Abstract
This issue of Journal of Theoretical Politics contains three original articles. All three articles tackle questions that are highly relevant to current events and, viewed broadly, all relate to the foundations and robustness of social and political stability and extend consideration of some of the themes tackled in recent issues of this journal. 1 These articles “come from” different substantive subfields within political science. As editors, we are focused on maintaining and broadening this breadth within the pages of the Journal of Theoretical Politics. By developing and applying analytical models to diverse questions, we can infer similarities and differences in the natures and origins of these phenomena by comparing and contrasting the models we build to understand them.
In “‘Sons of the Soil’: A model of assimilation and population control,” Avidit Acharya, David D. Laitin, and Ruxi A. Zhang develop and present a model of endogenous culture. In so doing, the authors tackle a topic of relevance as separatist movements seem to be attracting increasing support in many parts of the world. In more academic terms, they shift the focus of research on sons of the soil from violent conflict to struggles for cultural dominance. The model construes the value of adopting one culture/language versus another as a coordination game, the parameters of which can be controlled—through population control and/or encouraging assimilation—by the elites of the competing national and regional groups. Acharya et al. complement the model with four case studies, chosen to illustrate each of the four forms of equilibrium behavior that can emerge within their model. By suggesting how to bring the model to bear in large-n analyses, Acharya et al. provide an excellent example of the role that formal models provide bridges between various methodological approaches.
In “‘Strong’ states and strategic governance: A model of territorial variation in state presence,” Jessica Steinberg tackles a related question, extending the study of how a state—even a strong one—might fail to exert full control over its territory. Steinberg presents a theory of the incentives for central governments to provide transfers (services) to a local population based on a parsimonious, two-player sequential game of two-sided asymmetric information. Information is a key to Steinberg’s theory: the central government is uncertain about the willingness of the local population to protest if the government does not provide services, and the local population is uncertain about the government’s ability to enlist local non-state actors to provide the services in lieu of transfers. In this way, Steinberg offers a rich informational accounting for the emergence of informal delegation and clarifying how, as non-state actors capable of wealth extraction emerge, even a strong state might find it worth “pulling back” and leaving local service provision to such an actor.
Moving from informal institutions into classically formal ones, Florence So tackles a related question highly relevant to current events in democratic states such as Germany, Italy, and the United States: how do mainstream opposition parties choose between adopting a hardline position favored by activists and a more mainstream position that increases the party’s chance of being included in a governing coalition? In “Attract voters or appease activists? Opposition parties’ dilemma and party policy change,” So considers an informational model in which party leaders and members separately and sequentially react to the strategic choice of an activist group to rebel against the platform proposed by the party leaders. The theory extends the literature on intra-party politics, particularly by offering an argument for how electoral systems might influence these dynamics, suggesting that a proportional electoral system will better enable party leaders to change their parties’ platforms than will a majoritarian system.