Institutional layering,displacement,and policy change: The evolution of civic service in Israel

A quiet revolution has been taking place in civic national service in Israel, a change which may have a far reaching effect on relations between Israel’s Jewish majority and minority groups and their integration into Israeli society. It will have an impact on employment rates and will encourage many who up until now were often not employed, ultra-orthodox men, Bedouin and Druze ¹ women, to join the work force. Through a series of policy amendments the opportunity to volunteer to civic national service has been extended to sectors that hitherto were exempted or deferred from service. Primarily through a gradual process of “layering”, adding new rules and institutions alongside existing institutions and “displacement”, replacing or amending existing legislation, Israel has undergone a process of change that has been incremental but may be cumulatively transformative.

This article explores the process of endogenous institutional change using the example of civic national service policy in Israel. It will utilize the concepts of layering, displacement and policy drift, as developed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), and others to explore processes of gradual but yet significant and transformative change in public policy in a country with deep ethnic and religious cleavages and a multi-party system that reflects and fortifies these divisions. It will show that through a slow but gradual process of policy layering new populations and new programs could be added to an existing policy model and limited change achieved despite the strong opposition of minority groups and the reluctance of a powerful institution, the Israeli military. Layering proved to be an effective mode of policy change when more far reaching measures would have been met with significant opposition by target populations.

In democratic systems, laws and rules which define and regulate public policy are the result of deliberation and compromise. They reflect the prevailing power relations between sectors in society and the dominant interests of the majority. Once defined and translated into law, they endure over time, hence their categorization as institutions. Institutions may be defined as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions in the organizational structure of the polity or the political economy” (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010: 16). While stability and durability are characteristics of institutions, it is also clear that transformations and changes do occur.

The question of when and how changes take place has challenged public policy theorists. Historical institutionalists, Paul Pierson (2004) and Theda Skocpol (1995) for example adopt a punctuated equilibrium model that conceptualizes institutions as being relatively stable, with historical trajectories that begin in a past point in time and follow a determined path of development into the future. Major changes that occur are episodic and discontinuous, usually caused by such exogenous factors as revolutions, wars, occupation or financial collapse (Skocpol and Pierson, 2002). Others have suggested that punctuated change can also be the product of endogenous shocks and pressures which create policy change from within (True et al., 2007). Punctuated change requires the meeting of the right kind of change agent with the propitious political conditions that will allow for major change to occur. It is characterized by an alternating pattern of long periods of the status quo and occasional significant, periods of punctuated change. Policy in a particular sphere remains relatively stable and continuous until sparked by new circumstances or new groups that demand major policy transformation. Conceptually, change is viewed as a series of large steps that break the policy maintenance pattern which then creates a new status quo until the next shock induces change (Mahoney, 2010).

Similarly Kingdon (1995), in his discussion of major policy shifts in the United States (US), proposes that major policy change is often the result of the successful convergence of three process streams during a short “window of opportunity”. The streams are problem definition and recognition, pre-existing policy plans, and politics, which may be a change in the administration or in public opinion, an interest group campaign, etc. Big changes occur sporadically, when problem, program and politics coincide.

However, this understanding of policy change is clearly incomplete. It does not account for transformations that are small and incremental but cumulatively significant although not necessarily continuous. Non-continuous incremental change entails an irregular series of small steps that do not overturn the status quo and create a new one as envisaged in the punctuated equilibrium model but rather modify policy or add new layers to the existing policy sporadically over a long period of time. Each change does not appear to be “major” as is characteristic in the punctuated equilibrium model but rather is one of a discontinuous series of small changes which in retrospect is transformative. Only retroactively do we recognize that a substantial transformation has indeed transpired.

Often the choice of slow incremental change is the best strategy for achieving any change at all. The political forces that have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo may block far-reaching changes in policy that could threaten their preferred status or shift their allocations to others. Powerful interests may act to prevent modifications in the rules and regulations and will oppose the establishment of institutions that may limit or detract from their influence, funds or clients. This is particularly the case if these interests are well entrenched and enjoy privileges and status that have gone almost unquestioned for many years (Thelen, 2009). Moreover, the nature of the political system and its political structure will impact on whether change will occur and how. They will determine the extent to which interest groups, political parties and the third sector will have access to decision makers and the opportunities they will have to influence or to block policy. In a federal presidential system such as the US, for example, there are multiple venues of policy making, two houses of Congress, an independent executive, the federal/state system, that offer multiple opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to advance their case. Mobilization stymied in one venue may be successful in another (True et al., 2007). However in a unitary system such as Israel, with a parliamentary system of government, there are fewer venues open to pressure.

Transformative change may be opposed by a dominant institution which has control of policy in an issue area. Its dominance is supported by a powerful idea or image that is connected to core political values and public support that allows it to impede efforts to bring about change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 3–5). Attempts to change policy without the consent of the dominant actor may be met with powerful resistance and calls to the public to defend “time honored” traditions and policies. For example, in Israel, if a proposed change contravenes the interests of the military, an enshrined institution, it will have little chance of adoption, particularly if the latter frames the challenge as a threat to the national defense.

For these reasons, policy change may be the result of an uneven series of small adjustments that could be attained only by incremental measures. These could include a “tango” of policy revisions that may move several steps forward and then a step or two backward because of changes in the government coalition and the resultant shifts in administrative managers. Policy modifications may be put on hold during a change in government or cancelled. In multi-party democracies which typically have coalition governments, small minority parties often control the government ministries that impact on their constituents’ interests. They may condition their joining the government coalition with demands for concessions in areas they define as critical. In Israel, for example, coalition agreements are often reached with small religious parties, who condition their participation in the government on maintaining the status-quo in religious affairs, or on having veto power over any revisions in Israel’s Basic Laws.

Mahoney and Thelen (2010) outline three modes of endogenous institutional change, displacement, layering, and drift. Displacement involves change through the active destruction of prior arrangements and the creation of new alternatives in their place. It takes place when the partisan balance of power shifts in support of change. New laws are then passed or existing laws amended because of a change in circumstances or a shift in the relative power of political interests (Hacker, 2004). This mode of change corresponds to punctuated change discussed above. It is important here to note that the catalyst for change may be a decision of the constitutional court. In democracies with judicial review, constitutional courts have the authority to strike down legislation or to order its amendment. The status quo, while politically expedient, may be invalidated by the court for being inequitable or in violation of human rights.

When formal policy change seems unattainable in the current array of political interests, pragmatic actors may choose to adapt existing policies rather than challenge them directly. They may work instead within the existent system by adding new rules on top of or alongside old ones, a process called “layering” (Hacker, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Streek and Thelen, 2005). Defenders of the status quo may be able to preserve the original rules, but they may be unable to prevent the introduction of additional modifications (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). For example, new categories of beneficiaries can be added to government programs without overhauling the welfare system (Hacker, 2004). Benefits granted to married couples could be extended to same sex couples without completely revising tax legislation or passing a more far reaching equal rights law.

A third form of institutional change is what Mahoney and Thelen (2010) call “drift”, a situation that occurs when there is a shift in the circumstances surrounding a rule or policy rather than a change in the rules themselves. Such a shift, in effect, alters policy or institutional outcomes without a change in formal policy or in the institutional rules. By preventing revisions in legislation and administrative regulations that are clearly out of step with new circumstances, new outcomes are created, unforeseen by the original policy architects. Policymakers may recognize this change in circumstances but are reluctant, for political reasons, to modify the rules which clearly benefit entrenched interests. These interests act to preserve the rules that had been apposite in the past (Hacker et al., 2013).

It is important to note that institutional change may depend upon the extent of compliance or non-compliance in the ministry assigned to implement policy. If the minister or top bureaucrats are lukewarm toward a policy, administrative foot-dragging and delays may result. Additionally, internecine fights between executive departments each protecting and advancing its own interests may also cause a delay in implementation. Regulations may not get written; inter-ministerial committees may convene and disband without decision. Moreover, because primary legislation is typically ambiguous and subject to interpretation, the resultant policy may in fact turn out to be quite different from the intent of its statutory architects (Allison and Halperin, 1971; Kaarbo, 1998).

In the next sections we trace how policy layering proved to be a successful strategy of policy change in Israel in the area of national civic service. Layering as an analytical concept has been utilized (Hacker, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Streek and Thelen, 2005) to analyze social economic policy in western democracies but we have found that it is equally useful in analyzing the policy area of national service. We will suggest that slow but cumulative policy change was achieved in Israel mainly through a process of layering that enabled policymakers to sidestep politically sensitive issues and avoid confrontation with minority groups (the ultra-orthodox, Israeli Arabs) or powerful institutions (the Israel Defense Force (IDF)). We will also suggest that interventions by the High Court, in effect, policy displacement, were at times a positive catalyst for reform and at others a cause of change reversal.

Displacement and layering: Civic service for religious girls

Service has traditionally been defined in Israel as service in the military. The national security law, enacted in 1949, established a citizen army to which all able body men and women were drafted (three years for men and two years for women). In addition, citizens were required to do additional service each year in the reserves. The IDF was assigned civic tasks as well in the fields of education, welfare and immigrant absorption. Military service became a rite of passage into Israeli society for young men and women and for new immigrants. It was integrative and inclusive for those who were willing to share the Zionist ethos.

However, in actuality, Israel never adopted a universal policy of mandatory military service. From the start, religious girls could request to be excused from service and Israeli Arabs were never conscripted. Yeshiva students ² could defer service during their studies which were not limited in time. This differential service policy was often rationalized by ideology. In the first decades of the state, secular and religious Zionists shared a strong republican ethos that lauded and extolled military service and sacrifice to the state. These values were promoted in popular youth movements, in the state religious and secular schools and in the media. Israelis being “a nation in arms” regarded service in the citizen army as a component of good citizenship. Moreover, service in the military created social capital among those who served and promoted integration (Putnam and Goss, 2004; Roumani, 1979). It gave entrance into the “old boy network” and was often a trump card in finding a job (Levy and Mizrahi, 2008; Seidman, 2010). Conversely, for the non-Zionist ultra-orthodox who chose to devote themselves to religious studies and for Israeli Arabs who were exempted from military service, failing to serve was clearly a barrier to integration into Israeli society and economy (Levy, 2007; Peled and Shafir, 2002). Accordingly, with this patriotic republican regard for army service, Israel has never offered an alternative track of civic service to conscientious objectors as did many countries in Europe.

The first legislation pertaining to civic national service was adopted in the Knesset in 1953 with regard to religious women exempted from service. In what can be described as an act of vengeance against the religious parties for having voted against the government on an important issue or as a political maneuver to ensure passage of other legislation, Prime Minister Ben Gurion pushed through a law in the Knesset which required women excused from military service for religious reasons to serve two years in civic service. The law was supported by the secular parties but opposed by the small religious Zionist and ultra-orthodox parties, the latter resigning from the government in protest (Bick, 2013). ³

The National Service Law was passed by the Knesset in 1953 but has never been implemented. Discussions between the Ministry of Labor, which at the time was assigned ministerial authority to implement the law, and the religious Zionist Hapoel Hamizrachi party led to naught because they could not reach agreement on the details. The religious party insisted that the girls be permitted to live at home if they wished and that their supervisors be religiously observant, demands if met, would have rendered the law almost completely ineffectual since those most in need of their service resided in the country’s periphery. The ultra-orthodox organized mass demonstrations against the law, both in Israel and abroad avowing they would never obey a law that would “defile” their daughters. Reluctant to engage in further confrontations with the religious parties, the new Prime Minister Moshe Sharett suspended the discussions. The government’s attempt to achieve change in national service by means of policy displacement had failed. The law became a dead letter and remains as such since in all subsequent coalition agreements both the Labor and the Likud parties gave assurances to the ultra-orthodox parties that they would not implement the national service law (Bick, 2013).

Limited change was initiated 17 years later, in September 1970, when a small group of religious Zionist girls inspired by the nationalist feelings that engulfed the country after the 1967 war and discomfited by their exemption from service, asked members of the Knesset (MKs) from the National Religious Party (NRP) ⁴ to assist them in setting up a program of voluntary civic national service. In response a pilot program was established in several development towns in the periphery funded by the Ministry of Welfare.

At the same time Israel faced a serious shortage of teachers and teaching aides in the periphery. The government, at the request of the Minister of Education, decided to reopen the question of civic service for religious girls and appointed a ministerial committee to study the question. It considered two alternative policy strategies: implementing the 1953 law which would prove politically costly given the vigorous opposition of the ultra-orthodox parties or instituting a voluntary program along the lines of the pilot program established by the NRP a year before. In effect, the choice was between policy displacement and its greater political consequences or policy layering, which would create a smaller ripple of change without arousing significant opposition. The committee recommended the voluntary program which was accepted by the government. Implementation was assigned to the Ministry of Welfare, a portfolio held by the NRP. A policy of one year of voluntary service was instituted (rather than two that had been required in the 1953 law) supervised by religious personnel. Because service was voluntary, it did not impact on ultra-orthodox women who under the orders of their rabbis continued not to serve.

The government decision in 1971 was the first in a series of policy layering initiatives. It applied to a limited sector, religious Zionist girls, and was not open to others who did not serve in the military—ultra-orthodox men, Arabs, conscientious objectors or those rejected from service. By limiting its scope, it was able to sidestep the political minefields regarding service. Instead of implementing or rewriting the 1953 National Service Law, the Knesset amended the National Insurance Law to include the guidelines of civic service, the fields of assignments, the authority and responsibility of the placement agencies, and the rights and obligations of the volunteer (Article 287).

A series of amendments to the National Insurance Law 1998 (paragraph 3) and to the Absorption of Discharged Soldiers Law, 1994 were added over a period of years to grant the girls in national service the equivalent benefits of soldiers, e.g. post-service stipends for higher education, housing and businesses and free travel on public transportation. This gradual policy of equalizing the benefits with soldiers upgraded the status of civic national service and increased its attractiveness. Today the overwhelming majority of religious Zionist girls volunteer for national service, numbering 7,524 in 2002 and 11,160 in 2010 (Hatib and Biton, 2011).

More layering: Civic service for boys excused from the IDF

A second limited change in civic service policy occurs in 2001, again through a process of layering rather than through transformative legislation. The catalyst for change was a petition to the High Court of Justice challenging the exclusivity of national civic service. In 1995 Shlomit, a new non-profit service organization had assigned to civic service 12 Arab women and 10 Jewish men, rejected by the IDF because of disability. Soon after, it was notified by the Ministry of Labor that the volunteers were ineligible for service benefits because the existing administrative guidelines applied exclusively to religious girls. In response, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) petitioned the High Court in the name of a disabled Jewish boy and of two Arab girls claiming that they were being denied their “right to serve” (Eyal Daniel vs. the Director of National Insurance, HC9173/96). The court issued a decree nisi, requiring the government to defend its policy to the court. The government quickly reached an out-of-court agreement with ACRI promising to “study” the question and to develop new guidelines. It wanted to preclude a court decision which could have repercussions on other more politically charged conscription issues, e.g. yeshiva student deferments, and the exemption of Israeli Arabs. A committee appointed by the Minister of Labor to study the question recommended that the National Insurance guidelines be modified to include all those excused from service, including Israeli Arabs. However, when the Knesset in July 2001 passed the Voluntary National Service Law (Experimental-Boys) authorizing a limited pilot program (250 boys) it made no mention of Israeli Arabs. It is important here to note that the IDF still retained exclusive authority to determine who served and civic service was still not an option for conscientious objectors.

Thirty years after the civic service program for religious girls was established the program formally admitted its first male volunteers. The government had dragged its feet for five years and when it did act, it chose to enact a minimal change with relatively low political cost. However, it was the first small crack in the IDF’s monopoly on service for men and in its hard fast position against an alternative track of civic national service. The IDF was in fact opposed to the expansion of civic service and was on record against directing its surplus conscripts to a civic service track. It did not want to share its hegemony in the ethos of patriotism and service nor did it want funds diverted to service institutions not under its control. Rather than reduce manpower, it chose to expand military service to include assignments in the police, in military prisons and tangentially related “security” assignments in government offices in addition to service in education and welfare in the periphery (Seidman, 2010). ⁵ Through policy layering, minor modifications were introduced without reformulating IDF conscription policy.

Policy drift and displacement: Ultra-orthodox yeshiva students

While the status quo on long-term deferments for ultra-orthodox yeshiva students was held fast in coalition agreements, grassroots initiatives protesting this policy intensified, particularly by army reservists. By 2000, the number of yeshiva students with deferments had risen to almost 34 thousand. Many remained in yeshivas until age 41 in order to evade the draft, during which time they were not permitted to work but were privy to government subsidies, stipends, and tax exemptions. Ben Gurion’s decision in 1949 to grant deferments to four hundred yeshiva students in order to restore Jewish scholarship after the Holocaust had created a “community of scholars” that based its livelihood on government handouts (Berman, 2000; Friedman, 1991). This was a clear example of policy drift, when a policy continues although the circumstances that had prompted the initiation of the policy have vastly changed. Political actors who benefit from the policy protect it from change and by doing so maintain a situation that was not the intent of the policy’s architects nor was it necessarily in the interest of the general public (Hacker, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The policy of thousands of long term deferments was viewed as unfair and discriminatory by those who served and created a strain on the national economy, but it persisted because of the political power of the ultra-orthodox parties and their pivotal position in successive government coalitions (Cohen,1997; Ilan, 1999).

The catalyst for ending the drift and initiating policy change did not come from the government which was mired in political agreements with the ultra-orthodox parties nor from the politically impotent opposition but from the Israel High Court of Justice. In 1998 the court ruled that the long standing policy whereby the Defense Minister, in his administrative capacity, had granted deferments to tens of thousands of yeshiva students was inequitable and as such, unlawful. It gave the Knesset one year to pass new primary legislation to regulate yeshiva student deferments if it so wished (Rabinowitz v. the Minister of Defense, HC 3267/97). The court’s ruling brought relations with the ultra-orthodox to a crossroads and created an opportunity for the majority to transform national service policy, military, and civic. However, at this juncture rather than adopt transformative legislation, Israel’s policymakers again chose a course of policy layering and gradual cumulative change rather than nullifying the status quo.

The government appointed a special committee to study the issue. Its recommendations were adopted by the Knesset and written into The Service Deferment Law for Yeshiva Students for whom the Torah is their Trade (the Tal law). The Knesset accepted in principle that all citizens should be obliged to do some form of national service, but also took heed of the committee’s recommendation that conscription should be a gradual process and by consent. It recognized that the full and immediate conscription of all yeshiva students would not be enforceable given their strong opposition to service; nor did the IDF need all of them. It hoped that an important outgrowth of the new law would be an increase in the number of ultra-orthodox men leaving their studies and joining the work force (The Tal Committee, 2000). According to the law, yeshiva students at age 23 could interrupt their studies for one year and choose to work or study a trade without losing their yeshiva student status. At the end of this exploratory year of decision, they could return to full time yeshiva studies as before or enlist in the IDF for an abbreviated period of service. If rejected by the IDF, they would be obliged to serve one year in civic service and on completion would be eligible for all the benefits that accrued to those serving in the IDF in non-combat roles and more importantly, they could lawfully join the workforce. The policy paradigm was the civic service program for religious girls.

In actuality, the Tal law did not cause a major upheaval since it did not force yeshiva students to leave their studies against their volition. Its aim was modest: to achieve gradual change by enticing those who were not serious scholars to leave the yeshiva, fulfill their service obligation and then to go out to work. The ultra-orthodox parties strongly opposed the law but understood that the court had left the government with little recourse. The government, with the ultra-orthodox parties in the coalition, dragged its feet implementing the law. For five years it neglected to create the administrative infrastructure needed to operationalize the civic service program and only in 2004 did the Minister of Defense appoint yet another committee (the Ivri Committee) to study implementation of civic national service under the Tal law.

It is clear that when faced with a choice between gradual layered change and adopting broader more transformative change Israeli policymakers chose the former. The Ivri Committee concluded that mandatory service, for all citizens, Arab and Jew, military or civic was indeed the optimal policy but it would not be feasible politically given the strong opposition of both the ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arab sectors. Instead it recommended creating a track of civic service for ultra-orthodox men and, innovatively, a separate track for Israeli Arabs, the prototype being the veteran program of voluntary national service for religious girls. It also recommended the establishment of a Civic and National Service Administration (NCSA) to administer all three tracks of service. The government adopted the recommendations but did not establish the NCSA until January 2008. In the meanwhile, ultra-orthodox conscripts redirected by the IDF to civic service were left without placements. An impatient High Court, unimpressed by the government’s halfhearted steps to implement the Tal law warned in 2007 that it would strike down the law if the government did not vastly increase the number of ultra-orthodox inducted into the armed forces or to civic service.

The NCSA faced a formidable challenge marketing civic service to the ultra-orthodox. Among its first measures was to change the name of the program from “national” service to “civic” service in order to disassociate it from nationalism and Zionism, ideologies opposed by the ultra-orthodox. The NCSA chose a low key marketing strategy and refrained from advertising the program openly. Leaflets describing the program were left at the military recruitment centers but were not distributed in yeshivas or synagogues. The rabbis were purposely not approached to give their stamp of approval because it was feared that if they were asked for a ruling they might forbid students from participating. Recruitment was done by word of mouth and the rabbis’ approval achieved quietly, on a case by case basis. Most of the volunteers were assigned to placements within the insular ultra-orthodox community (Bick, 2010).

Nonetheless, the seeds of change began to take root in the ultra-orthodox community, albeit very slowly. The overwhelming majority (51,000 in 2009) continued to study in yeshivas and to defer service. Only 3,800 men took advantage of the year of decision, 1254 served an abbreviated period in the IDF and 1,752, served in civic service. On the positive side, each year the numbers who served increased and the community which had become accustomed to service deferments now had many families where one member served in the military or in national service. Moreover, those who served were more likely to go out to work after service. ⁶

Policy layering: Civic national service in the Arab sector

Instituting policy that would require an alienated, disaffected ethnic minority to contribute service to the state is a political challenge, particularly if until this time it had been exempt from any such obligation. In Israel, any government initiative that would have required all citizens to give service, would have inflamed passions on the Arab street. According to Israel conscription policy, Arab youth are not called up to military service, with the notable exception of the Druze (men) who have been drafted to the IDF since 1956 and the Bedouin who enlist as volunteers (Orgad, 2007). Consistently in the last several decades, Israeli governments have rejected proposals by MKs from across the political spectrum which sought to enact a universal mandatory program of national service that would have required Arab youth to serve (Bick, 2016). Similarly, as we have seen, when the subject of an equitable service policy came before the High Court of Justice regarding the ultra-orthodox, the court chose not to broaden the scope of its rulings to address the issue of service by Arabs.

The subject of service, military or civic arouses strong passions in the Arab community. The overwhelming majority of Arab citizens strongly oppose military service and are split on the question of civic service. The Arab leadership has taken a strong stand against civic national service which it views as a government plot to further the “Israelification” of Arab youth and a prologue to their conscription into the IDF (Hilou and Haim, 2014; Zarik, 2014).

In the past the government on several occasions had conducted exploratory talks with Arab leaders regarding the possibility of instituting civic national service in the Arab sector but with little progress. Talks begun in 2000 were discontinued after the October Events, when thousands of Israeli Arabs took to the streets in solidarity with the Palestinian uprising (Second Intifada) in Gaza and the West Bank. In the course of the demonstrations 12 Arabs were killed by police fire. An independent investigatory commission of the events sanctioned the government for its policy of neglect and discrimination against the Arab sector and called for immediate remedial measures (Or Commission, 2003). The Lapid committee, appointed by the government in September 2003 to study how to implement the Commission’s recommendations, recommended, among other things, the establishment of a voluntary program of civic service in the Arab sector. Such a program it said, would improve services, achieve greater equality and provide Arab youth with the opportunity to gain the stipends and benefits granted to those who serve. Similarly, the Ivri Committee appointed by the Minister of Defense recommended instituting voluntary civic service in the Arab sector (Ivri Committee, 2005). Neither committee considered mandatory service a reasonable option given the strong opposition of the Arab leadership. In December 2005 the government approved the establishment of voluntary programs of civic national service for all Israelis, Jews, and Arabs who were not conscripted to the armed forces. The decision was a major conceptual change in civic service policy and in policy toward the Arab community after years of inaction and policy inertia.

Given the strong opposition to service within the Arab sector, layering rather than displacement was in order. The program for religious Zionist girls served as the model, voluntary service for one year with an option of living at home and working within one’s own community. While Arab public opinion was relatively favorable toward the project, 76.2% in favor in 2007 (Smooha and Lechtman, 2012), the Arab leadership was unalterably opposed and it launched a concerted campaign to dissuade the youth from volunteering (Hilou and Haim, 2014).

Arab MKs and regional council heads organized meetings with school principals, students, and parents to warn that civic service was in fact a first step toward conscription. They pointed to the fact that the post-service grant to volunteers came out of the Discharged Soldiers Fund, clear evidence to the link between the security establishment and “civic” service. MK Ahmed Tibi stated it most clearly: “We don’t want anything like that through the state, no military service and no alternative to military service.” Moreover, he contended, Arab citizens should not be asked to give service until they achieve full political, economic, and social equality (Mako News, 26 June 2010). MK Jamal Zahalka charged that civic service was in fact “a colonialist attempt to weaken the Arabs’ national identity” (The Jerusalem Post, 7 June 2011). He branded those who served “lepers”, warning they would be ostracized by Arab society (Ynet, 27 October 2007) and would be at a serious disadvantage when they seek marriage partners (Haaretz, 9 June 2013).

The Baladna Arab youth organization also launched a viral campaign against national service, mainly through on-line media and workshops in schools and youth movements. Thousands attended Baladna’s anti-service seminars (The Media Line, 25 July 2011). Heads of regional councils pressured high school principals in their districts not to allow national service representatives to enter their schools to present the program and warned them not to accept volunteers.

Nonetheless, and despite the determined efforts by the Arab leadership to derail national service, significant but slow incremental change is taking place. In 2006 there were 240 Arab volunteers and in 2015, there were already 4,157, albeit a small percentage of those eligible, estimated at 25,000. The volunteers were comprised of Christians (10%), Moslems (54%), Bedouin (19%), and Druze (17%), and 90% of them were women. Of all, 75% of the volunteers served in Arab communities near their homes and 56% worked in education. (The Authority for National – Civic Service, April 2015.) In a move to make service more acceptable to Arab youth the NCSA pressed the government to take the post-service grants out of the hands of the Discharged Soldiers fund in order to defuse the charge that civic service was an extension of the military (The Shaked Committee, Protocol 27, 16 December 2013).

Druze women were the newest group to join national service. While Druze men have been drafted to the IDF since 1956, Druze women have been excused automatically because of their conservative religious and cultural traditions. The breakthrough occurred when the Head of the NCRA met with Druze religious leader Sheikh Moafaq Tarif and with the Druze religious council and assured them that the girls would not be asked to bear firearms or to wear uniforms and most importantly, would be able to live at home and serve in their own communities (The Shaked Committee, Protocol 27, 16 December 2013). For the first time, 618 Druze girls served in national service in 2013, more than half of those eligible.

Gradual change is taking place within the Arab community. Each year there are more youth who serve despite the fact that surveys indicate that support for service has declined among youth. Only 39.7% said in 2011 that they were willing to serve, down from 53% in 2009 (Smooha and Lechtman, 2012). While these statistics are troubling and point to the successful campaign against service lodged by the Arab leadership and Baladna, if we look at the bigger picture, Arab citizens, for the first time in Israel’s history, have the opportunity to serve and to gain the commensurate benefits and each year an increasing number choose to do so. Change is taking place, albeit incrementally, through a process of layering, through a series of administrative reforms.

Displacement and confrontation: The High Court intervenes

In February 2012, the High Court of Justice re-entered the policy picture in response to citizen petitions against the Tal law. Dissatisfied with the low number of ultra-orthodox serving in the army (1280 in 2011) and in national service (1070) the court struck down the law. (Resler v. Knesset, HCJ 6298/07.) Chief Justice Edna Arbel argued in the majority opinion that the new deferment policy was inequitable because it discriminated against the majority, the soldiers who were risking their lives while their compatriots engaged in study. While acknowledging that slow progress had indeed been made and that the number of ultra-orthodox conscripts and civic service volunteers had risen steadily each year, they were deemed insufficient.

The court forced the government to abandon its strategy of gradual but cumulative change and to adopt measures that would create punctuated change, i.e. a major transformation in policy. Several government and legislative committees worked on formulating a new law. In March 2014, the Knesset approved amendment 19 to the Defense Service Law (The Equal Sharing of the Burden Law) which created a new conscription policy for yeshiva students. The new law exempted current yeshiva students ages 18–22 from all service if they continued their studies until age 24. However, if they chose to leave their studies they would be required to serve in the army, and if rejected by the IDF, to serve in civic service. Civic service would be two years, rather than one under the Tal Law, and could begin only at age 21.

The transformative aspects of the new law were the addition of conscription targets and punitive measures, two changes that were absent from the Tal law. Starting in 2017 the government will set conscription targets for the ultra-orthodox recruits. If a sufficient number of yeshiva students volunteer to fill the targets, the others would be allowed to continue their studies and at aged 26 would be exempted completely from service. However, if the target number of conscripts is not met, there would be a general conscription of yeshiva students, with the exception of 1,800 promising scholars selected by their rabbis who would be allowed to continue their studies. There would be criminal penalties, imprisonment, for non-compliance.

The ultra-orthodox responded with fury to the new law, and organized mass protests. They were particularly incensed by the sanctions for non-compliance. Their rabbis announced that they would direct their students to choose incarceration rather than cooperate with conscription. However, since the second stage of the law is mandated to begin only in 2017 it leaves open the very realistic possibility that a future government with the ultra-orthodox parties in the coalition may amend the law again.

Regrettably, the court decision and the subsequent new legislation caused a setback to civic national service. Yeshiva students at age 21 were less likely consider signing up for military or civic service since under stage one of the new law they were to be exempted from all service at age 24. Moreover, the new law increased the anger and animosity toward the state among the ultra-orthodox. The number of ultra-orthodox in civic service plummeted after the legislation was passed. Only half of the expected volunteers had signed up to civic service in 2014 (The Shaked Committee, Protocol, 24 November 2014).

As part of its reform of its conscription policy, the Knesset in March 2014 passed the National Civic Service Law—2014, the first primary civic national service legislation since 1953. Consistent with a layering approach the law relates only to ultra-orthodox yeshiva students and does not relate to the other groups who volunteer for civic national service.

Discussion and conclusion

In societies marked by deep cleavages based on religion and/or national identity it is a daunting and perhaps impossible task to formulate and implement a common universal policy in areas that impinge upon group values, beliefs or norms. This is true, for example, in education where the values and goals of the majority may conflict with the faith and culture of a minority. It is also germane to the policy area of conscription/national service where by definition the state exerts control over the lives and behavior of conscripts, albeit for a limited time. Minorities if they perceive government policy to be a danger to their way of life or contrary to their political beliefs may oppose this policy and resist its implementation. A program whose intent is to compel change may in fact prove counter-productive; it may result in the protective reinforcement of community values and norms and increase a minority’s alienation from the state. For this reason, the choice of strategy of institutional change is of critical importance. The mode of change and the likelihood of its effective implementation will depend on the relative power of the political actors and on the policy instruments that are applied. Political alliances may protect the minority against changes in policy, thereby resulting in policy drift that continue a policy adopted years before. However, at some point these alliances may begin to unravel as electoral fortunes change and new advocacy groups organize to challenge the status quo. Alternatively, policy drift may create an inequitable situation which as seen in the case of Israel’s conscription policy may be successfully challenged in the courts.

In the case of Israel and its civic national service policy, layering as a mode of change was a pragmatic and less politically costly way to go than broad legislation or policy displacement because it allowed for a measure of fluidity rather than compulsion and for a differentially constructed policy. It could take into account multi-cultural difference and contest the wisdom and implementability of a one size fits all public policy. For example, religious girls could be exempted from service but encouraged to do voluntary national service without obliging ultra-orthodox girls or all those exempted from service (including Arabs) to do so. Boys rejected from military service could be directed to civic national service, without opening it up to conscientious objectors, a policy option opposed by the IDF. This process of layering allowed consociational arrangements to continue or to be marginally amended without upending the political understandings that had been reached decades before (Don-Yehiya, 1999).

However, if policy change is remanded to partisan political actors alone policy drift may create a gross imbalance that they may choose not to tackle. While cognizant of the gross inequities of the existing policy, it may be in the interest of the government to maintain the status quo in order not to jeopardize political alliances and the stability of the coalition. For that reason, it is willing to pay lip service to institutional change but in fact delay its adoption because of its expected political fallout. It will appoint committees to study reform, to make recommendations and in the meanwhile allow the status quo to prevail. In such cases, the intervention of an outside actor, not constrained by political agreements or considerations can be an important catalyst for punctuated institutional change. The outside actor, which in the case of Israel was the High Court of Justice, can be effective if it has the constitutional authority to compel reluctant political actors to correct an imbalance created by policy drift.

However, there is an important distinction to be made between intervention to remedy an inequity in response to a petition by a minority or individual who claims that government policy discriminates unfairly, and an intervention which orders the majority to cancel its consociational concessions to a minority group. In the first instance, court intervention brings relief to individuals who are unjustly treated. Such was the case in the petition by the boys rejected by the IDF who were rendered ineligible for service under the National Insurance Law. Their appeal to the court served as a catalyst to the government to reassess and amend existing policy, albeit marginally, to redress this injustice.

In the case of yeshiva students however we have a different kind of judicial intervention with more far reaching political consequences. In its first more limited decision in 1998 the court invalidated the longstanding deferment policy and ordered the legislature to anchor policy in primary legislation rather than in administrative directives. It left the content of the legislation to legislators’ political discretion and did not rule out new consociational arrangements with the ultra-orthodox. Its ruling was also specific to yeshiva students and did not extend to other sectors. The lawmakers chose to implement a relatively moderate program of change, which encouraged rather than forced yeshiva students to leave their studies. As a result, the Tal Law began a process of gradual change on the grassroots level with a small but growing number of ultra-orthodox men leaving their studies and doing service, military or civic. However in its decision in 2012, the court served not as a catalyst but also as a key player in determining the direction and the extent of change. It invalidated the Tal law for not meeting a universal standard of equality and in effect denied the majority the right to make concessions to the minority, multi-cultural considerations and political exigencies notwithstanding. This decision and the resultant legislation that included penal sanctions against yeshiva students who failed to comply set back the nascent process of change that had begun in the ultra-orthodox community.

In the Arab sector, the numbers of those volunteering to national civic service have been increasing steadily despite the steadfast opposition of Arab political leaders and we anticipate that as more youth engage in the program their leaders may reconsider their opposition especially if they are integrated into the program’s administration. If however Israeli lawmakers decide to legislate mandatory national service or if the High Court will order the Knesset to adopt a universal and more equitable policy of service, it will set back civic national service in the Arab sector significantly.

Our study of the evolution of civic service policy in Israel has provided some insights that may be useful when considering institutional change in western democracies in policy areas that are politically sensitive for minorities, religious, and ethnic. The Israeli experience has shown that a strategy of layering rather than displacement was a preferable mode of policy change, in politically charged issue areas.

Policy layering however may be a difficult process for analysts to research because it requires a research strategy that is longitudinal and detailed. Actions that make headlines and receive media attention are usually displacement decisions (e.g. transformative legislation or High Court decisions) and the resultant response or fallout from target groups. It is more difficult to trace changes that are achieved by a series of small incremental decisions because they take place under the radar of the media and are by their very nature less confrontational. Discussions are held and agreements reached that may adjust policy, avoiding a showdown. Changes may be small and perhaps seemingly insignificant when considered individually. However, when we examine where change began and where policy stands decades later, as new layers were added to old, we can then determine that significant policy change has indeed taken place. This is the challenge for further research in understanding policy change.