Making sense of financial incentive as a policy tool for the independent arts sector

Abstract

The local government of Stockholm in 2008 introduced a growth scheme including a financial incentive for the independent arts sector. As financial incentives are virtually non-existent in the cultural sphere, this must be seen as a rather extreme development in cultural policy. The article explores both the rationale behind the new growth scheme as policy tool as well as its reception by the sector through three complementary perspectives: historical institutionalism, ideology analysis and policy values analysis. Contributing to the empirically under-researched area of cultural policy, the combined approach offers a broader understanding of policy development and implementation than would a single perspective interpretation, and acknowledges the complexities of policy making and policy change. The institutional perspective shows that marketisation policy is layered on a previous Folkhem policy with an extended budget facilitating its introduction. An ideology perspective shows how the new growth scheme follows neoliberal ideas of the role of the state as facilitator of market growth in the arts. A values perspective, finally, shows that the economic values of the new cultural policy are not shared by the independent arts sector, but new policy instruments are accepted as they expand resources available for the sector.

Keywords

Arts cultural policy financial incentive local government marketisation values

In 2008 the city of Stockholm introduced a growth plan that included a financial incentive for the independent arts. Since the use of financial incentives is rare in the cultural sector, this decision provokes some fundamental questions. To begin with, why did the city choose such an extreme policy instrument? And further, how did the independent arts sector react and respond to this unorthodox move? As cultural policy helps shape programme development in independent arts organisations, understanding the rationale behind policy decisions and recognising the effect of these policies on the organisation itself are significant factors in evaluating the outcomes of any action. This article applies three perspectives – institutional historicism, ideology, and values analysis – to its consideration of Stockholm’s 2008 policy and its implementation process. Using a multi-leveled analytical approach supports increased understanding of this policy move and its consequences.

In order to be effective, policies need to accommodate a specific context and target group. Since the objective of the policy is to generate a change in the behaviour of the target group (Linder and Peters, 1989), any pattern for the policy instrument should be designed with the effectiveness of the policy in mind. This article investigates the consistency of the policy, the context, and the target group and develops its analysis empirically through the Stockholm case study.

Research on cultural policy is a small niche in policy studies and public administration, and its investigations mirror the size of the policy area itself (Scullion and García, 2005; Lindqvist, 2012). Therefore, specific conditions relating to this field call for additional research (Gray, 2009). Furthermore, while study of the increasing economisation of culture is abundant in the field of cultural policy research (Stevenson et al., 2010; Rius Ulldemolins and Rubio Arostegui, 2011), few reports of the direct use of financial incentives or growth strategies as policy tools are available. Qualifying the effectiveness of this kind of policy tool in the cultural field remains to be explored.

This article opens with a presentation of the three perspectives chosen for policy and policy change analysis: historical institutionalism, ideology, and values. Following this introduction, the second section includes a case study detailing the growth plan for the independent arts sector in Stockholm, and the third section covers interpretations of the Stockholm policy changes in line with the three perspectives applied. The article closes with a discussion of the study results, the conclusions drawn, and the possible questions remaining.

Approaches to policy analysis

An analysis of policy and policy change may employ various theoretical frameworks and perspectives (Gray, 2010). In this study, historical institutionalist (Nee, 2005; Peters et al., 2005; Immergut and Anderson, 2008), ideological (McGuigan, 2005), and value-focused approaches (Stewart, 2009) are used to consider Stockholm’s 2008 growth plan as a cultural policy tool.

From an institutionalist perspective, earlier policies form structures and processes in a policy area. In other words, policy design influences the evolution of institutions and societal structures. An institutional approach focuses on how structures influence the opportunities for political manoeuvring in specific situations in political processes rather than on the specific ideas or values of politics. While an institutionalist perspective focuses on structural dimensions, an ideological approach considers worldviews and linked models for problem solving through policy. An ideological perspective makes worldviews and dominant perceptions of policy absolutely clear, and this perspective can suggest answers to questions regarding motives and intentions in political processes and relationships in a way not open to the institutionalist approach (compare Hay and Wincott, 1998). Historical institutionalism emphasises the difficulties of implementing radical change in political systems and policy processes, while an ideological perspective draws attention to the reasons for wanting to implement radical policy change.

Value analysis is a third approach to policy study, and at the very outset, ideology and values in politics are tough to separate. Politicians refer to values in their communication, and values are central elements of ideology. Values can generally be described as what is desirable for individuals, groups, or societies, and effective public policies are designed according to the values to be achieved. Furthermore, actors who do not share ideology or worldview may still share values. Policy design and implementation are processes rife with decision-making situations in which values must be translated into action. From these actions and their outcomes, policy analysis can assess the level policy instruments actually achieve in terms of stated policy values and then evaluate the clarity of those values as expressed in the policy instrument. Such a study may also reveal inconsistencies between values manifested in the implementation of a policy instrument on one hand and intentions on the other. While sudden major policy change often sparks opposition, smaller policy changes over time can lead to significant value change without the accompanying resistance.

Links do exist between various perspectives on policy development and change. An emphasis on economic values is an element of neo-liberal ideology, for example, and this has marked policies in many countries in the past. In fact it would be expected that countries with similar policies would be structured in similar ways. While the historical institutionalist perspective explains why rapid change can be difficult in public policy, the ideological perspective allows an understanding of reasons for introducing policy changes at all. Finally, the values perspective uncovers reasons for behaviour not following ideological patterns.

Cultural policy reorientation in Sweden

Traditionally, cultural policy in Sweden has advocated for artists and arts organisations, and this support has been demonstrated in public grants distributed on the basis of artistic quality and adherence to policy objectives. This posits Sweden as adhering to the architect cultural policy model (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989; Kangas and Vestheim, 2010). In early cultural policy, the state and municipalities gave direct support to independent arts organisations as well as public arts institutions. This funding acknowledged that quality art would have difficulty surviving on ticket sales alone. Consequently, one of the objectives of Sweden’s first cultural policy was to counter the negative effects of commercialism (Proposition, 1974). Since the victory of a conservative government coalition in 2006, however, Swedish national cultural policy has been restructured, and this work continued through the second victory for the conservative coalition in 2010. The revised cultural policy grew out of an official investigation of how to renew national cultural policy (Kulturutredningen, 2009) and an ensuing cultural policy proposition that came out in 2009 (Proposition, 2009). These two documents challenged longstanding principles of Swedish cultural policy. Overviews of preceding cultural policies provide a background (Frenander, 2005; Harding, 2007) for these revisions.

The 2009 investigation identified ten areas where Swedish cultural policy should be revitalised. Among them were:

new cultural policy goals;

a new role for the state;

a broadened political arena for cultural matters, including cooperation between the cultural and other policy spheres;

a new strategy for support of artistic production; and

a renewal of the roles of authorities within the cultural area (Kulturutredningen, 2009: 16; author’s translation).

These and remaining areas were developed into concrete proposals appearing in the proposition published later that year. Two conflicting values had to be accommodated in the new policy design: the quality of culture and its freedom to develop independently versus the importance of creating productions that would appeal to audiences. The document described the cultural sector as being highly dependent on public support, and the cultural and arts sector was urged to reach out to other policy areas and become more entrepreneurial. Stakeholders were to take on new roles in relation to culture; for example, in terms of funding:

Through a shared economic responsibility between public and private donors and voluntary forces for culture, the possibilities for development and independence are reinforced. Private and voluntary initiatives have played and do play an important role in the emergence and distribution of cultural activities in our country. In many other countries, however, the proportion of sponsorship and voluntary resources to culture is significantly higher. It would be advantageous if the element of non-public funding increased in Sweden also; more cultural projects could then be realised, and the dependence of the cultural sector on political decisions would be reduced. How private funding of cultural activities could be increased therefore needs to be given additional attention. The various stakeholders of cultural life have much to win by engaging in increased cooperation regarding conditions and prerequisites for external funding (Proposition, 2009: 13; author’s translation).

And in terms of economic security for arts professionals:

The point of departure for the cultural policy of the government is that arts professionals should be able to make a living out of their artistic or cultural work and that dependence on the general safety systems thereby will be reduce. … Traditional forms of support and commissions to artists should be developed and combined with proactive strategies that strengthen the work market of artists. In this context, the cooperation between enterprise policy, economic and regional growth policy, and cultural policy is important to develop. The aim is to strengthen awareness of the potential of cultural and creative enterprises (Proposition, 2009: 24; author’s translation).

From 2009 onward, the government introduced a number of strategies designed to develop entrepreneurship in the independent arts and cultural sector (Regeringskansliet, 2009; Tillväxtverket; 2011). Commercialism was no longer something to counter with public means. In 2009 the proposition stated that ‘it [is] hardly relevant to indicate cultural activities undertaken on a commercial basis as essentially damaging or negative, and therefore as something to counteract. There is no predetermined dissonance between commercial sustainability and artistic quality or freedom’ (Proposition, 2009: 28; author’s translation).

A growth plan for the independent arts sector in Stockholm

The development of local cultural policy in Stockholm bore traces of the same globalisation seen in local and regional policies across Europe and the rest of Sweden (Johannisson, 2010; Andersen and Pierre, 2010). As the capital of Sweden, the city of Stockholm has a unique national position; it hosts the largest number of arts organisations in the country, independent and private as well as public (national, regional and local). The reorientation of local cultural policy in the city of Stockholm displayed substantial similarities to the policy on the national level, and this change of focus was discernible in the arguments for and design of a renewal plan for the independent arts sector in Stockholm. For the city of Stockholm, culture is central to its objective of achieving a world-class city status. In its overall management vision, Stockholm identifies several stakeholders such as businesses and tourists as actors who generate direct and indirect income for the city, rather than listing them only in the category of inhabitants ( Vision 2030 ). By seeking to attract the creative class as both investors in and inhabitants of the Swedish capital (Curman, 2008; Stockholm budget, 2009), the current local government aspired to play in the league of world leaders like Berlin and Barcelona. In 2007, a year after having achieved a coalition majority in the City Hall, the Executive Member for Culture and Property Management (kultur-och fastighetsborgarråd) and two coalition colleagues presented a draft for a new local cultural policy for Stockholm. Interestingly, this process had been initiated at roughly the same time as the national investigation (Kulturutredningen, 2009). The draft (Sjöstedt et al., 2007) typified the independent arts and cultural life of Stockholm as being made up of professionals having difficulties in earning an income, and as a culture reaching and engaging fewer citizens than desired. Based on this analysis, prioritised cultural policy objectives were formulated with the overall aim of supporting art and culture of high quality in Stockholm:

More professionals in the arts are to be independent and earn a living.

Culture is to reach more people.

Culture is to be more involved in society and not remain a separate sector.

These three aims echoed arguments for the renewal of the national cultural policy, one that promotes an art relevant to a larger part of society. The three problems and proposed policy objectives were not new; they had been addressed by the cultural policies of previous centre-left governments but in rather different ways.

The Culture Administration had the task of developing a plan to stimulate growth in the independent cultural sector (Sjöstedt et al., 2007). The project was targeted directly towards organisations within the independent arts sector eligible for “ordinary activities support” from the Culture Department. This “ordinary support” was based on artistic quality and audience orientation but was not permanent; over time criteria for receiving support were in a state of flux. The conditions for ordinary support stated that arts organisations should actively seek earned income and grants from other sources. Independent arts organisations in general and young people in Stockholm in particular did have additional support resources, ranging from fast money for smaller projects to larger cultural integration projects. The growth plan was introduced as a complement to already existing support sources. The proposed growth plan was accepted and implemented in 2008 as a tool for ‘reduced dependence on benefits and economic support’ (Stockholm budget, 2009: Inl1); it contained six elements (SK 2007-12-04; SK 2010-09-22):

a bonus system with the aim of stimulating the independent arts sector to increase its income;

a foundation for innovative arts and culture and for increased cooperation between the independent arts sector, business, and research;

support to the independent arts sector for export/import and EU project grants applications;

contracts regulating fees for exhibiting artists at exhibition galleries within the city of Stockholm;

a system of “live cheques” that function as performance remuneration for musicians; and

a marketing and ticket office for, and in cooperation with, the independent arts sector.

The plan combined infrastructural support with more direct stimuli for improving conditions for increased earned income to the independent arts sector. It expanded the culture budget targeted towards the independent arts sphere by SEK 11 million. In comparison, the Culture Department allocated around SEK 16 million annually for ordinary organisational support to independent art organisations, with the total budget of the department topping SEK 800 million (Stockholm budget, 2012).

The first element of the growth plan, the bonus or financial incentive, aimed to reward arts organisations showing high or increased levels of earned income and young audiences. The criteria were partly relative, in that they required an above-average level of earned income and an above-average proportion of young visitors, and partly absolute, in that they expected an increase in earned income and young audiences. Bonus payments also had their limits. In addition, the financial incentive tool did not require that arts organisations apply beforehand. The Culture Administration instead calculated increases and decreases in young audience numbers and earned income based on economic data reported by the organisations.

The second element of the growth plan, the fund for innovative culture, was designed to stimulate projects or activities at their early innovative stage. Projects undertaken by professionals in the field of art and culture that broke new ground artistically, initiated cooperation with for-profit organisations or research, or developed new processes qualified as innovative. The commission for fund development was put out for competitive bidding. The third and fourth elements of the plan included support to the independent arts sector for export/import and EU project grants applications, and for contracts regulating fees for exhibiting artists at exhibition galleries within the city of Stockholm. This third element of the growth plan related to established EU collaboration project support designed to stimulate international exchange and the marketing of Stockholm as an arts scene. The fourth component related to a demand from artists’ organisations to remunerate artists for the display of works at public arts institutions. Such an agreement had been reached on state level, and now the city of Stockholm wanted to reach a similar arrangement.

The fifth element was a live cheque – a system for musician remuneration. Organisers of small concerts could apply for a grant for musicians at the Culture Department. In this system, the hosting venue had to contribute 50 per cent of the total given musicians, and the amount granted by the city matched the contribution of the hosting venue. The application process involved supplying information on the quality of the music to be performed as well as details on the arrangement. The final element of the growth plan, a marketing and ticket office, was developed as an independent member-based organisation called Kulturdirekt, which opened a website and a physical desk for ticket sales to events of member organisations. The development of the structure for this activity was made in cooperation with the independent arts sector, which eventually formed an independent association that continued the work after October 2008.

Of the total resources earmarked for the entire growth plan, SEK 6 million was allocated to the bonus or financial incentive element (SK 2008-06-03). The other five elements of the growth plan shared the remaining 5 of a total of SEK 11 million. Evaluations in 2010 determined the growth proposal to be a partial success in that some elements were perceived as successful, and others as failures (Jacobson and Thelander, 2010; Johnsson and Hall, 2010; Olsson-Sundelin, 2010; Lindqvist, 2010). The bonus or financial incentive received the most negative response from the sector and the media (Hellekant, 2009; Kalmteg, 2010). Some organisations feared that the bonus system would lead to more commercialisation of the arts and called for more direct dialogue with the Culture Department or a resource centre for support in day-to-day work tasks relating to the two goals targeted by the policy instrument. The arts sector saw in an especially negative light the use of the term “bonus” and the assumption that economic incentives would motivate arts professionals.

Perspectives on the new cultural policy tool in Stockholm

An institutional perspective

To be sure, the rhetoric of cultural policy underwent radical reorientation in Stockholm, but the growth plan as a whole also contained several older cultural policy model elements. Among these was direct support for projects using an application procedure with criteria like artistic quality and audience orientation (Harding, 2007; Kangas and Vestheim, 2010). The bonus system was the only clearly neo-liberal element of the growth scheme; all the other components were instruments combining direct public support to cultural projects integrating marketing in their missions. In other words, with the new growth scheme, the arts organisations could pretty much do as they had been doing but with added support to develop marketing and audiences.

In the new millennium, Swedish cultural policy has been surprisingly unaffected by the dramatic changes in the international economic and political context (Frenander, 2007). From an institutionalist perspective, the neo-liberalising cultural policy of Stockholm and the national government was a result of path dependency, and its incoherence, a sign of the Folkhem model of cultural policy too institutionalised to successfully abandon overnight. This finding was in line with what others have noted about cultural policy in Sweden both locally and nationally, in that the consensus forming the cultural policy of the 1970s provided a formula for cultural policy difficult to relinquish until the late 2000s (Johannisson, 2010; Harding, 2007). What the conservative local coalition government in Stockholm effectively did was add a marketisation component to an existing cultural welfare policy and included additional funding. Beginning in 2010, the local government did reform other elements of local cultural policy for the independent sector. Except for the bonus, the growth plan as a policy instrument did not meet with great resistance, and one reason for the lack of opposition may be that the new plan came with additional resources and thus did not create competition for existing funds. These added funds could be interpreted as compensation for new marketisation demands; at any rate, it was a secure way to keep the sector content despite their increased market-oriented requirements (Christensen, 2011; Lundstedt, 2011). Later the independent arts sector and the media labelled as unfair changes in Stockholm’s cultural policy, especially the modification of criteria for “ordinary activity support” that reallocated existing funds (Brandel, 2011; Epstein, 2012).

The enduring architect cultural policy model in Sweden was based on broad political consensus over time, and according to institutional theory, the introduction of radical change in such an institutionalised structure is difficult. Stockholm’s newer cultural policy based on a marketisation rationale faced an institutional landscape structured according to older cultural policy. In such a context, the fact that the local government chose to piggyback the marketisation element on top of an earlier cultural policy rather than attempt a radical policy change is understandable. Even though the local government declared the arts to be a business sector, the independent arts sector in 2008 was a business sector in name only.

An ideological perspective

From an ideological perspective, making sense of new cultural policy development on both national and local levels requires an analysis of how the ideal society is perceived and by what means it can be achieved (Hinich and Munger, 1994; Grafton and Permaloff, 2005). Furthermore ideology develops and changes over time and can be analysed at several levels (Bevir, 2000, Moss and O’Loughlin, 2005).

Neo-liberal ideology assumes a subject acting on markets, a subject that is autonomous and strongly motivated to enterprise itself but one also existing in many versions and developing over time. From an economic point of view, neo-liberal doctrine sees markets as the most effective way to organise societal interaction, and the role of government is to help create balanced markets in all sectors of society (Lemke, 2001). In other words, the government should not intervene to counteract the negative effects of commercialism as the Swedish cultural policy objective in 1974 stated, but it should rather stimulate marketisation of the independent arts field. According to neo-liberal ideology, the market is not independently self-sustaining; it needs to be managed, and this necessitates government oversight even in a market-oriented cultural policy.

While direct support of the arts is an earmark of the traditional Swedish Folkhem approach to cultural policy, Stockholm’s growth plan instead dictated market solutions. The value of culture and the arts were acknowledged, but the value was based on the market as principle and not on values beyond the market. The epistemology of current cultural policy was economic; the problems seen in the cultural sector related to economics, and economic policies were seen as the remedy. Dominant notions in official documents were market, independence, and work, and the proposed policy aimed to “activate” cultural professionals and organisations to become self-supporting rather than dependent on public support. It also proposed that the problem of unequal cultural consumption be solved through marketing efforts and supply stimulus rather than through demand stimulus as it is in Folkhem cultural policy. Moreover, in order to make a difference outside the cultural area, the sector itself was asked to reach beyond its borders for collaboration. The responsibility for making a difference was placed on the cultural and arts sector, not on the sectors for which it should make a difference. Again, supply rather than demand stimulus was seen as the answer to the problem.

A values perspective

In the last decades, economic values have been introduced into policy areas where they have not been present before. This development, termed economisation of policy, is discernible within public policy and administration at large. Social science experts ascribe various meanings to this notion, but in general terms, the economisation of public policy has followed the trend of monetarism replacing Keynesianism in Western democracies since the 1970s (Peters et al., 2005). In economisation, economic ideas and theories gain increased influence and have an impact on policy and the political analysis of society. Economics has in fact become increasingly central in all policy areas as a result of diminishing national growth and ensuing demands on increased efficiency for Western countries since the 1970s (Garnham, 2005; Tummers et al., 2012). Sweden is far from alone in transforming its cultural policy in an environment where economic discourse and values have increasing importance (Jones and Wilks-Heeg, 2004; Hartley, 2005; Miller, 2009). Culture and the arts have in particular become buzzwords in regional and local development discourse (Strom, 2003; Paquette, 2008; EU, 2012).

The financial incentive element of the growth plan is a clear example of a policy instrument that expresses economic values. Financial incentives offer individuals, groups or organisations monetary or other rewards for achieving stipulated goals or actions. Behaviour, according to models of extrinsic motivation (Van Herpen et al., 2005; Heinrich and Marschke, 2010), can in this way be aligned with the priorities of management or policy makers (Burgess and Ratto, 2003; Le Grand, 2003; Hood and Dixon, 2010). In the arts sector, however, different types of values motivate achievement, and financial incentives are significantly non-existent. The non-profit sector is arguably more value-oriented than profit-oriented, and therefore non-financial motivational forces are assumed to be more important than financial ones for both employees and managers in this sector (Leete, 2000; Schepers et al., 2005; Borzaga and Tortia, 2006; compare Cook and Dixon, 2006). The repudiation of economic values in the arts, especially in the subsidised fine arts, has been pointed out in cultural sociology and cultural economics (Bourdieu, 1992; Abbing, 2002). The fact that arts and cultural organisations generally base their activities on a mix of public and private income sources (Froelich, 1999) further supports this premise. Several researchers report tensions between donors and non-profit organisations when donors require performance reporting and measurement (Rentschler and Potter, 1996; Evans, 2000; Campbell, 2002; Craik, 2005; Ostrander, 2007). Since the relationship between donor or supporter and non-profit organisations is generally based on shared values rather than on hierarchy, these tensions are apt to rise to the surface. Trust of course plays a central role in the legitimacy of non-profit organisations as well as political bodies (Davis et al., 1997; Benjamin, 2010). Newman (2007) especially cites managerialism in the civil sphere as reason for organisational pressures in voluntary sector organisations.

Value conflicts between actors in a field and values expressed through policy tools cause tensions in the organisations targeted by the policy and in various parts of the policy chain. Research has identified strategies through which organisations accommodate policy-values conflicts; among them are cycling, hybridisation and incrementalism (Thacher and Rein, 2004; Stewart, 2009). Cycling means that different values are attended to at different points in time, and it is a strategy that becomes apparent only over time. On the other hand, hybridisation describes a condition where two policies or practices based on conflicting values are active at the same time within a field or organisation. New policy may be implemented on top of another previous and still-valid policy or practice. Finally, incrementalism refers to the idea of introducing a policy based on conflicting values in smaller steps in an effort to avoid or reduce opposition.

Fairness or equity and equality of access are values commonly employed in public policy, and with the economisation trend, efficiency and growth have been added to the list of standards. In certain areas of public policy such as healthcare and culture, the values of quality and autonomy are also central. As a whole, this set of values provides a framework for the analysis and assessment of individual policies and policy instruments (Stewart, 2009). In this section, these six values will be discussed in relation to the growth plan and cultural policy of Stockholm. By way of this analysis, values respectively supported and contested by policy makers and the cultural field can be identified.

Fairness or equity is a core value of public policy, and most stakeholders endorse the concept. It means that a policy should not discriminate against any actor or produce any discriminating results. Fairness in Stockholm’s 2008 cultural policy was seen in its non-political approach to marketisation, for example. Political influence over support is lower in the stimulus of a market for independent arts organisations and their activities than in some other sectors. According to perception, an unfair element of the growth plan was the bonus because it gave differing opportunities to generate additional funds to individual arts organisations.

Equality of access has been a central element of Swedish cultural policy since the beginning, and recent national and local policies have stipulated that arts organisations make efforts to engage audiences not normally participating in publicly supported culture. What is striking in the Stockholm cultural policy however is that even though equality of access was stated as a central value, policies have only been developed for the supply side in terms of the independent arts sector. One remedy has been a wider distribution of culture. For example, in order to reach children during their organised daily activities and not just during their free time, live theatre productions have been performed at municipal schools. The 2008 policy reinterpreted this as an emphasis on incentives for addressing young audiences and in cooperation with other organisations. In terms of the growth plan, the active marketing of culture to certain markets insured equality of access. For one, the common ticket and marketing office jointly developed by independent arts organisations helped guarantee equality of access. And once again the market was seen as the underwriter of this value. This element is in contrast to earlier cultural policy in Sweden, which had stimulated a demand for culture by subsidising school purchases of productions appropriate for school children and also facilitating travel for complimentary theatre productions. For at least a year or two, other parts of cultural policy remained unaltered and complemented the growth plan.

Efficiency is an economic value that has become increasingly central to public policy, especially since monetary policies have replaced Keynesian policies. In spite of its increased importance, efficiency is relatively non-controversial; money has traditionally been scarce, and most actors are used to achieving a lot with a little. The hollowing-out effect of public allocations as a result of expected increases in efficiency and productivity has been debated, but this is more apt to happen in large public institutions than in the independent arts sector.

Growth is one of the values that clearly differentiates the most recent cultural policy and policy tool from previous cultural policies. Economic growth was added to social and cultural growth in the most recent cultural policy for Stockholm, and even though culture and the arts had traditionally been seen as fulfilling a social and cultural growth aim, the emphasis now was clearly stated and in detail. Marketisation again was key: public support was to establish a growing market for the arts, but the growth plan was directed only to the independent cultural sphere. Corresponding stimuli for businesses or organisations or young audiences were not introduced. The cultural policy asked the arts organisations to stimulate the growth demanded themselves, with the new growth strategy existing as a help to self-help.

Quality is one of the dimensions most discussed in the cultural and arts sector, and judgments of quality are springboards for individual and organisational advancement. In the Stockholm cultural policy proposition, quality was mentioned as one of the essential objectives of national cultural policy. And while quality also appears in the formal documents regarding the development of culture in Stockholm, the growth plan itself did not discuss quality. In addition, while qualifying for “ordinary activities support” – a requisite for participation in the bonus system – required an assessment of artistic quality and audience orientation, the growth plan did not stipulate or assess quality. The growth plan was only concerned with market-related data that recorded the activities of independent arts organisations: earned income and young audience numbers. Some independent arts organisations feared the negative commercial effects of the bonus system, arguing that including quality as a dimension of consumer market behaviour rather than defining it as an element of the product offered would stimulate an increasing number of lower-quality products attracting larger young audiences and more earned income. The growth plan was based on a rationale that quality is one of several factors informing consumer market decisions. Further, the professional arts sector was concerned with the formal quality of a product or production rather than perceived quality in a market transaction context. Even though the arts sector assumed that customers made the same assessments of quality that the producers of arts goods did, market logic only identifies perceived quality dimensions affecting market behaviour.

Autonomy is a value with many dimensions, and these features have both united and divided the government and the independent arts sphere. Autonomy is always relative, and cultural policy is a political system that affects cultural products and workers, much as the economy of society and individual households does (van Maanen, 2008; Vestheim, 2009). Autonomy of culture and the arts is a child of liberalism in Western political thought. With the emergence of liberal rule, capitalism became the guarantor of autonomy for other segments of society from influence by the state; this is the idea discernible in the recent neo-liberalising developments in European cultural policies. Although the local government in Stockholm saw the market as guarantor of autonomy of the arts and artists from undue political pressure, the arts professionals in the case study defined this marketisation as undue political interference; they saw the market as a regulating mechanism just a step away from autonomy (Oscarson, 2010). Autonomy for the arts sector then translated to autonomy from market forces and detailed political control. At the same time, autonomy for the government meant independence from public support and political interference and more direct interaction with audiences. Although Sweden’s traditional Folkhem cultural policy emphasised direct state intervention according to policy goals, it also stressed relative autonomy in relation to the market for artists and institutions in matters concerning artistic products. In this case, the autonomy of the government was a shift from one type of relative autonomy: that from the market to that from the state.

Conclusion and remaining questions

This study of the first years of the Stockholm growth plan shows that a neo-liberalising policy was layered onto existing cultural policy and that the new policy was based on economic values and emphasised market growth. Political adversaries and media and arts organisations contested this set of values, claiming that other standards were central for the cultural and arts field.

The application of historical institutionalism, and ideology and values perspectives to an analysis of Stockholm’s 2008 growth strategy reveals that inconsistencies discernible in neo-liberalising cultural policies were due to the well-established and only recently abandoned Swedish Folkhem model of cultural policy. This model makes radical structural changes difficult to implement in a short period of time. In addition, differing value systems held by actors in the arts and cultural sector and those in the government caused controversies over the new cultural policy and growth plan, while other values such as fairness and equality of access seemed to be shared across the two sectors. Clear instances of incrementalism and hybridisation showed up in the Stockholm plan; marketisation policy tools, for example, were piggybacked onto existing cultural policy although they were eventually changed in smaller stages.

A number of questions regarding the growth plan as a policy tool remain to be answered: has the 2008 cultural policy meant that artists are better off economically? Have new professional groups such as arts administrators, rather than core arts professionals, found new resources? If so, are these desirable outcomes? Under this cultural policy, has public spending on the arts decreased, increased, or remained the same? What would the alternative outcomes have been for the money spent? What are the implications of diminishing returns?

The most important outcome of Stockholm’s 2008 policy and growth strategy was the manifestation of cultural policy reform that included increased marketisation. In addition, the continuing redesign of local cultural policy in Stockholm points to even more marketisation as a guiding principle. How successful the policy will be in the long run remains to be seen.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank four anonymous reviewers of Public Policy and Administration for helpful comments on previous versions of the article.

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