Resisting the cultural division of protest: The Israeli demobilized reservists’ protest after the Yom Kippur War (1973

Abstract

The Israeli demobilized reservists’ protest after the Yom Kippur War is historically renowned for accelerating the emergence of civil criticism with regard to military and strategic affairs and for enabling the formation of peace movements in Israel. This article argues that this movement’s largest contribution was its ability to restructure the rigid cultural division of protest. In the political culture of the early 1970s in Israel, any form of street protest was associated with marginal groups engaging in a disruptive revolt against the established order. The demobilized reservists’ protest recruited members of mainstream social categories for a series of large-scale peaceful demonstrations, which concluded with the resignation of the Israeli government. This precedent blurred the traditional association of street protest with counter-hegemonic movements, and liberated the Israeli repertoire of contention for new social actors and issues. Analyzing the dialectic relations between the cultural division of protest and tactical selection in the demobilized reservists’ protest, this article shows that when members of the mainstream society employ tactics affiliated with marginal or radical groups, they legitimize these tactics as standard forms of political participation and expand their society’s modular repertoire of contention.

Keywords

Repertoire of contention cultural division of protest Protest collective action Yom Kippur War Civil–military relations

One of the external factors influencing tactical selection in social movements is what this article defines as the cultural division of protest. A cultural division of protest occurs when a specific set of tactics is affiliated almost exclusively with distinct groups or issues, and is therefore less likely to be selected by other groups or in relation to other issues. When a social group challenges the cultural division of protest and chooses tactics outside of its “legitimate” repertoire, it risks being excluded or ignored by the society, or, as this article shows, in doing so it may reshape the cultural division of protest and restructure its society’s repertoire of contention. By analyzing Israeli reservist soldiers’ protest following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, this article discusses the dialectic relations between the cultural division of protest and tactical selection in social movements. It shows that when members of mainstream society employ tactics affiliated with counter-hegemonic movements, the use of these tactics is legitimized and transformed into a standard form of political participation.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the demobilized reservists’ protest

One of the remarkable effects that the Yom Kippur War (1973) had on Israeli political culture was its awakening of civil society. The war triggered the transformation of two major ideological movements into powerful social movement organizations: the Movement for Greater Israel formed Gush Emunim (Block of Faith) which actively led the settlement movement in the occupied territories, and the Peace Now movement, formally established in 1978, which coordinated and voiced the civil call for peace negotiations and anti-occupation resistance among Israelis (Newman and Hermann, 1992). More closely related to the war’s aftermath, two protest movements left their mark on history. First, a movement established by parents of captive and missing soldiers during the ceasefire negotiations effectively placed the issue of war prisoners on the public agenda and generated public pressure on the political leadership (Lebel and Rochlin, 2009). Another protest, which left an equally important impression, was the public campaign waged by demobilized reservists against the political leadership, a campaign that led, or at least contributed, to the government’s resignation in April 1974.

The demobilized reservists’ protest was initiated following the massive release of soldiers in late February and early March 1974, and ended with the government’s resignation on 11 April 1974. It began with a protest of a single soldier, Major Motti Ashkenazi, who immediately upon his release from active service stationed himself in front of the Prime Minister’s Office, holding signs demanding the resignation of the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan for the failures of the war. Gradually, Ashkenazi was joined by other groups of demobilized reservists expressing their frustration with the failure of the military intelligence to anticipate the war, and the prevailing confidence within the Israeli military and among political leadership that neighboring Arab armies wouldn’t attack Israel after the Israeli Defense Forces’ decisive victory in the 1967 War. Ashkenazi organized meetings with students and youths throughout the country, as well as a series of large demonstrations in Jerusalem. For the first time, mainstream Israeli youths and reservist soldiers took part in systematic, well-organized protest that significantly impacted both public opinion and political leadership. The protest leader, Motti Ashkenazi, “the man who toppled an Israeli government,” became a legendary icon in the collective memory, and the demobilized reservists’ protest which he instigated is seen as a turning point in the history of protest movements in Israel (Lehman-Wilzig, 1990).

Despite its unshakable significance in Israeli collective memory, very few studies have been dedicated to the protest of the demobilized reservists of the Yom Kippur war. The most recent one examines the protest within the myriad of political opportunities, focusing on the modalities by which the political climate after the traumatic experience of the war created the appropriate conditions for the emergence of social unrest (Hermann, 2004). The government’s inability to repress the demonstrators, who were considered as the future generation of the ruling elite (p. 71), and the declining status of the security forces, allowed for the organized protest to impose the “recognition that one is permitted to protest with regard to affairs positioned at the top of the hierarchy of political priorities” (p. 74).

The current study argues that alongside the structure of political opportunities, which had certainly facilitated the demobilized reservists’ protest, the success of the movement and its positive reception within public opinion was equally due to the strategic planning and performance of the movement’s activities. The movement’s leadership carefully designed and staged a protest movement that would successfully meet cultural expectations, resist opposition and gain positive media coverage. Most notably, in a political culture which associated any form of street protest with counter-hegemonic activism, the demobilized reservists’ movement positioned itself as a movement characterized by undisruptive protest, which although demanding corrective measures within the system, did not challenge national ethos.

Repertoires of contention

“Repertoires of Contention” refer to the reservoir of tactics available for collective action in favor, or against, the promotion of social change. In a broad sense, the term refers to the sum of tactics known to social activists in a given historical-cultural context (Tilly, 1986, 1995). For this reason, the repertoire is often described as a modular repository which contains a set of available protest tactics that can be used simultaneously by diverse groups and organizations, promoting different or even contradictory goals. In a narrower sense (often referred to as tactical toolkit), the term indicates a set of tactics chosen by a specific group in relation to a distinct claim or in the context of a specific movement (Taylor, 1996).

This duality is also reflected in the explanations given to the innovation and modification of protest repertoires over time. On the one hand, following Charles Tilly’s historical perspective, trends and changes in the formation of repertoires are examined within broader socio-historical contexts such as the emergence of nation-states, the creation of political parties, the formation of trade-unions, the expansion of mass media and the configuration of social networks (Tarrow, 1998). On the other hand, innovation processes are examined with respect to cultural opportunities and constraints imposed on a specific movement. Some have examined movements’ selection of a repertoire as it relates to its cycles and patterns of protest activity (Tarrow, 1993a), or with respect to activists’ level of experience, skill and degree of competence as political or social agents (Crossley, 2002). Collective action repertoires are also studied with respect to the movement’s propensity to external factors, such as the activities of other movements (Meyer and Whittier, 1994), its position in multi-player protest arenas (Bearman and Everett, 1993) and the outcome of activists’ interaction or confrontation with the establishment (Della Porta and Diani, 1999).

Social movement leaders and activists refer to a multi-dimensional system of considerations and constraints when considering and negotiating protest tactics from the collective action repertoire (Tilly, 2005). A protest movement may refer to a set of socially accepted protest tactics, which have proven efficient in previous campaigns, in order to either express a symbolic bond with other movements (Della Porta, 1995) or to appropriate the cultural meanings associated with past movements (Whittier, 2004). Furthermore, movement leaders are constantly required to accommodate protest tactics to the target audience’s cultural expectations. As shown in previous studies, social movements analyze their political environment and choose protest tactics accordingly (Alimi, 2007; McAdam, 1983; McCammon, 2003; Williams, 2016). Moreover, the degree of legitimacy or support for the protest from allies, institutions or significant others is largely dependent on the selected action tactics, and their ability to evoke empathy (or antagonism) from various target groups (McAdam et al., 2001).

Studying shifts in the protest repertoire within a particular society requires an analysis of social movements’ employment of strategies and tactics with respect to pre-established social expectations. Following Polleta’s (2005) findings on the “whitening” of participatory democracy, I argue here that the cultural association of given tactics with a specific social actor is a dialectical process: it might explain why social actors would adopt or reject some tactics (as Polleta has shown), but it can also explain how protest tactics are granted (or denied) legitimacy based on their usage by new social actors.

Research outline: Periodization and scope

Within the scope of analyzing the demobilized reservists’ protest after the Yom Kippur War as a transformative chapter in the history of Israel’s repertoire of contention, the present study refers to two distinct periods: the first period—which begins immediately after the ceasefire in late October and ends with the general legislative elections held on 31 December 1973—is characterized by a political and media discourse that expresses the political elite’s profound concern regarding social unrest following the war. The second period begins after the 1973 elections and ends with the resignation of the government on 11 April 1974. This period commences with emerging signs of unrest among soldiers on the front lines, reaching its peak during the major protest events in Jerusalem at the time.

Consistent with this study’s focus on the dialectical dynamics between cultural expectations and tactical selection, it offers an analysis of three principle sources. The first is the discourse of the political elite that was prominent during the first period, mostly through the ruling party’s daily newspaper Davar and the 1973 election campaign discourse, both of which uncover institutional and mainstream conceptions of protest, political criticism and social unrest. Second, the motives and logic which governed the strategic planning of the protest are analyzed on the basis of a series of interviews with the protest leader, Motti Ashkenazi, a documented chronology of events (in Livne, 1977), and media coverage of the protest activities. Last, the social reaction to the protest will be identified mostly through journalistic commentaries and op-ed and magazine articles representing the reception of the protest in the public sphere.

“No to street democracy”: The institutional rhetoric of control

The first period, from the end of October 1973 into early 1974, was marked by profound fears that public unrest would flare up into protest. This concern, widely expressed by the ruling party’s supporting newspaper Davar, arose following a series of incidents perceived as having the potential to destabilize the political system and inflame public hostility toward the government. Among such events was the Justice Minister Yaakov Shimshon Shapira’s demand for the dismissal of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan immediately after the war. This demand was strongly condemned by Prime Minister Golda Meir, who stated that Dayan had her “full confidence” (Patir, 1973). Other party leaders, as well as trade-unions and party-affiliated organizations called for the dismissal of the Justice Minister due to his “unspeakable words and their timing” (Davar, 1973a). The lack of confidence expressed by the opposition parties with regard to the post-ceasefire negotiations strengthened the concern that criticism against the government would inflame general unrest. Such unrest became visible by the end of October, when rightwing organizations such as The Movement for the Greater Israel (1973), Movement for Political Boldness (1973a, 1973b) and Citizens against Surrender (1973), began to publish statements, picket in front of the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem and organize road blocks in Tel Aviv, demanding to halt the release of prisoners and establish an emergency national unity government (Davar, 1973b; Ma’ariv, 1973). The intensive activity of families of prisoners of war (POWs) and soldiers missing in action (MIAs), which initially called upon foreign governments to take part in a diplomatic effort to release Israeli soldiers from Egyptian and Syrian captivity (Davar, 1973), gradually turned its rhetoric against the Israeli government (Haelion, 1973), generating much concern among the political leadership (Lebel and Rochlin, 2009).

Against the backdrop of this unrest, and the emergence of the concept of “Mechdal” (oversight or massive failure) which became rampant in the public sphere, the political leadership maintained that any question or doubt regarding the War should be “clarified in due time and appropriately” (PM Meir, quoted in Segev, 1973). The institutional discourse focused on denying the legitimacy of unauthorized criticism, and identifying institutional-professional instances as the authorized arena in which to examine facts and draw the necessary conclusions about the war. Explicit criticism and public unrest were labeled as “a Jewish Polemic,” a “Lynch” and “Public Trials”; unruly public behavior was tagged as “irrational,” “moody” and “vengeful.” The institutional intelligentsia was determined, through a derogatory rhetoric, to prevent the emergence of a “street democracy.” They aimed to ensure that the official investigation would be assigned to the appropriate authorities and handled in a “reasonable manner.” Opinion pieces in the newspaper Davar were devoted almost entirely to “calming the spirits,” warning against a “civil war that would expose our least attractive sides” (Zemer, 1973), denouncing the “press releases or demagoguery speeches” of the opposition and advising to “hold inquiries in closed forums—among the General Staff, the government and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee” (Bloch, 1973). The public unrest of the time was tagged by the already acclaimed novelist Yoram Kaniuk (1973) as an “obsessive preoccupation with the oversight”. Demands for public inquiry were portrayed by the influential columnist Ruth Bondi as symptoms of “irrationality, ingratitude and fickleness […]. Just like a primitive tribe, we need a ceremony to please the spirits” (Bondi, 1973).

The fear of public unrest made its way into elections discourse. The ruling party, Mapai¹, running under the name “Ma’arach” (Labour Alignment Party), coined the election slogan “Nevertheless—Ma’arach.” Terms such as “protest voting,” “anger vote” and “punishing voter” were featured in ads in an effort to point out the futility of an “emotional response” (Ma’arach, 1973a), while distinguishing it from a “rational decision” (Ma’arach, 1973b). This position was also voiced by institutional intellectuals,² who framed the elections not only as a duel between Likud and Ma’arach, but mainly as a choice between “emotional voting” and “rational decision.” Journalists constantly attempted to assess the extent to which the Israeli voter will “punish” the political leadership: “In two days we will know the extent to which the reasonable consideration prevailed, or whether voters vented their disappointment […]. Hopefully, the people will not disappoint” (Avneri, 1973).

Framing unrest and “protest voting” as irrational political behavior, reflected and reproduced previously held perceptions regarding protest activities in Israel. In the Israeli imagery, protest was associated with ethnic and social “riots,” namely with the demonstrations held by Mizrahi Israelis,³ such as the Israeli Black Panthers movement,⁴ labeled in the institutional discourse as “perverse,” “subversive” and “criminal” (Lev and Shenhav, 2010). Early 1970s student activism was perceived as bearing a potential to “import the ugly global wave of student protests” into Israel (Cohen and Orkibi, 2008a). Political activism outside the party system was identified with marginal groups of radical ideology such as Matzpen or the Movement for Peace and Security, which were alienated from the public sphere (Wigoder and Wigoder, 1999). As a rule, public demonstrations targeting security policy and strategic affairs were uncommon, and seen as deviant (Lachover, 2008: 53–54). Most importantly, in a context of a strong “security-political complex,” wherein military and political leaderships are interwoven and constitute the state’s power elite (Lebel, 2007: 9), public unrest regarding military affairs is de facto a matter of political discontent. Thus, in addition to the government’s effort to enforce stabilization in the aftermath of a severe military crisis, the social agitation after the Yom Kippur War was perceived as a genuine challenge to the Mapai party’s five decades of political hegemony.

The emergence and performance of the demobilized reservists’ protest

The election results, in which the Labour Party maintained its position as the ruling party, and the establishment of the National Commission of Inquiry into the Yom Kippur War (the Agranat Commission⁵), were largely perceived in early 1974 as appeasing factors. Right wing protest, in the form of an open letter by high-school students to the Prime Minister and street rallies organized by the Likud opposition party against the “surrender and unilateral withdrawal” (Likud, 1974), did not generate serious concerns, nor did advertisements announcing the release of the third edition of the highly critical collection of essays entitled The Oversight.⁶ It was generally understood that despite expressions of discontent among journalists or political movements, the public at large trusted the inquiry commission and the political leadership. However, the massive release of combatant forces in late January and early February would take the unrest over the “oversight” far beyond verbal criticism.

Inception: Story and location

As mentioned above, the movement began with the single protest of reserve officer Major Motti Ashkenazi, at the parking lot in front of the government’s offices in Jerusalem. Ashkenazi’s one-man protest demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, claiming that Dayan should take ministerial responsibility for the war. While Ashkenazi estimated that given the centrality of security issues and the status of the army, as well as the public’s sensitivity to lives lost in the war, his demonstration will attract public attention, it was still unclear which kind of protest would be granted public legitimacy (Motti Ashkenazi, personal communication, 10 October 2013). Facing the rhetorical dilemma of how to protest against the security elite and inducing public sympathy,⁷ he opted for a solo demonstration.

Although Ashkenazi’s social network included non-parliamentary political activists due to his previous engagement with the Movement for Peace and Security,⁸ a solo demonstration was preferred for two reasons: it did not require legal authorization, and it promised to attract media attention due to the dramatic tension inherent in the individual man’s struggle against powerful institutions. Ashkenazi hoped to lower the potential for public opposition by conveying the story of a single demonstrator rather than a group of agitated activists threatening to wreak havoc in the streets (Motti Ashkenazi, personal communication, 10 October 2013). The location was also strategically selected: it provided media-worthy moments every time a senior official stopped to talk to him, or, contrarily, ignored him (see for example Tomer, 1974b). In addition, placed next to the entrance of the Givat Ram campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Ashkenazi estimated that the traffic of students and teachers would improve the potential for recruiting sympathizers and supporters to join his protest movement. Finally, and symbolically, the location branded the protest as an event taking place at the heart of the “official quarter” of the Israeli political and cultural elite, between the Knesset, government compounds, the Hebrew University and the Israel Museum. Ashkenazi sought to physically and symbolically situate his protest within the political establishment, in a blurring of existing social distinctions between the “bastions of power” and “the street” (Motti Ashkenazi, personal communication, 10 October 2013).

Expansion: Moderation in conduct, constituents and message

Ashkenazi held his demonstration on Sundays and Mondays during the month of February, devoting the rest of the week to meetings with audiences throughout the country, especially in universities and Kibbutzim. Within 2 weeks, Ashkenazi and a small group of sympathizers collected some 5600 signatures in a petition to depose Dayan⁹ and on 17 February they held their first demonstration, in which several thousand protesters marched from the government building toward the Knesset building (Ma’ariv, 1974b).

Toward the end of February, veterans of the Parachute Brigade joined the protests by holding a silent protest vigil in front of the Knesset, under the slogan “We are here!” In an attempt to coordinate between the various initiatives, on 12 March the protesting demobilized reservists established a new movement for political reform (Davar, 1974b) and invited the public to support their activities (Tmura, 1974). Under the leadership of Motti Ashkenazi, who continued to appear before diverse audiences across the country, on 24 March, the movement organized a mass demonstration, which soon became known as “the day of public responsibility.” Over 6000 people gathered in Jerusalem for the demonstration, described by the media as “one of the largest demonstrations held in the city in recent years” (Mendelson, 1974a).

During the entire period, Ashkenazi maintained direct contact with the authorities. Coordinating with the police force, he planned the demonstrators’ rallies and routes, the positions of barriers and the exact locations where the protesters would be allowed to gather and demonstrate. Furthermore, in coordination with the police, Ashkenazi instructed his partners to order the protesters to show up unarmed, in view of the fact that some mobilized reservists had not yet returned their battle equipment upon discharge (Motti Ashkenazi, personal communication, 10 October 2013). The demonstrations were characterized by restraint and order, while preventing any attempt to break the police barriers, to block roads or clash with the police. Mostly, Ashkenazi aimed to distinguish his demonstrations from the recent uncontrolled “riots” led by the Israeli Black Panthers in central Tel Aviv¹⁰ (Motti Ashkenazi, personal communication, 10 October 2013).

The movement’s expansion was intentionally limited. Its rhetoric addressed two target audiences: sympathizers, that is, the general public, called to express support by signing petitions or making donations (Ashkenazi, 1974b), and potential movement members, that is, demobilized reservists who were called upon to take part in the protest activities. In newspaper ads, Ashkenazi addressed demobilized soldiers in a direct and familiar style: “I call you, you who have carried the burden of war, to stand beside me in my protest” (Ashkenazi, 1974a). It is this attribution of roles that framed the protest as a combatant reservists’ movement—an expression of those whose criticism is morally justified. The protesters’ profile—described by Hermann (2004) as “Ashkenazi Jewish¹¹ men, relatively educated and secular” (p. 69)—did not only contribute to the protest’s moderate nature, but was in many ways a direct result of the movement’s effort to recruit society’s “finest sons,” that is, young combatants and officers of the Israeli Defense Forces, many of them students, culturally identified as the héritiers of Israel’s hegemonic secular Zionist order (Kimmerling, 2001).

The protest movement expanded and started showing signs of institutionalization: the inauguration meeting of a new movement, “Shinui (Change)—for social and political change” was held in Tel Aviv, and a student conference at Tel Aviv University called for a reform in the electoral system and demanded new elections (Ma’ariv, 1974c; Meisels, 1974). Later that week, representatives from all movements and organizations met to coordinate their activities and set up a joint committee to secure cooperation (Dagan, 1974). During this meeting, the various demobilized reservists’ protest groups officially merged and announced the establishment of Israel Shelanu (Our Israel)—the Movement for Reform (Goldstein, 1974).

This unification and institutionalization was a result of the organizer’s commitment to the ethical demand for ministerial responsibility, which could not be identified with any specific political party. Ashkenazi and other protesters conversed with representatives of various political parties, but systematically rejected any formal collaboration or public endorsements from political figures. In addition, they firmly repudiated any attempt to conduct any form of political activism as part of the protest, especially the diffusion of political propaganda among demonstrators (Mendelson, 1974a).

Climax: Setting a precedent

In early April, the Inquiry Commission published an interim report recommending the dismissal of senior military intelligence officers and of some commanders and the Chief of IDF’s General Staff. However, the interim report cleared the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir from any responsibility for the failure. In response, the protest movement announced its intention to intensify the protest, demanding that the government take ministerial responsibility for the exposed military failures (Davar, 1974c), and announced a mass protest calling for the resignation of all ministers serving since 1968 (Davar, 1974e). While Golda Meir’s resignation, which in practice led to the resignation of the entire government just a few days prior to the planned demonstration, had surprised the protest leaders, the mass rally took place in Jerusalem as scheduled on 11 April 1974 (Ma’ariv, 1974d).¹²

The government’s resignation contributed to yet another precedent: for the first time in Israeli politics, public pressure has led to the resignation of an elected government. This outcome constitutes more than a tactical success of the movement: it marked a new period in Israeli political culture, in which official institutions and instances played a limited role in granting public legitimacy to the political elite. In her statement to the Knesset on 11 April, Golda Meir mentioned the reservists’ unrest as one of the reasons that led her to submit her resignation as Prime Minister: “This protest, which may be natural, and surely legitimate, has expressed itself in many ways,” she said, adding that “I came to realize that we would do best if the public received a new opportunity to select its representatives, re-examine and decide on the establishment of a new strong government” (Mendelson, 1974b). This may have been the culmination of the very same scenario feared and warned against by the intellectual and political elite: “street democracy” shapes political reality while replacing or even opposing the professional decisions made by the institutional authorities.

“Ecce Homo”: The reception of the protest in the public sphere

From its early stages, the demobilized reservists’ protest gained extensive media coverage, with journalists expressing interest towards the protest and its leader, Motti Ashkenazi and offering him a central stage from which to convey his messages (Tomer, 1974a). Columnists of different newspapers projected a positive portrait of the young protestor: “This unrealistic, lonely person, protesting in good faith while following his own logic by virtue of what he has endured, stands against that which all working, wise, realistic, career building men overlook in their day to day lives” (Dor, 1974a):

You are our final hope. A hope that your personal example would result in a chain reaction that will form a growing flow of civil protest—a huge mass demanding answers. Ecce Homo, Motti Ashkenazi, commander of the coastal outpost, be strong and courageous! (Shoham, 1974)

In the newspaper Davar, columnists initially lashed out against the “waves of sympathy” towards Ashkenazi, accusing him of abusing his privileged status as a combatant: “Shall we not be silenced with fear and awe before such a heroic authority?” (Izak, 1974). Among Ashkenazi’s critics, author and public intellectual Moshe Shamir expressed a firm position, explaining that the protest’s targeting of the Defense Minister would end up “tarnishing the names not only of one man, head of the defense system—but of combatants and officers on all levels” (Shamir, 1974). Soon enough, however, Davar also printed pieces in support of Ashkenazi: “Hopefully, Motti Ashkenazi’s strike heralds a new era—the era of people who care and express this in public” (Geva, 1974).

By March, the protestors’ demand for Moshe Dayan’s dismissal, which several months earlier was perceived as an “undesirable provocation,” became commonplace both in the public and political discourse. Many Labour Party Knesset representatives met with Ashkenazi and endorsed his position (Bloch, 1974b; Davar, 1974d). Towards the end of March 1974, a Davar editorial warned against the danger of a radicalization of the protest, but simultaneously stated that “The political socialization of thousands of citizens-soldiers-reservists, including many young people, who have never been involved in political activity, is in itself a positive novelty” (Davar, 1974a).

This transformation in perceptions towards the protest was reflected in the discourse of the public intellectuals, who viewed the demobilized reservists’ movement as a constructive step toward renewing a political culture (Bartov, 1974; Bloch, 1974a) which would re-energize and restore the Labour Party as a leading political movement (Dor, 1974b; Eilam, 1974; Gotholf, 1974). This shift eventually broke through the discourse of the political leadership. During the annual Board of Governors meeting at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, just a few days before her resignation, Golda Meir declared that “The young people returning from military service are asking many questions and looking for answers.” Praising their devotion to their homeland, Golda called to political parties to let these young people join their ranks. Wondering about the effectiveness of demonstrating as a means to change the electoral system, she added, “demonstrations against the old woman who heads the government are very tempting. I would have willingly joined them” (Ma’ariv, 1974a).

Conclusion: Expanding Israel’s modular repertoire of contention

The political culture in early 1970s Israel was marked by a cultural division of protest. Tactics such as mass demonstrations, rallies and sit-ins were associated with social agitation of an ethno-economic background or with marginal non-parliamentary political activism, and were attributed to peripheral social categories such as Mizrahi Jews¹³ or Arab citizens of Israel. Extra-parliamentary politics in general were still considered contradictory to the well-established “parliamentary operative consensus” and the understanding that public disagreements should be resolved solely within the Knesset (Sprinzak, 1999). Collective action targeting security policy and strategic issues was viewed particularly as a deviance from the dominant political culture of civil militarism (Ben-Eliezer, 1995; Feige, 1998) and was therefore rejected by members of mainstream society and those affiliated with the political elite.

The demobilized reservists’ protest after the Yom Kippur War radically modified this situation. Triggering a restructuring of the cultural division of protest in both modus and topos, it set a large-scale precedent for an effective protest movement focusing on military and strategic affairs, as opposed to “riots” in protest related to social inequalities. A series of collective action tactics, such as demonstrations, vigils, and media events, became legitimate means of political participation for those who had previously avoided them due to their association with disruptive, anti-hegemonic activism.

To a large extent, this modification was due to the nature of the movement and its members: relatively peaceful demonstrations, organized and attended by prominent members of mainstream social categories that had carried the burden of military service. Motti Ashkenazi successfully managed to initiate and lead an effective protest spectacle, which distinctively and systematically sought to rehabilitate the common perception of “street politics.” The demobilized reservists’ protest was strategically staged to counter the fears and concerns expressed and cultivated by the political elite immediately after the war, while challenging prevailing notions of protest in Israeli political culture. The government’s resignation contributed to yet another precedent: it demonstrated how protest can be politically effective.

Paradoxically, the path to liberating the Israeli public sphere for the expression of criticism and protest regarding military affairs was paved by reservist soldiers and officers. This social category could not be dismissed by the political elite as being subversive or marginal, nor could its members be accused of distorting the national ethos of cultural militarism. In fact, it is this precise social category that would mobilize the social status of its members in order to initiate and lead, in the decades following the War, the most important peace movements in Israel: from the Peace Now movement, which called for peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt during the 1970s and protested against the military operation in South Lebanon during the 1980s; to the Peace and Security Association which has promoted, since 1988, a political solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; or the bi-national Combatants for Peace movement, which is currently active in the anti-occupation protest.

By liberating the protest repertoire for new issues and constituencies, the demobilized reservists’ protest reshaped the cultural division of protest in Israel. Not only did it pave the way for constant public contention with regard to security issues and strategic affairs (Feige, 1998; Helman, 1999; Lebel and Rochlin, 2009), it also blurred the pre-established association of street protest with counter-hegemonic movements. Consequently, Israel’s civil society gradually became less subordinated to cultural constraints, and social movements could run their tactical selection according to their own logic and internal “division of labour” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993).

By granting legitimacy to a previously excluded set of tactics, the Yom Kippur protest contributed to the evolution of an Israeli modular repertoire, that is, a reservoir of forms of contention which could be used by different actors with regard to a variety of issues (Tarrow, 1993b; Wada, 2012). From the Yom Kippur protest onward, contentious politics in contemporary Israel have led to different types of action: counter-hegemonic movements can easily employ institutional tactics, such as appeals to the Supreme Court (Jamal, 2008), while mainstream social actors often adopt disruptive tactics, from street-blocking to military disobedience (Lebel, 2014).

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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Resisting the cultural division of protest: The Israeli demobilized reservists’ protest after the Yom Kippur War (1973–1974)

Abstract

Keywords

The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the demobilized reservists’ protest

Repertoires of contention

Research outline: Periodization and scope

“No to street democracy”: The institutional rhetoric of control

The emergence and performance of the demobilized reservists’ protest

Inception: Story and location

Expansion: Moderation in conduct, constituents and message

Climax: Setting a precedent

“Ecce Homo”: The reception of the protest in the public sphere

Conclusion: Expanding Israel’s modular repertoire of contention

Footnotes

Funding

Notes

References