Policy transfer in a corporatist context: Agents,adjustments and continued innovation

Abstract

This article examines a case of collaborative policy transfer from Australia to Sweden involving a three-year project of structured analysis, piloting and system modification. The influential role of agency and the manner in which formal mechanisms established to manage engagement impact upon policy analysis and transfer are explored. The analysis finds that agency mobilised with the supplementation of institutional resources becomes a highly motivating and powerful force underpinning collaborative policy transfer processes. The nuances and challenges of policy transfer from a predominantly neoliberal administrative domain into a characteristically corporatist environment are analysed demonstrating that domestic policy processes are critical for defining avenues for actor participation and the manner through which policy adjustments are progressed. A key finding of the work is that policy transfer is more than the one-way transmission of ideas, systems and practices from one jurisdiction to another but can also act as an iterative process, more evidently linked into each jurisdictions’ domestic policy cycles of problem analysis, action and review. Under collaborative policy transfer the resources and interest from two distinct locations are mobilised around a policy concern and this effectively enhances the level of critical thinking and reflective practice that contributes to problem solving and solution development. The findings of this study confirm that cross-country collaboration and transfer is an increasingly important pathway in the ongoing development of policy reform and innovation.

Keywords

Corporatism policy agents policy transfer regulatory policy road transport compliance

Introduction

Over the past two decades a major branch of study has developed within the policy and public administration literature that considers how policy and the associated ideas, institutions and administrative systems transfer across levels of government and from one jurisdiction to another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Evans, 2009b). The study of this phenomenon helps improve policy practice by directly learning from the experience of others (Rose, 2005) and also builds our theoretical understanding of factors that shape an increasingly complex and dynamic policy process at the local, national and interjurisdictional level (Grin and Loeber, 2006; Marsh and Sharman, 2009).

Finding solutions elsewhere and then understanding how they were developed, implemented and managed over time not only requires the exchange of information between parties (Bennett, 1991) but also, in some cases, a commitment to engagement and a process of collaboration (Evans and McComb, 1999). This article examines the experience of Australia and Sweden in their efforts to collaborate in the development and implementation of a regulatory compliance programme that targets the commercial trucking industry. Over a three-year period, a project was undertaken to trial and assess the Australian programme and progress its implementation in Sweden. This involved road transport agencies and industry stakeholders from each country in a process of engagement through formal committees and working groups. A key finding of this study is the important and influential role of agency when supported with institutional resources and defined administrative processes.

A key concern for this study is identifying factors that reshape policy as it progresses to local implementation and in the context of Sweden, aspects of corporatism and how it impacts on policy transfer are examined. The findings highlight how characteristics of the administrative domain shape processes for actor participation and the mechanisms through which policy adjustments are managed. The study of international policy transfer is also of interest since it provides insight into an aspect of the policy process that increasingly characterises domestic policy work (Fawcett and Marsh, 2012). Governments, firms and communities are ever more aware of developments in other jurisdictions, nearby and distant, and often call for innovative responses to local problems that demonstrate global leadership. This makes policy work local in solution and focus but also a process shaped by global trends and influences. The case study presented in this article illustrates the global search by Sweden for ideas in crafting a local policy response to a regulatory and compliance problem in road transport that is common to many countries. The Australian compliance system (Intelligent Access Project (IAP)) was considered a new and unique system that had not been tried by other road transport agencies and hence became subject to sustained analysis and testing. And while the transfer of policies between Western countries is a dominant theme within the literature (Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Marsden and Stead, 2010), what is unique to this study is that it documents collaboration and transfer between two distinctly different countries in terms of location and geography and who share no significant history of social, political or economic engagement. This study specifically highlights how collaborative policy transfer moves beyond the one-way transmission of ideas and administrative systems from jurisdiction A to jurisdiction B, to an iterative process of policy learning, adjustment and improvement in each jurisdictions’ domestic processes of analysis, action and review. In these circumstances, policy transfer accentuates the analysis and critique of policy problems common to multiple jurisdictions. In an increasingly global context, this work demonstrates that collaborative policy transfer is an important contributor to contemporary efforts in policy reform and innovation.

This article is organised into the following sections. The next section explores the academic literature on policy transfer and touches on the relevance of corporatist policy making within the Swedish context. In this study, local corporatist practices are noted to have an influence on actor engagement and the transfer process. This is then followed by an overview of the operational features of the Intelligent Access Program (IAP) as it works in Australia and the arrangements under which the project that trialled the IAP was managed in Sweden. The methodology utilised in this study is then outlined. The final sections of the article provide an analysis of the collaborative process, highlighting some of the key findings in the case. This includes an analysis of factors that have facilitated transfer and encouraged adaptation. The article concludes with implications for theories of policy transfer and interjurisdictional collaboration.

Policy transfer: A growing area of attention and analysis

The process of transfer, movement, adoption and implementation of policies across states and levels of governments has been subject to considerable academic attention (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). This study utilises Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996, 2000: 5) frequently cited definition of policy transfer as a process where administrative arrangements and ideas move from one political setting to another. This process is distinct from policy diffusion which concerns the communication and dissemination of ideas and practices across social systems over time (Berry and Berry, 1999: 171; Stone, 2004: 564). The value of the diffusion literature is that it identifies context and broader global forces that orientate state interest in specific projects and policy transfer action. Authors such as Dobbin et al. (2007) point to the competitive interaction of states and highlight how this predisposes policy makers to learn from the policy experiments and experience of other jurisdictions. While in some cases the expressed intention is to learn from others, successful policy transfer still requires a process of embedding in the recipient’s social and political context (Alasuutari, 2014). Thus, whilst related to concepts of policy diffusion and convergence, policy transfer embodies a research agenda with a distinct focus on subject, place and agency (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). For authors like Stone (2000, 2004, 2012) the strength of the policy transfer literature is its focus on the internal dynamics of the adopting state and the role of agency in the transfer process. Agents act as important conduits of knowledge transfer and instigators of action that bring together parties in the policy transfer process. A notable development in the policy transfer literature is the acknowledgement of the growing diversity of transfer agents and their influence (Grin and Loeber, 2006). Agency is no longer limited to governments and their multinational bodies and policy transfer is often shaped by the aspirations and actions of non-government actors, think tanks, experts, advocates and corporate networks (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Porto de Oliveira, 2017; Stone, 2004). A key concern for the role of agents is how they contribute to learning as part of the transfer process. This is a challenging and complex research task since evidence of learning requires a detailed analysis of the structures and process through which organisations and individuals interact, exchange ideas and develop knowledge (Dolowitz, 2009).

A variety of factors can influence the transfer process, leading to the modification and adaption of policy in the receiving jurisdiction. Domestic policy issues (Béland, 2005; Duncan, 2009), economic and social conditions (Kwon, 2009), institutional arrangements and competition (Manwaring, 2016), government capabilities (Shipan and Volden, 2012), historical and cultural differences in institutional development (Desai and Snavely, 2007) and temporal elements such as political and electoral changes (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012) have been noted to influence the transfer, adoption and modification of policy. Local context, particularly the institutional and political environment are noted as important determinants shaping policy transfer (Alasuutari, 2014; Clavier, 2010; Johnston, 2005; Radaelli, 2005). These conditions influence how policy travels is received within a new location and what it finally becomes as a newly implemented policy. Revealing and tracing such micro processes is particularly common with the case-based research of policy transfer and aligns with the focus of this work (Hadjiisky et al., 2017; Marsh and Sharman, 2009).

This study describes a transfer process that has its foundations in a project that pilots and tests a policy over three years prior to the determination of what will be adopted and transferred. Here, policy transfer is a voluntary and rational activity, deliberately integrated into local analytical structures and processes over a defined period of time. The activity is future focussed and designed to be a constructive learning process that draws on the experience of another jurisdiction to improve national policy (Malik and Cunningham, 2006). This highlights a distinguishing feature of policy transfer where actors share a common affiliation with the project, engage in negation and debate on the aspects of policy structure and action, and are informed about the policy preferences and choices of others (Knill, 2005). In this study, action is centred around shared policy objectives, a factor noted to influence the transfer process (De Jong and Geerlings, 2005). Operationalising policy through pilots and trials strengthens the learning process shifting it from the soft process that Dolowitz describes as involving ‘… policy makers going on vacation, seeing something they like, and then coming back and attempting to mimic it’ (2009: 323). In contrast, undertaking a three-year project to analyse and investigate a potential new policy represents a harder form of learning particularly orientated towards understanding operational impact within the local context (Dolowitz, 2009). Mobilising resources around a defined project to test and examine a new policy also entrenches transfer into the local policy-making process and brings to the fore the role of local actors and the agents of transfer as they engage in deliberations. As Stone notes, policy transfer and development is ‘not the exclusive prerogative of governments or international organizations … but incorporates independent societal and corporate interests into a policy network’ (2004: 558–559). These aspects of policy transfer have particular resonance with the corporatist nature of Swedish policy making and administration which are known for being more open to actor engagement and deliberation (Larsson and Bäck, 2008; Levin, 2009). The role and nature of actor networks forms an important part of the analysis in this case since the empirical data reveals divergent activities and interests. Some actors are seen to support transfer while others seek to reshape policy on implementation. A key driver of actor behaviour is market forces. Competition, shaped by global and domestic economic forces, is known to influence actor interest in policy transfer (Dobbin et al., 2007; Walker, 2017). The analytical focus of this study aims to explore these recognised aspects of policy transfer, including the role of shared objectives and common problem definition, the impact of local actors and the agency of champions who are active in promoting policy transfer (Porto de Oliveira, 2017).

This study is also concerned with the dominant frame that shapes state and actor interaction in the development and implementation of policy. Australia’s neoliberal approach to economic and social policy management (Castles, 2007; Fenna and Tapper, 2012) contrasts significantly to the Swedish policy-making process that is characteristically more corporatist in style and approach (Öberg, 2015). These macro shaping forces tend to be given less attention in the policy transfer literature. However, in this study the ongoing legacy of corporatist policy making in Sweden plays an evident role in determining the path and process for policy transfer. Corporatism in the Swedish context is understood as the ‘institutionalized and privileged integration of organized interests in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies’ (Christiansen et al., 2010: 27). These arrangements can exist in a variety of policy areas and involves a ‘political exchange between privileged interest groups and the state’ (Öberg et al., 2013: 367). In this scenario, governments control legislation and authoritative decision-making power, while interest groups are assumed to ‘control internal opinions’ (Öberg et al., 2013: 367). These groups are actively involved in the co-ordination and mediation of policy development processes and hence well positioned to offer support or consent for government policy that is favourable to their own objectives (Öberg et al., 2013; Lijphart, 2012). While some authors argue there is an evident decline in the strength of corporatist practices in some policy areas (Christiansen et al., 2010; Lindvall and Sebring, 2006), the active participation of interest organisations still remains a distinguishing feature of Swedish policy-making processes (Öberg, 2015). This understanding of actor and state interaction in Sweden is important for this case study, since the analysis, modification and transfer of new systems and policy practices occurs subject to local corporatist decision-making structures. While discussed in more detail in the body of the article, the analysis suggests it is this corporatist mode of interaction that plays an important role in shaping both the manner of policy transfer to Sweden as well as the policy that is finally adopted for implementation.

Before moving to a discussion of how Australian and Swedish transport agencies engaged in the process of policy transfer, the following section describes the operational features of the IAP and how it contributes to road safety and compliance policy in the trucking sector.

The Intelligent Access Project

The road transport sector involves different regulatory approaches that seek to achieve compliance with a regime of prescriptive standards that stipulate weight limits, dimensions and operational standards of trucks and other complex industrial heavy vehicles that use the road network. Innovations in vehicle design and improvements in technology have made it possible for regulatory schemes to utilise mobile and intelligent forms of technology to monitor and survey driver behaviour and vehicle compliance to routes, weights and speed. These new tools provide supplementary approaches to existing enforcement practices and are increasingly drawn on by governments to help manage risk where regulatory and policy change approves greater access to the road network for larger trucks and unusual heavy vehicles.

One such innovative compliance tool is the IAP, a national voluntary programme administered by Transport Certification Australia (TCA). The IAP is the first regulatory telematics application in Australia and it enables the provision of accurate compliance monitoring for trucks and heavy vehicles. TCA is a statutory body established by national, state and territory road transport agencies to manage and deliver regulatory telematics services. The IAP uses Global Navigation Satellite System to monitor the speed, time and location of trucks. This information is obtained through the electronic in-vehicle IAP device installed in participating vehicles. In return for committing to 24/7 electronic monitoring of compliance, vehicle operators are provided with improved access to the Australian road network. For example, vehicles may be permitted to carry loads above the regulated limit and travel on specified routes between a primary site and a processing plant, port or depot. Such arrangements provide significant productivity advantages for trucking firms. As Figure 1 illustrates, IAP service providers, transport operators and road transport authorities share an interactive relationship with each other in the functioning of the IAP. At the centre of the triangle is TCA whose role is to ensure that IAP service providers are certified and audited. IAP service providers supply the in-vehicle units and certified services to transport operators enrolled in the IAP (TCA, 2016c). Road transport authorities stipulate access conditions and entitlements that must be adhered to by transport operators. This information is conveyed to TCA and included in the IAP framework of conditions accessed and monitored by telematics service providers. In the case of noncompliance, for example a transport operator travels off an approved route or is remotely detected breaching other specified travel conditions such as time of travel or speed, a report is electronically generated by the IAP service provider and sent to the relevant road enforcement authority. The enforcement authority will then assess the report, deciding whether any action or penalty is required (TCA, 2016c).

Figure 1.

The IAP operational model.

The IAP offers a system of assurance to road authorities and the potential for innovative transport solutions as well as more profitable operations to truck operators. The programme is in operation across all Australian states and has just over 3600 vehicles participating under a variety of programmes, schemes and special conditions (TCA, 2016b). Firms voluntarily participate, reflecting business decisions that assess the economic value of improved access to the road network against the cost of participating in such an intensive monitoring programme.

The IAP and Sweden

Internationally, the Australian road transport sector is considered a world leader in terms of efficiency and innovation (Walker, 2012). Australia’s experience in managing and regulating new vehicle designs and configurations means it is the focus of attention for many countries considering productivity reform as well as new methods for monitoring compliance and enforcing safety standards. Swedish transport officials and academics engaged in road transport research first became aware of innovative regulatory developments in Australia through sessions presented at the 2009 Intelligent Transport Systems World Congress held in Stockholm. At this time Swedish officials saw the IAP as a potential compliance application that could help manage some of the capacity constraints of the road network and demands from industry for greater road access. During 2010, a transport academic from Lund University with close connections to Swedish transport agencies visited Australia to further analyse and assess the operation of the IAP. This initial engagement and exposure to Australian policy and industry practices was followed up with a formal study visit by policy officers from Swedish road transport agencies (Trafikverket and Transportstyrelsen) in 2011 (TCA, 2011). Staff from TCA facilitated the visit of Swedish officials to various state transport agencies and to IAP industry demonstration sites across Australia. At this time Swedish officials were considering the development of a national programme of policy and regulatory change for road transport and Australian regulatory innovation was seen as presenting possible options for addressing key compliance challenges within their reform agenda.

From this initial visit strong interpersonal relations developed between key individuals from TCA, Trafikverket and Lund University, Sweden. Interviewees described this as a formative period during which the Swedish delegation gained an understanding of the operational detail of the IAP and how it might be applied within the Swedish context. Officers from TCA were subsequently invited to travel to Sweden in 2014 and 2017 and this supported further exchange of information and the development of ideas on how to operationalise the IAP in Sweden. A unique feature of this case was that the transfer of policy and engagement between parties was formalised through an agreement to a three-year project where the concept would be piloted and assessed for implementation. A memorandum of understanding between TCA and the Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket) was signed in 2012 (TCA, 2012) and the trial of the IAP in Sweden commenced in 2014 (TCA, 2014). The Swedish component of the trial was managed through Lund University with funding provided from the Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket). The project involved a range of stakeholders including the national Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen), the Transport Efficiency Research Centre (CLOSER) (https://closer.lindholmen.se/en), the Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute (VTI), the forest research institute, Skogforsk as well as truck manufacturers Volvo and Scania.

Another distinctive feature of this transfer case was the way in which central operational components of policy remained based in Australia throughout the trial process. Rather than duplicate the monitoring infrastructure in Sweden, the IAP technology remained located in Melbourne, Australia. Australian providers tracked Swedish trucks electronically with compliance infringements being reported to TCA. TCA then sent the breach of regulatory conditions to the transport authority and project managers in Sweden. To support this arrangement regular telephone conferences were held with Australian and Swedish stakeholders to discuss trial progress, barriers and implementation issues. This unique arrangement allowed Swedish stakeholders to experience the IAP and observe its functions, benefits and challenges before deciding whether to invest in the required policy, regulatory and monitoring infrastructure.

As noted earlier, the trial of the IAP occurred within the context of ongoing discussions about road transport policy reform in Sweden (Trafikverket, 2017). Over recent years, there has been a concerted push to see the introduction of longer and heavier trucks in Sweden. While industry and government have been keen to see increased productivity in sectors such as forestry, pressure for policy reform has also derived from the differential limits of neighbouring jurisdictions (Finland), which are more generous in length and mass. Sweden has traditionally adopted a highly consultative form of policy development and engagement with local stakeholders (Anton, 1969; Öberg, 2015; Petersson, 2015). The process for developing this current generation of transport reforms involved a national steering committee with numerous subgroups undertaking specific projects relevant to the reform agenda. The project that examined the IAP operated and reported as one such subgroup. Swedish vehicle manufacturers, Volvo and Scania, were central participants in the IAP trial providing resources and vehicles to help test the application of the concept on the national road network. A central element of the Swedish transport reform agenda was that the introduction of higher capacity vehicles occurs with secure forms of monitoring and control, particularly to assist with infrastructure protection such as weak bridges (Wendel, 2016). The IAP was considered and tested as a possible regulatory tool for managing this compliance risk.

Following the completion of the three-year trial in late 2016, the Swedish government determined that it would implement a modified version of the IAP. Implementation would follow a phased approach. In the first instance, trucking firms use their own telematics services to store and retain auditable records of vehicle movements that may be subject to random inspection by road transport agencies to confirm compliance to specified conditions. The scheme has been called Intelligent Access Control and applies to vehicles permitted to carry extra weights (up to 74 tonne) beyond the standard limit of 64 tonne. Over a period of years (unspecified), the electronic surveillance of vehicles will migrate to a real time system that resembles the same monitoring and reporting framework as the IAP. There is no commitment to establish a TCA type authority to certify telematics systems. Truck manufacturer in-vehicle units have been approved as recognised tracking and recording systems and are not subject to third-party certification against performance standards (as in the Australian programme). Before discussing the results and findings, an outline of the methodology used to collect data and examine the policy transfer process follows.

Methodology

This is a qualitative study drawing on several data sources including interviews, observations and document analysis. It has involved a total of 22 interviews with different stakeholders in Australia and Sweden. This includes eight interviews in Australia with representatives from TCA, IAP telematics service providers, representatives of truck industry associations and truck industry consultants. These interviews took place over three months in 2015 and were approximately 45 minutes in duration. Fourteen interviews were conducted in Sweden during a two-week research visit in December 2015. Representatives were interviewed from the national transport agencies, road safety research centres, truck manufacturers, logistic firms, hauliers, university experts and representatives of industry associations and consultants to the industry. In Sweden, the interviews ranged from 30 minutes to one hour and were carried out in English since all the participants were fluent with the language. The study has elements of participant observation since it also involved attending policy and stakeholder meetings where trucking and road transport policy reform and trial results were discussed and reported. These meetings were conducted in English to accommodate the researchers. Both the Australian and Swedish interviews were semi-structured, including a range of open-ended questions that allowed interviewees to raise any points of concern and interest. The interviews were recorded and later transcribed and then thematically analysed. To support the analysis research was also undertaken reviewing the literature relevant to transport compliance and policy transfer, agency reports were reviewed along with other policy documents relevant to the IAP and road transport policy reform in Australia and Sweden. A level of triangulation and thematic analysis was undertaken to validate issues shared across participants and with document sources. This approach is consistent with standard studies of policy work (Hall, 2006; Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). While a weakness of qualitative methods is the subjective nature of data collection and analysis, it is recognised that the experience of direct engagement with actors and their subject matter allows for insightful interpretation and the identification of interconnected issues (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). By using this inductive method key factors that influence the transfer and implementation of the IAP have been identified and critiqued. The following section discusses these findings.

Findings: Factors that influence the transfer of the IAP

An outstanding feature of this study is the investment from key agents and institutions in processes of engagement and collaboration to help support the successful analysis, trial and transfer of policy. The results show, however, that despite the commitment of lead actors to collaborate and transfer policy, local conditions and stakeholder interest play a critical role in reshaping what is finally adopted for implementation. The following discussion highlights features of the engagement process as well as the inevitable tension that emerges from the Swedish corporatist approach to policy making. Discussion considers how this aspect of local policy development both strengthens the analysis of what is suitable for local adoption but also provides opportunities for significant local stakeholders to shape policy as it progresses through transfer and implementation processes. Market factors are identified as influencing interest in the local application of the IAP and the results also reveal the benefits of learning that emerge from undertaking a three-year collaborative project.

Shared regulatory objectives and collaboration

One of the key findings of this study has been the importance of shared core regulatory objectives that help with the initiation of policy transfer processes. The protection of infrastructure and improved road safety were key objectives shared and expressed by interviewees from both Australia and Sweden and noted as factors that brought them together to explore how they might collaborate in policy reform. One interviewee explained, ‘their issues are the same as ours which is what’s really remarkable. For two different countries on … opposite sides of the world, the very issues that drove the IAP in this country are the same issues that are driving them’ (IntA02).¹

What is notable in this case is that mechanisms for collaboration were formalised by the signing of a memorandum of understanding. Institutionally shaped processes of engagement subsequently flowed from this formal agreement, including an interjurisdictional steering committee as well as Australian participation (via teleconference) on the Swedish working group that reported on the pilot of the IAP to the Swedish national steering committee on road transport reform. The meetings of these groups helped sustain regular contact and participation from policy officers and researchers. These forums contributed to an atmosphere of collaboration and allowed actors from both jurisdictions to share ideas and jointly analyse the policy implications of the IAP in a new environment. A number of interviewees noted that frequent engagement and exchange of information facilitated policy learning and this meant that ‘… trust is possible’ (IntA01). Swedish stakeholders saw the trial ‘very much as a collaborative effort’ (IntSw7) and particularly valued the interaction and analysis stating: ‘the collaboration with TCA, the talks on how we are going are of much, much more value than the test we do with the boxes’ (IntSw1). These observations are consistent with earlier studies that note policy transfer is more likely to succeed when it involves jurisdictions in collaboration around similar ‘substantive problems’ for which they are seeking a policy solution (De Jong and Geerlings, 2005; Johnston, 2005)

Central to the success of this collaborative engagement has been the lead role played by key actors in Sweden and Australia. In Sweden it was the transport academic from Lund University who played a critical role in advocating for the transfer of the IAP and aligning this initiative with an existing network of actors from industry, government and research institutes already committed to progressing national reform in road transport policy. On the Australian side it was a senior officer within TCA who shared a conviction that the IAP was an effective compliance policy that could be readily transferred to other jurisdictions. The conviction of these two actors was underpinned with financial support from transport agencies to investigate the feasibility of policy transfer. Here we see the role of agency in the transfer process strengthened through material and institutional support. For Sweden this represented an investment in analysing a potential component of national transport policy reform, while for the Australians, participation in the project represented an opportunity to further test and validate the investment they had made in the electronic monitoring of trucks and heavy vehicles. These agents or ‘champions of transfer’ played an important role in sustaining actor networks and continued interest in the policy transfer process (Porto de Oliveira, 2017). Throughout the three years of the IAP transfer project these agents remained designated points of access to the administrative systems and policy-making processes of their respective jurisdictions. Their subject expertise and knowledge of local institutions and processes helped build trust amongst parties and was effective in resolving obstruction and instances of stakeholder resistance. A number of interviewees identified these agents as critical in connecting actors with shared interests and providing information that improved participants’ understanding of the IAP concept.

Distinct approaches to policy development and industry engagement

In the field of road transport regulation, Australia and Sweden share similar administrative structures, having robust regulatory and public sector agencies, active industry associations and a sophisticated transport and logistics industry. This occurs within relatively similar democratic states and hence this institutional likeness would be assumed to allow for a smooth transfer of policy. However, this research has found that despite these common administrative structures, policy-making processes significantly differ in each country. Sweden’s administrative and governance processes are distinctly measured and corporatist in style (Anton, 1969; Dahlström, 2015; Jacobsson et al., 2015), a trait well recognised by a number of interviewees. One noted, ‘in Sweden we discuss, discuss, discuss … it takes much longer to reach a decision’ (IntSw5). Another commented that ‘here in Sweden we have a tradition to investigate everything thoroughly … to have rather well-grounded decisions. It is a tradition we have’ (IntSw6). These comments highlight the practice of interest group negotiation and mediation that characterises Swedish policy-making processes. During our participation at steering group meetings, we observed representatives from industry including Volvo, Scania and the forestry industry playing an influential role in negotiations and discussions about road transport reform. These corporations contributed resources, technical assistance and vehicles to the IAP trial. Industry representatives were also heavily involved in reporting trial results and contributing to the analysis of findings. From the Australian perspective close engagement and embedding of significant industry players into the policy process seems unusual and potentially problematic where business and national interests may not align. One interviewee stated these concerns, explaining that in Australia third-party actors are excluded from strategic discussions, ‘we also recognise they aren’t Government and they have their own business interests which is good but also problematic … and I think excluding third-parties at certain points in the process is only right and proper’ (IntA01).

In contrast to these comments, the involvement of industry and major truck manufacturing corporations was discussed by a number of the Swedish interviewees as characteristic of standard policy-making practice. One interviewee claimed, ‘it’s part of the Swedish way of working. You talk with industry, manufacturers of goods and the government. Together we can find some solution that is beneficial for the industry and the manufacturers. Also the society’ (IntSw2). Another interviewee explained that ‘policy-making is a kind of interplay between some industries, union and the Government’ (IntSw11). To further the point, one interviewee expressed that ‘this is something that Sweden takes pride in. It’s an old … way of working things in Sweden that the administration and the industry works together … so it’s … nothing new’ (IntSw3).

Our observations of lengthy discussions and a desire for consensus decisions at steering committee and working group meetings is consistent with much early work and analysis undertaken by Anton (1969) who described the Swedish policy-making process as deliberative, rationalistic and open to stakeholder input. More recent academic work argues that over the last 20 years the institutionalised involvement of interests groups has weakened (Öberg, 2015) and the extent of open, rationalistic deliberation has declined (Petersson, 2015), though this is reported to vary across specific policy sectors (Feltenius, 2008; Lindvall and Sebring, 2006). A more recent critique of governance in Sweden notes that while formal corporatism has eroded, interaction between public and private organisations still remains active though it has changed in nature becoming decentered, more frequent and informal. The evidence from this study tends to align with this contemporary analysis. A corporatist, consensus style of policy making appears dominant in the Swedish road transport sector, characterised by a devolved and open approach that readily engages private actors in the activities of policy analysis, testing and concept development. This distinguishing feature of local policy making has had some impact on the policy transfer process from Australia to Sweden. It can create tension with regard to timely decision making and the pace at which reform and transfer is progressed. The lead Australian actor supporting the transfer process commented, ‘they don’t do dramatic reforms, they’re very considered, and part of the frustration we have is that they are slow …’ (IntA01). Despite the formal level of commitment between parties to collaborate (such as a memorandum of understanding), tension can arise when two distinct approaches to policy making are brought together around a common project.

Despite the tension around timing and incremental action, the Swedish approach to policy making has been effective in building trust and commitment amongst local participating stakeholders. Corporatist arrangements are inherently dependent on some level of trust between state representatives and interest groups. The mobilisation of resources and commitment from public and private actors requires a sincere intent to engage in deliberation and exchange (Öberg et al., 2013: 368). This stronger sense of partnership in policy analysis and development, combined with the general capability of industry players to influence policy determinations may explain why the Swedish model of the IAP resulted in an approach that relied on truck operators using their own in-vehicle systems for the monitoring and storage of electronic records of compliance. Industry representatives were active in promoting in-vehicle telematics systems as an essential component of the IAP. A number of interviewees saw this as an appropriate development of the IAP. They believed that the IAP could function in the ‘Swedish context where … instead of having a special box, we use the boxes they already have on board … because it takes a long time to build a specific system’ (IntSw5). In this instance stakeholder deliberations were effective in shaping policy modifications that accounted for the technical capacity and interests of major industry players.

This policy outcome is significantly different to the Australian approach where vehicle monitoring records are managed, stored and analysed by third-party telematics firms. In the Australia context a history of antagonism, driven primarily from punitive enforcement practices, has resulted in low levels of trust between industry and regulators (McIntyre and Moore, 2002). In comparison, Swedish regulators demonstrated greater interest in engagement with industry and a number of interviewees expressed concern that in its unmodified form, the IAP appeared rigid and punitive in its orientation. This sentiment was well articulated by one interviewee who argued the Swedish version of the IAP should ‘assist with cooperation between the hauliers and the drivers … rather than controlling them’ (IntSw3). The scheme was seen as a mechanism for providing assistance to drivers to ‘do the right thing’ (IntSw3). On transfer into Sweden we see the IAP reframed as the analysis and interests of local participants prioritised the strengthening of industry self-management and compliance rather than accepting a system focussed on detection and punitive action.

Market pressures and industry influence

The role of competition and markets were dominant concerns that emerged from the thematic analysis of the interview data of Swedish participants. These concerns influenced actor behaviour and their predisposition to the policy analysis and transfer process. Global truck manufacturers and forest industry operators approached the IAP as a policy initiative that served to extend their commercial interests and strengthen their market position. As noted earlier, truck manufacturers pushed for the inclusion of their own in-vehicle devices as recognised electronic tracking systems and this strengthened the alignment of their commercial product with potential regulatory requirements. When asked why they were participating in the working group and national steering committee processes one industry representative claimed, ‘We do this because we want to be, … a leading company, and to be that you cannot just sit and wait,’ (IntSw10). Another interviewee expressed a clear understanding of the links between business interests and government policy saying, ‘I think it’s important to be involved in early stages, to influence policies … that shape the market’ (IntSw12).

For forest product carriers the IAP represented a control and surveillance mechanism necessary to achieve government approval of a higher and more competitive truck weight limit. From this stakeholder’s perspective, policy transfer was actively supported. One interviewee explained that the forestry industry ‘have been one of the most straightforward promoters of the IAP system’ (IntSw9) and another noted the industry’s effectiveness in pushing for policy reform, ‘they are very aggressive in their lobbying … without them, we wouldn't be where we are’ (IntSw3). So while it has already been noted that the corporatist nature of the deliberative process ensured industry had a seat at the policy table, it can also be seen that competition and market pressures are both influential factors in shaping the reform agenda and directing actor interest towards solutions derived from international policy transfer.

For a number of other stakeholders, the IAP was seen as a policy mechanism that would help to manage the perceived competitive undercutting of carriers from low-cost countries and the impact this has on sustaining a fair and safe local road transport market. International discount hauliers were considered to engage in illegal foreign cabotage and were ‘not controlled and what you can see is that many of our own transporters and companies are going bankrupt because they can’t compete on the same conditions’ (IntSw12). While the common perception was that foreign firms were undercutting local truck operators and that industry safety standards were in decline, it was not possible to validate these claims against national road safety data. What is noteworthy in respect of these comments is that such perceptions significantly informed the interviewees belief that more control was needed to ensure competitive fairness across the local market. In this context, the IAP was seen as a possible tool to assist in the management of the local market, providing a mechanism for strengthening surveillance, control and the detection of noncompliance. For example, one interviewee stated,

if we have this control system … it is easier for us to put in a wedge between those who are compliant and those who are not. This will be a tool for us to use … protecting the integrity of our market … so it operates … fairly. (IntSw3)

This does, however, represent a misunderstanding of the IAP and the extent to which the system could influence these aspects of market competition is negligible. Nevertheless, the expressed concern for a managed market where policy settings actively protect local business interests again highlights the corporatist nature of policy thinking and practice amongst Swedish actors. A shared understanding of local circumstances and the embedded nature of cultural practices in policy development and administration appear to have stimulated actor interest in the IAP and support for the policy transfer process.

Policy ownership, learning and adjustments

Another factor to stimulate policy modification as it moved to implementation was a shared desire amongst Swedish actors to develop a unique local version of the IAP. An important insight of the policy transfer literature is that the ‘key’ to rational and legitimate policy transfer is a sense of ownership by local actors (Evans, 2009a: 402). Stone suggests that this process of owning policy involves gradual modifications being made that may ‘lead to different outcomes than may have originally been envisaged’ (2012: 489). Interest in local ownership was expressed by one interviewee who claimed, ‘I think we’re going to take some bits and pieces of the IAP system and make it into a Swedish IAP system … maybe with a twist or let’s say a Swedish approach in it’ (IntSw8). In order to develop this locally owned policy solution the lessons learnt from the trial of the IAP have been crucial. ‘It enabled us to start understanding the system from how it’s set up in Australia and … the requirements that we would like to have on the system that would support the Swedish road transport reforms’ (IntSw7). Another participant reflected on the experience saying, ‘we saw the options, but also the limitations, it was not a question of copy and paste but we have to see if some of these solutions they would be able to adjust and implement in Sweden’ (IntSw6). Swedish participants expressed confidence that they had attained the knowledge needed to develop their own version of the IAP. This, along with the importance of local context, was acknowledged by one Australian participant who observed,

we don’t know where Sweden will end up but what we do know with some certainty is whatever they do with the IAP it won’t be the same. It’ll look and feel similar but it won’t be exactly the same and it can’t be exactly the same … there’s things that are unique to Sweden, there’s things that are unique to us. (IntA02)

An important aspect of interjurisdictional engagement in cooperative policy transfer emerging from this case is that lesson learning can flow in both directions. The Swedish critique of the IAP provided valuable lessons for Australian policy makers. Following their experience in the three-year project, TCA officials initiated a series of trials with Australian transport industry stakeholders that examined how best to provide real time data on road conditions, rest areas and other driver relevant data through in-vehicle technology including the IAP (Andrews, 2015; TCA, 2016a). The objective of this initiative was to increase the amount of information available to drivers to assist them in remaining compliant with transport regulations, a limitation of the IAP that was made evident during the policy transfer process. More recently, for low-risk transport operators, TCA has included an option within the IAP that does not involve the automatic electronic reporting of infringements. Instead, electronic records of travel and compliance conditions are stored and subject to random audit by transport inspectors. These reforms are modelled on the Swedish approach and were implemented to expand the appeal of the IAP to industry and assist enforcement agencies in managing the volume of electronically detected compliance breaches. These two recent examples illustrate the iterative process of lesson learning and knowledge exchange that may often characterise collaborative policy transfer activity (Fawcett and Marsh, 2012: 183).

Conclusion

The findings of this study provide helpful insights into the process of collaborative policy transfer. Shared interest in the policy challenge and development of an appropriate regulatory tool brings parties together and helps establish collaborative working relationships. The strength of this relationship is supported by a number of factors. Proactive agents who champion policy transfer, supported through formal mechanisms such as a memorandum of understanding and structured forums that facilitate frequent communication are significant reasons why engagement between jurisdictions has been robust and sustained. In this context, agency mobilised with the supplementation of institutional resources becomes a highly motivating and powerful force underpinning the transfer process. The corporatist nature of Swedish policy-making processes meant that major local stakeholders were readily engaged in the policy development and analysis process. The expression of stakeholder concerns or resistance often resulted in collaborative effort through the steering committee, working groups and project management processes to identify suitable policy modifications.

In addition, collaboration and engagement in policy transfer is seen to support an ongoing process of policy analysis and review that presents new information and ideas for improving policy practice in the sending jurisdiction. In this case, participation in a joint policy project allowed jurisdictions to share knowledge, ideas and insights that may not have been observed or produced in their own domestic settings. Suggestions for policy improvement emerged from the Swedish experience and this has stimulated policy action and improvement in the Australian context. Here we see policy transfer not only acting as a one-way force for the transmission of ideas, systems and practices from one jurisdiction to another but also as an iterative process more evidently linked with each jurisdictions’ domestic policy cycles of problem analysis, action and review. Under collaborative policy transfer the resources and interest from two distinct locations are mobilised around a policy concern and this effectively enhances the level of critical thinking and reflective practice that contributes to problem solving and solution development.

This study has also illuminated the way in which unique domestic approaches to policy making play a critical role in shaping the dynamics of the policy transfer process. Domestic policy processes are critical for defining avenues for participation by local stakeholders as well as international transfer agents. In this case study, the nature of Swedish corporatism has been fundamental. Understanding how these local processes work in the jurisdiction of transfer provides insight into factors (and actors) that may fundamentally reshape the transferred policy. This is also important for how agency might function, obtain support or be obstructed in the transfer process. Once embedded in the local policy-making process the transferred policy becomes subject to the interactions that reshape policy into an operating model that fits within the local context. Continued success in transfer is dependent on an awareness of the forces and processes that constitute the local context. Market forces have been identified as significantly influential in shaping and sustaining interest in policy transfer processes. In this case, concern for industry competition and productivity has heightened interest in key aspects of the IAP. A sense of local ownership over the transferred policy also helps explain the support for innovations and modifications as the policy is reshaped for local implementation.

The findings of this study confirm that cross-country collaboration is an important pathway in the ongoing development of policy reform and innovation. Its success can take time (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012) and requires the leadership and commitment of agents who share access to local actor networks in the relevant policy arena. As the search for lessons from others becomes an increasingly important aspect of policy development, a growing challenge for public sector agencies is how they will continue to develop and sustain avenues for effective interjurisdictional collaboration, particularly in a global political climate (following Brexit, for example) that now seems increasingly resistant to growing and strengthening formal instruments of international collaboration and engagement. However, as this case demonstrates, the interpersonal connections of policy champions remain an effective mechanism for linking actor networks and supporting transfer initiatives. A key challenge for further research is developing a deeper understanding of those factors, such as the project-based approach adopted by Sweden, that help to sustain effective relations and support successful policy adaptation and transfer.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Alexandra Moulis who provided research support, and Gavin Hill, Transport Certification Australia, and Professor Sten Wendel, Lund University, Sweden, for their assistance with gaining access to industry stakeholders throughout this research project.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Australian and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) 2015 Research Funding Grant.

Note

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