Trade union involvement in work–family life balance: lessons from France

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, European institutions have given social partners and member states the responsibility for improving the reconciliation between work and family life, with the objective of strengthening equal opportunities and increasing female employment rates (Demetriades et al., 2006). Compared to legal regulation, collective bargaining offers several potential advantages, notably the suitability, legitimacy and enforcement of negotiated measures (Dickens, 2000: 196). Social partners are able to conceive policies that fit the characteristics, constraints and circumstances specific to each bargaining level. This tailoring, in turn, increases the legitimacy and enforcement of policies aimed at changing corporate practices. Nevertheless, the impact of such policies for employees depends on the ability of trade unions to identify and defend employees’ needs and expectations regarding work–family life balance (WFB).

France provides an interesting setting for an investigation of the extent to which public policy can stimulate union engagement with the WFB issue. In studies conducted in the early 2000s, this question was considered to be a low priority for most French unions and a no-go area for bargaining (Gregory and Milner, 2009; Ollier-Malaterre, 2009). These studies emphasized that, in the context of adversarial labour relations, French unions distrusted employer actions and gave the welfare state greater legitimacy to act on WFB. However, shortly after these studies were completed, the European impetus provoked an explicit call for companies to implement family-friendly policies as part of their strategic and collective bargaining process. In line with ongoing reform of the French industrial relations system, the state introduced a direct incentive for social partners to bargain on WFB issues. This legislative support led to a significant increase in collective agreements that address this topic (Rabier, 2009).

The research presented here examines the effect of this new context on union involvement in WFB at branch and company level. Union engagement is explored by drawing on qualitative data from respondents at the French Democratic Confederation of Labour (CFDT), a major confederation that has promoted interest in the issue at national level. Data were collected at the federation level and within 13 companies, all of which had conducted negotiations on the WFB issue and represent a wide range of activities and geographical locations.

Union involvement in WFB: a matter of context?

Qualitative studies conducted in various national and industrial contexts show how trade union involvement in WFB is highly dependent on the institutional and organizational context. Such studies highlight the difficulties trade unions face in investing in this polycentric issue which is absent from traditional bargaining agendas. Accordingly they describe the unions’ role in introducing and developing family-friendly policies as either variable (Berg et al., 2013; Gerstel and Clawson, 2001; Ravenswood and Markey, 2011; Rigby and O’Brien-Smith, 2010a), or marginal (Gregory and Milner, 2009; Hyman and Summers, 2007; Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2009). These studies posit a wide range of factors that may hinder or, conversely, favour union action. For the purposes of the present analysis, they can be grouped into three theoretical issues: opportunity structure; voice; and choice issues.

Scholars influenced by social movement theory have suggested that the shifting patterns of state intervention may produce an ‘opportunity structure’ that encourages innovations in union policy and practices (Heery, 2005, 2006b; Heery and Conley, 2007). Public policy influence is indeed widely evidenced by studies of union intervention in the WFB issue (Berg et al., 2013; Gerstel and Clawson, 2001; Gregory and Milner, 2009; Heery, 2006a; Ravenswood and Markey, 2011). Comparative research shows how, in providing for minimum entitlements, legislation offers a resource or lever for unions to use in bargaining (Dickens, 2000: 197). Legislation may also have an awareness-raising impact on unions (Gregory and Milner, 2009: 131). However, some studies point to the limits of the power of the state to determine union involvement in WFB, and they stress the joint influence of union bargaining power and priorities (Berg et al., 2013; Gregory and Milner, 2009).

Union bargaining power and, more broadly, the nature of the relationships between unions and employers are all the more decisive when the pattern of industrial relations is devolved. In this context, as Heery and Conley (2007: 22) note, employers exert significant influence over union conduct. Union intervention in this area thus appears to be favoured by receptive employers who are persuaded that a business case exists for WFB (Berg et al., 2013; Heery, 2006a). More generally, research stresses that, in contrast to the adversarial style of industrial relations, a co-operative relationship creates greater opportunities for unions to address the WFB issue (Gregory and Milner, 2009; Ravenswood and Markey, 2011; Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2009). WFB may thus be seen as a propitious area for an integrative approach to employment relations within which union and employer agendas might coincide. However, this view is contested by case studies revealing difficulties in attempting to reconcile managerial and union objectives regarding WFB when working practices and the needs of businesses offer employees little effective leeway (Rigby and O’Brien-Smith, 2010a, 2010b; Tailby et al., 2005).

Bargaining priorities also matter. In accordance with the voice role of unions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984), union action on WFB has been shown to vary according to members’ or workers’ expectations and support for work–family benefits. In line with the voice issue, several case studies suggest that union mobilization is curbed by a lack of demand for such provisions. Different explanations are provided. First, employees are reluctant to raise WFB issues, because they do not feel entitled to demand help from employers for their families (Gerstel and Clawson, 2001: 288; Rigby and O’Brien-Smith, 2010a: 213) nor do they want to challenge managerial prerogatives (Hyman and Summers, 2007: 382). Second, workers facing the greatest difficulties in reconciling employment and family life are no longer in the workforce (Gerstel and Clawson, 2001: 288). Third, latent demand for work–life balance provisions varies across the workforce according to occupation and parental status, and such measures are not among the most pressing claims for many employees (Tailby et al., 2005). Following these arguments, union involvement in WFB policies depends on the characteristics of their membership or, more broadly, of the workforce, because such policies must be regarded as beneficial by a sufficient number of union members or employees to be claimed (Berg et al., 2013: 502). Given that women experience the most severe constraints in this respect, the feminization of the workforce is commonly perceived as a decisive factor (Gerstel and Clawson, 2001; Gregory and Milner, 2009; Ravenswood and Markey, 2011; Rigby and O’Brien-Smith, 2010a). The gender effect is nonetheless only partially confirmed by quantitative studies (Artz, 2011; Heery, 2006a; Heywood and Jirjahn, 2009).

If employees’ shared preferences fuel the bargaining agenda, the formulation and organization of the agenda are a matter of choice for union representatives and leaders. The choice issue leads to a focus on factors that influence unions’ receptiveness to employees’ WFB expectations. Feminist literature has stressed that trade unions have historically been male-dominated organizations that neglect the interests of women workers and support a gender-based division of labour for bread winning and childcare (Haas and Hwang, 2013; Wajcman, 2000). A further argument suggests that reforms of trade union governance and administration that seek to facilitate the expression of women’s concerns and needs should favour the adoption of pro-women policies within the labour movement (Heery and Kelly, 1988). In line with this reasoning, several case studies confirm the positive role of specialist equal opportunities officers and of the presence of women in representative and leadership positions in getting the work–life balance issue onto the union agenda (Gregory and Milner, 2009; Ravenswood and Markey, 2011; Rigby and O’Brien-Smith, 2010a). Referring to the strategic choice approach, Heery and Kelly (1988) and Heery (2006b) promote a more voluntarist account of the action of union officers. Extending beyond gender issues, their research emphasizes the importance of the age, seniority, education and personal commitments of officers in shaping the way in which they perform their representative roles, translate members’ interests and consequently influence the ability of unions to move away from traditional bargaining agendas. Nevertheless, Heery’s (2006a) study of a representative sample of paid union officers in the United Kingdom reveals a weak association between officers’ characteristics and the inclusion of work–life balance items on the bargaining agenda.

In sum, while a key role is commonly granted to the public policy environment in stimulating union involvement in the WFB issue, diverse factors are likely to hamper this opportunity effect. In order to investigate the lessons that can be drawn from the French case, this article addresses the following questions in more detail:

Prior to addressing these questions, the article provides insights into the recent development of the French institutional context for WFB and describes the research design.

Recent developments in the French institutional context

Comparative studies traditionally rank France among countries with the lowest corporate involvement in the WFB issue, mainly because of its extended legislative and social welfare base (e.g. Ollier-Malaterre et al., 2013). Indeed, although companies are long-standing institutional parties to French family policy, their involvement has thus far been based more on legal constraints than company initiatives. Since the mid-20th century, companies have been involved in governing the family branch of the social security system (through representatives of trade unions and employers’ organizations) and its funding via a mandatory contribution based on payroll, which is currently in dispute. Consequently, financial support and services have been provided, first and foremost, through this public welfare programme that offers family benefits (both universal and targeted) and support for childcare (delivered in partnership with local governments). In parallel, the Labour Code has subjected companies to a growing number of legal provisions that protect the family life of employees. In addition to rights related to pregnancy and maternity or paternity leave, employees are afforded various forms of leave of absence and working time arrangements related to parenting (see MISSOC, 2014). The extent of these legal obligations for employers, and their counterpart in terms of social rights for employees, show why many actors in the workplace, public authorities and researchers have, until recently, viewed company initiatives regarding WFB as marginal.

A number of measures have nonetheless been adopted at the corporate level. Through collective agreements, some branches and large companies with a ‘social’ or ‘paternalistic’ tradition have provided an extension of existing social rights to maternity or family event leave (in duration or level of compensation) and offered financial support to families (via benefits or occasional assistance). Support has also been provided through works councils (WCs), which have been legally responsible for administering social and cultural activities (in all companies with at least 50 employees) since 1946. Within their budget, WCs have developed a range of services, facilities and subsidies for families, mostly directed towards leisure and holidays. However, the development of such company policies has been very uneven, and their scope, including the amounts involved, has been limited (Lefèvre et al., 2007).

The early 2000s marked a turning point in corporate involvement in the WFB issue. As in other conservative countries, welfare-state provision was lagging behind increasing female labour-market participation, the growing proportion of dual-earner families and the need for work–family support (Den Dulk et al., 2012: 2805). In response to these needs and in a context of scarce public funds, the French state attempted to increase corporate WFB initiatives through various incentives. In 2004, a ‘family tax credit’ (capped at €500,000 per year) was created for companies as financial compensation for WFB measures. Meanwhile, the state supported the creation of labels, charters and agencies aimed at promoting the involvement of employers through counselling, sharing of experiences and publicizing good practices. Finally, since 2006, the state has encouraged collective bargaining on WFB via mandatory negotiations on gender equality at work (see Figure 1).

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Figure 1.

Mandatory negotiations on gender equality at work.

This shift in state strategy is not unique to WFB. If public regulation remains a dominant feature of the French context, the state favours recourse to a collective bargaining process in order to change employer practices (Caser and Jolivet, 2014). This strategy of ‘negotiated public action’ (Groux, 2001) has been deployed since the 1982 Auroux Laws. It involves establishing a legal obligation for employers to negotiate regularly with representative trade unions over a range of topics, considered as critical. The level, terms, conditions and frequency of negotiations are thus prescribed by the labour code, which enables unions to request the opening of negotiations in cases where employers are not taking the initiative. Conclusion of an agreement is not mandatory but can be encouraged by state incentives. The state may decree financial penalties and deny access to public orders for companies if no agreement is reached. These legal obligations and incentives exemplify the ambiguity of the French industrial relations system, where the state frequently intervenes both to promote an autonomous social dialogue and to frame the negotiations, in a context of persistent adversarial relationships between social partners (Naboulet, 2013).

Research design

The findings presented here are part of a wider study initiated at the request of the CFDT and aimed at elucidating the various forms of support that companies offer to employees with family responsibilities. The CFDT’s interest in this issue arises from two broad strategies that characterize the confederation and help define its structure and identity.

First, the CFDT has been a pioneer in commitment to gender equality and mixing, in both companies and its own internal management (Cristofalo, 2013: 4–5; Le Brouster, 2009; Silvera, 2006: 24). In the 1980s, a one-third quota policy was established in leading confederation bodies and was complemented by measures aimed at fostering women’s involvement (e.g. financial assistance, training, charter and guidelines, commissions and liaison representatives). This proactive policy, in addition to the CFDT’s dominant presence in the tertiary sector, has increased the feminization of membership and activists.

Second, the CFDT has openly displayed its reformist approach. In a field historically marked by a culture of conflict, the CFDT defends a strategy of partnership unionism, focusing on the search for pragmatic compromises through social dialogue and collective agreements (Barthélemy et al., 2012). The CFDT is, in fact, the confederation that has the greatest propensity to sign collective bargaining agreements in the companies where it is present (Ministère du travail, 2015: 537).

Commissioned by the CFDT, this study thus offers an opportunity to explore how, within a relatively feminized confederation that positions itself as partnership oriented and that operates at the cutting edge of equal opportunity issues, union representatives have (or have not) taken advantage of state incentives to act on WFB at branch and company level. Previous studies have described all these characteristics as favouring union involvement in the issue. Based on a qualitative data analysis, this research demonstrates how such involvement materialized in different workplace contexts.

Fieldwork was conducted from January 2012 to March 2013 in 13 companies from 10 sectors in industry or services (see Table 1). Companies were selected according to three criteria. The first two criteria were designed to capture a wide range of family-friendly programmes and company profiles regarding sector, workforce and geographical location. The last criterion ensured the presence of CFDT representatives within the company. More precisely, companies were selected based on a combination of three sources of information gathered from the website of the Corporate Parenthood Observatory (a non-profit organization that takes an inventory of family-friendly companies), company websites and interviews with CFDT leaders at the federal level.

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Table 1.

Key features of the sample.

Sector	Federation leaders	Company	Local representatives	HR management respondents
Commercial bank and insurance	FBA/Male	BANK1	UD-WCE/Female	Female*Male
		BANK2	UD-WCE/Female
		ASSIST	UD-WCE/Male
Business services and counselling	F3C/Female	AUDIT	UD-WCE/Male	Female*Female*Male
		CALL	UD/Female WCE/Female
Cosmetics	FCE/Female	COSMO	UD/Male WCE/Male WCE/Female	Female
Beverage	FGA/Male	WATER	UD-WCE/Male
Software and Electronics	FGMM/Male	IT	UD-WCE/Male	Male*Male
		SPACE	UD/Male WCE/Female	Male
		AERO	UD-WCE/Male WCE/Female	Female
Airline	FGTE/Male	FLY	UD/Female
			UD-WCE/Male WCE/Male
Social security	PSTE/Male	PENSION	UD/Female WCE/Female	Female
		SOCIAL	UD-WCE/Male WCE/Male	Male

Note: UD: union delegate; WCE: representative elected to the WC.

The aim of this first set of semi-structured interviews was to provide a broad picture of the mobilization of industry actors around the WFB issue and the results of collective bargaining at branch level. The goal was also to define the sample of companies for the study by collecting information about the collective bargaining activities of the companies related to the branch. Similarly to other French confederations, the CFDT covers all industries but is more firmly established in certain sectors and occupations. Federations are organized along industry lines and benefit from considerable autonomy within the framework of the confederation. They can define their own strategy according to their priorities, their members’ profiles and union culture in the branches they encompass. However, their strategy is shaped by the broad orientation of the confederation, which they help to design via the delegates they elect to the confederation (Goetschy and Jobert, 2011).

A second set of semi-structured interviews was conducted at the workplace with CFDT local representatives and, more specifically, with trade union delegates who took part in the collective bargaining process addressing the WFB issue, and WC members who participated in the management of the company’s social activities. Because of the low membership rate, it is common for one activist to hold both positions. When poss-ible, management representatives (i.e. a person in charge of human resources or labour relations) was also interviewed to compare and contrast viewpoints and to grasp contextual factors. For both categories of respondents, questions were mainly directed at determining which measures were used to support WFB, whether they resulted from collective bargaining, to what extent they were linked to union action and how they affected employees. Questions also focused on the respondents’ views of the role of companies and social dialogue in supporting WFB. Level of commitment, positions and practices of employer and employee representatives in that regard could thus be characterized. Additionally, information was collected through reports from union or management representatives regarding the company’s economic and social situation; gender equality indicators; and the WC’s welfare activities. Similarly, all collective agreements in which the WFB issue was considered were analysed in depth (at the branch and corporate level). The analysis below is organized around the most salient findings of this research as regards union responses to the WFB issue.

Union responses to WFB

When asked about their assessment of the support from employers for WFB, CFDT informants were generally critical. Although employers were described as being open to dialogue on the subject, according to them, the cost of measures often posed an obstacle to a concrete commitment since WFB was far from being a management priority. Even though complaints differed according to the workplace context, local representatives commonly emphasized how working conditions limited the amount of leeway enjoyed by employees in reconciling work with family life.

Despite the rather critical assessment of the situation in most companies, CFDT informants noted that trade union mobilization on the WFB issue was weak overall. As a male leader of the Banking and Insurance Federation (FBA) noted: ‘[t]his is an emerging theme but one that is not yet integrated into the list of claims’. Most local representatives emphasized that the WFB issue had little influence in bringing together various trade union organizations at the workplace, as it was often of little general interest. They agreed that, including within their own union, the issue was commonly considered as being at the margins of the ‘real’ issues trade unions face, particularly in times of economic crisis.

Regarding WCs’ social activities, the interviews of WC members and analysis of their expenditure showed that WCs still support families primarily by subsidizing cultural and leisure activities, as far as financially possible. Few WCs devoted much effort to the WFB issue by subsidizing specific programmes such as childcare services. Yet, interviews with both management representatives and WC members revealed that employers were attempting to push WCs to act on the issue, although the response had been negligible hitherto. WC members explained that these programmes were overly expensive considering the number of people whom they benefit, leading to a problem of fairness in the context of increasing individualism and budgetary restrictions. They also stressed that WFB concerns working conditions and should, therefore, be the responsibility of employers.

With reference to collective bargaining, CFDT informants reported that, since none of the trade unions in the company see the issue as strategic, it was not the object of a bitter struggle. Achieving one or two measures, the extension of existing rights from ‘mothers’ to ‘parents’ for example, could be sufficient for agreement to be reached. Content and monitoring of an agreement were therefore dependent on the personal commitment of those union and management representatives who supported it. Moreover, while CFDT respondents involved in the collective bargaining process addressing the WFB issue appeared to be mobilized, advocacy strategies – where they existed – emerged as fragmented, thus indicating a lack of clear and unified union strategy on the issue. Although some favoured an approach based on gender equality, others mobilized on more universal issues of parenthood, discrimination or quality of work life.

Weak union involvement and the lack of strategy are reflected in the poor quality of many collective agreements reached at company level. In accordance with legal incentives, negotiated measures to foster WFB were most often included in agreements on gender equality at work. To comply with the law, these agreements must provide corrective measures to address gender inequalities with regard to compensation and promotion, alongside innovative measures to strengthen equal opportunities. However, statements of good intentions are more frequent than concrete commitments, and the less expensive and restrictive the measures are for employers, the more they are widespread (Milner and Gregory, 2014). As regards specifically the reconciliation of work and family life, negotiated measures are often limited to a summary statement of rights or benefits that largely precede the agreement and provide merely short-term support for employees, without clear justifications or objectives. In fact, few agreements explicitly link WFB to gender equality, or seek to strengthen equal opportunities.

Three types of measures can be identified. The first type focuses on extending social rights instituting family-related leave, thereby confirming that minimum legal entitlements provide resources that can be used in bargaining. However, the scope of such measures is limited. Essentially, the provisions that most effectively distinguish the agreements consist in the payment for short-term statutory leaves such as paternity leave (seven days) and leave to care for sick children (three days). The second type of measure relates to the organization of working time. Efforts to adapt meeting schedules, business trips and training periods to family obligations are both the least constraining and the most widespread measures. Working time accounts and teleworking are more rarely mentioned. The most significant measures regarding flexitime arrangements and part-time work were generally addressed in previous agreements devoted to working time, negotiated in the context of the transition to a 35-hour week (1998–2002), with few direct references to the WFB issue (Gregory and Milner, 2009). When mentioned in collective agreements on the WFB topic, such measures often take the form of provisions in which the company, ‘as far as possible’, commits to considering employees’ family obligations in terms of access and use. The third type of measure relates to benefits and subsidized services to support employees in performing family responsibilities and covers efforts to raise management’s awareness of parenting concerns. Provision of this last type of measure is very heterogeneous and generally underdeveloped.

The fieldwork also revealed a number of substantial and innovative agreements, supported by motivated representatives, in branches or companies with a tradition of social dialogue. These agreements included an extension of paid paternity leave or the possibility of flexible weekly hours for parents with alternating child custody. In general, at the branch or group level, the preamble to the agreements tended to be more far-reaching and to detail various demands relating to the WFB issue, most notably under the influence of studies conducted at this level. However, the content of these agreements rarely constrained companies because the agreements aimed mainly to establish broad orientations and a range of recommendations.

The following sections aim to elucidate these findings by examining the relevance of the different perspectives referred to in the literature review.

Explanatory factors for union involvement in WFB

During the interviews, the CFDT informants touched upon virtually all the explanatory factors suggested by the literature.

Discussion and conclusion

Studies of the role of unions in providing family-friendly policies commonly emphasize the importance of union investment in the issue. For employees, union involvement provides a way of developing measures tailored to their needs (Dickens, 2000: 196) and available to the greatest number of employees (Gerstel and Clawson, 2001: 282). For unions, involvement in this field is promoted as a vector for the modernization and revitalization of union action (Dickens, 2000: 198; Gregory and Milner, 2009: 142), affording them the opportunity to expand their audience, especially among women and youth (Gerstel and Clawson, 2001: 294). However, these studies also highlight the obstacles to such involvement; this new field of negotiation is therefore as full of challenges as it is of opportunities.

This qualitative research conducted among CFDT informants provides insight into the extent of these challenges. Despite a potentially favourable context in terms of public incentives, union identity and employer willingness, the WFB issue appears to be underinvested and suffering from a lack of advocacy strategies. Collective bargaining on the topic is not the object of bitter fighting and the agreements reached are rarely ambitious and innovative. Similarly, apart from subsidizing leisure and holidays, WCs devote few resources to supporting working parents. Interviews with union representatives suggest that the WFB issue is a field of mobilization that is poorly valued, even though there were grounds for acting. Although the study does not provide a representative account of the various positions on the WFB issue adopted across the French trade union landscape, it suggests a sceptical assessment of the state of union mobilization on the topic.

The research also contributes to a deeper understanding of the nature of the challenges union mobilization faces. It points to the limited impact of the ‘political opportunity structure’ on union involvement. Compared to previous analyses of the French case, the data show that the state’s explicit call for firms to address the WFB issue, notably through mandatory collective bargaining, has provided opportunities for the development of union involvement. The issue has become an institutionalized subject of negotiation between social partners, and the legitimacy of employer intervention has been strengthened. However, the scope of opportunities provided by mandatory collective bargaining appears to be doubly limited. First, this legal device induces an administrative approach of the WFB issue that limits the consciousness-raising impact of the law suggested by Gregory and Milner (2009). Second, while the law promotes social dialogue on the WFB issue, it does not secure the conditions for its effectiveness. Therefore, exploiting the opportunities afforded by state policy remains contingent on the existence of a favourable bargaining context.

According to Heery (2006b: 540), ‘[i]n this context of declining bargaining power, unions have become more dependent on opportunities afforded by changes in employment law and wider public policy to open up collective bargaining on new issues’. The CFDT case shows that legislative support is able to offset the structural weakening of trade unions only partially. The action of union representatives on WFB appears to be conditioned by the receptiveness of employers. This is all the more true at company level where short-term economic imperatives prevail and where the very low unionization rate constrains union bargaining power (Parsons, 2013). The scope for manoeuvre of worker representatives in WFB bargaining appears to be even more limited than the opportunities for deploying an integrative strategy are rare. Most of the employers in this study framed bargaining on this topic as an additional administrative burden rather than as a business case, which explains why formalism dominates innovation in compliance with legal requirements.

Nevertheless, union underinvestment in the WFB issue is due only in part to the lack of effectiveness of the opportunity structure. The lack of pressure for union action coming from the workforce evidenced in other national contexts is also apparent in this research. The study shows more specifically that dissatisfaction exists but does not result in collective claims. This may be, first, because employees experiencing the greatest difficulties are most likely to choose the ‘exit’ path through resignation, as suggested by Gerstel and Clawson (2001: 288). They may also withdraw partially or temporarily from employment through the gendered use of parental leave or recourse to part-time work, as is more frequently the case in France. Second, employees who are dissatisfied with their WFB may choose the ‘apathy path’ rather than the ‘voice path’ (Bajoit, 1988). The study confirms the reluctance of employees to reveal their family concerns and shows how their latent demand is in fact expressed after company support programmes are established or through other media. The preferences employees express to union representatives therefore suffer from bias, as they rely on an artificially narrow basis. This may also explain why they are perceived as specific, except in cases where the workforce shares common characteristics and thereby faces relatively homogeneous constraints. In general, however, the partial and heterogeneous nature of the preferences expressed by employees hamper their merging into ‘public goods’ that can be claimed by the collective voice of unions (Freeman, 2005: 653). This difficulty is even more acute in a general context of the erosion of worker solidarity (Katz, 1993: 16) and specifically in the French context where legislation already provides an extended safety net that protects the family life of employees.

Finally, the research confirms that the barriers also lie within unions themselves. Despite the endorsement of the WFB issue at the confederate level, the study shows that this issue rouses little interest among most CFDT local representatives. More specifically, the study supports Heery’s (2006a) view that gender, age and personal experience affect union representatives’ awareness and approach to WFB problems faced by employees and, thereby, their ability to give momentum to union action. However, union mobilization is overall hindered by the gender stereotypes that are associated with this topic and downplay the issues at stake. Given the presence of a rather ‘traditional’ division of domestic labour in France (Crompton and Lyonette, 2006), the WFB is indeed perceived as being first and foremost a female issue, within both companies and trade unions. These stereotypes persist despite the feminization of trade union membership and the reforms of CFDT structures aimed at enforcing women’s agency within the union. This contributes to the gap between confederate impetus and local engagement in favour of the WFB issue. At the local level, this issue is in fact weakly problematized, especially with regard to its gender dimension, which explains the floating of advocacy strategies. This perception narrows the scope of the claims as well as the remedies to be implemented, and contributes to the reproduction of gender inequality.

In conclusion, while the legislation has given CFDT representatives an opportunity to negotiate on WFB, it has failed to stimulate innovation in related union policy and practices. In accounting for the reason why this issue remains underinvested, the article shows that such union behaviour is not so much the result of a strategic choice but rather results from a lack of strategy in an adverse bargaining context where short-term economic imperatives prevail and gender stereotypes persist.