Abstract

The Spirit Level demonstrates that societies with less economic inequality have better social outcomes, with the result that everyone in a more equal society is better off. It then argues that economic inequality is the key cause of social problems and proposes several ideas for making societies more equal. I found it a frustrating book to read. In part, it is brilliant: concise, clear and compelling. But the other part is simplistic, speculative and polemical.
The main substance of the book can be found in Chapters 4 to 12. These chapters establish that there is a strong statistical relationship between higher levels of economic inequality, poorer community life, higher levels of health and social problems and less social mobility. This is demonstrated through analysis of advanced industrial economies and of US states. Wilkinson and Pickett do a very good job of communicating these relationships in a clear and simple manner. Their favoured method is to plot graphs of the relationship between the gini coefficient and different outcomes. They explain this method in clear and simple language that is readily accessible. They eschew more complex statistical and econometric methods, although they include plentiful supporting references to studies based on these methods. Throughout they discuss why these statistical relationships are observed. Simply put, they argue that the social conditions of less equal societies lead to less trust and create more stress and anxiety. Again, this argument is well supported with references to the academic literature, and the weight of evidence is convincing.
Later chapters are more problematic. Wilkinson and Pickett assert strongly that economic inequality is the key cause of poor outcomes. They posit that while other social conditions may vary between countries, countries with very different social and economic systems (e.g. the Scandinavian nations and Japan) both enjoy relatively low levels of social problems while also possessing relatively low levels of economic inequality, therefore equality must be the cause of good outcomes. Consequently, it is essential to reduce inequality. The methods used to reduce inequality are of secondary importance. I am not convinced. Many of the studies cited suggest more complex chains of causality, which imply the methods used to reduce inequality will matter for the outcome. To pick one example from many, Michael Marmot’s Whitehall studies (see Marmot, 2004) are cited to explain why inequality leads to ill-health. But the implications of the Whitehall studies are that the social organization of work matters. A more egalitarian wage structure would not improve the health of lower paid workers unless issues of autonomy and control were also addressed.
The essential point the analysis misses is that policies that reduce economic inequality may go some way to changing social relations by reducing the stress of poverty, but unless issues of education and skill formation, labour market regulation and work organization are addressed, a nation will not necessarily see the full benefits. The Scandinavian nations and Japan may enjoy lower inequality for very different reasons, but both have distinctive employment systems which help to sustain low levels of social problems and result in lower levels of inequality.
Despite arguing that the methods by which inequality is reduced do not matter, Wilkinson and Pickett argue for very specific policies to tackle inequality, which seem to hinge on the abolition of capitalism as currently constituted and its replacement with a system of production and exchange based on co-operative enterprise with zero economic growth. They cite Cuba as an example of a society that has successfully combined environmental sustainability with a healthy society. I am not sure the Cuban model of political repression, stunted economic opportunity but good healthcare is one many would aspire to. These arguments appear, at best, eccentric. I fear they undermine the credibility of the earlier, much sounder analysis.
Wilkinson and Pickett then put forward suggestions for how to bring about political change. There is a naivety to these suggestions. For example, it is assumed that making people aware of the damage caused by inequality will bring pressure for change. But the British Social Attitudes Survey suggests that while 78 per cent of Britons think society is too unequal, just 37 per cent think that government should pursue redistributive policies while only 27 per cent favour spending more on benefits. The problem here has been well articulated by Mike Savage (2000): individualization has transformed the cultural landscape so that routine actions reproduce deep inequalities. Challenging this routine behaviour is no simple task, as evidenced by repeated failures of political parties of the left to create electorally successful programmes that reduce inequality.
To summarize, this book is important because of the clear, lucid and convincing way in which it illuminates the relationship between inequality and unhealthy societies. It is a shame that this analysis is wrapped in a poor quality polemic, which undermines the credibility of the central argument.
