Divide and Conquer: Social Assistance Clients’ Competing Frames of Social Justice

Abstract

Like many other countries, the Netherlands have witnessed increasing conditionality regarding the right to social assistance. To date, research paid little attention to how recipients themselves experience (in)justice in an increasingly conditional policy landscape. Based on 53 interviews with recipients, we distinguish three different ways of framing social assistance: as a right, a transaction, or a gift. Each frame gives way to particular ideas about social justice, legitimates different feelings and leads to othering of fellow social assistance recipients. Bringing together insights from the sociology of emotions and social justice literature, the article empirically shows the diversity of ideas and feelings regarding social justice, illuminates the role of framing and feeling rules in the process, and argues that increased conditionality produces steep divisions that undermine in-group solidarity.

Keywords

activation Netherlands othering social assistance social injustice social justice sociology of emotions

Introduction

In the Netherlands, people who are unemployed and not eligible for insurance-based unemployment benefits (Werkloosheidswet) receive non-contributory social assistance benefits (bijstand, officially subsumed under the Participation Act since 2015). Dutch social assistance benefits are state-funded, but since the introduction of the Work and Assistance Act (WWB) in 2004, municipalities are responsible for administering them, as well as for designing and implementing local activation policies. With the implementation of the Participation Act in 2015, both their freedom and responsibility expanded.

While the freedom of municipalities expanded, the freedom of Dutch social assistance clients was limited by increased conditionality and stricter enforcement of duties. The Netherlands is not an exceptional case in this regard. Making social assistance more conditional is a process that took hold of many OECD countries under the banner of ‘activation’ from the 1990s onwards (Larsen, 2005; Newman and Tonkens, 2011; OECD, 2007; Van Berkel and Borghi, 2008). In line with ‘work first’ and ‘welfare-to-work’ approaches in the United Kingdom and the United States, the Dutch approach is characterized by the fastest possible transition from benefits to paid work.

In order to limit the number of beneficiaries and to promote labour market participation, the Dutch government took several policy measures that increased conditionality. Firstly, the implementation of the WWB introduced ‘workfare volunteerism’ as a way of ‘activating’ the unemployed (Kampen, 2014). Workfare volunteerism means that volunteer work is demanded from social assistance clients as a way to reciprocate their benefits. Many Dutch municipalities now demand unpaid work in return for benefits and impose sanctions when beneficiaries do not comply with those demands (Kampen et al., 2019).

Secondly, eligibility criteria are rigidified. Thirdly, compliance with job application requirements is more closely monitored. Fourthly, the policy definition of ‘suitable work’ is reformulated to make social assistance clients accept work that is below their educational level or requires moving. And lastly, penalties for a lack of language skills, obstructive behaviour and inappropriate appearance have been introduced to increase people’s ‘work readiness’ (van den Berg and Arts, 2019).

Besides policy, public opinion in the Netherlands and elsewhere has also shifted towards support for more conditionality. People living in wealthier countries – and to some degree with more generous social policies – are more likely to be in favour of conditionality (Buß et al., 2017). Reeskens and van der Meer (2019) found that Dutch public perceptions heavily rely on control and reciprocity as criteria for distinguishing between who does and who does not deserve state support. In other words: people are considered more deserving when they have less control over their neediness, and when they have previously contributed to the community or are expected to do so in the future. Growing support for conditionality is also reflected by the increasing number of Dutch citizens in favour of demanding beneficiaries to do something in return for their benefits (SCP, 2012).

The conditionality of the right to social assistance raises questions regarding justice, such as: Is it fair to let social assistance recipients do something in return? What is a fair demand in return for benefits? And when is it just or unjust to impose sanctions?

Policy and public opinion have shifted towards (supporting) conditionality, but what about the opinions of beneficiaries themselves? We cannot simply assume that beneficiaries will be more outspoken against conditionality than the general public. Also, we have to keep in mind that, besides having a preference for conditional or unconditional social assistance, social assistance recipients experience the direct consequences: they are both influenced by public opinion and subject to policy. The central question of this article is: how do social assistance recipients think and feel about current social assistance policies, and what does this imply in terms of social justice?

To answer this question, we use two central concepts from Arlie Hochschild’s emotion management perspective (1979, 2003). Even though Hochschild has not explicitly contributed to theories of social justice, we suggest her concepts of framing and feeling rules are of great value to do so. They enable us to explain how differences in framing social assistance lead to different ideas and feelings about the (in)justice of social assistance (see also Golding and Middleton, 1982). In the following theoretical sections, we discuss the main concepts and explain how we have used them in our research. In the empirical sections, we discuss the three frames of justice that we found among social assistance beneficiaries. Finally, we draw conclusions and reflect on the theoretical implications of our findings.

Conditionality of social assistance

A principle of conditionality holds that publicly provided welfare entitlements should be dependent on an individual first agreeing to meet particular duties or patterns of behaviour (Deacon, 1994). Conditionality is a clear departure from TH Marshall’s (1950[1992]) idea about social rights. Marshall argued that public welfare would lessen inequalities and foster a sense of solidarity between citizens (Cox, 1998) and should therefore be universal and unconditional.

The shift in policy and public opinion towards conditional social assistance mirrors the ideas of American political scientist Lawrence Mead (1986) and British social scientist Anthony Giddens (1998). In their view, a socially just system of benefits balances the right to social assistance with duties of individuals. These authors consider developing a work ethic to be a fair way of fulfilling societal duties and contributing to personal development. Mead defends conditionality by claiming that people will not act in the interest of the collective unless they are forced to do so. Consequently, claimants who refuse to comply with reciprocity demands harm a principle of social justice and should be sanctioned.

Other social scientists and philosophers have been critical of increased conditionality. Walters (1997) argues that it limits access to social rights to workers in the paid labour market. Dwyer (2000) contends that it leads to ‘blaming the victim’. Others argue that increased conditionality stigmatizes people by reinforcing notions like ‘undeserving poor’, ‘welfare queens’ or ‘welfare fraudsters’ (King, 1995; Soldatic and Meekosha, 2012). Still others point out that making welfare more conditional by implementing workfarist policies contributes to growing precarization. Such policies actively facilitate the unemployed to take up precarious work and impose sanctions when they refuse (Dörre, 2015; Greer, 2016; Rubery et al., 2018; Samaluk, 2021).

Research into conditionality is often concerned with ideals of social justice – for example, because researchers argue for a fair alternative to current policies. However, these ideals are not always made explicit and, with a few exceptions (Dwyer, 2000; Patrick, 2011), the perspective of social assistance recipients themselves is remarkably absent. In this article, we provide an empirical account of social justice by focusing on how recipients think and feel about the benefits they receive. For this, we build upon Hochschild’s sociology of emotions.

Social justice, framing rules and feeling rules

Hochschild eloquently shows that people’s emotions are inextricably linked to how they interpret or ‘frame’ a situation; people abide by ‘framing rules and feeling rules’ (1979, 2003). Framing rules are the social rules that guide how people frame (i.e. interpret, define, legitimize) a situation. According to Hochschild, people often use frames of reference that are historical, moral, or pragmatic: people compare their situation with a moment in the past, with what is morally good or with what is available (2003: 116).

Feeling rules provide guidelines for how people feel (or should feel), depending on how the situation is framed. When unemployment is framed as a personal problem, shame is the appropriate feeling. When unemployment is framed as a structural problem, anger becomes a more appropriate response (see also Peterie et al., 2019). Feeling rules direct our attention to the ideological side of emotions; to how emotions are governed by social rules. People apply feeling rules to themselves (‘I should be happy to receive social assistance benefits’) but also to others (‘she should be happy to receive social assistance benefits’). Feeling rules are socially shared, but can differ according to social backgrounds, class and gender (Hochschild, 1979; Peterie et al., 2019).

While Hochschild does not make an explicit contribution to the social justice literature, her work can be interpreted as an implicit critique of the large amount of political-philosophical works based on absolute standards. Political-philosophical works on justice are important because they provide a horizon towards which we can strive, such as maximizing welfare, freedom, or virtue (Sandel, 2010). However, absolute standards are less useful for understanding people’s everyday experiences and claims for justice. In the face of such standards, it is difficult to understand why citizens do not revolt against unjust situations more often. Hochschild was puzzled over the lack of indignation among women who were expected to enter the labour market and work a ‘second shift’ at home (1989). She concluded that concrete frames of reference (e.g. a historical comparison with mothers or grandmothers who were worse off) stifle feelings of injustice. Her work shows that people seldom compare their situation with absolute standards, like maximizing welfare, freedom or virtue; when judging fairness, people use frames of reference that are more directly available to them.

Even though Hochschild herself has not addressed this, we suggest that framing and feeling rules are also insightful concepts to analyse processes of ‘othering’ among social assistance recipients (Broughton, 2003; Chase and Walker, 2012; Riach and Loretto, 2009; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Othering denotes a ‘process of differentiation and demarcation, by which the line is drawn between “us” and “them” – between the more and the less powerful – and through which social distance is established and maintained’ (Lister, 2004: 101). While the term was originally coined within post-colonial theory (see Spivak, 1985 for the first systematic use of the concept), it has now entered a wide range of other domains, including class-based research (Skeggs, 1997), works on gender (Renold, 2004), ethnicity (Jensen, 2011), poverty and social assistance (Broughton, 2003; Lister, 2004).

Studies on social assistance have shown how stigmatizing discourses in media, politics and popular language are used by beneficiaries to describe other recipients (Broughton, 2003; Chase and Walker, 2012; Golding and Middleton, 1982; Riach and Loretto, 2009; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Others are, for example, described as cheating the system, or as unable to deal with the hardships of poverty. Through these processes of othering, beneficiaries distance themselves from stereotypes and try to maintain a sense of self-respect (Chase and Walker, 2012; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013).

Hochschild’s concepts of framing and feeling rules, we suggest, are well-suited to explain these processes of othering in more detail. They enable us to describe how recipients apply their frame of reference to negatively assess other recipients’ lives and behaviours. In other words, recipients do not only view their own situation through a particular frame, they also view other people’s situations through that frame. Consequently, they expect those others to have corresponding feelings – for example, to feel ashamed when unemployment is framed as a personal failure. The absence of such shame provides a legitimate reason for stigmatizing and vilifying fellow recipients.

The article makes two important contributions. Our first contribution is empirically showing the diversity of, and interrelation between, ideas and feelings of social justice among social assistance recipients by using Hochschild’s concepts of framing and feeling rules. This is an original contribution to the literature on social justice that is often focused either on ideas (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) or feelings (Hoggett et al., 2013; Solomon, 1989). Our second contribution lies in illuminating the role of framing and feeling rules in processes of othering.

Methodology

Our article is based on semi-structured interviews with 53 social assistance beneficiaries in eight Dutch municipalities in a variety of settings (from urban to rural). In five municipalities, invitation letters were sent to recipients with the help of welfare agencies. Three municipalities did not want to cooperate, after which letters were distributed in welfare agencies, supermarkets, medical centres, churches, food banks, and second-hand stores. Recipients were asked to contact the researchers by telephone or email if they wanted to participate in the research.

In each municipality, six to eight beneficiaries were interviewed about their ideas regarding social assistance. With regard to gender, age, educational level and psychiatric or physical problems, our sample of respondents corresponds with the characteristics of the total number of recipients on a national level: slightly more women than men were included; a majority has a low educational level, physical and/or mental complaints, and has been on social assistance for three years or more (CBS, 2018). However, only five of our respondents had a migration background, compared to almost half of the total social assistance recipients on a national level (CBS, 2018). When reading the results, most specifically respondents’ resentment towards migrants, this needs to be kept in mind.

During the interviews, respondents were asked questions about social assistance in general, their rights and duties, and about interactions with welfare officials. The interviews focus on their framing of social assistance and their feelings. Feelings were discussed by paying attention to both what people said and how they said it. ‘Objective signs of emotions’ (Scheff, 2000), such as blushing, fumbling, stuttering and an unusually low- or high-pitched voice, were indicators to carefully ask respondents to elaborate on how they felt.

Interviews lasted between 45 and 100 minutes. Respondents received a voucher of 20 euros for their participation, and written consent was obtained in all cases. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed thematically (Green and Thorogood, 2009; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) in Atlas.ti, with the main themes being benefits, rights (e.g. premiums for participating in programmes), duties (e.g. workfare volunteerism), sanctions and interactions with welfare officials. While coding, specific attention was paid to how different themes were framed (framing rules) and felt about (feeling rules). We also coded what respondents thought other social assistance recipients should feel. These ideas were often underlined by anecdotes about the behaviour and attitude of other recipients that illustrated, according to our respondents, their inferior way of framing social assistance.

After an initial phase of open coding and discussing preliminary findings with our research team, codes were categorized in code groups, following an iterative process of grouping and new phases of coding. This process resulted in the identification of three main frames that we will discuss in the next empirical paragraphs: the rights-frame, transaction-frame and gift-frame. These frames are more intertwined in practice than on paper: our informants do not express themselves in just one frame, but often combine elements. However, respondents do express themselves in a dominant frame when talking about social assistance.

The rights-frame

The first frame that we abstracted from our empirical data is the ‘rights-frame’. A minority of respondents built their judgements about (in)justice on the idea that social assistance is a right. This frame was dominant in about a quarter of all cases, and was the least-used frame in our research.

According to people using the rights-frame, social assistance benefits exist for legal citizens or residents who, for a variety of reasons, are jobless or unavailable for the labour market and in need of temporary financial assistance. Their need for assistance was the main deservingness criterion (cf. Van Oorschot, 2000):

I think it [receiving social assistance benefits] is normal in the Netherlands. I did not ask for being in this situation. If I had money, I wouldn’t need it. And if I had a nice job, I wouldn’t need it. But I am in desperate need. (woman, 58, single, one year on social assistance)

Those who frame social assistance as a right found it unfair to make the right to social assistance conditional upon fulfilling specific duties. Consequently, they strongly disagreed with workfare volunteerism for several reasons. First, they questioned the motives behind workfare volunteerism:

I can still hear [Prime Minister] Rutte say: ‘We don’t want people to be excluded in the Netherlands’, so he presented it as if it [workfare volunteerism] was in our interest but that is just BS! [. . .] It’s in the interest of the established order! (man, 53, single, seven years on social assistance)

Second, they considered workfare volunteerism to be an illegitimate use of power since it forces people into precarious, unpaid labour: ‘In my view it feels a bit like slavery. I am sorry to put it that way, but that is what it feels like to me’ (man, 61, single, four years on social assistance).

In a rights-frame, strict controlling measures were deemed unnecessary and counterproductive. They would demotivate beneficiaries and frustrate their transition to paid work: ‘If you financially punish people who are already at the bottom, you push them further and further down. And you can’t get out, you can’t get out’ (woman, 58, single, five years on social assistance). The rights-frame echoes concerns from scholars about state-manufactured precarization through workfarist policies (Dörre, 2015; Greer, 2016; Lorey, 2015; Rubery et al., 2018; Samaluk, 2021). These scholars argue that mandatory participation in activation programmes and punishments for non-participation increase the loss of income, and hence the distress, associated with unemployment. Instead of helping unemployed individuals to escape their precarious situation, they contribute to precarity.

Those who framed social assistance as a right generally referred to a ‘good past’ in which social assistance was less conditional, less coercive, and rights and premiums were more generous. By applying this historical framing rule (Hochschild, 2003), they felt entitled to complain. They especially expressed indignation about the loss of rights to additional financial aid:

In the past you could receive vouchers for a bicycle or a washing machine a few times a year. But not anymore, I think. And you also had [name of extra premium]. That also does not exist anymore. It is all gone. So, I have no rights anymore. (woman, 37, in a relationship, with children, five years on social assistance)

From a rights-frame, respondents argued that asking for additional aid is a legitimate claim: ‘I’m a person that expects more from welfare agents. Because they have contacts with corporations as well, they know which jobs are available. So, I think it’s reasonable to expect some extra help with finding a job’ (man, 42, single, one year on social assistance).

Those who frame social assistance as a right considered a fair treatment (by welfare officials) to be a right as well: ‘Local authorities should serve citizens. And I strongly get the impression that, when it comes to social security, the government has forgotten that’ (man, 55, single, one year on social assistance).

In sum, respondents who framed social assistance as a right believed that all Dutch (legal) inhabitants in need should receive benefits. Additional assistance and a fair treatment were also viewed as a matter of rights. Making social assistance conditional (e.g. by demanding volunteer work in return for benefits) tampers with this right and gave rise to feelings of injustice. The rights-frame made it legitimate to feel angry and indignant about the increased conditionality of social assistance (Hochschild, 1979, 2003).

Respondents framing social assistance as a right judged the situations of other beneficiaries accordingly. When citizens have a hard time accessing their rights, they should be helped. Failing to provide such help on a systemic level is considered a great injustice:

So many people make mistakes, don’t know anything and are often low-literate. And I do experience that as an injustice. Perhaps I am privileged because I understand it. I really experience that as unjust. Not personally but more in general. (man, 55, single, one year on social assistance)

Other beneficiaries were repeatedly presented as inarticulate citizens, incapable of standing up for themselves. They were ‘othered’ as voiceless people – for instance because they do not speak the language (well). Depicting others as inarticulate citizens incited feelings of compassion and empathy. Adopting a rights-frame directs negative feelings towards the ‘system’ (e.g. because of increased precarization), but positive feelings towards fellow social assistance recipients (cf. Broughton, 2003; Chase and Walker, 2012; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Interestingly, the rights-frame was often used by men, of whom few had psychiatric or physical problems, and of whom many were relatively highly educated.

The transaction-frame

In the second frame that we abstracted from the empirical data, judgements about (in)justice were built on the idea that social assistance is a transaction. This frame was characterized by an aspiration to find a balance between receiving social assistance benefits and repayment. The transaction-frame was most widely used by our respondents, as it was dominant in close to half of all interviews.

Contrary to the rights-frame, for people reasoning from a transaction-frame, the right to social assistance was not an unconditional entitlement. Being in need was not considered a sufficient reason to claim a right to social assistance; rather, it should be conditional on the fulfilment of duties: ‘I think it is normal that certain obligations are imposed when you are on social assistance’ (woman, 39, single, four years on social assistance). Obligations, like having to apply for jobs or workfare volunteerism, were considered ‘logical’, ‘fair’ or ‘normal’:

You can try to resist but you will have to do it [workfare volunteerism]. You do not receive those benefits for free, you know. I just think it is normal; you will have to do something in return for those benefits. (woman, 59, divorced, with children, nine years on social assistance)

Hence, in line with Dutch public opinion, the main deservingness criterion expressed by people using a transaction-frame was reciprocity: the more people reciprocate the more they earn their share (Van Oorschot, 2000).

While accepting the principle of reciprocity, respondents reasoning from a transaction-frame carefully weighed their efforts and gains. What they paid back had to be ‘in balance’ with what they received. The content of their volunteer work should be proportional (not too long, not too much), fitting to their interests (aligned with their passion), and/or rewarding (helping them find a job more easily). When that is the case, workfare volunteerism was considered a win-win situation from which both municipalities and beneficiaries could benefit.

However, when those who reasoned from a transaction-frame felt they were paying back more than they received, irritations arose. For example, when the duration of volunteering activities exceeded what they felt was a fair repayment: ‘I surely want to make a contribution to society, but gardening is not good for my reputation. I don’t think it will help me find a job’ (woman, 36, single, six years on social assistance). Or, as another respondent told us:

I think [doing something in return] is a good idea, but . . . you have to give people the opportunity to do what they like. People need to be able to do something they are passionate about. You know, not because your welfare agent thinks ‘you have to do something, go peel bulbs’. No! I don’t like that. (woman, 31, divorced, with children, seven years on social assistance)

Respondents who framed social assistance as a transaction felt obliged to reciprocate their benefits, but also entitled to make claims about how to reciprocate – for example, by objecting to the content and duration of their workfare volunteerism. Social assistance was regarded as a matter of ‘balanced reciprocity’ (Mauss, 1990[1923]; Sahlins, 1972) and so the ultimate aim was an equal balance. Hence, the biggest injustices were felt when there was an imbalance between people’s efforts and gains.

Those keeping track of the balance believed controlling measures were necessary and important to check whether (other) social assistance clients were making enough effort to reciprocate:

There must be some control, yes, that makes sense. I was once at a training and there was someone who hardly spoke Dutch. When the class supervisor was gone, he said: ‘You have to pretend that you have a burn-out so you don’t have to work anymore’. It has nothing to do with discrimination, but I have been confronted with this a few times, that I thought, yes, there is also a group that really does not want to work. (woman, 36, single, six years on social assistance)

Also, sanctions were considered legitimate when duties were not fulfilled: ‘If you do not fulfil your duties, then your benefits should be cut’. [Interviewer: ‘Why?’] ‘Simply because you do not meet the conditions you should meet to receive your benefits’ (man, 61, single, four years on social assistance).

Different from a rights-frame in which people were owed a fair treatment, according to the transaction-frame a fair treatment was something to be deserved. Repeatedly, recipients expressed they were treated fairly – for example, given a lot of freedom or understanding – because of their previous behaviour, like conscientiously living up to their end of the deal: ‘You just have to comply, and I think: the more you cooperate, the easier the social assistance agency will make your life. I think it is mainly up to you how hard or easy you make it’ (man, 25, single, three years on social assistance).

However, by reasoning that ‘you get what you deserve’, people got irritated easily when they felt they were treated more severely than they deserved. A respondent, who was repeatedly visited by authorities to check whether she was committing fraud, stated: ‘They do random checks. But it was the third time this year for me! I am not a criminal, but I am being treated like a criminal. Meanwhile, the criminal who is actually committing fraud, walks free’ (woman, 61, single, four years on social assistance).

In sum, social justice in the transaction-frame is a matter of balancing what you get and what you receive. Unlike the rights-frame, the transaction-frame is fundamentally conditional. Both the distribution of rights and duties, as well as the way people are treated, are conditional on their own efforts and actions. Feelings of injustice occur when there is a perceived disbalance between what you get and what you receive. The transaction-frame turns frustrations about such disbalance into a legitimate feeling (Hochschild, 1979, 2003).

Respondents framing social assistance as a transaction judged other social assistance recipients by the same standards. Most striking was a general sense of mistrust, based on the assumption other recipients did not properly adhere to the principle of reciprocity. Fellow recipients were repeatedly ‘othered’ and described as free-riders. In the eyes of people using a transaction-frame, the government should be harder on them: ‘There is a whole bunch of people who are just too lazy to apply or too lazy to work. I think they need a stricter approach’ (woman, 61, single, four years on social assistance). Or, as another respondent expressed:

If they are keeping an eye on me for a while, like last week, then I think: go check those people who have been receiving benefits for years and do nothing, hang out on the street. At least I do volunteer work; I’ve been doing that for years. (man, 51, single, eight years on social assistance)

In some cases, the free-riding other was presented as a perfectly healthy young person who enjoys free money and chills out at home:

Apparently, everyone has a right to social assistance. And that is precisely the problem. Because everyone thinks: ‘Yes, I am entitled to social assistance whether I do something or spend the whole day on the couch smoking pot’. I’m talking about young people specifically. Then I think: ‘Are those people also entitled to benefits? Right now, they are. But is that entirely fair?’ (woman, 58, divorced, two years on social assistance)

In many other cases, people with migrant backgrounds were depicted as free-riders who came to the Netherlands to take advantage of the social safety net:

We, as Dutch people, are disadvantaged in our own country. We are actually the foreigners. How do I say this? I do not want to discriminate. Well, I do feel disadvantaged then. As a Dutchwoman, I just get less done. They [foreigners] just have to go to the municipality and get what they need. (woman, 57, divorced, eight years on social assistance)

People using a transaction-frame felt envious of other social assistance clients that received more than they ‘deserved’. In other words, they felt others should ‘pay back’ their benefits too. When others failed to do so, they were blamed and envied. The stereotypes in a transaction-frame were fundamentally racialized and aged; immigrants and young adults especially were perceived as free-riders.

The gift-frame

In the third frame we distinguished, judgements about (in)justice were built on the idea that social assistance is a gift. The gift-frame induced feelings of gratitude, but also shame for being dependent on the gift of social assistance, and stood out as very uncritical towards the system. Being dominant in a third of all cases, the gift-frame was not as widely used as the transaction-frame, but more than the rights-frame.

In a gift-frame, social assistance was not considered a self-evident entitlement and was therefore met with gratitude:

I am grateful that it [social assistance benefits] is there . . . if you think about me not having a job and you see the house where I live now . . . and think about the money I receive . . . that is not the case in every European country. So, I am grateful that it is there. (woman, 58, divorced, with children, five years on social assistance)

The main deservingness criterion in the gift-frame was ‘attitude’ (Van Oorschot, 2000): to deserve social assistance it should be met with a grateful attitude.

Since those framing social assistance as a gift did not want to seem ungrateful, they tended to refrain from any kind of judgement about their rights and duties as recipients. Interviewees reasoning from a gift-frame felt it was unjust to make demands or complain about social assistance:

I think my rights and duties are balanced. Because I don’t really have that much to demand. [Interviewer: ‘What do you mean?’] Because I just receive it [benefits], so to speak. So, I am grateful. (woman, 51, divorced, 20 years on social assistance)

Those framing social assistance as a gift had ambivalent feelings about receiving benefits. They were grateful, but also felt dependent and ashamed for having to ‘hold up their hand’: ‘If I could just work, I wouldn’t have to hold up my hand like this. Sometimes I feel a bit like a beggar’ (woman, 39, divorced, with children, six years on social assistance).

Social assistance benefits were considered a gift, which like all gifts, needs to be reciprocated in one way or another. Similar to the transaction-frame, doing something in return was considered normal. However, contrary to looking for the perfect balance, in the gift-frame, reciprocity was a matter of ‘generalized reciprocity’ (Mauss, 1990[1923]; Sahlins, 1972): reciprocity that is not calculated, not bounded by a specific time frame, but based on trust and helpfulness:

I think that, if your circumstances allow it, I think it [workfare volunteerism] is more than fair. [Interviewer: ‘Why do you think it is fair?’] I mean, if I would be able to – and the social assistance agents know that – then I’d really do something. I’d really help. My neighbour here was in the hospital. Well, I cleaned up the snow there. I think that is more than fair. (woman, 39, divorced, with children, six years on social assistance)

Feelings of injustice arose when respondents felt welfare officials were questioning their grateful or helpful attitude – for instance, when officials tried to quantify their efforts:

I certainly want to work. I also help when people are in need of help. So, I’m not too bad for that. But why should there always be something in return? [. . .] I have chosen to be a mother and if somebody asks me, you want to help paper the walls because I cannot do that alone, or help me paint, then I surely will help. (woman, 55, divorced, 25 years on social assistance)

In a gift-frame, good treatment by social assistance agents is not seen as a right, neither as something you need to earn. Rather, it was thought to be dependent on the personal relationship between the official and the beneficiary. What made a relationship personal was an agent willing to know their clients’ personal situations and recognizing their good intentions. A woman struggling with psychiatric problems illustrated how such a relationship was characterized by the welfare official’s trust in her willingness to work:

There was no pressure on me like, ‘Hey, you have to do this or that’. They know that I am eager, and that I am open [to work]. So, as soon as things go well, then I just do that. Then they don’t even have to tell me, because I would say it myself: ‘Hey, I am out. I’m going to work.’ (woman, 37, divorced, with children, six years on social assistance)

Since a personal relationship was so important for those framing social assistance as a gift, it was especially harmful when their assigned welfare agent was replaced by somebody else.

In sum, those framing social assistance as a gift did not consider benefits self-evident. This framing generated feelings of gratitude (for receiving benefits) and shame (for being dependent on them). These feelings intertwined with a felt disentitlement to make judgements about the (un)fairness of the social assistance system or concrete policies and practices.

Respondents framing social assistance as a gift used this same frame to judge other social assistance recipients. In a gift-frame ‘beggars cannot be choosers’; therefore, social assistance clients in general are not in a position to complain and were strongly condemned when they did:

They are not ashamed at all. They just complain aloud. I felt ashamed when I applied for benefits. And that feeling remains. If people ask me whether I’m on social assistance, I just say that I receive disability benefits. I lie about it. [. . .] Because I am too ashamed to say I am receiving social assistance benefits. (woman, 61, divorced, four years on social assistance)

Hence, respondents reasoning from a gift-frame applied the same frame to other social assistance clients and the corresponding feeling rules; they argued that others should feel ashamed for receiving benefits, just like them. Claiming additional rights was also considered shameless, and breaking a feeling rule:

I am very grateful that after being thrown off my pedestal, I am nevertheless cared for. But I also saw that there are so many [other social assistance clients], well, maybe not so many, that there are a number of people abusing the situation. If a municipality has something to offer, then they are the first to be on the doorstep shouting: ‘I want that too!’. And then ‘that’s what the municipality is there for!’. I hate that. (man, 62, divorced, 11 years on social assistance)

Hence, those who did not (appear to) follow the same feeling rules were repeatedly described as ‘shameless’ since they tried to receive a lot yet failed to give.

It was striking that those who framed social assistance as a gift were very often single mothers with a past of divorce, abuse and financial dependence on their husbands, of whom many struggled with mental health problems. They were profoundly aware of the limited opportunities they had for providing for their children in a context of unemployment and trauma (cf. Fuller et al., 2008). Consequently, many single mothers were grateful for receiving benefits because it allowed them and their children to escape a sometimes-abusive relationship. Strikingly, the most vulnerable social assistance recipients most often felt grateful and ashamed.

Conclusions

The central question of this article was: how do social assistance recipients think and feel about current social assistance policies, and what does this imply in terms of social justice? To answer this question, we identified three, partly competing, ways to frame social assistance: the rights-frame, transaction-frame and gift-frame. Each frame implies specific feeling rules, leading to different judgements about what is just and unjust.

The first contribution of this article shows the diversity of, and interrelation between, ideas and feelings of social justice among social assistance recipients. When people frame social assistance as a right, they feel angry about the increased conditionality. Having to do something in return feels highly unfair and they worry about others not being able to stick up for themselves enough. When they frame social assistance as a transaction, having to do something in return feels fair as long as it is proportional with regard to the actual benefit they receive. Those framing social assistance as a transaction, envy other recipients who do not pay back enough. When they interpret benefits as a gift, they feel both grateful and ashamed, and they expect others to do so as well. Recipients refrain from judging social assistance as highly fair or unfair, since they are not in a position to judge; they do not want to appear ungrateful (Table 1).

Table 1.

Competing frames of social justice.

	Rights-frame	Transaction-frame	Gift-frame
Deservingness criterion	Need	Reciprocity	Attitude
Feeling rule	Anger about conditionality	Envy of other recipients	Gratitude and shame for benefits
Othering	Inarticulate citizen	Free-rider	Ungrateful recipient

By showing how ideas and feelings of social (in)justice are generated by available frames of reference, this article makes an important empirical contribution to the predominantly political-philosophical literature on social justice. Ordinary people, like the welfare beneficiaries in our research, do not make sense of their experiences of justice and injustice by referring to absolute standards of justice like welfare, freedom or virtue that we traditionally find in political-philosophical theories (Sandel, 2010). Such absolute standards ignore the strong comparative character of (in)justice in everyday life; people compare their situation with a moment in the past, with what is morally good or with what is available. Therefore, relative concepts like Hochschild’s framing and feeling rules allow us to understand people’s ideas and feelings of injustice more adequately than absolute standards of justice.

In addition, the article enriches existing empirical works on social justice (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Hoggett et al., 2013; Solomon, 1989) by analysing the interrelation between ideas and feelings of social (in)justice instead of focusing on either one.

The article also makes a modest contribution to research on conditionality by showing how the rights-frame is strongly overshadowed by both the transaction- and gift-frame. Roughly three-quarters of all respondents predominantly use a gift- or a transaction-frame. The fact that most of them frame social assistance as a gift or a transaction, can be understood as a consequence of the increased conditionality of social assistance. Previous works have documented how the conditionality of social assistance contributes to growing precarization, and how actively facilitating the entry of the unemployed into insecure, precarious work through workfarist policies and activation schemes contributes to a ‘normalization’ of precarity (Rubery et al., 2018). Our study shows that precarity is normalized among welfare recipients as well, as only a minority of respondents – those using the rights-frame – speak out against the loss of income and distress produced by mandatory participation in activation programmes and punishments for non-participation (Rubery et al., 2018).

The article adds to previous works that have pointed out processes of othering among social assistance recipients (Broughton, 2003; Chase and Walker, 2012; Riach and Loretto, 2009; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). We enrich this body of literature by borrowing concepts from the sociology of emotions (Hochschild, 1979, 2003) to illuminate the role of framing and feeling rules in processes of othering. Recipients do not only frame their own situation in a particular way but use that same frame to assess the situation of other recipients. Consequently, they quite consistently judge others by the same standards and expect them to think, behave and feel the same way about receiving social assistance. Those who do not, are reduced to stereotypes like the inarticulate citizen (rights-frame), the free-rider (transaction-frame) and the ungrateful recipient (gift-frame).

Our research shows that conditional frames negatively impact recipients’ ideas and feelings about each other. Othering in the rights-frame was more compassionate and less divisive. Even though the rights-frame also reduced other social assistance clients to passive citizens who are deprived of agency, they were believed to be and were described as good-hearted citizens. Instead of negative emotions like envy and resentment towards other social assistance clients, or shaming and blaming them, othering social assistance recipients as inarticulate citizens was rooted in feelings of care and concern.

A possible explanation for this less negative othering of fellow social assistance clients is that people using a rights-frame were often the ones in less marginalized positions. As highlighted in the empirical section, the rights-frame was often used by men with a relatively high level of education, and few additional problems (e.g. mental health, physical, financial). It seems that, in order to maintain a sense of self-worth, these respondents felt less need to distance themselves from others. By contrast, people in more marginalized positions, like single mothers on social assistance, were more inclined to feel threatened and therefore more obliged to actively assert their self-worth and deservingness (see also Chase and Walker, 2012). In line with previous works on framing and feeling rules (Hochschild, 2003; Peterie et al., 2019), this points at the importance of conducting research that is sensitive to the intersection of differences like class, age and gender.

Taken together: increased conditionality has diminished the rights-frame and emboldened two frames that produce processes of othering that may very well be harmful to social assistance clients’ in-group solidarity. While the article is based on a study of Dutch recipients, this finding is relevant to other countries where the conditionality of social assistance is increasing. Social assistance clients who are standing up for their rights (or are believed to do so), are experiencing stigmatization from within: other social assistance clients blame them for not abiding by the same framing and feeling rules. This produces steep divisions within a group that would ideally share interests and collectively work towards improving their precarious situations. It shows that TH Marshall (1950) was right in pointing out that a sense of solidarity was one of the main assets of unconditional social assistance.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We are very grateful for the help of Olivier van Donk, Tijmen Legemaate, Evelien Tonkens and Wander van der Vaart.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study was funded by Instituut GAK.

ORCID iD

Melissa Sebrechts

Melissa Sebrechts is an anthropologist and Assistant Professor at the University of Humanistic Studies. In her research, she focuses on the impacts of welfare programmes and precarious employment on people’s moral emotions and sense of self. Her work is characterized by in-depth ethnographic fieldwork, put at the service of theoretical debates like social justice and recognition.

Thomas Kampen is a sociologist and Assistant Professor at the University of Humanistic Studies. His research focuses on the lived experiences of welfare state reforms in the Netherlands. His main topics are welfare-to-work, workfare volunteerism and the decentralization of activation, long-term care and youth care policies in the Netherlands.

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