The marginalization of policy integration: Dynamics of integrated policymaking in the periphery of bureaucracy

Abstract

Governmental organizations face the challenge to integrate different sectoral policy perspectives and interests to deal effectively with the wicked issues of late-modern societies. This article delves into attempts of governmental organizations to realize such integrated policies and unravels the intra-organizational dynamics of collaborating on policy integration.

Based on two in-depth case studies from The Netherlands, one focusing on public transport for specific target groups in the city of Rotterdam and the other focusing on a national policy program for criminal youth groups, we show how attempts at policy integration take place in the periphery of bureaucracies by temporary program teams. After the abolishment of the program team, the integrated policy easily volatilizes because of the lack of foothold and ownership in the line organization. Ironically, policy integration becomes a differentiated activity in the margins of public organizations rather than a joint exercise of sectoral organizational units.

We present three explanatory hypotheses of this dynamic of marginalization. First, from a system-psychodynamic perspective, the line organization and the program team maintain distance from each other to reduce the tensions that are inherent in policy integration. Second, from an institutional perspective, the line organization marginalizes policy integration to protect their sectoral and vested interests. Third, from an innovation perspective, however, innovative policy integration does need the margins of organizations to protect itself against conservative reflexes from bureaucracies at risk of becoming marginalized and alienated. To facilitate a productive dynamic of policy integration in governmental organizations, this article concludes with providing the components for such an organizational design.

Keywords

Policy Integration Collaborative governance Organizational dynamics Public Administration Wicked problems Administrative organization and structures

Introduction

Societal problems of late-modern societies have often been characterized as complex and wicked, in the sense that they are interwoven, multi-layered, and dynamic (Head, 2019; Termeer et al., 2019). They cannot be dealt with separately, because interventions in one part of the system do have consequences for the other parts (Teisman et al., 2009). In line with the idea of requisite variety (Ashby, 1991), many scholars have argued that public policies must resemble the complexity of societal problems by combining different policy strategies and solutions into more integrative policies (Tosun, Lang, 2017; Winship, 2006).

Realizing integrated policymaking is no sinecure in governmental organizations given that one of the guiding principles of modern bureaucracies is task specialization (Morgan, 2006). With this principle, issues are decomposed into small parts for which specialized units with a clear territory are responsible (Head and Alford, 2008). To deal with the fragmentation that inevitably results from this bureaucratic way of organizing, many different approaches for coordination or integration have been explored and analyzed. Most of these approaches focus on realizing policy integration in collaboration with other public or private actors (e.g., Briassoulis, 2004, Stead and Meijers, 2009; Ansell and Gash, 2008). Although policy integration has an essential inter-organizational dimension, it also requires strong efforts by civil servants within public organizations to realize an integrated policy in a pillarized and siloed bureaucracy (Joosse, 2022).

This article delves into the intra-organizational side of policy integration, by focusing on the dynamics of realizing horizontal and integrative collaboration in a hierarchical and task-oriented organizational context. To explore the dynamics of policy integration in public organizations, we use two case studies: one relates to policymaking about public transport for special target groups in the city of Rotterdam and the other concerns the national policy towards criminal youth groups. These cases show how attempts to organize more integrated policies become marginalized within the governmental organization and are slowly switched off. Our main contribution is to abductively present some theoretical perspectives (system-psychodynamic, innovation, and institutionalization) that can explain this marginalization of policy integration (Section 6). We conclude with presenting some conditions for a productive dynamic of policy integration in public organizations. But first, we start with formulating our theoretical starting point by utilizing the literature on policy integration, collaborative governance, and multi-actor collaboration.

Theoretical framework

The need for policy integration

Already for decades, scholars have pointed at the limitations of traditional ways of public policymaking. Governmental organizations, and units within governmental organization, tend to make their own policy for their own, demarcated problems. This has been a dominant approach for dealing with wicked problems (Cf. Rittel and Webber, 1973). Interwoven and dynamical public issues have been split into separate problems to be solved by specialized organizations or organizational units. In this way, the wickedness and complexity of problems has been simplified (Joosse, 2022), tamed (Conklin, 2006; Roberts, 2000), and structured (Hoppe, Hisschemöller, 2001).

Although this approach has substantially contributed to the development of modern countries, it is deemed no longer sufficient in dealing with the high-complex and nested character of contemporary issues. Many public issues are “in-between” classical policy domains and transcends sectoral boundaries of mobility, safety, care, and so on. Scholars have argued that the classical approach of differentiated policymaking can easily result in fragmentation, boundary conflicts between sectoral policies (Stone, 2012, see also Hirschman, 1991; Sterman, 2006), and “intractable controversies” (Hoppe, Hisschemöller 2001). The positive news is that combining different policy problems and solutions can result in richer, more effective, and more attractive public policy (Weick, 2007; Joosse, 2022). From this perspective, policy integration can generate added value (1 + 1 = 3), being an alternative to the classical approach (1 + 1 = 2) and its perverse effects (1 + 1 = 1 or even 0).

Defining policy integration

Especially in the domain of spatial planning and since the end of 20^th century, scholars have discussed the idea of policy integration. Stead and Meijers (2009: 321) define policy integration as

‘…the management of cross-cutting issues in policy making that transcend the boundaries of established policy fields, and that do not correspond to the institutional responsibilities of individual departments. While these cross-cutting issues are also sectoral objectives in some cases, it is often the case that they do not fall neatly under single sectoral departments and their objectives’

According to the authors, policy integration goes beyond policy coordination:

‘(…) A major difference between policy integration and policy coordination is that the latter aims to adjust sectoral policies in order to make them mutually enforcing and consistent. Contrarily, policy integration results in one joint policy for the sectors involved’ (Stead and Meijers 2009: 322).

In other words, while policy coordination seeks to fill the gaps between policy fields and remove inefficient overlap, policy integration searches for a joint and new policy in which sectoral interests and perspectives are combined to a richer whole. According to Briassoulis (2004: 13), the result is an “integrated policy system aiming to achieve multiple complementarities and synergies among policies.” Different and competing values and interests are integrated and synthesized (Kuitert et al., 2023).

Policy integration and collaborative governance

Obviously, policy integration requires collaboration between different actors. Ansell and Gash (2008) define collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.” Emerson et al. (2012) emphasize that collaborative governance is about working on the boundaries of organizations. Combined with the concept of policy integration, it is about collaboration between organizations to define a joint policy in which individual and sectoral interests and policy fields are integrated.

The literature about collaborative governance has paid considerable attention to factors that influence the collaboration. These factors include dialogue, trust, commitment (Ansell and Gash 2008); shared motivation, and principled engagement (Emerson et al., 2012); the capacity of actors and their interrelations (Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz et al., 2001); and the role of power (Huxham and Vangen, 2004). Other scholars have written about incentives for collaboration (Scott and Thomas, 2017) and its results, such as collaborative advantage (Huxham and Vangen, 2004). However, these factors have been mostly studied in the context of inter-organizational collaboration and policy integration. In this article, we aim to strengthen the internal pendant of both concepts. Within governmental organizations, there is also a strong fragmentation between different units and departments, and many different policies are executed at the same time. Therefore, the need for intra-organizational policy integration is equally important here as it is between different organizations; however, this may bring about its own dynamics and struggles.

Intra-organizational dynamics of policy integration

In the literature about multi-actor collaboration and interdisciplinary collaboration, an important role has been given to the so-called in-between spaces (Vilsmaier and Lang, 2015; see also Molinengo et al., 2021). These spaces are “no man’s lands” in which representatives of organizational units meet each other and define a collective aim. This process means that each of these units brings in their own sectoral policy goals and searches for a common policy. In this in-between space, two movements take place. One movement is that of integration, in which actors combine sectoral policy fields into a new, joint policy. The second movement follows as a consequence of this, as these representatives must also keep the connection with their own constituency and must retranslate their integrated results to their sectoral home bases. Therefore, integration comes again with differentiation (Vilsmaier and Lang, 2015). In the context of policy integration, this means that integrated policy does not replace the sectoral policy nor wipes out the differences between sectoral interests; rather, the integrated policy is translated and fed back into sectoral policies. With this process, feedback continuously takes place between sectoral policies and cross-sectoral policy. By means of creative confrontation, integrated policy is created that may give rise to tensions with or adjustments of sectoral policies.

For actors around the table, this means the need to continuously shuttle between the common, cooperative space and their own sectoral space (home base) (Schruijer, 2021). In the sectoral space of their own unit or team, they account to their superiors for the integrated result, translate the integrated result into implications for the sectoral policy, and organize support and legitimacy for the integrated policy. From their “home base,” they bring in new challenges and demands to the collaborative structure. In the literature about boundary spanning, this has been called vertical boundary spanning (between hierarchical layers) and horizontal boundary spanning (between sectoral policy fields) (Williams, 2012, Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 2018; Guarneros-Meza and Martin, 2016). Figure 1 shows the dynamics of integration and differentiation and shuttling between common space and home unit.

Figure 1.

Dynamics of policy integration and differentiation. Actors shuttle between the collaborative space of policy integration and their own sectoral space (home unit) (based on: Van der Spek 2023 (forthcoming)).

Dynamics of time and place

In fact, the literature discussed above presents policy integration in public organizations as a matter of ambidexterity (two-handedness), namely, the art of combining different activities and logics. On the one hand, there is integration into a new policy, and, on the other, there is differentiation to do justice to what remains valid sectoral policies. From this point of view, both types of activities form an almost simultaneous movement. Ambidexterity literature, however, presents some other possible relations between contrasting logics in organizations (Choi and Chandler, 2015; Raisch et al., 2009). Rather than applying integration and differentiation simultaneously, they can be applied separately, in the sense that unit A works on integrated policymaking, while unit B formulates sectoral policy, or even in different periods time (unit A integrates in period A, unit B differentiates in period B). From this perspective, there are more integrated forms of policy integration and more differentiated forms of policy integration. This raises the question of whether policy integration is indeed a collaborative effort in public organizations or a more soloistic attempt of certain organizational units. This leads to a further question of whether the results of policy integration can, in fact, endure, or whether, over time, they are pulled apart again into sectoral fragments. In the remainder of this article, we explore these dynamics of policy integration and their possible explanations.

Methodology

Case studies

This article is based on two in-depth case studies in The Netherlands. The first case study is about the design of a public service, namely, the mobility transport service in Rotterdam. This service is provided by the municipality for citizens who are not able make use of individual or public transport because of physical or mental restrictions. Each day, circa 25.000 inhabitants of Rotterdam make use of this taxi service to such destinations as schools, shelter employment, mental health care institutions, and day care. The case study focuses on attempts by the municipality to integrate the different target groups into a single contract in the period 2013–2019.

The second case study concerns the national policy on criminal youth groups. This policy was formulated in 2010 by the Minister of Justice and Security. His aim was to reduce the 89 criminal youth groups in The Netherlands to zero in 2 years by a repressive safety approach (i.e., imprisonment). For this goal, the Minister established an “action program team.” The case study focuses on the attempts of the action program team to enlarge the scope of the policy and incorporate other causes of criminal behavior, other life domains of criminal youth, and other policy interventions beyond the security domain.

These cases have been selected because they are clear examples of attempts at policy integration within public organizations on different levels of governance (national, local) and policy domains (mobility, security). Hence, the selection criteria were partly theory-based and paradigmatic and partly based on variation arguments (see Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Design of the case studies

In general, case studies serve to investigate social realities with their specific contexts, human relationships, and experiences (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). In this article, the case studies aim to unravel the dynamics of policy integration within governmental organizations (national and local public authorities). With interviews, civil servants’ experiences of integrating different policies into a more holistic and encompassing policy have been explored, together with their relations to other parts of their organizations. Combined with document analysis (meeting reports, policy documents, e-mails), a detailed reconstruction has been made of the policy integration process and the collaboration between different organizational units. In both cases, the researcher had access to governmental buildings to do fieldwork on location (interviews, observations, social talks) and see policymakers “in action.” Therefore, the research can be characterized as a form of “institutional ethnography” (Smith, 2008), in which the insider’s perspective is central (Fetterman, 2008). In respect to the case of the mobility transport service, the researcher has been involved for almost 4 years, enabling him to study the dynamics of policy integration over a long period of time.

The table below presents the key characteristics of the case studies (Table 1).

Table 1.

Key characteristics of the case studies.

	Mobility Transport Service	Criminal youth groups
Case description	Redesign and implementation of mobility transport service (2013–2020), with focus on municipal program team, line organization, and political actors	Development of national policy on criminal youth groups (2010–2015), with focus on the Minister and his action program team
Primary government	Municipality of Rotterdam	Ministry of Justice and Security
Core policy domain	Mobility and Care	Safety
Role of researcher	Reconstruction, observation/participation, evaluation (ex durante)	Reconstruction, evaluation (ex post)
Period of research	Apr 2017–Jan 2021	Aug 2017–Mar 2019
Interviews	60	15
Documents (ca)	400	40

Cross-case dialogue and abduction

The data has been processed into an extended case narrative: a detailed and chronological description of “time, place, and person” (Stake, 1995). The document was then compressed until a “thick description” was left (see Geertz, 1973). Next, the researcher entered a cross-case dialogue in search for patterns and mechanisms in the dynamics of policy integration. Buijs and others (Buijs, 2009) have symbolized this process with the letter T: in-depth case studies (the leg) combined with comparison between cases (the roof). Because both case studies partly overlapped in time, this cross-case dialogue influenced the research focus of the case studies. For example, when it became clear that the integrated policy result in the case of the criminal youth groups had been eroded, an important question arose whether the integrated policy in the case of the mobility transport service would be sustained. Both cases soon showed an important similarity: namely, that attempts of policy integration took place in a separate organizational arrangement (a program team). Much attention has been paid to the question of how the policy integrating program relates to the sectoral organizational units.

In looking for explanations for the dynamics of policy integration that we found, a deductive logic was used. Because there is a scarcity of literature about policy integration inside governmental organizations, let alone about its mechanisms, we searched for theoretical perspectives that could serve as explanatory hypotheses (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). Based on the data, we “abducted” three perspectives (Dew, 2007) that are possible explanations for the dynamics of policy integration and presented these in Section six.

Results

Case 1: Mobility Transport Service, City of Rotterdam

Problems of fragmentation

Around 2013, the organization of the mobility transport service was strongly differentiated within the municipality (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2012, 2013a). The transport service consisted of six different target groups (e.g., schools, daytime activities, and elderly people), based on eight different laws (e.g., Societal Support, Youth, Participation), which were distributed among four different departments (Care Adults, Care Youth, Work, Education). Each target group had its own contract. Additionally, as each group had its own vans, the target groups were separated in the implementation. Furthermore, the quality of the mobility transport service was primarily judged on punctuality and travel time. Good transport was defined as “going from A to B as quickly as possible.”

Because of the decentralization of tasks from national to local government in 2015, the number of target groups would have to be increased from three to six, which would mean more fragmentation and coordination problems between the different departments and target groups. For example, because some clients belonged to several different categories, it was possible that two drivers could be looking for the same child at school (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2018b). Therefore, the city council of the Municipality of Rotterdam decided to integrate the different contracts in the next tendering (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2013b).

Policy integration by a program team

To fulfill the task of integrating the different contracts, a program team was installed in 2013. This was a special, temporary unit staffed by eight people who were not part of existing departments but deployed from a flexible pool of employees. The program was positioned according to the distance of the departments in the line organization and, as such, had considerable space to explore how the integration could be designed and implemented.

Because of a lack of consensus in the taxi branch about the design of the integrated contract (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2014), the program team decided on an innovative tendering procedure that allows for dialogue with market parties about the design of the mobility transport service. Furthermore, client research showed that punctuality is only one of the relevant quality criteria; communication and social contact were important as well. In addition, the program team considered mobility related to other policy domains such as loneliness and sustainability. The needs of clients together with the goals of other policy domains, were bundled in to one invitation to tender that, in 2016, resulted in an integral contract with a transport consortium. The quality of its service was to be mainly judged on client satisfaction (instead of punctuality). With the help of welfare organizations in the consortium, the transporter would not only be able to transport the clients but also be able to pay attention to other problems that the clients may have, such as loneliness, health problems, and money issues (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).

Fight about the integrated policy

Although the program team won several prizes for its innovative results, problems were raised in the implementation phase (2018). The contract (management) had to be transferred to the line organization; however, the program manager feared that, as there were circa five departments and 10 teams with formal responsibilities regarding mobility, the integral contract ‘would be torn to shreds’ and lost in the line organization. The program team considered these units part of the “system world”, having less interest in the lifeworld of clients and, as a result, reluctant to provide these units with information about the contract. The departments in the line organization, on the other hand, did not feel ownership of the new, integral contract. They “were part of a different movie, a parallel situation,” as one employee said. “We did not have a good view of the content of the contract and its governance. It was difficult to get a foot in the door.” They experienced a lack of grip and trust, which was manifested in the principles of the new mobility service, namely, that of steering their service according to client satisfaction, with substantial freedom given to the transporter in the implementation. This turned out to be incompatible with the standards of the line organization, namely, that of steering the service according to strict operational criteria such as punctuality and travel time. The new contract manager in the line organization said: “we did not feel that we could manage the contract well."

Moreover, the audit and control department concluded in a critical report that “no measurable performance agreements have been made in the contract,” and “it is remarkable that punctuality, which has played a prominent role prior to the tendering, plays a minor role in the client satisfaction grade” (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2019). The city council and the Alderman were also very critical. A council member asked whether “we will return to measurable indicators. That is what we miss as a council” (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2020). The Alderman declared: “if things are going well, you do not have to worry about it; but if things are going wrong, you will not be able to pull the strings."

Integrated result partly lost

After 1 year of “war,” the principal actor in the program team, who was also chief of one of the divisions in the line organization, decided to abolish the program team and assign the management of the contract to the division with the largest responsibility in the mobility transport service. From this division, an “integral contract manager” was appointed to coordinate the connections with other divisions within the same department. However, some other issues of the mobility transport service, such as sustainability, infrastructure, and the link to public transport, were part of other departments and thereby beyond the formal mandate of the integral program manager. Moreover, the integral steering indicator of client satisfaction has been pushed to the background by the political focus on punctuality. The integral result of the mobility transport service has thus been partly lost.

Case 2: Criminal Youth Groups

Problems of sectoral safety policy

Around 2010, several Dutch cities, such as Gouda and Culemborg, faced problems with criminal behavior of youth groups. In the new, right-wing cabinet of Prime Minister Rutte, Minister of Justice and Security Opstelten formulated a stringent security policy for dealing with problematic youth groups. Research showed three categories of youth groups: obtrusive (1.154), nuisance (284), and criminal (89) (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, 2010; Ferwerda and Van Ham, 2010). In May 2011, the Minister announced the goal to reduce the number of criminal youth groups from 89 to 0 within two years (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2011). His approach was based on traditional safety interventions. In an interview, he said: “they [criminal youth groups] should be removed from the street, with punishment or an appropriate treatment.” He created a special “action program team,” directly under his supervision, with the task to realize this goal in collaboration with the National Prosecutor and the Police (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2011).

The members of the action program team soon realized that the unidimensional security approach strongly risked ineffectiveness. There was confusion about the specific number of criminal youth groups and there were signals that municipalities twisted the number in their favor, for example, to qualify for state help (money, knowledge). Moreover, the sectoral security solution was in danger of failure. Research has consistently shown that imprisonment probably leads to more criminal convictions after release (e.g., Nieuwbeerta et al., 2007).

Policy integration by program team

The program team therefore developed an alternative approach. From their holistic perspective, other causes of criminal behavior, other aspects of the youths’ lives, and other interventions should also be taken into account. The program team developed an “integral multi-track approach” (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2015a). In this approach, the youth is central, with his/her different life domains (home situation, school, free time, work, finance, health, et cetera) (Figure 2). This approach involved a broad constellation of actors, such as police, school, general practitioner, housing association, and debt assistance. The spider in this web of different domains and actors is the municipality. The perceived task of the action program team is to facilitate the local government with knowledge and advice.

Figure 2.

Visualization of the “integral multi-track approach.” The youth and his/her life domains in the center, surrounded by local and national actors.

The Minister supported this alternative, integral approach. At the same time, he sticked to his unidimensional security approach in the communication to the Lower House and media. The action program team carefully monitored the decline of the number of criminal youth groups. In 2015, the Minister to reported the Lower House that the number had declined from 89 in 2010 to 33 in 2014 (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2015b). In their cooperation with local actors, however, the program team scarcely used the numbers, and only did so as background information. In their view, the effects of policy in the world of youth and their families are “less expressible in numbers,” a respondent declared, “but I see people working in an unorthodox manner, in their own way, but from the same perspective.”

Dynamics between program team and line organization

The members of the action program team were mainly active in the different regions of the country to facilitate the municipalities. The right approach for criminal youth, as one team member argued, cannot be formulated from “the 26^th floor of a tower block in The Hague” (where the Ministry of Justice and Security was housed). The aim was for the team to be in The Hague as little as possible. “The Hague does not contribute much to the quality of our work” was the tenor of the program team. In their view, the Ministry was highly sectoral, with less attention given to other aspects of the lives of the youths, and with minimal flexibility to make policy that fits the lifeworld of these youths. In contrast, colleagues at the Ministry considered the program team “outsiders,” “standing with their backs to The Hague.” Retrospectively, the program team members acknowledge that they failed to translate the integral and local policy to the sectoral reality of The Hague. “The Ministry did not see what was in the policy for them.”

End of integrated policy

In March 2015, Minister Opstelten resigned after wrongfully informing the Lower House about a money laundering case. Soon after his departure, many members of the program team also left. The urgency for the policy on criminal youth groups faded away. Additionally, the program team members had little foothold in the ministerial line organization, and attempts to create a special division for criminal youth groups failed. “I lost that battle,” a respondent said. “We did not succeed in embedding the approach in the organization,” another respondent declared (Figure 2).

Analysis: The marginalization of policy integration

Both cases demonstrate failed attempts to overcome the fragmentation resulting from from the traditional, sectoral policy approach of dealing with wicked problems. These attempts have been organized in temporal programmatic structures which functioned in the margins of the standing organizations. However, in both cases the attempts evaporated over time.

The starting point in both cases is the significant fragmentation of policies. This fragmentation is the result of a rigorously implemented combination of task specialization, categorization, and quantification (Stone, 2012; Morgan, 2006). The mobility transport service had six target groups, assigned to four different departments. The quality of the service was measured by one indicator: punctuality. The policy of criminal youth groups was based on three categories of youth groups, quantified and plotted on a map. From the perspective of the Ministry of Justice and Security, it concerned a security problem (criminality) for which a security solution (incarceration) was necessary. The policy in both cases departed from a sectoral perspective with one-dimensional definitions of the problem and of the solution.

Within this fragmented context, it turned out to be very difficult to develop efficient, effective, and attractive solutions. Regarding the youth groups, the one-dimensional, repressive solution risked a perverse effect, and the strict categorization of youth groups was disputed and open to manipulation. In the case of the mobility transport service, the boundaries between categories were far from watertight, resulting in implementation problems and service gaps. The multiplicity of categories caused coordination problems between the responsible departments. In both cases, the strong demarcation in categories, tasks and policy actions caused boundary conflicts (Stone, 2012; Sterman, 2006), controversies (Hoppe, Hisschemöller, 2001), and ineffective policies (Scott, J. C. 1998).

Over time, involved actors developed the need to combine different perspectives and interests into more integrated policies (Cf. Briassoulis, 2004, Stead and Meijers, 2009). In both cases, integration has been approached by taking the perspective of the target group as a starting point. Departing from the living world as experienced by the client or youth groups, the relationship between problems and needs has been explored (human-centered design) (Visser, Stappers et al. 2005). Accordingly, the unraveled complexity of the public issue has strengthened the idea that different sectoral policy domains should be integrated.

Interestingly, in the two case studies, the integration was organized by setting up a separate, dedicated team, just because to organize a certain degree of freedom and safety against the distorting power of this fragmented context. This team was organized as a program, positioned at the edge of the line organization. It was either specially set up to bring about integration (case mobility transport service) or it took on this task on their own initiative (case Criminal Youth Groups). In both cases, the teams were quite small, with short lines to the Alderman or Minister and with some distance to the line organization (which was deemed necessary to safeguard some freedom and room for maneuver and realize the integration). At this point, the cases deviate from the theory on policy integration. In the literature representatives of (sectoral) units meet in an interspace to make integrated policy and commute back and forth between their home unit and collaborative space (Williams, 2012, Guarneros-Meza and Martin, 2016), whereas in the cases, this space was institutionalized (in a program) and set apart from the departments. The space for policy integration was moved to the edge of the organization. Consequently, units in the line organization worked on their own sectoral policy (e.g., contract management of different target groups), and the program team worked relatively autonomously on a new, integrated policy product. Not unexpectedly, this separation contributed to a mutual sense of alienation and misunderstanding.

In the way in which policy integration was organized, we can discern a specific approach of organizing ambidexterity, namely, structural ambidexterity (Cf. Choi, Chandler, 2015; Raisch et al., 2009). A structural separation was made between agencies focusing on differentiation and the team focusing on integration. In the case study of the Target Group Transport, both movements also took place in different periods (separated in time). After a period in which the sectoral policy and its negative consequences dominated, a period with attempts at policy integration followed. In 2013, a program team started and developed a creative and innovative policy design that integrated different policy domains and accommodated as many client needs as possible. In 2019, the integrated policy product had to be transferred to the line organization but lacked the power to really make an impact. This transfer was thus accompanied by a great deal of misunderstanding and conflict, which means that ubstantial elements of the integration was lost after the program ended. Strictly speaking, it was a form of “temporal structural ambidexterity”: the organizational structure that focuses on policy integration was temporary and was removed over time.

The case of the Youth Groups shows a different picture in this respect. The action program did not only work on policy integration but also continued to apply the sectoral perspective. It regularly reported on the reduction in the number of criminal youth groups, which enabled the Minister to demonstrate the effectiveness of his sectoral and repressive approach in the Lower House. At the same time, the action program remained at a distance from the line organization. After the Minister’s departure, the program and the integrated policy faded away because it failed to achieve a foothold in the line organization, consequently, and lacked the power to break through existing routines and patterns.

The cases show how attempts to integrate policy were organized in isolation, thereby meeting resistance from the standing (task-oriented) organization. As a result, feelings of alienation between both the temporal—on integration focusing—team and the standing organization evolved. This estrangement ultimately hindered their structural embedding and uptake and marginalized policy integration in public organizations. Ironically, policy integration became a specific, differentiated activity, separate from sectoral policymaking in the line organization, with little interaction between them or even competition. At first, this distance supported the realization of integration by eliminating difficult confrontations between the sectoral policy units. But at the same time, without these fruitful tensions and checks and balances, the integration effort became alienated and volatilized over time. As a result, policy integration was only temporary, and its results were not sustained in the long term. Lacking roots in the line organization, the results evaporated when the program team ceased to exist.

Discussion: Explaining the marginalization of policy integration

Our findings pose the question of why policy integration in governmental organization is approached as a differentiated and temporal effort that loses much of its impact with the passing of time. We distinguish between three different perspectives that shed light on this dynamic of marginalization.

System-psychodynamic perspective

First, the case studies indicate that there were strong tensions between line organizations and program teams. They kept distance from each other by developing mutual negative images. For example, the members of the action program of the Ministry argued that “The Hague does not contribute much to the quality of our work” and that policy cannot be formulated from “the 26^th floor of a tower block in The Hague.” From this perspective, sectoral policies from “The Hague” are seen as meaningless and do not fit the local contexts that need tailor-made solutions. The case of the mobility transport service shows how the program team considered the line organization a threat, because it can “[tear] the integrated results to shreds.” On the other hand, the line organization in both case studies considered the program teams as “outsiders” and, especially in the case of the mobility transport, strongly criticized the results of the policy integration by arguing that the new contract lacked “measurable performance agreements” and that the integral steering was “diffuse.”

These tensions and negative perceptions can be explained from a system-psychodynamic perspective, which focuses on the relationship between systems and their functions and the tensions that can exist between different systems with their own logic, values, and routines. The assumption is that individuals and groups of individuals explore possibilities to contain their anxieties in social systems. To reduce the socio-emotional tensions that are inherently part of complex tasks, members of organizations develop defenses against complexity (Sher and Lawlor, 2021; Prins, 2010). One of these defenses has been called splitting (Sher and Lawlor, 2021), which means that negative views are projected on other parts of the organization, whereas the principles and methods of one’s own team are deemed to be good and correct. In this way, certain parts of the organization are put at distance, so that tensions that would have been experienced when collaborating with these parts can be avoided.

From a system-psychodynamic perspective, policy integration is a highly complex effort that evokes strong tensions among civil servants. Combining different sectoral interests instead of denying them or casting them aside strongly appeals to the capacity of civil servants in managing conflict and being ambidextrous, in a context in which there is much pressure to achieve short term results within their own policy domains. From a system-psychodynamic perspective, marginalization of policy integration is an attractive option, not only for the line organization, but even for the program teams. Integrated policymaking is not only marginalized by the line organization, but program teams also alienate and thus marginalize themselves as a defense against the sectoral reflexes from the line organization.

Institutional perspective

Other signals in the case studies point to another explanation. The struggles between line organization and program team seem to involve a battle between vested and non-vested interests. Policy integration took place in teams that were small and temporary and located at the edge of the organization. They were literally positioned outside the establishment. They have described their attempts to embed the integrated policy in the line organization as a “battle.” The program manager of the mobility transport service said that “the ball [the integrated policy, authors] was continuously passed back and forth” between line organization and program team. Ultimately, the program team was eliminated because the director “had no support of his managers.” The program manager also suspected that the critical studies about the new contract were, in fact, strategically used to get rid of it. This shows that the program teams felt as if they were the subject in a power play in which they had a dependent, subordinated position.

Moreover, key players in the line organization pointed to the role of vested interests. As mentioned before, the result of the battle between the program team and the line organization was that the “integral contract manager” had been positioned in one of the clusters of the municipal organization. The alderman of this cluster said: “yes, it has been positioned in this cluster, but that is logical. I want a good management from this cluster and a good authority of my director.” If the integral contract management had been located outside this cluster, “the management would have been ‘organized away'.” The integral contract manager acknowledged that integral management across different clusters “is a noble idea.” “But with the existing organizational culture and structure, it is impossible to organize. Directors want to be responsible themselves, (…) they did not agree in the board meeting where it was discussed.”

These empirics fit an institutional perspective well, in which established interests, rules, and practices that structure policy making processes are central. Especially, the concept of path-dependency shows that practices established in the past can reproduce themselves and decrease the space for change (Arthur, 1994; Torfing, 2009). One of the mechanisms of path-dependency is the protection of vested interests by using power. Persons or groups make use of power asymmetry as a form of negative feedback, to maintain the status quo and nip changes in the bud (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000). From an institutional perspective, attempts at policy integration are marginalized and put at distance to the line organization to maintain established power relations and protect sectoral interests.

Innovation perspective

There is third perspective that can explain the distance between program team and line organization. Respondents in the case studies argued that this distance was important to realize an innovative policy integration. The program manager of mobility transport service said that he had consciously built a team of people that enjoy the complexity of the integration task. “A small team has a risk in terms of work pressure, but has the advantage of overview, of working with people you trust and making progress,” he said. In another interview, he argued: “it is good to stand at the edge of the organization. If I was part of the line organization, we could not have done it. Then you are too much ‘in the structure’ and you will start to believe that it is good how it is now.” This special space at a distance of the line organization has resulted in innovative results. As was mentioned before, the program team won two prizes for the design and tender of the transport service. Members of the program team of criminal youth groups also suggested that their position “outside the order of the standard civil servant” was key in realizing tailor-made solutions for criminal youth. Precisely because they were in The Hague as little possible, they were able to work closely together with local authorities to develop policy across the borders of different policy domains.

From an innovation perspective, distance, margins, and niches are favorable places to develop path-breaking public sector innovations. They are “protective spaces” in the sense that they shield early innovations from conservative reflexes from the regime (Smith and Raven, 2012). They are necessary to escape from the mainstream selection pressures (Boon et al., 2014; see also Schot and Geels, 2008) and demarcate a place in which civil servants can work in an iterative, holistic, and experimental way. From this perspective, marginalization is necessary for realizing innovative policy integration. At the same time, a strong dilemma arises. Mulgan (Mulgan, 2014, see also McGann et al., 2018) has called this the “radical’s dilemma”: “do you work from the outside to create a coherent alternative to the status quo, but risk being ignored and marginalized; or do you work within the system and directly influence the levers of power, but risk being co-opted and shifted from radical to incremental change?” Others have called this the “pilot paradox” (Van Buuren et al., 2016): the conditions that are necessary for creating novelty (distance) are the same conditions that stand in the way of structural impact (embeddedness).

The table below summarizes the three perspectives on the marginalization of policy integration (Table 2).

Table 2.

Three perspectives on the marginalization of policy integration.

	System-psychodynamic perspective	Institutional perspective	Innovation perspective
Level of analysis	Individual–organization	Organization	Organization
Explanatory mechanism	Splitting as an emotional defense against the tensions and complexity of policy integration	Vested sectoral interests and power relations are protected by marginalizing policy integration	Safe havens are necessary for experimentation but hinder the uptake and embeddedness of policy integration

The three perspectives illustrate an interesting dilemma regarding the proximity dimension of ambidexterity. From an innovation perspective, a certain distance is necessary to prevent integration attempts being prematurely extinguished. At the same time, this distance fosters the risk of alienation between the integration unit and sectoral policy units and helps the latter to resist the integration efforts and to stick to existing, ingrained routines. This raises the question of how more successful policy integration in public organizations can be achieved by balancing a certain degree of distance and closeness when organizing policy integration within a highly pillarized and path-dependent environment.

Design conditions for a productive dynamic of policy integration

Based on our findings, it is key to avoid a splitting in the organization, meaning a separate and peripheral structure that exclusively focuses on policy integration. This separation stimulates projecting negative images between sectoral units and the integration structure and creates emotional distance between both groups. It gives the integration structure a vulnerable position in the periphery, allowing the more powerful line organization to overrule it and safeguard their sectoral policies. In the end, the separation ensures that policy integration is not transformative: it does not have a lasting and changing effect on the sectoral units and policies.

The findings, together with the theoretical insights on policy integration (Vilsmaier and Lang, 2015; Schruijer, 2021), imply that sectoral units in public organizations should create a joint space in which representatives of these units sit at the table with the goal of making a joint, integrated policy. At the table, a balancing act must be achieved between distance and proximity, between sameness and separateness (see Van der Spek, 2023 (forthcoming)). This balance is precarious. On the one hand, the collaborative space must be sufficiently protected against conservative reflexes from the sectoral world; it should have enough distinctiveness in relation to the sectoral units and their conventional routines and logics. On the other hand, the space of policy integration should not be detached from the sectoral world; in that case, the result risks suffering from a lack of support and ownership in the organization.

This balance places a number of high demands on the people at the table. First, these people must have strong ambidextrous skills: to collaborate, to be open to other’s interests and perspectives, to creatively look for a joint interest and goal, but also to translate this joint effort to sectoral goals, to represent and stand for the integrated policy in their own unit. Paradoxical and two-legged thinking and acting is necessary (see Raisch et al., 2009). Second, orders from managers of sectoral units to make integrated policy are supportive. Support and a clear mandate from above give the policy integration process at the table the necessary authority and legitimates participants to free up their (scarce) resources. It also provides participants something to fall back on when they encounter resistance from their sectoral home units.

Ideally, policy integration efforts are not one-off projects that vanish after some time but are rather transformative processes that increase an organization’s ability to collaborate and achieve joint results in a more lasting way. To realize this, it is necessary that policy integration is approached as a joint process of learning and reflection in a systemic way. This means that the process is not only between the partners at the collaborative table but also with the organizational home units. This process of learning and reflection should be focused on the dynamics at the moment of policy integration, but also on the more structural forces in the organization that hinder or support policy integration. Such a more concerted and systemic approach can help to realize more lasting organizational change (Van Buuren et al., 2012).

Conclusion

Governmental organizations face the challenge of combining and integrating different sectoral policy perspectives and interests to deal effectively with the wicked issues of late-modern societies. While the existing literature on policy integration has mainly focused on the inter-organizational dynamics of policy integration, this article delves into the difficulties of policy integration within governmental organizations. The theoretical assumption has been that civil servants from different organizational units create a collaborative, in-between space in which they work on an integrated policy, while they at the same time, translate this integrated policy in to their sectoral policies. This article, however, demonstrates a different and peculiar dynamic of policy integration. Based on two Dutch case studies, we have showed how policy integration was developed in temporary program teams at the edge of public organizations and easily volatilized over time because of a lack of foothold and ownership in the line organization. Ironically, policy integration became marginalized: a differentiated, stand-alone task executed in the periphery of bureaucracy.

We found three perspectives that can explain this dynamic of marginalization. From an innovation perspective, positioning integration efforts at the margins is necessary (and deliberatively chosen) to realize path-breaking innovations; a certain distance protects early results against conservative reflexes from the regime. From a system-psychodynamic perspective, marginalization is a way to avoid the tensions associated with policy integration. By keeping distance, line organizations and program teams can project negative images on each other, while cherishing their own “good” routines and logics. From an institutional perspective, the line organization marginalizes policy integration to protect their own vested sectoral interests and power. The line organization is both unable and unwilling to change their sectoral policies and to make integrated policies. By organizing distance, the organization can remain unharmed and let the innovation eventually die out.

The results of this article show that policy integration is a contested practice in governmental organizations. It is subject to organizational reflexes and forces that easily result in a marginalization of policy integration. This dynamic is understandable from the three perspectives described above, but also strongly unproductive and ineffective. When policy integration is marginalized, the results remain temporary and do not have a lasting effect on the (sectoral) organization. It is therefore key to make policy integration a collaborative effort of sectoral units in the heart of governmental organizations, which not only imposes high demands on individuals at the table. Moreover, it also requires an organizational and systemic process of reflecting on (un)productive dynamics in the organization and creating favorable conditions for policy integration.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Hans Joosse

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