Power distance,sub-ethnic groups,and teams of civil servants: Overlooked factors of administrative reform in Kazakhstan?

Abstract

Administrative reform is a key element of postsocialist transformations. There were three rounds of New Public Management-inspired administrative reform in Kazakhstan, yet they did not lead to substantial increases in the quality of governance. This lack of progress is partially the result of a lack of attention to the issues of administrative culture in the blueprints of administrative reform. This article explores elements of administrative culture in Kazakhstan such as power distance, sub-ethnic groups (Zhuz), and teams of civil servants. The analysis is based on the outcomes of bivariate statistical tests and a multiple regression. The article shows that the prevalence of teams and ethnic groups has an impact on civil servants’ perceptions of the effectiveness of administrative reform. The study also suggests that the civil service in Kazakhstan is characterized by a high power distance, which may undermine the principles of New Public Management.

Keywords

Administrative reform New Public Management (NPM)team Kazakhstan Zhuz clan power distance

Introduction

Administrative reform represents one of the key components of catch-up modernization because governments tend to replace weak or absent nonstate stakeholders (Gerschenkorn, 1992: 122). This trend applies to developing countries and postsocialist countries, including Kazakhstan. Several attempts have been made to reform the government since this country gained its independence in 1991. For instance, the need for reforming the public sector in Kazakhstan was acknowledged in its official development strategy Kazakhstan 2030 promulgated in 1997 (Knox, 2008: 480). This document examines the creation of a “professionalized state” as one the seven long-term objectives. Key social and economic targets outlined in the “Kazakhstan 2030” strategy had been declared completed by the end of 2012, when a new strategy, “Kazakhstan 2050,” was unveiled. After the address that he delivered on December 14, 2012, President Nursultan Nazarbayev once again considered the goal of further “… improving the operation of government bodies …” as one of the seven strategic priorities. Administrative reform in Kazakhstan has been largely inspired by New Public Management (NPM) and post-NPM reforms that originate in developed Western countries (Tendentsii, 2013).

However, the real progress in reforming the public sector in Kazakhstan has been less impressive than implied in official declarations. Inefficiencies and corruption continue to prevail. Administrative reform has become a permanent state instead of being a policy with clear temporal limits and identifiable outcomes. Similar tendencies characterize the situation in China. Since the reforms started in 1978, six rounds of administrative reforms (1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008) have been launched in that country (Miao et al., 2013: S79).

Why do NPM reforms succeed in some countries and fail to produce the expected outcomes within a reasonable amount of time in others? Such a broadly defined inquiry requires an emphasis on the context of administrative reform. The context “must include time (chronologically and broadly historically) as well as social culture, political culture, economics and geographical location” (Massey, 2010: 195). A contextualized take on administrative reform undermines the perception of NPM as advice about how to do things better that is valid everywhere and at any moment (for a critique of taking NPM out of the historical context, see Pollitt, 2008).

One specific research question addressed in this paper refers to the informal structures that influence the progress of administrative reform in Kazakhstan. The identification of such structures serves to differentiate the universal and country-specific elements in the design of administrative reform. Specifically, this article discusses how power distance and the particularities of teams and sub-ethnic groups in the civil service influence state representatives’ reactions to administrative reform in Kazakhstan.

This article is structured as follows. The first section discusses both the universal and country-specific components of administrative reform. It is argued that the demand for administrative reform tends to have a universal character whereas its context, namely the administrative culture, varies from one country to another. Particular attention is paid to the informal structures in which administrative culture may be embedded: ethnic groups, sub-ethnic groups, and teams. Some background information about Kazakhstan and administrative reform in that country is provided in the second section. The third section explains the sources of information used in this paper, namely a survey of civil servants, and the instrument design. The fourth section highlights the ambivalent role of teams in the Kazakhstan civil service. A combination of traditional and rational elements characterizes teams in this particular case. Teams may become an important resource for reformers, yet teams require specific policies intended to enhance rationality in their operation.

Administrative reform in the context of administrative culture

Universal demand for administrative reform

Administrative reform is driven by an array of factors. In democracies, demands for a more transparent and cost-efficient government lead to attempts to reform existing government bodies. Administrative reform is intended to produce governments that would be more responsive to the voters’ demands by providing more (services) for less (fewer tax dollars). In autocracies, the people vested in power demand a better compliance with their orders on the part of their lieutenants. The objective of administrative reform is to reduce interferences and losses of information when transmitting the rulers’ demands to the population.

No matter where the demands come from, governments are expected to meet them in an expeditious manner. A model of governance with two principal actors, the power elite and the sub-elite, applies to both democracies and autocracies even though they use different mechanisms for recruiting their members. In keeping with the classical definition, the power elite is composed of individuals who are able to make decisions that have major consequences for others (Mills, 1957: 3–4). Members of the power elite need the assistance of specialized staff¹ when implementing their decisions. Specialized staff may be recruited on the basis of either merit and professionalism or loyalty to the power holder.

In theory, the sub-elite does not have an autonomous source of power. The major duty of the members of the sub-elite is to transmit the will of the members of the power elite with as few distortions as possible. For these reasons, the sub-elite is expected to continue its operation regardless of who occupies the highest office, a democrat or an autocrat, a national leader or an enemy who took control of the country (Weber, 1968: 988–989).

Nevertheless, the expertise and know-how accumulated by the sub-elite, as well as the high costs of control over its day-to-day operations, explains the relative autonomy enjoyed by the sub-elite and the existence of room for opportunistic behavior on the part of its members. Instead of implementing the will of the members of the power elite, the members of the sub-elite may well try to increase their own power (Coleman, 1990: 148–166).

Administrative reform always affects a balance of strength between the power elite and the sub-elite either by increasing the compliance of the latter or by restricting the former’s discretion (Grief, 2008: 55). For instance, increased compliance of the sub-elite can be achieved by tightening regulations and the enforcement of such regulations, as in the Weberian model. Alternatively, the members of the sub-elite can be controlled by market forces, as in the case of NPM. Because uneasy relationships between the power elite and sub-elite are not specific to either democracy or autocracy, there is a tendency for these formulas to be applied in a universal manner.

NPM-inspired administrative reforms were first implemented in the developed countries of the West in the 1990s before being adapted in developing and postsocialist countries. In some cases, the adaptation was voluntary; in the others, it was the result of loan conditions imposed by foreign lenders (Oleinik, 2006). Cases of a voluntary implementation of NPM can be explained by the desire of the power elite in less developed countries to catch up with developed countries by replicating a policy whose effectiveness is believed to be superior.

The design of NPM-style reforms is amply discussed in the scholarly literature. It includes such elements as service orientation; contracts; financial and material incentives; competition between government agencies and between public, private, and nonprofit organizations in the production and distribution of public services; decentralization of the government and outsourcing of its function to the private sector; assessment of government agencies with the help of quantifiable performance measures and others (Callahan, 2007; Killan, 2008; Van Berkel et al., 2012a, 2012b). NPM is intended to strengthen the control over the sub-elite by means of market mechanisms and principles.

Subsequent developments in the design of administrative reform are conventionally referred to as “post-NPM.” Post-NPM also originated in developed Western countries. Post-NPM style reforms rely on the development of internet technologies. The model of e-governance (Peristeras and Tsekos, 2004) involves delivering public services online. E-governance allows for some reintegration, i.e. the production and distribution of public services by government agencies as opposed to their outsourcing in the case of NPM. Another dimension of post-NPM refers to the active use of ethical guidelines for civil servants (Christensen and Lægreid, 2008; Kernaghan, 1994). In the case of post-NPM, members of the sub-elite are disciplined with the help of internet technologies and ethical imperatives.

Country-specific administrative culture

Both NPM and post-NPM have very specific origins, namely the developed Western countries. However, administrative reforms deriving from NPM and post-NPM have been implemented throughout the world. Outcomes of their implementation vary not only among the developed and less developed countries but also within the group of the developed countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In order to understand these divergent outcomes of administrative reforms with a similar design, some scholars refer to administrative culture. Broadly defined, “administrative culture is a transmissible pattern of beliefs, values, and behavior in public agencies about the agency’s role and relationships to the public” (Anechiarico, 1998: 17; see also Keraudren, 1996).

According to these scholars, administrative culture is an element that is missing in the design of administrative reform, particularly when principles of NPM and post-NPM are implemented outside of the countries in which they originated. In order to succeed, NPM and post-NPM style administrative reforms should have some “elective affinity” (in Weber’s terms) with the administrative culture existing in a particular country (Bouckaert, 2007: 36; Christensen and Lægreid, 2008; Howlett, 2003: 477; Kernaghan, 1994; Killan, 2008: 44). In the case of NPM, the civil service has to be penetrated at least to some extent by market-inspired values and behavioral patterns. Otherwise, the goals and ideas of administrative reform may simply be perceived incorrectly. There is a need for several structural preconditions too. The existence of a full-fledged market is one.

The concept of administrative culture can be further operationalized by identifying its key components. Both formal and informal institutions shape the values and behavioral patterns of the sub-elite. Institutions are “the rules of the game…, more formally, … the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). Formal institutions include “juridical or quasi-juridical rules that are consciously produced and enforced by mechanisms created for purposes of such enforcement” (Ledeneva, 2012: 377). Formal institutions may be changed relatively easily by political will (Perlman and Gleason, 2007). For instance, democratic institutions such as free elections have a formal character and can be introduced virtually overnight. They provide a foundation for the orientation of the sub-elite with respect to servicing the population whose representatives make up the power elite. The presence or absence of democratic institutions has an impact on those who benefit from administrative reform without necessarily affecting the prospects of such reform, however. “The transfer of the Western models [of governance] appears compatible with both conservative and revolutionary projects” (Badie, 1992: 127). A similar conclusion was made by a scholar involved in designing and implementing administrative reform in Kazakhstan, a country with mixed democratic credentials (Knox, 2008: 492).

Some other formal institutions turn out to be better predictors for the degree of compatibility between a specific administrative culture and a particular design of administrative reform. Manning and Parison use the term “malleability” to describe various formal aspects of governance. For instance, centralized governments possess greater malleability than decentralized ones. Centralization enables the government “… to drive through comprehensive and uniform reform programs …” (2004: 43).

Informal institutions refer to “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727). They are inherited from the past (“path-dependent”) and their eventual changes are incremental in nature (North, 1990; Pollitt, 2008). If corruption is understood as a particular system of social interactions that deviate from officially prescribed patterns, then it represents an informal institution (Osipian, 2010; Rosenblatt, 2012). Compared with the formal institutions of governance, the informal institutions “have been little studied” (Collins, 2004: 225). The collection of primary data about the informal institutions requires time- and resource-consuming ethnographic and sociological studies.

Power distance

The socially acceptable model of power also exemplifies an informal institution. A model of power relationships that prevails in a particular country is not outlined in that country’s constitution or laws. Most often, the rules structuring interactions between the superior and the subordinate are not formally spelled out. The superior and the subordinate interact in various contexts — at home, within the firm, at the university, in the government. Some scholars argue that in a stable system all the rules structuring power relationships tend to have elective affinity (Eckstein et al., 1998; Oleinik, 2009). The prevailing culture of power determines the scope of the possible in administrative reform.

Power distance refers to one aspect of the model of power relationships. Power distance is “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1980: 99). High power distance means that the subordinate accepts a larger inequality in the distribution of power. NPM-inspired administrative reforms may succeed in countries with a relatively low power distance (Bouckaert, 2007: 49; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2010). On the other hand, the Weberian design of administrative reform is a better option for countries with a high power distance. A high power distance characterizes administrative cultures in many postsocialist countries (Miao et al., 2013: S78; Muratbekova-Touron, 2002: 220; Neshkova and Kostadinova, 2012: 325). This conclusion is often based on anecdotal evidence, however.

Sub-ethnic groups as informal institutions

Ethnicity may be a factor affecting administrative culture in multiethnic societies, especially if they have colonial past. For instance, the American administrative culture and the administrative cultures of Native American tribes significantly differ, which undermined efforts to make governance structures uniform throughout the country. After the implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act (1934), “the paraphernalia of American legal and political tradition were transferred to a people whose experience of these institutions was remote or nonexistent” (Taylor, 1980: 51).

Kazakhstan has both a colonial past (being a part of the Russian and later the Soviet empire) and a multiethnic population. As a matter of fact, Kazakhs constituted a minority in this country before the fall of the Soviet Union. The percentage of ethnic Kazakhs was 40.11% in 1989. Only 10 years later, Kazakhs became a majority (53.3% in 1999; Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po Statistike, 2000: 21). In 2012, Kazakhs represented 64.55% of the population; Russians made up the second largest ethnic group at 22.35% (down from 37.42% in 1989; Agenstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po Statistike, 2012: 27).

The share of Kazakhs in the civil service increased accordingly, although there are no publicly available data in this regard. Schatz (2000: 493, 495) observed that affirmative action policies intended to increase the portion of Kazakhs in the power elite and sub-elite have never taken explicit forms. They remained ad hoc and outside the law or written regulations. These unwritten and often unspoken policies prompted the consolidation of the Russian population, however (Schatz, 2004: 108; Zolotukhin, 2012: 100, 103).

Sub-ethnic groups, Ru (the local clan) and Zhuz (the umbrella clan composed of several local clans), also play an important role in Kazakhstan (Cummings, 2005: 20; Perfil’ev, 2010; Schatz, 2000: 489–490; Schatz, 2005: 238–239). Sub-ethic groups are formed and connected by blood ties. Three Zhuz, Senior/Elder (Ulu), Middle (Orta), and Junior/Younger (Kishi) prevail in the South, the Center/East, and the West of Kazakhstan correspondingly.

The Zhuz’s origins go back to the 16th–17th centuries. Paradoxically, the role of this traditional institution increased during the Soviet period. On the one hand, given the conditions of permanent shortages that characterized the Soviet economy all kinds of informal connections, including those embedded in the Zhuz, were mobilized to facilitate access to goods and services in short supply (Schatz, 2004: 110; Schatz, 2005: 239). On the other hand, Dinmukhamed Konayev, the leader of Soviet Kazakhstan in the 1960–1980s, reportedly promoted the recruitment of representatives of his Senior Zhuz into the power elite and sub-elite (Cummings, 2005: 19, 85). This led to an overrepresentation of the Senior Zhuz in the power elite (Cummings, 2005: 67, 99; Schatz, 2004: 98, 102; Schatz, 2005: 242), whereas the Junior Zhuz still remains underrepresented. The transfer of capital from Almaty in the South to Astana in the Centre in late 1997 brought more Middle Zhuz Kazakhs into the central state apparatus (Schatz, 2005: 242) which produced an informal alliance between the Senior and Middle Zhuz in the power elite and sub-elite.

If, according to a narrow definition, the Zhuz is a social group based on kinship (Schatz, 2005: 233), the clan does not necessarily require its members to be connected by blood ties. Social ties — broadly defined—ensure social cohesion of a clan. Blood ties within clans may be “fictive, or perceived and imagined” (Collins, 2006: 25). Because of the more flexible nature of the clan, this concept serves to combine normative/cultural and rational approaches (Ibid: 34). Similarly to the Zhuz, clans tend to take the place of and “crowd out” formal institutions (Collins, 2004: 244).

In more country-specific terms, the clan sometimes takes the form of a zemlyachestvo. The zemlyachestvo is a group of people born in the same region or locality. Blood ties may or may not connect its members (Klintsov, 2009: 167, 171; Schatz, 2004: 106). This predominately informal group is characterized by in-group solidarity: its members tend to assist one another, counting on those they help to reciprocate. In contrast, people born in other regions are perceived as “Them.” According to some scholars, the strengthening of regional identities was an outcome of the Soviet institutional system in which regional leaders enjoyed significant autonomy, at least in Central Asia (Jones Luong, 2004: 208).

Teams

Some elements of administrative culture may be embedded in informal organizations as well. Compared with institutions, organizations have clearer boundaries, which implies a conscious coordination of activities by its members using a set of written or unwritten (in the informal organization) agreements (Ménard, 2005: 93–95). Teams as a particular type of informal organizations appear to be particularly relevant for studies in administrative cultures.

The concept of team is widely used in the discourse on public administration both in the developed Western countries and developing countries. This concept illustrates a rule in comparative studies according to which “even what appears to be the same word carries different connotations and cultural meanings” (Neuman, 2011: 494). Teams in the Western context refer to horizontal and mostly formal structures. Teams have great flexibility when it comes to adapting to changing circumstances (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999; Finn et al., 2010; Steyvers et al., 2010). Team work tends to be formally acknowledged and promoted by specific policies.

In the postsocialist countries, specifically in Russia and Kazakhstan, a different meaning is given to the same word. The team (komanda) has a hierarchical structure (as opposed to the horizontal one prevalent in the West) with a clear leader making all key decisions. Teams also have a predominantly informal character (as opposed to their formal status in the West). Their existence is rarely acknowledged and sometimes explicitly prohibited. Teams in the postsocialist countries include 3 – 10 civil servants working at the same government body (but not necessarily formally connected), regrouped around a particular member of the power elite or sub-elite and following him or her from one office to another. Their members trust one another. The team member must, on the one hand, be loyal to the team leader and, on the other hand, possess professional credentials and skills necessary to perform an assigned functional role (Oleinik, 2011: 28–33). It is not absolutely necessary for a would-be team member to be a member of the team leader’s ethnic or sub-ethnic group. Compared with the clan, the team represents a stronger mixture of traditional and rational elements.

Teams should not be confused with the other informal organizations, trudovoi kollektiv (work collective) and svyazi (connections). The work collective also represents a Soviet legacy. Organizational entities constituted both formal (e.g., a workshop at a plant) and informal (unofficial connections between people employed at the workshop) structures. Compared with teams of civil servants, work collectives are less hierarchical. In this respect, they share some common features with the traditional Russian peasant community, obshchina (Barnett, 2004; Oleinik, 2004). The web of connections that one uses to achieve his or her pragmatic goals, from finding a good doctor to solving a problem with government officials, is called svyazi in the post-Soviet countries (Smith et al., 2012). The scope of this network is not limited to the boundaries of a particular organization, however. Moreover, the svyazi network does not necessarily involve relationships of subordination.

Administrative reform in Kazakhstan: A case study

The choice of administrative reform in Kazakhstan for a case study has several rationales. First, Kazakhstan has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. As in the case of Russia, its Northern neighbour, economic growth in Kazakhstan is fueled by resource rents (Figure 1). This country has important deposits of oil, gas, uranium, iron ore, and coal.

Figure 1.

GDP growth rate and total natural resources rents (% of GDP), Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, 1998–2012. Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. The estimates of natural resources rents are calculated as the difference between the price of a commodity and the average cost of producing it. Source: The World Development Indicators by the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).

Second, Kazakhstan provides an interesting example of the interactive dynamics of the formal and informal institutions of governance. The ineffective formal institutions (repeated attempts to carry out administrative reform confirm their inefficiency) coexist with the informal institutions that lead to outcomes that often diverge from those set officially. Rationally set goals (for instance, both the Kazakhstan 2030 and Kazakhstan 2050 strategies set out an elaborate hierarchy of goals and outline means for and steps in their accomplishment) coexist with the personalized rule of the power holders. In Kazakhstan “personalism of office, patron-client networks and factional elite conflict are interwoven with formal legal-rational institutions” (Isaacs, 2011: 1).²

Third, Kazakhstan does not have a strong democratic record. Freedom House assesses the political system in Kazakhstan as “not free” with a score of 6 out of 6 (the higher the score, the poorer the record) for the protection of political rights and a score of 5 out of 6 for the situation with respect to political liberties (Freedom House, 2013). These scores have remained unchanged since 1994. Nevertheless, the need for administrative reform was officially acknowledged in this country and there have been three rounds of administrative reform (Emrich-Bakenova, 2009).

The signing of the President’s December 1995 Decree on the Civil Service, which had the force of a law, paved the way for a first round, namely, a departure from the Soviet system of governance. A second round started in 1997. The Civil Service Agency, which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of a unified civil service policy, was established in 1998. At this and subsequent stages, administrative reform was partly externally (through programs of technical assistance provided by the developed Western countries, including the European Union, see Knox, 2008: 479), partly internally driven. A content analysis of addresses delivered on a yearly basis by President Nazarbaev (Oleinik and Djamangulov, 2012) shows recurrent references to administrative reform. In his first address (which outlined the Kazakhstan 2030 strategy) he said:

We have started the process of reorganization of the state apparatus and need to proceed without delay. This is why I initiated a radical reform of our government at the start of this year [1997]. The government is being downsized at the central and regional levels and this process will continue.

A third round of administrative reform started in 2007 (Tendentsii, 2013: 32). In spite of the fact that administrative reform continues to be inspired by NPM and post-NPM, the third round is mostly internally driven. The 2007 presidential address calls for “prompt completion of administrative reform taking into consideration the relevant international experience.” The frequency of references to administrative reform has two peaks that correspond to the second and third rounds of administrative reform (Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Frequency of mentions of administrative reform in President Nazarbaev’s annual addresses, 1997–2012. χ²= 24.395, df = 16, p = .004. The dictionary based on substitution includes the following expressions: administrat*_reform*, modernizats*_gosudarstv*, reform*_pravitel’stv*, reorganizats*_pravitel’stv*, reform*_apparat* (* refers to any letter or their combination). Annual addresses were not delivered prior to 1997, which excludes their coverage of the first round of administrative reform. Source: The official site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (http://www.akorda.kz/ru/category/narody_kazahstana).

At the end of 2013, administrative reform in Kazakhstan had produced mixed outcomes. On the one hand, Kazakhstan continues to outperform neighboring post-Soviet states (Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) in terms of economic growth. Overall, the socioeconomic situation in Kazakhstan is assessed as more stable and sustainable than in the other postsocialist countries in Central Asia. This outcome cannot be attributed to its endowment with natural resources because Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are also resource rich. Strategies adopted by the power elite make a difference (Perlman and Gleason, 2007; Schatz, 2009).

On the other hand, the three rounds of administrative reform did not lead to a significant improvement in the dynamics of key indicators for the quality of governance. The level of perceived corruption remains high. Transparency International (2012) places Kazakhstan at the lower end of the 10-point scale (the lower the score, the higher the amount of corruption). World Bank experts consistently assess the government effectiveness in this country below the average level worldwide. The dynamics of these and other indicators do not seem to be affected by administrative reforms (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

Key indicators of quality of governance, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, 1998–2012. Corruption Perception Index varies from 0 (an absolutely corrupt government) to 10 (100 in 2012; an absolutely transparent government); the governance score for government effectiveness varies from −2.5 (the government underperforms compared with the other governments in the sample) to +2.5 (the government absolutely outperforms the other governments in the sample). Source: Transparency International (http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/); the Worldwide Governance Indicators project by the World Bank (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home).

Can particularities of administrative culture explain these mixed and somewhat contradictory outcomes of administrative reform? A comprehensive exploration of this question lies outside the scope of this article because it requires one to control the impact of several factors operating both at the micro- and macro levels. We will limit ourselves to the study of informal institutions and organizations, namely power distance, sub-ethnic groups and teams, and their impact on the perceived effectiveness of government bodies. It should be noted that the principal objective of administrative reform is to increase government effectiveness, i.e. its capacity to achieve outcomes desirable for the power elite. Effectiveness has a broader meaning than efficiency: the latter refers to the ratio of output to input (Bovaird and Löffler, 2009: 155; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: Chap. 1). A specific hypothesis that we will test is that the prevalence of a particular model of power (operationalized through power distance), teams, and sub-ethnic groups (Zhuz) influences how the sub-elite in Kazakhstan perceives the effectiveness of government bodies.

Sources of information

To address this question, a survey of the sub-elite was carried out in May–June 2013. The two junior coauthors of this article, who are civil servants themselves, approached 600 individuals working in the central government, its regional bodies, and local government bodies in five regions of Kazakhstan: Taraz (South), Pavlodar (North), Astana (the capital city, Center), Öskemen (East), and Uralsk (West). Respondents work both in managerial (24%) and subordinate (76%) positions. This sample represents 0.7% of the total population of civil servants in Kazakhstan (n = 86,887 as of the start of 2013; Agency for Civil Service Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2013).

Several parameters of the sample do not substantially depart from those of the population of civil servants: respondents' gender, age, and work experience in the civil service. Nevertheless, there is some mismatch regarding the respondent’s region of work, Zhuz membership, and the type of government body at which he or she is currently employed. The South is underrepresented (16.7% in the sample compared with 31.3% in the population), whereas the East is overrepresented (16.7% and 4.3%). Employees of the central government are overrepresented (27.4% and 9.5%). There are no official records for Zhuz membership (Collins, 2004: 236; Schatz, 2004: 113). Thus, unofficial estimates for the proportions of the three Zhuz in the total population of Kazakhstan (Schatz, 2005: 242) were used as a point of comparison. The Senior Zhuz turned to be slightly underrepresented in the survey sample (21.6% and 34%).

Taking into consideration the interest in the role of informal institutions in administrative reform, a weighting procedure was used to achieve a better match with the parameters of the population.³ As a result of the difficulties with assessing the validity and reliability of the data on the proportions of the three Zhuz in the population, cases were weighted by respondents' region of work as a proxy for his or her Zhuz membership. Respondents' self-declared membership in the Zhuz turned out to be strongly associated with the region of employment: the former accounts for more than 39% of variation in the latter (Table 1).

Table 1.

Respondents' self-declared Zhuz membership and place of work, before weighting

			Zhuz membership				Total
			Senior	Middle	Junior	No membership	Total
Region of current work (recorded)	South	Count	56	14	10	18	98
	South	% within Senior Zhuz	52.3%	6.2%	6.2%	17.5%	16.4%
	Center, North, and East	Count	49	210	37	67	363
	Center, North, and East	% within Middle Zhuz	45.8%	92.5%	23.0%	65.0%	60.7%
	West	Count	2	3	114	18	137
	West	% within Junior Zhuz	1.9%	1.3%	70.8%	17.5%	22.9%
Total		Count	107	227	161	103	598
Total		% within the Zhuz membership	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note: Recoded regions correspond to traditional areas of prevalence for the three Zhuz. χ²= 418.317, df = 6 significant at p < 0,001; λ = 0.391 significant at p < 0.001.

The instrument (a questionnaire) contained 43 closed-ended questions formulated in Russian.⁴ Most questions use a 4-point Likert-type scale going from “Completely agree” to “Completely disagree.”⁵ It was specifically designed to analyze the role of informal institutions and organizations, especially, power distance, the Zhuz and the team, in the civil service. For instance, the instrument contains three standard questions gauging power distance (Hofstede, 1980: 403–410).

Since empirical research on teams in the civil service of postsocialist countries is rather limited, two original scales were constructed. Five questions were initially intended to operationalize respondents' perception of teams, four other questions focused on the role of trust in the civil service. However, after conducting an item analysis to check whether the scales are one dimensional, only two questions in the team work scale were retained: “Do you believe that team work in government bodies contributes to increasing their effectiveness?” and “Do you believe that any manager should have his/her own team?” (Cronbach’s α = 0.498).⁶ The four questions on trust (in people in general, in fellow civil servants, in the immediate boss, and in the government) constitute a one-dimensional scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.764).

The availability of the scales served to run a regression analysis in addition to using bivariate statistics. Variables measured at the nominal level (e.g., the Zhuz membership) were converted into dummies. The screening for violations of the assumptions for a multiple regression with dummy predictor variables (Warner, 2008: 470–471) showed that they are met in most cases. Namely, the distribution of values of the two scales approximates a normal distribution. The variance of the dependent variable (the team work scale) across levels of the dummy variables turned out to be homogenous.⁷

The role of team and Zhuz membership

Zhuz membership explains the variation in an element of administrative culture such as power distance. The value of the Power Distance Index (PDI) for the group of civil servants in Kazakhstan, 126, exceeds similar figures for 68 other countries.⁸ Kazakhstani civil servants accept an extreme unequal distribution of power, which undermines the prospects of NPM in this country. The PDI values also differ across the Zhuz with the Senior Zhuz having the highest score (132) and the Junior having the lowest (107).

The outcomes of the survey confirm that members of the Senior and Middle Zhuz prevail in the central government (their alliance emerged after the capital was transferred to Astana). Together, they occupy 71.4% of positions in the central government. Their share of all civil service positions is 55.9%. Zhuz membership turned out to be associated with the type of government body (χ²= 64.487, df = 6 significant at p < 0.001 and λ(Lambda) = 0.108 significant at p = 0.027).

Nevertheless, Zhuz membership predicts less variation in the variables specifying different dimensions of administrative culture than team membership. For instance, team members believe that team work in government bodies contributes to increasing their effectiveness (79.4% of them agree or rather agree as opposed to 57.5% in the group of nonmembers; χ²= 36.553, df = 3 significant at p < 0.001 and λ = 0.082 significant at p = 0.011) more often than nonmembers. Team members also agree that any manager should have his or her own team (55.7% against 30%; χ²= 48.604, df = 3 significant at p < 0.001 and λ = 0.103 significant at p < 0.001) more often than nonmembers. There are fewer respondents among the team members than among the nonmembers who agree that the exercise of control over the subordinate is itself a source of pleasure for the superior (27.7% against 33.9%; χ²= 37.107, df = 3 significant at p < 0.001 and λ = 0.105 significant at p = 0.014). Compared with the nonmembers, the team members tend to be more skeptical that everything could be bought. In all, 35.6% of the members agree or somewhat agree that money can buy everything as opposed to 47.7% of the nonmembers (χ²= 13.477, df = 3 significant at p < 0.001 and λ = 0.061 significant at p = 0.06).

These findings suggest that the team represents an unusual combination of rational and traditional elements. On the one hand, the team members view team work as a method for increasing the effectiveness of the civil service and perceive power as a means rather than an end in itself. On the other hand, the team members have more ethical constraints when considering market rationality. In order to further test the assumption about both rational and traditional nature of the team, a number of additional bivariate statistical tests were run.

Answers to the question “Do you believe that team work in government bodies contributes to increasing their effectiveness?” were cross-tabulated with answers to several other questions. The belief in the effectiveness of team work turned out to be associated with a few rational beliefs. Namely, those who believe in the effectiveness of team work tend to agree that the manager’s key quality consists in motivating the subordinates toward achieving common goals (χ²= 109.316, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ(Gamma) = 0.332 significant at p < 0.001). They also think that, compared to the subordinates, the manager has to demonstrate his or her superior professional qualities and skills (χ²= 46.019, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.128 significant at p = 0.028). Those who believe in the effectiveness of team work consider contests and competitions among subordinates an important motivational strategy (χ²= 43.400, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.131 significant at p = 0.009). Thus, the team does have a rational component.

The existence of a traditional component in teams was also confirmed. The cross-tabulation of the same question about the effectiveness of team work with the question on the role of emotions in the team operation shows that answers to these questions tend to be positively associated (χ²= 92.433, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.279 significant at p < 0.001). In spite of its name, the team also appears to be a rather hierarchical structure in the civil service of Kazakhstan. Those who believe in the effectiveness of teams agree that the more demanding the manager is, the better the subordinates work is (χ²= 59.522, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.182 significant at p = 0.001). They also consider career advancement an important motivational strategy (χ²= 53.183, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.194 significant at p = 0.001). In line with the previous finding, those who believe in the effectiveness of teams tend to agree that only a bad soldier does not dream of becoming a general (χ²= 54.492, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.168 significant at p = 0.004). These findings highlight a traditional component in the team.

Connections between teams and trust need to be mentioned separately. As stated earlier, the research on teams in the Russian civil service shows close connections between their operation and trust. Regardless of the source of trust—tradition or rational choice⁹—the team in Kazakhstan is also built upon trust. Those who believe in the effectiveness of team work have a higher level of trust in people in general (χ²= 49.561, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.173 significant at p = 0.001), in fellow civil servants (χ²= 53.886, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.123 significant at p = 0.030) and in the head of the government body at which they are employed (χ²= 35.324, df = 9 significant at p < 0.001 and γ = 0.195 significant at p < 0.001).

At the final stage, a regression analysis was performed to predict respondents' opinion about the impact of teams on the effectiveness of the civil service (measured with the help of the team scale) from the level of trust (the trust scale), the Zhuz membership (dummy coded 0 = Not member, 1 = Member for each of the three Zhuz and the “fourth Zhuz,” i.e. non-Kazakhs), gender (dummy coded 0 = Female, 1 = Male), the team membership (dummy coded 0 = Not member, 1 = Member), respondents' preference for working with professionals as opposed to nice people (dummy coded 0 = No preference, 1 = Preference), respondents' preference for having a professional as opposed to a nice person as a boss (dummy coded 0 = No preference, 1 = Preference), respondents' preference for having a particular type of manager as a boss (dummy coded 0 = No preference, 1 = Preference for each of the four types of manager described by Hofstede for the purpose of calculating the PDI), the type of government body (dummy coded 0 = Not applicable, 1 = Applicable for the central government, its regional bodies, and local government bodies), the type of employment (dummy coded 0 = Subordinate position, 1 = Managerial position), age (dummy coded 0 = Older than 31 year, 1 = 30 year old and younger) and work experience in the civil service (dummy coded 0 = 6 years and more, 1 = 5 years and less). The multiple regression was performed using Method = Forward with the probability of F for entry set at p = 0.05.

The overall regression, including 4 of 19 candidate predictors, was statistically significant, R = 0.431, R²= 0.186, adjusted R²= 0.18, F(3, 575) = 32.841, p < 0.001. Approximately 19% of the variance in team scores is accounted for by the regression. In Step I, team membership was entered producing a largest R² increment of 0.107, F(1, 577) = 69.553. In Step II, job at a regional body of the central government was entered; it produced an R² increment of 0.063, F(1, 576) = 44.106. In Step III, age was entered producing an R² increment of 0.008, F(1, 575) = 5.669. In Step IV, Senior Zhuz membership was entered producing an R² increment of 0.007, F(1, 574) = 5.013. The remaining predictors were not entered because their probability of F for entry was below the criterion established (Table 2).

Table 2.

Results of statistical (Method = Forward) multiple regression to predict team scale (Y) from team membership, type of government body, age, Zhuz membership, gender, position in the hierarchy, experience of work in the civil service, trust scale, preference for working with professionals, preference for having a professional as a boss, preference for having a particular type of manager as a boss

	Team (8-point) scale	Team membership	Work at a regional government body	Age	Senior Zhuz membership	B	β	SR²_incremental
Team membership	−0.320**					−0.969***	−.290	0.107
Work at a regional government body	0.285**	−0.115**				0.810***	0.216	0.063
Age (30 year old or less)	−0.149**	0.013	−0.246**			−0.310*	−0.091	0.008
Senior Zhuz membership	0.163**	−0.151**	0.220^**	−0.065		0.333*	0.087	0.007
Not entered:
Junior Zhuz membership	−0.072	0.065	0.007	0.017	−0.319**	–	–	–
Middle Zhuz membership	−0.105*	0.028	−0.219**	0.116**	−0.449**	–	–	–
“Fourth Zhuz” membership	0.023	0.070	0.014	−0.095*	−0.256**	–	–	–
Gender	0.119**	−0.154**	0.148**	0.052	0.123**	–	–	–
Managerial position	−0.047	−0.049	0.033	0.224**	0.001	–	–	–
Work at the central government	−0.091	−0.096*	−0.421**	0.345**	−0.041	–	–	–
Work at a local government body	−0.179**	0.195**	−0.553**	−0.097*	−0.165**	–	–	–
Experience of work in the civil service (5 years or less)	−0.103*	0.021	−0.232**	0.643**	0.010	–	–	–
Trust scale	0.132**	−0.138**	0.172**	−0.057	−0.031	–	–	–
Preference for working with professionals	−0.094*	0.105*	−0.044	−0.085*	−0.028	–	–	–
Preference for having a professional as a boss	−0.051	0.087*	−0.059	−0.085*	−0.053	–	–	–
Preference for having a Type 1 (most autocratic) manager as a boss	0.008	0.006	−0.060	−0.010	0.098*	–	–	–
Preference for having a Type 2 manager as a boss	−0.030	0.040	−0.003	0.132**	0.014	–	–	–
Preference for having a Type 3 manager as a boss	0.083*	−0.070	0.084*	−0.129**	−0.050	–	–	–
Preference for having a Type 4 (most democratic) manager as a boss	−0.042	0.014	−0.005	−0.030	−0.109**	–	–	–
						Intercept = 4.851***
Mean	4.58	–	–	–	–	R²= 0.186
SD	1.674	–	–	–	–	R²_adj = 0.18
						R = 0.431

*Significant at the 0.05 level. **Significant at the 0.01 level. ***Significant at the 0.001 level.

SR²_incremental refers to the additional proportion variance explained by each predictor variable at the step when it first enters the analysis.

The outcomes of the regression confirm that tension between tradition and rationality characterizes civil service teams in Kazakhstan. Team scores are positively affected by Senior Zhuz membership. It should be noted that this Zhuz prevailed in the power elite and sub-elite. Representatives of the youngest cohort of civil servants have a skeptical view about the benefits of team work, as reflected in a negative relationship between age and team scores. Actual team membership is also negatively related to the predicted variable. This can be interpreted as an indication that the existing teams do not work up to expectations. Instead of increasing the effectiveness (a commonly held belief), they may undermine it.

Conclusions

The present study shows that the particularities of administrative culture in Kazakhstan have to be taken into account when designing blueprints for administrative reform in that country. Namely, a high power distance may limit the applicability of NPM. Elements of the Weberian model (the need for detailed regulations and enhanced hierarchical control) appear to be more appropriate in the circumstances, eventually in combination with such elements of post-NPM as the use of internet technologies for making civil servants more responsible and responsive.

This study also confirms that team and Zhuz membership influences civil servants’ perceptions of the effectiveness of government bodies. The civil servants share the belief that the existence of teams eventually increases the effectiveness of the government operation and that managers at all levels of the hierarchy should form their own teams. At the same time, the existing teams do not seem to operate up to high expectations. Team membership has the largest—and negative—influence on respondents' opinion about the ability of teams to increase government effectiveness. Teams prevail in the civil service of Kazakhstan and other postsocialist countries, yet they tend to complicate administrative reform instead of facilitating it.

A possible strategy for dealing with teams of civil servants consists in their selective legalization. A similar idea was proposed in respect of sub-ethnic groups: “to fight clan politics, states must selectively and in limited fashion relegitimize kinship as a basis for social organization and political life” (Schatz, 2004: 171). Practically speaking, the teams that have demonstrated their effectiveness could be legalized and even promoted. Team membership takes explicit forms when its leader gets a new appointment. Subordinates, who follow the manager to the new location, usually constitute his or her team. Article 29 of the 1995 Decree on Civil Service formalized this practice of the simultaneous resignation (and appointment) of a top government official and his or her entire staff (Emrich-Bakenova, 2009: 724). The screening of the team members’ performance during such transfers represents a good opportunity for enhancing their rational aspect: in order to be allowed to follow their leader, the team members must demonstrate the necessary professional credentials and skills.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The authors are indebted to Dr Kayratbek Djamangulov (International Turkic Academy in Astana, Kazakhstan) and three anonymous reviewers of Public Policy and Administration for making several constructive and helpful suggestions as to how to improve earlier versions of this article. Sheryl Curtis of Communications WriteTouch improved the style of this manuscript.

Notes

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