as the date by which the Philippines should submit its memorial. 18 On 21 May 2014 China repeated its non-acceptance of, and non-participation in, the arbitration and did not submit its counter-memorial by the 15 December 2014 deadline, 19 although it did release a position paper stating, inter alia, that the arbitral tribunal lacked the necessary jurisdiction to hear the case. 20 The arbitral tribunal subsequently requested additional written argument from the Philippines on specific issues. 21
At first glance, this lack of preparedness to submit the South China Sea disputes to third-party dispute resolution might suggest a lack of Chinese confidence in the strength of their legal position. By not participating in proceedings before a court or tribunal a state risks a decision into which it has provided no input and the option is likely to be chosen where a state wishes to minimize the appearance of defeat insofar as ‘it can say the Court has given a judgment which is academic and so not really binding on it’. 22 Non-appearance before a court or tribunal may also be a tempting option for a state in a highly political dispute in which it believes it can achieve more advantageous outcomes through a purely political solution. 23 A state relatively weaker than a potential respondent could, on the other hand, be anticipated to try to bring China into the courtroom rather than to address the dispute through bilateral negotiations in which other considerations, for example trade, may be used to pressure them into giving ground to China.
China has nevertheless remained defiant, even in the face of the 2016 award strongly favouring the position of the Philippines. According to the Tribunal: China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention [UNCLOS] and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Tribunal concludes that the Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.
24
China has rejected the outcome, 25 President Xi Jinping declaring that it did not affect China’s territorial sovereignty or marine rights. 26
Making sense of China’s international law stance in relation to the South China Sea
Unsurprisingly, most international lawyers have long maintained that the UNCLOS framework in combination with existing rules of customary international law holds the key to resolving China’s disputes in the Western Pacific. According to Beckman, ‘If the states bordering the South China Sea comply in good faith with the applicable provisions of UNCLOS, then the maritime disputes will be clarified, and a framework will be established that will enable the claimants to set aside the sovereignty disputes over land territory and to cooperate in the areas of overlapping maritime claims’. 27
On the other hand, a realist political scientist such as Mearsheimer hopes for the best but sees intense security competition, if not war, ahead. Mearsheimer explains that a hegemon does not want a peer competitor in another region because that leaves it free to roam. Mearsheimer predicts that China will endeavour to achieve regional hegemony, to be stronger than any other state in Asia, just as the United States attempted to repel Europeans from the Americas in the 19th century. China can be expected to try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region. ‘We should expect China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine’, by which, by the end of the 19th century, the European great powers had become minor players in the Americas and the United States had succeeded in attaining regional hegemony. 28 The United States thereafter played a heavy hand in its own region, intervening in the domestic affairs of regional countries to prevent the rise of an anti-American leader and dictating what is unacceptable – such as no nuclear weapons in Cuba. 29 During the 20th century four countries had the capability to achieve regional hegemony: Wilhelmine Germany (1890–1918), Nazi Germany (1933–45), imperial Japan (1937–45), and the Soviet Union (1945–90); but in each case the United States played a key role in preventing the peer competitor from achieving control in either Europe or Asia. 30
Unfortunately, with its building of military bases and increasing assertiveness in the region, China seems to be behaving less as the supporters of UNCLOS would want, and far more along the lines predicted by Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer noted that, with China trying to keep the United States out of being involved with the South China Sea disputes or with China conducting naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, we are beginning to see the first inklings of a Chinese Monroe Doctrine. 31 Florian Dupuy and Pierre-Marie Dupuy commented that ‘one cannot but be puzzled by the striking contrast between China’s assertive stance and far-reaching pretensions in the South China Sea, on the one hand, and the indeterminacy of its legal position as evidenced by the deliberate use of ambiguous terminology and tacit reliance on principles not recognized by international law, on the other’. 32 And in 2014 Alan Dupont and Christopher Baker wrote that ‘China’s once lauded charm offensive has given way to exactly the kind of coercive behaviour its critics have long predicted.… China’s rise … now appears more revisionist than benign’. 33
Using the Monroe Doctrine analogy to better understand China’s legal position and the possible implications thereof
Observers of developments in one of the world’s most strategically significant zones have thus been offered both a legal take on what China could or should do, and a real-politik assessment of what China is actually doing and most likely to do in future. But Mearsheimer is the first to admit that he may have, and hopefully has, got it wrong. Perhaps, for example, domestic political factors may intervene in the unfolding of his structuralist analysis. From an international lawyer’s perspective, law is another potential intervening variable. Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, has little faith in international law (it is not even in the index of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics) or institutions to alter the course of events he predicts. Interestingly, his position is less extreme than that of Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, who has argued that global legal regimes have actually made the situation worse, by vesting ‘otherwise worthless islands with immense economic value’; encouraging ‘dangerous escalatory gestures’ of sovereignty and penalizing apparent acquiescence; and by lacking precision, militating against any state risking adjudication. 34
The Monroe Doctrine to which Mearsheimer refers has in other contexts been perceived to be relevant to international law as well as international politics. 35 Let us therefore take up Mearsheimer’s analogy but as a window to better understand the nature and significance of the legal ambiguity of China’s claim, the disconnect between that position and the dominant legal regime of the oceans, and China’s rejection of third-party dispute resolution under international law. Obviously the doctrine cannot be applied in the most literal form. Here we are not examining China’s policy regarding the Western hemisphere, Europe and its colonial acquisitions, and so in applying the analogy choices have to be made regarding the level of abstraction at which the comparison is to be made.
Identifying China’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’
The Monroe Doctrine was originally articulated for a domestic audience. Indeed, as enunciated by James Monroe in his annual message to Congress of 2 December 1823, it was not a doctrine at all but statements found within his speech reacting to perceived contemporary threats resulting from policies of Russia and Spain. 36 The initial congressional address is widely understood to contain three propositions. The first, contained in paragraph 7, declared that the ‘American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers’. The second, in paragraph 50, declared that ‘we should consider any attempt on their [European powers] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety’. And the third, contained in paragraph 51, stated that the United States should not interfere in the ‘internal concerns of any of its [Europe’s] powers’. 37
This would suggest that the attitudes or actions Mearsheimer refers to as China’s Monroe Doctrine must embody or implement the doctrine but would not in themselves constitute the doctrine and that the equivalent of the doctrine must already exist if, as according to Mearsheimer, we are beginning to see China acting on that basis. The basis for China’s aggressive actions in the waters of the South China Sea is the nine-dash line. Although the line has entered the general consciousness of the West relatively recently, the Chinese government circulated an atlas internally in 1947 that included an eleven-dash line to indicate the scope of its authority in the South China Sea, which was, in 1953 reduced by two dashes to become the nine-dash line. 38 Expressed as a doctrine, this would state that China has rightful authority over the area demarcated by the nine-dash line.
Let us now take some of the themes from the considerable literature on the Monroe Doctrine and see if by analogy they can help illuminate China’s attitude towards international law in relation to the South China Sea disputes.
The Monroe Doctrine as a unilateral pronouncement of foreign policy, not international law 39
It has been virtually unanimously held that the Monroe Doctrine, as with other doctrines of US foreign policy, is a statement of political, as opposed to legal, principles. 40 Although the Monroe Doctrine could be described as a political position statement, it is relevant to understand the stance of the United States in respect to contemporary international law because the doctrine was to function as the foundation for its foreign policy. The Monroe Doctrine did receive a measure of international recognition in a legal instrument, being referred to in Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 41 The United States never became party to the Covenant; the fact that the Senate agreed a reservation inclusive of the point that the United States had the sole right to interpret the doctrine would, however, tend to emphasize the national political, as opposed to the international legal, character of the doctrine.
Although a political as opposed to legal phenomenon, Heiko Meiertöns asserts that the Monroe Doctrine was compatible with international law at the time of its creation, 42 just as Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia maintain that the nine-dash line has always had a foundation in international law. 43 As seen above, however, the predominant view outside China, even before the South China Sea Arbitration, has been that the nine-dash line is not compatible with contemporary international law, just as David Dent maintains that the Monroe Doctrine contained no legal basis. ‘European governments dismissed the Monroe Doctrine as irrelevant and having no legal foundation, particularly during the nineteenth century when the United States lacked the power to enforce it.’ 44 Confirming that the significance of China’s nine-dash line is primarily political – albeit with international legal implications – may assist us in understanding the scope for likely paths to peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes.
Just as the United States reserved the right to interpret the Monroe Doctrine, so China regards it as its right to unilaterally delimit the nature and scope of its claims associated with the nine-dash line. This helps clarify Chinese assertions that China enjoys ‘inalienable’ rights within the nine-dash line, rights that could not be derived from the UNCLOS. It also helps make sense of statements that China’s claim to virtually the whole South China Sea is based on its 1992 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 45 (中华人民共和国领海及毗连区法) and the 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国专属经济区和大陆架法). 46 This is not to accept or to reject China’s position, but to consider one implication of the Monroe Doctrine analogy for our understanding of China’s position.
The Monroe Doctrine as resistance
The Monroe Doctrine has been interpreted as a statement of resistance of two forms. Charles Hyde read paragraphs 48 and 49 of Monroe’s speech as resistance to any attempt to establish monarchical government in Latin America. 47 The doctrine has also been understood as a ‘protest against the great international principles of law and practices in force in Europe when it made its appearance’. 48 This is an interesting point to compare with China, known for its sense of having been victimized by international law, particularly through unequal treaties, and also through not having had appropriate opportunity to shape significant regimes of international law. With its nine-dash line better grounded in national politics and law than in international law and its refusal to justify it in terms of UNCLOS, China is arguably disregarding the ‘constitution of the oceans’ and thumbing its nose at what that represents.
The Monroe Doctrine was initially presented to a domestic audience as an essentially defensive response to what would otherwise be a regional agenda set beyond the region. Just as a rising United States was strongly anti-imperial, so does China’s Military Strategy (中国的军事战略) of 2015 emphasize that its foreign policy is opposed to hegemonism ‘in all forms’. 49 Viewed in the light of the Monroe Doctrine, the nine-dash line, in association with other Chinese rhetoric such as that of ‘peaceful rise’, can be understood as serving to counter, at least domestically, images of an increasingly assertive China with a perception of China’s engagement within its region as benign, historically grounded and defensive of Chinese interests against external interference. A Xinhua commentary published after the arbitration portrayed the ruling as a ploy by the West to contain China and to impede its journey towards becoming a major global power. 50
The Monroe Doctrine in domestic law
The Monroe Doctrine was not part of international law, but once it had the power to do so, the United States used the doctrine and its various interpretations and corollaries 51 to ‘dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, and make it clear they [would] pay a substantial price if they [did] not follow the rules’. 52 China held elections in the South China Sea in May 2007, followed by the establishment of a new district-level administrative region within Hainan Province. Sansha City was established in June 2012 to form the administrative centre of its claims in the South China Sea. 53 On 1 January 2014, legislation of Hainan came into effect by which non-Chinese fishing vessels would need to obtain permission from the Hainan authorities before operating in the South China Sea. The penalty for not complying would be forcible removal or impounding of vessels and their catches, and fines of up to RMB 500,000 or US$83,000 for crews. 54 China would therefore appear to be backing up its nine-dash line with local and national laws and regulations.
China’s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone authorized the use of force to keep foreign naval and research vessels out of its claimed areas in the South China Sea. 55 On 23 November 2013, China declared an air defence identification zone over much of the East China Sea, in which China asserts the right to monitor and request identification from aircraft, even those not en route to China, flying within airspace overlapping with similar claims by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The area in question includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, so potentially setting a precedent for the unilateral extension of China’s authority in areas of the West Pacific. Since 2013 there has been apprehension internationally that China would also declare an air defence identification zone over the South China Sea. 56
The doctrine came to be seen as an assertion of legitimate regional hegemony
Another key characteristic of the Monroe Doctrine is that its meaning and significance for US policymakers have changed over time. The principles were over the succeeding decades often drawn on and extended. The last principle of desinteressement had earlier been enunciated by George Washington and was abandoned only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The precise date varies by interpretation but could be 1884 with the US involvement in the Congress of Berlin, or 1898 with the Congressional resolution regarding the annexation of Hawaii, or 1917 with the US entry into the First World War. 57 It is the first two principles that are regarded as the most relevant to the current situation. As we have seen, the principles were initially understood in a defensive sense.
Over time, however, a claim to hegemony over the American region came to be regarded as a natural complement of the doctrine. 58 According to Mearsheimer, the United States may not have been powerful enough to act on those principles when articulated by James Monroe in 1823, ‘but by the end of the nineteenth century, the European great powers had become minor players in the Americas. The United States had achieved regional hegemony, which made it a remarkably secure great power.’ 59 The United States protested against European interventions in Mexico from 1825–60 and the French occupation of Mexico after 1862 and the controversy between Britain and Venezuela over the boundary in 1895. 60 Senator John Bell of Tennessee said in 1856 that the Monroe Doctrine had become ‘a doctrine of progressive absorption and annexation and conquest of Spanish America’. 61
Mearsheimer interprets the doctrine as having been a call to physically keep European powers out of the region as a key step towards achieving regional hegemony. 62 It specified separate spheres of influence – the independent states of the Western hemisphere would be the US sphere; the United States would not interfere in the political affairs of Europe or in existing European colonies in the Americas. 63 Analogized to China, Mearsheimer asserts that China will want to keep the United States out of its immediate region, to push the US navy beyond the first island chain of the Greater Sunda Islands, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan – and, ideally, even beyond the ‘second island chain’ from the eastern coast of Japan to Guam and down to the Moluccan Islands. 64
Tension in the Western Pacific threatens to bring the United States and China into conflict either because the former wants to ensure freedom of navigation or indirectly, through US support for its allies in the region. Beijing has an ‘idiosyncratic’ interpretation of the exclusive economic zone. Whereas under UNCLOS this 200-nautical-mile zone outwards from a country’s baseline can be regulated by the littoral state only with respect to economic activity, not military transit or surveillance, China asserts that no other country’s naval ships can move through those waters, and no surveillance can be engaged in, without China’s permission. 65 Hilary Clinton reaffirmed in 2010 that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was a US national interest. 66 The more assertive China is, the more its regional neighbours look to the United States.
Does application of the Monroe Doctrine analogy suggest that international law has no role to play in the peaceful resolution of the disputes?
Application of the Monroe Doctrine analogy has underscored the small likelihood at present of China seeking to resolve its disputes in the East and South China Seas on the basis of UNCLOS. Indeed, China’s attitude towards the arbitration brought by the Philippines would appear to suggest that China would at present prefer to avoid any resolution of the dispute that would necessitate compromise. In the case of a rising power, avoiding resolution of a dispute means that it may be able to settle the matter from a relatively stronger position in future, whether through direct action or by increased leverage in negotiations, particularly if on a bilateral basis, 67 or presumably through a multilateral solution led by China. In this regard, China’s assertion that it has rights to some 90 per cent of the South China Sea is reminiscent of the position of the United States after the Second World War in relation to territorial claims in Antarctica. The United States never applied the Monroe Doctrine to Antarctica and never made a formal claim to Antarctica; by the 1950s there was in any case only one, relatively undesirable, wedge of land left unclaimed. American interests were arguably inadequately supported by the existing international law of territorial acquisition. The United States sought a formula that might lead to peaceful resolution of the legal morass in a manner satisfactory to US interests, the upshot of which was a multilateral agreement that put the status of the sovereignty claims on hold while giving largely open access to the continent for all interested parties, including the United States. 68
The United States had thereby overcome the weakness of its legal claim, to acquire just the access it wished to the Antarctic continent. Note that it did this without trampling on the legal positions adopted by existing claimants but by superimposing a novel legal regime on top of the existing level. 69 A somewhat similar arrangement appears to have been planned with the announcement that a global institution would be created to sit above the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the International Energy Agency, to give a greater voice to China and other rising economies in global energy markets. 70 It is not inconceivable that an increasingly confident, powerful and proactive China might come up with a solution that subsumes, rather than attempts to compete with, the existing regime for the law of the sea in the East and South China Seas.
Conclusions
This article has looked into insights a Monroe Doctrine analogy can lend to our understanding of the legality of China’s nine-dash line and its implications for the peaceful resolution of its maritime disputes. China’s legal position in relation to the South China Sea has been characterized by a failure to correlate its position tightly with contemporary international law. An apparent aversion to multilateral solutions and to third-party dispute resolution on the basis of law might appear to reflect recognition by China of the weakness of its own legal position. China is, on the other hand, increasingly acting assertively on the oceans, just as a realist perspective would predict. China is widely assumed to be rejecting third-party dispute resolution out of a belief that it can do better by dealing with each dispute bilaterally, and using its increasing muscle to its own advantage.
Applying the Monroe Doctrine analogy to China’s nine-dash line has illuminated the fact that while China’s position may lack legal clarity internationally, in domestic polit-ical terms it is very clear. This would have made it extremely difficult for China to submit voluntarily its relatively weak position under international law to third-party dispute resolution. It would make it just as difficult to surrender that position. But whereas a realist view devoid of international law perceives only weak prospects for harmonious resolution of such disputed claims, analogizing the Monroe Doctrine to China’s legal position has led to consideration of the possibility of other outcomes that, while not necessarily likely to be welcomed by other players, stop short of war. Assuming China’s continued rise, it is not inconceivable that further down the track China may, for example, seek to superimpose a regional legal regime of its own liking over that offered by UNCLOS.