Abstract
This article addresses committee scrutiny undertaken at the National Assembly for Wales during the third assembly (2007–2011). The analysis is addressed through a scrutiny framework that considers the substantive issues in terms of three overarching elements – selection, access to information and assistance, and evaluation. The framework is developed through scholarship about the UK House of Commons as well as a wide range of other parliaments and assemblies. This analysis is also used to identify features facilitating effectiveness and specify seven hypotheses concerning explanations for scrutiny characteristics. The analysis is then applied to the Welsh case study, which results from a substantive series of interviews with Assembly Members, witnesses and officials, as well as significant documentary analysis.
Keywords
The establishment of the Assembly in Wales and the Parliament in Scotland reflected substantially the successful culmination of campaigns that had emphasised the democratic deficit and weaknesses in governmental oversight (Rawlings, 2003; Mitchell, 2009). The institutional manifestation of devolution thus led to an intensification and decentralisation of oversight by politicians, for example increasing volumes of written and oral questions to ministers (Cole, 2006) and the augmentation of the Scottish and Welsh Affairs select committees, with a plethora of similar committees in the devolved institutions.
In this article, these trends are considered through an evaluation of departmental committees and the Finance Committee operational during the third National Assembly for Wales (NAfW). In considering the NAfW, this analysis also thus addresses committee scrutiny in the context of on-going institutional change that was specifically the outcome of an initial constitutional settlement that has been widely regarded as flawed and quite dysfunctional (Rawlings, 2003; McAllister and Stirbu, 2007).
This analysis is undertaken through the theme of scrutiny and its deconstruction into three elements – selection, access to information and assistance, and evaluation. This framework is also deployed to identify characteristics conducive to effective scrutiny. In addition, analysis of the scholarly literature is used to develop seven hypotheses to explain the characteristics of such committee scrutiny, which are subsequently applied to the Welsh case study.
This article draws both on comparative scholarship (see, for example, Strom, 1998) and a wide range of country-specific studies. In undertaking a Welsh case study, the analysis also reflects the dearth of significant literature about the operation of NAfW committee scrutiny (for an exception, see McAllister and Stirbu, 2007) or substantial assessments of the NAfW’s broad scrutiny activities during this timeframe. Some studies (see, for example, Monk, 2010) have considered the overall impact of the committee scrutiny process. In view, however, of core evaluative problems concerning issues such as variations in the magnitude of recommendations and difficulties specifying causes and effects, this article eschews such matters. In summary, the article has two overarching objectives: to enhance scholarship about the operation of Welsh devolution and to develop approaches, especially in relation to explanations, that could be applied more widely.
Committee scrutiny
Scholarly work on the UK parliament has long incorporated the functions of such committees within a broad scrutiny framework (Morris, 1970; McKay and Johnson, 2010). Furthermore, in the last decade “scrutiny” has been deployed to address the operation of similar local authority committees (Ashworth and Snape, 2004) and several committees at the National Assembly for Wales (McAllister and Stirbu, 2007).
This concept of committee scrutiny has, therefore, been used by academics and a wide range of other commentators to consider and discuss the functions of committees of elected politicians in overseeing, evaluating and holding accountable elected politicians with executive roles, a diversity of public sector officials and board members and, less frequently, employees or board members from the private or third sectors. Taking wider UK practice as the benchmark, the concept used in this article also assumes an ingrained bi-partisanship grounded on evidence-based working and, thus, a substantive diminution of party political conflict and competition.
While such scrutiny does allow for expressions of political partisanship, for example in the cross-examination of ministers and restricting the scope of committee agendas, the core issue is that much of the process has an atmosphere quite distinctive from the standard political debate. Such an atmosphere is also identifiable in a wide range of other parliaments and assemblies, although some adopt a more partisan tone. Thus while the grounding of this notion of committee scrutiny in an evidence-based bi-partisan style of working was observed, contrasts were also noted. The degree, therefore, that such bi-partisanship pervaded the process was a notable theme for this study. Furthermore, this overarching bi-partisan atmosphere does not, however, cover “committee stage” line-by-line scrutiny of legislation, which usually reflects a culture of ritualistic presentation of opposing agendas rather than genuine attempts to achieve bi-partisan outcomes.
Selection
One core theme is the extent to which parliaments and assemblies have the committee infrastructure and political culture to ensure a continuing and significant stream of such scrutiny. In the UK House of Commons (UK HoC), the establishment in 1979 of a “permanent” structure of select committees produced mechanisms for the ‘systematic inquiry into the full range of Government activity’ (Newton, 2001: 29). This structure generated a substantial volume of evidence, reports and recommendations, albeit with notable coverage weaknesses, for example concerning public expenditure (Ryle, 1997) and legislation (Newton, 2001). Similarly, UK HoC select committees have been constrained by political partisanship, which has usually driven agendas towards issues of relatively low political controversy (Robinson, 1985). This restraint has been generated through an evidence-led orientation and assumptions that committee inquiries require the development of a substantive degree of bi-partisanship amongst members from different political parties (see Rogers and Walters, 2004).
Such themes have been echoed concerning committee scrutiny elsewhere; for example, Barnhart (1999) observed wide variations in the scale of the committee infrastructure across Commonwealth legislatures. Similarly, in addressing a wide-ranging comparative context, Strom (1998: 30) noted that ‘the number of committees matters’, while Smith (1980) argued that increasing the number of committees diminishes executive power.
There were also important selection issues concerning who shaped the agenda. Overall, scholarship about the UK HoC (Norton, 2005) has found that the committees determined their own agendas. Such discretion was not, however, universal; for example Bal Shekar (2003) noted that such committees in Australia required the agreement of the House or the minister in order to initiate inquiries. Scholarship has also specified legislative scrutiny requirements as a core constraint on the ability of committees to determine their agendas (Anderton, 1999). Specific institutional committee configurations mean, however, that this latter restriction did not apply to the UK HoC or the third NAfW.
Selection also concerned the choice of committee members, the core aspect being the influence of party managers and implications for the independence of the scrutineers. At the UK HoC, this theme has been of some significance. In particular, it has been suggested that Members of Parliament (MPs) have been prevented from joining, or removed from, select committees through having too independent a spirit and willingness to oppose leadership positions (Judge, 1992; HC 300, 2000). However, in spring 2010, this position was transformed through the institution of secret-ballot elections for chairs and committee members. Similar themes have emerged in relation to other parliaments and assemblies, for example Kesavan (2003: 46) concluded that committee membership in Japan’s Diet resulted from decisions made ‘by a small number of party bosses’. Similarly, Strom (1998: 41) commented that even where chairs were formally elected by the whole parliament or assembly, those decisions usually just reflected decisions reached through the party machines.
Access to information and assistance
This aspect concerns the availability of oral and written evidence and research assistance. In relation to the acquisition of evidence, at the UK HoC this objective has been promoted through powers of compulsion to oblige individuals based within the UK to provide oral or written evidence (Rogers and Walters, 2004). Although these subpoena powers don’t cover ministers or civil servants, a political culture grounded on the risk of ‘parliamentary opprobrium’ (Norton, 2005: 120) for ministerial refusals has minimised such difficulties, while civil servants have a duty to assist select committees. There have, however, been a few disputes about access to official documents (Judge, 1992) and ministerial refusals to allow specific officials to testify (George et al., 2005). In addition, there have also been some arguments about the appearance of ministers, for example with Gordon Brown concerning an inquiry on public–private partnership for the Tube (Maer and Sandford, 2004). Similar issues have echoed amongst wider scholarship; for example, Giri (2005) and White (1989) identified significant powers to summon evidence held by committees of the Indian parliament and the Ontario legislature, respectively.
In relation to assistance, at the UK HoC scholarship about the availability of parliamentary staff to undertake research support has generated criticism in terms of the modest scale (Newton, 2001), although the creation in 2002 of a scrutiny unit staffed by specialists with expertise in areas like law, finance and economics has notably enhanced assistance (Long and Sandford, 2012). Problems concerning adequate support for such committees across the Commonwealth were noted by Barnhart (1999). In contrast, Piccirilli and Zuddas (2012) found significant assistance for pre-legislative scrutiny in Italy.
Evaluation
In terms of the core evaluative element of the process, three key aspects can be identified. First, the skills-expertise of committee members can be specified, for example, concerning criticism of the quality of questioning at the UK HoC (Jogerst, 1993). Similar deficiencies have been observed concerning other parliaments and assemblies, for example, the Czech Republic (Mansfeldova, 2011). This issue has also been associated with multiple-committee assignments and the workload of elected politicians. For example, Strom (1998: 37) noted that some parliaments limited multiple committee memberships, an agenda that could be justified because multiple assignments have often adversely impacted on ‘specialisation which facilitates influence’. Similarly, Docherty (2005) identified negative impacts, arising from the workload of elected politicians, on the operation of Canadian committees.
Second, the extent to which evaluation was associated with much diminished partisanship and stress on generating outputs based on evidence from their submissions. This approach has been recognised in relation to the UK HoC (Jogerst, 1993). Similar assumptions about committee bi-partisanship have been identified elsewhere, for example concerning Ghana (Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2012) and New South Wales (Clune and Griffith, 2006). In contrast, more partisan committee atmospheres have been observed, for example, in Singapore (Meng, 1999). This aspect can also be clearly associated with the absence of direct interventions from the party machines in the committees’ evaluative process, a theme that has been recurrent, for example, in scholarship about the UK HoC 1 (Drewry, 1985; Rogers and Walters, 2004). Committee bi-partisanship can also be associated with variations in the partisanship of deliberations generally in the parliament or assembly (Goodsell, 1988; Lazardeux, 2009). This issue suggests, therefore, potential research agendas in terms of the impact of the wider political atmosphere on committee scrutiny.
Third, the scale of the outputs arising from the evaluative process can be identified, a theme that has echoed, for example, concerning a significant quantity of outputs at the UK HoC (Drewry, 1985; Norton, 2005) and India (Giri, 2005). In contrast, the small quantity of non-legislative reports from the Italian committees was mentioned by D’Onofrio (1979).
Effectiveness
Through this analysis, a range of characteristics potentially conducive to effective committee scrutiny can be specified. The effectiveness of the selection phase might be explained in terms of the existence of a large-enough committee infrastructure; limited interference in appointments by the party whips; committees having autonomy over the specification of their agendas; and the selection of agendas amenable to bi-partisan compromise. In terms of access to information and assistance, effectiveness could be associated with strong powers and the politico-administrative norms-culture to obtain relevant evidence of sufficient quality. Similarly, the availability of substantive research support can also be identified as conducive to effectiveness. Effective evaluation can be connected with having committee members with good scrutiny skills, the absence of external interference in the deliberative process; the production of a substantive amount of publicly available reports; and the development of outputs constructed on a clear evidence base.
Hypotheses for the characteristics of committee scrutiny
This summary of scholarship about such committees elsewhere, combined with the context of Welsh devolution, supplies the background for the development of seven hypotheses of committee scrutiny, which are subsequently applied to the Welsh case study. The first three are derived from the idea that the nature of the overarching constitutional/institutional settlement affects committee scrutiny.
First, it is postulated that committee characteristics reflect the importance of concern about an accountability–democratic deficit to the initial and perhaps on-going process of constitutional and institutional change (Kay, 2003; Falleti, 2005). This hypothesis, in particular, reflects devolutionary processes in Wales and the centrality of accountability issues to the roles of such committees (Cole, 2006; McKay and Johnson, 2010).
Second, it is suggested that committee scrutiny reflects attitudes towards the scope of powers, functions and responsibilities an assembly or parliament should possess. This hypothesis relates to the context of Welsh devolutionary processes as well as core committee scrutiny themes – for example, workloads of politicians and the legislative burden. This emphasis on connections with the processes of devolution suggests a third hypothesis in terms of committee scrutiny reflecting the contemporary trajectory of change and development of the institutional and constitutional arrangements.
Fourth, a hypothesis is postulated in terms of committee scrutiny as a by-product of inheritance through widespread expectations of similar committee scrutiny in parliaments and assemblies. This can be specified concerning practice in a wide range of democracies (Barnhart, 1999; Kesavan, 2003; Giri, 2005) and, in the Welsh context, specifically the practice of the UK HoC departmental select committees (Rogers and Walters, 2004; Norton, 2005).
Fifth, it is hypothesised that the number of elected politicians affects the characteristics of committee scrutiny. This theme reflects scholarship on parliaments and assemblies (Stone, 1998) and has a potential impact through factors like committee support and the workloads of politicians. Sixth, it is suggested that the nature of civil society impacts on committee scrutiny, a hypothesis arising from the core function of external witnesses in the process (Drewry, 1985; Maer and Sandford, 2004).
The final hypothesis relates to the impact of the overarching political atmosphere on committee scrutiny, specifically the intensity of wider political partisanship in the relevant parliament or assembly. The core assumption is that the intensity of the wider political battle might spill over, to some extent, into committee deliberations. Observations about variations in bi-partisanship on committees thus could, in part at least, be explained through ingrained behaviours in the wider political arena.
Methodology
The methodological approach reflects an implicitly positivist set of assumptions ‘that it is possible to know the world through experience and observation’ (Stoker, 1995: 14). Furthermore, the use of scholarship about the operation of specific committee systems to develop hypotheses, and the NAfW evaluation, suggests a central inductive orientation whereby findings are derived through ‘empirical observation and the search for patterns and generalisations’ (Stoker, 1995: 14). However, elements of the reasoning used to devise the hypotheses, in particular in terms of the use of institutional–constitutional–devolutionary processes, suggest also a deductive element through which conclusions are derived ‘from first principles’ (Stoker, 1995: 14).
The main emphasis on departmental-related committees reflects their central position in the scrutiny configuration at the third NAfW (McAllister and Stirbu, 2007), the UK HoC (Rogers and Walters 2004) and elsewhere (Kesavan, 2003). The incorporation of the Finance Committee reflected its status at the third NAfW and its role in undertaking the type of departmental scrutiny that at, for example, the UK HoC would be performed through departmental committees. For ease of expression, in this article the Finance Committee is, therefore, incorporated within the concept of scrutiny, although at the third NAfW that committee was classified as an “other” not a “scrutiny” committee. Evidence is also drawn from a wider range of committees when this main sample is too restrictive or lacks relevance to a specific scrutiny issue. Despite its importance, the article does not focus on the Audit/Public Accounts Committee because the distinctive emphasis and support raise a range of highly specific matters.
There are two distinct sources. First, findings were acquired from a series of semi-structured interviews undertaken with Assembly Members (AMs), witnesses and assembly officials in 2009 and 2010. This programme incorporated interviews with twelve AMs, 2 four committee witnesses and two assembly officials. Discussions with the AMs covered agendas, assistance, organisational constraints, experience with specific witnesses, political constraints, powers, appointment procedures and skills of committee members. Witnesses were asked about the context of their appearance(s) and to evaluate the process. The two officials were questioned about the nature of the agendas, assistance, organisational constraints, experience with specific witnesses and the skills of the committee members. This conversation avoided, however, politically sensitive questions, given the political neutrality of the interviewees. The interviews were 30 to 45 minutes in duration. In addition, the study also draws on evidence from four interviews conducted with AMs 3 in summer 2012, which were also 30 to 45 minutes in length and covered many similar issues.
Second, evidence has been obtained from committee minutes, transcripts and reports. In general, the statistical data is drawn from May 2009 to May 2010, selected to cover contemporary evidence whilst avoiding any atypical characteristics associated with the run-in to the 2011 elections. The May start reflected the electoral cycle and when each assembly commences its business. A longer timeframe was used for some data to generate a sufficient volume of findings.
Assembly committees
The third NAfW possessed four main departmental-scrutiny committees (Communities and Culture; Enterprise and Learning; Health, Wellbeing and Local Government; and Sustainability) of nine AMs, with a core focus on specific departments but also incorporating cross-cutting themes such as public service delivery or social enterprise. There was also a Rural Development sub-committee of four AMs, 4 seven other non-legislative committees with significant scrutiny functions, and a Business Committee. In particular, a Finance Committee had a crucial role in scrutinising the budget and the NAfW possessed an Audit/Public Accounts Committee, with a similar remit to its Westminster equivalent. There were also five legislation committees, which took all the clause-by-clause committee stage debates on legislative items and much of the legislative evidence sessions.
Scrutiny in the Assembly occurred within an overarching political atmosphere that was consensual by UK standards; for example, Melding (2003: 82) emphasised how proceedings reflected, in part, ‘the art of conversation and allows parties to agree when they agree’. During 2007 to 2011, scrutiny also operated within the context of the One Wales coalition government between Labour and Plaid, which meant that over two-thirds of AMs represented governing parties.
Selection
Overall, the institutional infrastructure and political–administrative atmosphere at the NAfW generated a quite substantive range of activity. For example, in 2009–2010 the six scrutiny committees published reports about 43 inquiries. There was some commitment to financial scrutiny; for example the Finance Committee generated 14 reports in 2009–2010. In addition, the departmental-scrutiny committees evaluated the relevant draft governmental budgets; in 2009–2010 each of them devoted one or two sessions in the autumn to budgetary evidence. However, the focus of departmental-scrutiny committees on financial issues was limited. For example, only 18 reports published by those five committees during the third assembly had any significant financial orientation. These findings, in terms of overall scale and limited financial scrutiny, suggest, therefore, similarities with the UK HoC (Ryle, 1997).
The scrutiny committees also occasionally undertook evidence sessions on legislation. For example, from May 2008 to April 2010 two of these committees staged a combined total of 14 such sessions to scrutinise three UK bills with implications for Wales, and one legislative competence order. 5 The main thrust of legislative scrutiny was, however, undertaken by the legislation committees, which held evidence sessions to scrutinise all draft primary legislation (assembly measures) and legislative competence orders.
The committees also had a wide discretion to select their own agendas, although such freedom was constrained by some specified obligations; for example the departmental-scrutiny committees had to consider the relevant budget. But overall, as one AM commented, ‘we are pretty free to pick what we want’. Similarly, a Conservative AM commented that ‘there has never been pressure from my party about what we looked at’ and that all committee members ‘were free to give our views and make recommendations about the agenda’. This finding suggests similarities with the UK HoC (Norton, 2005) and also could be interpreted as reinforcing conclusions from elsewhere about the deliberative freedom arising from having separate committees to address legislation (see Anderton, 1999).
Agendas reflected the tendency to select topics of modest political controversy amenable to an evidence-based process and compromise amongst political opponents, again suggesting similarities with the UK HoC (Robinson, 1985; Rogers and Walters, 2004). For example, during the third assembly inquiries were held on topics such as the economic contribution of higher education, community mental health, biodiversity, allotment provision, manufacturing strategy, the role of school governors, the accessibility of arts and cultural activities, major sporting events, domestic abuse and funding of voluntary sector organisations.
The appointment of committee members and chairs reflected a traditional political patronage process controlled through the whips and bargaining amongst the party machines (Judge, 1992; Kesavan, 2003), in which the input of most AMs was restricted substantially to expressions of personal preferences. These discussions occurred, however, within a framework of constraints; for example, there were requirements to maintain a political balance on each committee and with regard to chairs. In addition, the small number of AMs, and thus prospective appointees, meant, as an AM recalled, that the whips had ‘limited room for manoeuvre with specific appointments’. In any case, some appointments were linked to the possession of spokesperson positions. For example, a Conservative AM commented that many appointments involving members of his party group were ‘linked to party portfolios’. Removing those AMs thus would necessitate a significant reshuffle of responsibilities. Overall, the party machines focused on attempting ‘to persuade or cajole busy members onto committees’ rather than issuing ‘threats about removing patronage’ (AM). This process was summarised by one Labour AM, who observed: ‘[when] I left the front bench, I just told the chief whip what interested me’ – he was subsequently appointed to those committees.
Access to information and assistance
There were clear similarities with UK HoC select committee powers (Rogers and Walters, 2004) to summon evidence; for example, neither scrutiny nor select committees had powers to subpoena ministers or civil servants. Initially, however, assembly committees’ powers were also restricted to current members and employees of specified organisations (GWA, 1998: 5.74). This position changed through the 2006 Government of Wales Act (GWA), which gave committees powers to summon ‘any person’ to attend proceedings and/or supply documentary evidence about devolved matters. However, as well as the restriction concerning ministers and civil servants, there were additional exceptions. For example, as McAllister and Stirbu (2007: 295) commented, ‘current or former AMs or secondees of the Welsh Assembly government need not comply with the requirement to give evidence but can send another person in their place’.
Overall, as one AM observed, most witnesses were, however, ‘very co-operative and appreciative of having the opportunity to say what they want to say’, although there had been problems concerning refusals to give oral or written submissions from experts and organisations located in civil society, originating in capacity limitations. This issue was specified by a committee chair, who noted that ‘the only times when we have been let down by organisations… (not supplying witnesses)… are linked to capacity’.
Acute capacity pressures were identified concerning the Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA). For example, between September 2008 and July 2010 WLGA employees appeared as witnesses before 10 assembly committees on 31 occasions. Furthermore, it was noted by a WLGA interviewee ‘that in many instances the topic of the inquiry is outside what we would do in our day-to-day work’ and that the burden of supplying evidence for assembly inquiries ‘amounted to two or three full-time posts’. These pressures occasionally led the WLGA to decline to participate in inquiries – a WLGA witness recalled that requests to assist an inquiry about domestic abuse were rejected because the topic was ‘outside the standard remit of our work’.
As in the UK HoC (Norton, 2005), clashes with ministers over attendance were rare; one exception related to the Deputy First Minister, who cited other commitments in an attempt to avoid attending a Finance Committee session on transport. Overall, ministerial appearances were a regular feature of committee sessions; in 2009–2010 there was a combined total of 123 appearances by cabinet ministers before the six scrutiny committees – an average of 20.5 appearances in front of each committee, although across the same timeframe deputy ministers addressed these committees on only three occasions. In addition, scrutiny of departmental officials was not particularly frequent. In 2009–2010, the NAfW scrutiny committees each held an average of approximately eight sessions 6 involving departmental witnesses and only six public servants appeared on more than three occasions.
In relation to assistance, while the quality of the clerking and research back-up was acknowledged to be high, the scale of this support was modest. Scrutiny committees were assigned two clerks and a support officer, and could draw on expertise from several small teams based in the research office and the resources of the library. 7 In addition, many AMs were reluctant to hire external expert advisors; for example Labour and Plaid AMs combined to block the appointment of a special advisor to assist with a Finance Committee report on transport. As one AM observed, the ‘Labour and Plaid members were uncomfortable with the idea’. He/she commented that amongst many AMs there was ‘cultural resistance’ to the notion that these committees required external research support. The technical nature of some inquiries meant, however, that the Sustainability Committee was more inclined to hire expert advice and in the third assembly appointed external advisors to assist with inquiries about carbon reduction, the marine bill and planning (Sustainability Committee, 2011: 7). These findings suggested some parallels with support weaknesses at the UK HoC (Newton, 2001) and elsewhere (Barnhart, 1999). Furthermore, in comparison to the UK HoC at least (McKay and Johnson, 2010) such support was provided on a significantly diminished scale.
Evaluation
The small scale of the NAfW 8 and the quite extensive committee structure meant that the committee workload strained opposition and backbench Labour and Plaid AMs. Thirteen opposition and backbench AMs served on four or more committees. These capacity issues were particularly acute in relation to backbench Labour and Liberal Democrat AMs, who sat on an average of three and four committees, respectively. 9 As one Liberal Democrat member commented, many AMs were ‘working to capacity’. Furthermore, as an AM observed, the scale of the committee infrastructure and the small number of AMs generated ‘timetable clashes with other committees, so some members have to choose which committees to attend’. Similarly, another AM noted that timetable pressures in the third Assembly meant that ‘it was now difficult to take committee members out of Cardiff … . they would miss too many other things’. Such workload themes echoed findings about some other parliaments and assemblies (see Strom, 1998; Docherty, 2005), although not the UK HoC (Rogers and Walters, 2004).
Multiple committee assignments were also interpreted as weakening the capacity of AMs to scrutinise effectively because the associated workload increased the difficulty of developing any significant level of subject expertise, findings that also reflected scholarship about other institutions (Strom, 1998). For example, one AM commented: ‘I simply have too much to do to study these subjects in depth’, while a colleague observed that they were ‘too busy to develop any genuine specialism’.
Such skill deficiencies were obvious in relation to some of the more technical inquiries. For example, Finance Committee members struggled with private finance initiative (PFI) intricacies, while a prominent AM admitted deficient financial skills and that he/she was, therefore, ‘nervous at looking at the budget next year’. Similarly, another politician noted that AMs were ‘very reliant on committee support a lot of the time’ and ‘just read the briefing and the suggested questions given to them’. One AM claimed that, mostly, committee members operated ‘at the level of a well-informed member of the public’. Indeed, an expert witness, who gave evidence concerning PFI, argued those that AMs were ‘too fundamentally ill-informed to formulate a worthwhile question’ and that one AM carried ‘so much political baggage that you couldn’t have a sensible conversation with him’. Similarly, another PFI witness observed that their ‘report didn’t show any signs that they had understood my evidence’ and attributed comments to him that clearly had been derived ‘from the internet’ not transcripts of the committee session.
The committees also exhibited much diminished partisanship, even in relation to the relatively consensual atmosphere at the NAfW, albeit within the context of agendas being restricted, in general, to the less controversial end of the spectrum. For example, a committee chair recalled how ‘a politically aligned question’ designed to promote Labour policy ‘didn’t see the light of day’. Furthermore, he characterised this committee’s approach as ‘very much across political boundaries’ and noted that the party whip didn’t have any role in ‘our deliberations’. These findings thus matched evidence from the UK HoC and elsewhere (Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2012), although there were variations (Meng, 1999).
This broad approach was reflected, for example, through the Enterprise and Learning Committee, which had ‘a very independent ethos’ and ‘a clear evidence-based strategy’ (AM). Similarly, a Conservative AM observed that ‘my party doesn’t tell me what I should be doing on this committee’. Overall, as another politician commented, ‘an overwhelming majority of AMs sought a genuine scrutiny role and were prepared to transcend party allegiances’.
However, a few committee members had a much greater focus on the party political context of committee deliberations. For example, one AM noted that his/her scrutiny committee had a couple of government backbenchers who saw ‘defending government policy’ as the core part of their committee role. However, such individuals had a quite marginal effect on the overall atmosphere. In relation to the above example, the impact of those two AMs was marginalised by the chair and another three Labour and Plaid AMs, who were prepared to criticise and even embarrass ministers. This atmosphere was strengthened by three opposition members with bi-partisan and evidence-centric inclinations to ‘engage in constructive criticism of the government’ (AM). These findings, therefore, reflect comments made by Jones et al. (2009: 7.13) that these committees were characterised by ‘considerable consensus and cross-party collaboration’. This practice was not, however, universal, for example one AM commented that the chair of one major committee was ‘too combative, an insufficient consensus builder’ and caused ‘angst’ in other committee members. Nevertheless, overall those with experience of committee scrutiny at the UK HoC and NAfW acknowledged ‘an enhanced evidence-led and co-operative atmosphere’ (committee witness) in Wales.
Committee scrutiny at the Assembly was associated with a substantive range of publications. For example, 43 reports were produced by the six committees in 2009–2010 (see above), an output scale reflective of the approach of the UK HoC (Drewry, 1985). Furthermore, during the third assembly, two scrutiny committees produced follow-up reports to assess the implementation of recommendations and agendas. The Sustainability Committee published five reports about carbon capture, while the Enterprise and Learning Committee compiled follow-up reports about school funding and support for dyslexia as well as three interim reports – concerning, for example, the economic contribution of higher education.
Effectiveness
In relation to selection, these findings imply characteristics conducive to effective scrutiny in terms of the substantial scale of the committee infrastructure, the volume of inquiries, the substantive committee autonomy over their agendas and the avoidance of topics likely to divide the committees along party lines. However, weaknesses were identified in terms of the scale of financial scrutiny, while the patronage-based appointments system could be interpreted as a constraint on effectiveness, albeit much restricted through the limited number of AMs.
In terms of access to information and assistance, this analysis suggests effectiveness weaknesses in terms of powers to summon witnesses and perhaps the frequency of scrutiny of public officials. In contrast, a politico-administrative atmosphere relatively conducive to supporting scrutiny in practice minimised conflicts over evidence between government and committees, while ministerial scrutiny was regular and non-governmental witnesses were, in general, co-operative and willing to attend. There was, however, evidence to suggest that civil society sometimes struggled to supply evidence, thus perhaps weakening effectiveness. Furthermore, effectiveness was also potentially constrained through the limited scale of internal research back-up and limited enthusiasm for hiring external expertise.
In terms of evaluation, factors constraining effectiveness could be specified through multiple committee assignments and clear deficiencies in the scrutiny skills of many AMs. However, the substantive scale of the outputs, the bi-partisan evidence-based atmosphere and the independence of the process from the party machines suggested features conducive to effectiveness.
Hypotheses of committee scrutiny: Relevance to Wales
In this section, the findings are used to address the seven hypotheses outlined earlier and thus to generate explanations for the characteristics of committee scrutiny in Wales.
The first hypothesis, about the impact of criticism of an accountability-democratic deficit on institutional and constitutional processes, which was a crucial factor in the 1990s' debates about Welsh devolution (CM 3718, 1997; Cole, 2006), can be identified as reflective of several NAfW committee scrutiny themes. These include the substantive volume of inquiries and reports, the frequency of ministerial attendance and the existence of separate legislation committees, thus ensuring that legislative scrutiny obligations did not crowd-out the wider scrutiny function. 10
The second hypothesis, that the characteristics of committee scrutiny can be explained in terms of attitudes towards the scope of powers, functions and responsibilities an assembly or parliament possessed, could be addressed through the quite subdued intensity of devolutionary processes in Wales. This effect has been expressed through initially limited public enthusiasm for devolution – for example in the narrow result of the 1997 referendum – and the establishment of an assembly still without tax-raising powers and lacking full, primary legislative powers until 2011 (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012). This context meant negligible quantities of legislation, 11 thus enabling AMs to focus on wider forms of scrutiny.
The third hypothesis, relating committee scrutiny to the contemporary staging-post of the devolved settlement, could also be seen as reflected in the restrictive legislative scale, arising from the absence of full, primary legislative powers until the fourth assembly, and consequent strong emphasis on non-legislative scrutiny. The hypothesis was enhanced through considering the impact of the contemporary institutional and constitutional position on civil society. The lack of a substantive legislative programme allowed certain core civil society organisations, such as the WLGA, to sustain their scale of support for committee scrutiny. This effect was mentioned by a senior manager from a leading civil society organisation, who commented: If and when the assembly acquires greater legislative powers we will have to re-direct resources to influencing the Welsh government and I don’t see how, as a small organisation, we will be able to continue the current level of effective research support to committees.
The fourth hypothesis, which emphasises the significance of institutional inheritance, could be validated in terms of characteristics like capacity to obtain evidence, the departmental-scrutiny model and autonomy over agendas. The fifth hypothesis, about the impact of the quantity of elected politicians, can be identified as explanatory of committee scrutiny in terms of factors like modest support, diminished patronage powers, timetabling difficulties and the heavy workloads of the AMs, a factor which is associated with diminished specialist expertise.
This case study also supports the sixth hypothesis, that committee scrutiny reflects the nature of civil society, through scholarship about the impact of its relatively small scale and access to modest resources. In addition, this analysis of the NAfW also illustrates the significance of the seventh hypothesis, which explained committee scrutiny through the prevalence or otherwise of bi-partisanship in the institution. This study of Wales implies, therefore, that an overarching ethos of bi-partisanship (Melding, 2003; Jones et al., 2009) facilitates committee scrutiny, through the presence of a diminished difference between the frequent evidence-led focus of much committee scrutiny and behaviour of the same politicians in other aspects of their job. This atmosphere can, for example, be specified through reluctance of many opposition members to oppose for its own sake, and the converse willingness to publicly support government initiatives rather than exaggerate and create artificial policy differences as an element of partisan conflict. Furthermore, it could be identified through the coalition between Labour and Plaid which, of course, required the two largest parties to co-operate. This arrangement also highlighted the substantive ideological agreement 12 amongst these two centre–left parties rather than their traditional rivalry that, particularly at grassroots levels, often had characteristics of heightened intensity of competition amongst a substantively similar electorate (McAllister, 2001).
This bi-partisanship could also be associated with the intimacy derived from scale factors and the fact that politicians of rival parties, in general, knew each other better than in larger institutions. As one prominent AM observed, ‘this place is so small that everyone knows everyone else’. In addition, this political ethos could be interpreted as a lingering effect from the initial devolution campaign and subsequent shared objective to embed the new institution permanently within Welsh governance. During the third assembly, most of those in leadership positions had first been elected in 1999 (Shipton, 2011) and many had been active campaigners for Welsh devolution for much longer (Morgan and Mungham, 2000).
Conclusion
This article has addressed the theme of committee scrutiny through an analysis of existing scholarship, the identification of features conducive to effectiveness and the construction of seven hypotheses about factors explaining its characteristics in specific parliaments and assemblies. These themes have then been used to develop understanding about committee scrutiny in the third National Assembly for Wales, using documentary evidence and findings from a series of interviews with AMs, committee witnesses and assembly officials.
The core assessment of committee scrutiny at the Assembly conceptualises the process in terms of three phases – selection, access to information and assistance, and evaluation – and identifies similarities with typical features of other systems, but also some more distinctive features. Those features included party patronage diminished through scale; effects from location within a quite bi-partisan institution; and intensive capacity issues both concerning AMs and committee witnesses. This Welsh analysis also suggests a range of factors related to effectiveness; for example, characteristics conducive to effectiveness included the scale of the committee infrastructure, a politico-administrative atmosphere supportive of evidence gathering, delivery of a large quantity of reports and recommendations, and bi-partisanship. In contrast, effectiveness was weakened through factors such as a patronage-based appointments model, albeit significantly diminished through scale issues, weak formal powers to summon evidence, AM workloads and expertise and capacity limitations of civil society.
The identification of seven hypotheses about factors affecting the nature of committee scrutiny also assists in developing a scholarly understanding of committee scrutiny at the NAfW. In particular, this analysis highlights the importance of factors such as the on-going processes of institutional and constitutional change, inheritance from practice in similar institutions, impacts from civil society and the effect of wider bi-partisanship on the evolution of committee scrutiny.
The study, therefore, develops significantly understanding of committee scrutiny at the National Assembly for Wales. Furthermore, through constructing a conceptualisation of committee scrutiny through selection, access to information and assistance, and evaluation, the identification of characteristics facilitating and diminishing effectiveness and the specification of seven hypotheses to explain committee scrutiny characteristics, this study develops tools that could be applied to similar committee scrutiny elsewhere.