The Synthetic Unity of Virtue and Epistemic Goods in Maximus the Confessor

Virtue and the Cognitive Life

Though they differ over the extent to which the intellectual virtues relate to the issues and questions of traditional epistemology, the following character-based virtue epistemologies envision fresh ways of conceiving the relationship between the intellectual virtues and the cognitive life. As I hope to show, an expansive move of this sort is ripe for theological appropriation. Moreover, my constructive reading of Maximus’s account of virtue focuses more on the role that the virtues play in the cognitive life than on whether they contribute significantly to, supplant, or complement traditional concerns.

In The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, Jonathan Kvanvig aims at carving out a robust account of the cognitive life (what he calls the cognitive ideal option) and finds that the intellectual virtues are best suited for this task. Conversely, traditional epistemology (what he calls the Cartesian perspective) targets the justification of individual propositions (a cognizer knows that p) and thereby presumes a time-slice approach to the pursuit of epistemic goods. However, a standpoint of this sort fails to address the social dimension of intellectual inquiry. ⁴ Alternatively, the intellectual virtues, for Kvanvig, ought to be at the heart of epistemological inquiry (not at the heart of taking up and solving the questions and issues of traditional epistemology). The cognitive ideal approach takes seriously the social conditions under which intellectual agents develop their cognitive capacities. It envisions humans in the context of inquiry (and of the cognitive life) as ‘potentialities in need of socialization in order to participate in communal efforts to incorporate bodies of knowledge into corporate plans, practices, rituals, and the like’. ⁵ Thus, an account of the intellectual virtues, for Kvanvig, is best construed as independent of traditional epistemology, especially since it seeks to decipher the actual conditions under which humans depend on social structures, practices, and exemplars in their quest for truth. Accordingly, a robust and ‘standard account of the importance of the virtues begins by noting that it is in settings involving cooperative plans and projects where the evaluation of persons, as opposed to acts and beliefs, is of special importance’. ⁶ Ultimately, Kvanvig’s cognitive ideal is still focused on truth, but its way of getting there is far removed from epistemic egoism—the life of the mind as something pursued on an epistemic island alone.

Robert Roberts and Jay Wood have recently proposed a regulative approach to epistemology that gives particular attention to individual intellectual virtues. The aim of this approach is not to employ the virtues to resolve the problems of traditional epistemology, nor is it to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of the relevant intellectual character virtues. Rather, the goal is to provide an extended analysis of particular virtues (e.g., love of knowledge, intellectual firmness, courage and caution, humility, autonomy, generosity, and practical wisdom), and, in so doing, enlarge ‘our practical understanding of the inner workings of the intellectual life’. ⁷ Seen in this way, a regulative approach to epistemology is ‘particularly attentive to the character traits of the excellent epistemic agent’. ⁸ It has profound implications for thinking principally about how intellectual and social practices guide and shape the formation of cognitive agents and how the intellectual virtues contribute to cognitive flourishing. A comparable move can be made in terms of Maximus’s focus on the regulative path that enables one to make progress toward fulfilling the ultimate end of human existence. ⁹

In The Inquiring Mind, Jason Baehr offers an account of the nature, structure and role of the intellectual virtues in the cognitive economy; he also evaluates the role that reflection on the intellectual character virtues should play in taking up the questions and problems of traditional epistemology. Overall, he frames the book in terms of the relationship between the intellectual virtues and inquiry. One can engage in the process of inquiry well or poorly. Sometimes the failure of an inquiry can be attributed to a ‘mechanical factor’. That is, a person may fail to ‘reach the truth on account of a defective cognitive faculty’ (e.g., poor vision, weak hearing, or a faulty memory). Yet, the success or failure of an inquiry often has a more ‘personal source’. This stems mainly from the fact that inquiry has a ‘robustly active dimension’. In this sense, inquiry involves activities such as ‘observing, imagining, reading, interpreting, reflecting, analyzing, assessing, formulating, and articulating’. However, success in these activities is not necessarily ‘guaranteed by the possession of sharp vision, impeccable memory, and sensitive hearing’. Rather, the active dimension of inquiry calls for the exercise of particular intellectual character virtues (e.g., ‘attentive observation’, ‘careful and thorough analysis’, or ‘fair-minded interpretation and assessment’), and this aspect of inquiry can be very demanding. ¹⁰

Baehr argues that a character-based approach plays a limited role in solving the problems of traditional epistemology. In terms of the traditional analysis of knowledge, the exercise of the intellectual character virtues is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge (e.g., simple perceptual knowledge does not require the exercise of intellectual character virtues since it is mostly automatic). However, Baehr shows how the pursuit of epistemic goods such as high-grade (or reflective) knowledge and justification calls for more than the basic employment of the faculties, and this is where the intellectual character virtues may play a background or secondary role. For example, attaining the truth in areas such as history, science, philosophy, psychology, ethics, or religion is not simply a matter of possessing ‘good eyesight, a good memory, or making valid logical inferences. Rather, the individuals in question reach the truth because they manifest certain attitudes or character traits’. ¹¹

More importantly, Baehr lays out (in the second half of the book) a personal worth conception of intellectual virtue. The relevant traits (e.g., open-mindedness, intellectual courage) are ‘intellectual virtues because they contribute to their possessor’s “personal intellectual worth”, that is, to their possessor’s intellectual goodness or badness qua person’. ¹² So, subject S is an intellectually good person insofar as S is positively orientated toward (or loves) the relevant epistemic goods. This comes down to clarifying what S identifies with, loves, or desires. In other words, virtuous inquiring minds have a deep and abiding desire for knowledge, truth, understanding, wisdom, and so on. Thus, what makes this proposal epistemic in nature is that it links a positive psychological orientation with ‘cognitive states’ such as knowledge, truth, understanding, and wisdom. ¹³

The point of this brief overview is not to resolve current disputes in virtue epistemology, nor is it to conflate the contemporary scene and the context of Maximus’s thought. However, these character-based virtue epistemologies concur that one can take up genuine epistemological questions that are largely independent of the problems and issues of traditional epistemology. Moreover, I have no intention of addressing the question of how Maximus’s account of virtue solves the problems and issues of traditional epistemology. Rather, I hope to show that the epistemic hints in his conception of virtue fit nicely with the character-based focus on the cognitive life. More specifically, Maximus’s account of virtue is ripe for constructive appropriation, especially in terms of showing how the virtues create a positive psychological orientation toward epistemic goods.

Virtue and Epistemic Goods

Maximus envisions the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods in terms of three inextricably related stages of the spiritual life: practice of the virtues (ἐθική or πρακτικὴ φιλoσoφὶα), the process of deciphering the logos in and through the created world (φυσική or φυσικὴ φιλoσoφὶα), and experiential knowledge of God (θϵoλoγική or θϵoλoγικὴ φιλoσoφία). ¹⁴ Fundamental to this three-fold approach is the formation of a ‘singularly insatiable desire for deifying knowledge’ ¹⁵ that outweighs and redirects competing desires. ¹⁶ By including the virtues here, Maximus rejects the intellectualist move that frames the epistemic pursuit of God primarily (if not only) through contemplation (or intellect) alone without engaging in (or giving little attention to) the process of ascetic formation (praktike). ¹⁷ Alternatively, praktike plays a fundamental role in the formation of a positive orientation toward and a diligent quest for the relevant epistemic goods. ¹⁸ The stronger claim is that ‘whoever desires to seize the knowledge of God without engaging in action is struggling in vain’. ¹⁹ Praktike makes rigorous demands on the self, requiring the possession of virtues such as prayer, humility, self-control, dispassion, prudence, and love. These traits are not optional in terms of the self’s desire to pursue the relevant epistemic goods. Moreover, praktike has a cognitive dimension, especially since its pursuits are ‘connected to reason’ and its sound judgments are ‘embraced by contemplation’. In fact, praktike supports the process of discerning ‘reality and activity’. ²⁰ As we will see, cultivating and embodying virtuous dispositions is a precondition for clearing away distractions, for rendering apt judgments, for perceiving correctly the divine in and through nature, and for participating in the life of God.

Virtue, according to Maximus, is a divinely infused power in the natural order of things. It is therefore not reducible to a human (or a natural) origin. Rather, God is the essence of the virtues. Accordingly, the one who ‘participates in virtue as a matter of habit unquestionably participates in God, the substance of the virtues’. ²¹ In both removing vicious dispositions (that are discordant with ‘nature’) and cultivating the ‘good natural seed’ (in accordance with the logos of nature), the self manifests ‘the splendor of its natural virtue’. ²² Though all have the capacity to manifest the virtues embedded in their very nature, the degree of cultivation is person-specific. That is, the manifestation of virtue depends on the self’s inclination and aptitude for well-being. ²³ Both volitional and cognitive elements are involved in cultivating ‘aptitude for well-being (that is, for goodness and wisdom)’ and in moving the self toward its proper end—eternal well-being. ²⁴

The vices bring about a state of disintegration in which the self misuses its faculties. More importantly, the vices impede the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods. As a result, the self fails to decipher the truth indicators of God’s presence. Alternatively, the virtues factor prominently in the reintegration of the self. They clear away volitional and intellectual obstacles and thereby create psychological space for pursuing the relevant epistemic goods. More specifically, the virtues play an indispensable role in employing the faculties rightly, in redirecting noetic distractions, in fostering stable dispositions, and in enabling the self to ‘return to its senses’. ²⁵ Maximus, for example, says that without the virtues of dispassion and humility, ‘no one will see the Lord’. ²⁶ A person regulated by the virtues will not be distracted by false representations or fantasies, but will be positively oriented toward what is true, beautiful, and good.

The point here seems to be that the virtues have an epistemic payoff insofar as they foster volitional openness and facilitate the process of pursuing epistemic goods. Without the relevant virtues (e.g., love, humility, dispassion, self-control, prudence, and prayer), the mind is unable to devote itself perfectly (without distraction) to God. ²⁷ A ‘careless’ mind quickly assents to or gets caught up in its own ‘passionate imaginings and impulses’, while the ‘virtuous mind’ combats such noetic distractions. ²⁸ With this connection between virtue and epistemic goods in mind, a very important part of deiform existence requires rectifying misguided desires and cultivating a praiseworthy desire for knowledge of God.

Maximus, then, sees the role of the virtues as crucial for creating psychological space to pursue epistemic goods. Along these lines, the self must engage in reliable belief-forming processes and practices. In addition, the goal of moving toward the ultimate end of human existence (eternal well-being) requires the ‘dignity, nature, and character of those who practice virtue and who are moved toward divine knowledge’. ²⁹ That is, the virtues nurture epistemic stability and facilitate the right manner of seeking knowledge of God, discernment of divine truths, wisdom, and so on. Those who have ‘rightly accomplished the way of the virtues’ are both led ‘on to knowledge’ and shown the ‘brilliant treasures of wisdom’. ³⁰ In other words, these epistemic goods are there for those who are volitionally (open) fit for well-being and cognitively attuned to the reality of God’s presence. So, the process of cultivating and embodying virtuous dispositions purifies one from misguided or false notions, enables one to advance in knowledge of God, and opens up the possibility of receiving divine wisdom.

Accordingly, the virtues are rationally tempered in that they are embedded in the very nature of things (in accordance with the logos) and manifest the very presence of God. Those who successfully form a virtuous habit of mind and become ‘rich in knowledge’ discern and assess ‘everything according to right reason’. ³¹ However, acquiring right reasoning of this sort rarely happens in isolation. Rather, it comes by learning from exemplars of ‘intelligence and virtue’. These exemplars are ‘competent’ to ‘uncover, through unwavering engagement in formidable struggles, the truth which has meanwhile lay hidden’. ³²

Maximus’s observation about the importance of exemplars (in the process of pursuing epistemic goods) warrants a brief constructive connection. Recent philosophical studies have shown that testimony plays an important role in obtaining epistemic goods such as true beliefs, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. Without testimony, immediate experience would be the only means for forming and sustaining beliefs. Moreover, recent work in social epistemology has shown that the move to the individual as a basis for coming to know p is deeply problematic, especially in light of what we know about the process of belief-formation. ³³ More exactly, people learn to discern and make apt judgments under the tutelage of exemplars of cognitive excellence; they hone cognitive capacities in order to inquire proficiently about matters (e.g., history, philosophy, psychology, science, and religion). In other words, the context of inquiry calls for induction into a community with vibrant practices, nurtured by exemplars of skillful judgment. Epistemic reliance on others implies the acknowledgement of an exemplar’s competence to render apt judgments about the relevant issues. It requires a disposition of trust for solidifying human transactions in everyday events and for maintaining a vibrant community of reflection. In this sense, acquisition of epistemic goods is a cooperative enterprise.

Praktike and Theoria: Synthesis without Confusion

The self must be properly oriented (volitionally open) in order to pursue the relevant epistemic goods, but the work of contemplative practices is largely focused on and responsible for successful acquisition of them. Consequently, a truly robust account of the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods includes both virtuous (praktike) and contemplative (theoria) aspects of deiform existence. Though there is a clear distinction between the practical and contemplative components, they are inextricably linked in terms of the self’s move toward the relevant epistemic goods. Maximus, for example, claims that in both the rational activity of prudence (φρόνησις) and the contemplative activity of wisdom (σoφία) ‘consists the true science (ἐπιστήμη) of divine and human matters, the truly secure knowledge and term of all divine wisdom’. ³⁴ The contemplative aspect, when properly regulated and supported by praktike, is positively oriented toward the relevant epistemic goods and moves ‘unswervingly toward God’. ³⁵

In the Mystagogia, for instance, Maximus lists the five pairs of mind and reason, wisdom and prudence, contemplation and action, knowledge and virtue, and enduring knowledge and faith. Each pair retains (without confusion) the practical (e.g., goodness) and contemplative (e.g., truth) ends of deiform existence. Nevertheless, the goal is to ‘unite’ and ‘weave’ these aspects of deiform existence into each other: ‘reason with mind, prudence with wisdom, action with contemplation, virtue with knowledge, faith with enduring knowledge’. What results is the formation of a ‘rational mind, a prudent wisdom, an active contemplation, a virtuous knowledge, and along with them an enduring knowledge which is both very faithful and unchangeable’. ³⁶ The relationship between virtue and knowledge, for example, is one of ‘“identity” (ταυτoτ́Ąς)—a term which denotes an intimate unity without violation of its parts, a “synthetic” unity’. ³⁷ A synthetic unity of this sort not only indicates that virtue and knowledge are both ‘important, and that one cannot be isolated from the other, or substituted for the other. It also implies that they support each other in their functions, and thus condition the perfection of each other’. ³⁸

The synthetic unity, envisioned by Maximus here, does not divide up praktike and theoria strictly into independent and unrelated realms. Rather, it follows that when virtuous and contemplative practices ‘mutually cohere in one another’, the self’s thoughts are sanctified. ³⁹ However, praktike is obviously not sufficient in and of itself for acquiring the relevant epistemic goods. Rather, theoria is largely directed toward these goods. Yet, the self will not flourish in its contemplative pursuits without properly formed virtuous dispositions and practices, and so theoria, in this sense, is supported and facilitated by praktike. In the end, Maximus claims that praktike and theoria are integrated (though not confused), but they are also hierarchically ordered in that the former frees (makes psychological space for) the latter to pursue the relevant epistemic goods.

Virtue and Positive Orientation: Toward Epistemic Goods

As we have seen, the virtues play an important role in perfecting the right use of the faculties and in redirecting them to their proper end. The key here is to cultivate a properly oriented desire for the relevant epistemic goods. The desire for knowledge of God needs to win over competing desires. The self must learn to operate in ‘the right way’ and ‘transfer its whole longing onto God’. ⁴⁰ In so doing, the faculties will be rightly disposed, prepared, and oriented in such a way that the self will make progress in its pursuit of the epistemic goods.

For example, dispassion (ἀπάθϵια) is a fundamental goal (or consummation) of praktike. As a peaceful and stable state of mind, dispassion resists intellectual and affective distractions (e.g., irrational influences and thoughts). The self is then able to ‘see things rightly’ ⁴¹ and respond only to those things that are true, good, and beautiful. A habit of mind of this sort fosters stability and thereby frees the self to contemplate divine matters. Consequently, the mind is prepared for and ready to journey ‘straight ahead to the contemplation of created things’ and then fly freely to the ‘knowledge of heavenly things’. ⁴² In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that a passion, according to Maximus, is ‘blameworthy’ when it moves ‘contrary to nature’. ⁴³ The self’s noetic state is discordant with nature when ‘it fails to cultivate its natural powers’. ⁴⁴ Once the ‘underlying passions’ of the self are ‘aroused’, ‘they blind the understanding and do not allow it to look at the rays of truth or to discern the better from the worse’. ⁴⁵ Perhaps, a contemporary application is the epistemic agent’s ability to consider complex philosophical issues without caving into easy solutions.

When the self is free from affective and intellectual distractions, a properly formed desire is crucial to the pursuit of epistemic goods. A positive orientation entails deciphering the relevant love of epistemic goods. ⁴⁶ The self’s rational activity should be positively oriented toward God, and so the cognitive and the volitional should be coupled so as to foster a praiseworthy desire for God. As Paul Blowers points out, desire plays an integral role in the pursuit of epistemic goods.

But as Maximus indicates…desire is intrinsic to the upward intellectual and spiritual advance toward things divine. Seeking after (ζήτησις) God consists precisely in a desirous motion (μϵτ’ ἐφέσϵως κίνησις) of the mind. In indwelling and stretching the natural faculties, which fully retain their capacity (ἕξις) and integrity while cooperating with divine grace, the Spirit specifically instills an ‘impassible desire’ (παθὴς ἔφϵσις) in the questing mind. ⁴⁷

Proper use of the faculties requires both the requisite knowledge (γω̑îσις) and the concrete guidance by the intellectual virtue of prudence. ⁴⁸ In purifying the self from false notions and misguided desires, ‘all the virtues co-operate with the intellect to produce [an] intense longing for God’. ⁴⁹ A ‘praiseworthy passion of love binds’ the mind to ‘divine things’, and accordingly the self forms and sustains a ‘tenacious habit of contemplation’. ⁵⁰

In this regard, the virtue of love plays a supportive role and provides a positive orientation (over against competing desires) toward the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods. Though it is clearly distinguished from these goods, love is deeply linked with forming a praiseworthy desire for knowledge of God, the illumination of divine truths, and so on. ⁵¹ With this distinction in mind, love serves as a facilitating virtue in that it disposes the self to prefer knowledge of God to all other things, ‘renders the mind modest’, and ‘constantly prepares it to advance in knowledge’. ⁵² In fact, the mind’s desire to pursue epistemic goods is ‘born of’ and ‘activated by love’. ⁵³ Thus, love is not to be understood merely in affective terms but also in cognitive terms, especially since it is conducive to and supportive of the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods.

Concluding Reflections

With few exceptions, most of the recent work in religious epistemology has focused on the status of beliefs, that is, whether religious beliefs are rational, justified, true, evidentially based, and so on. However, little attention has been given to the conditions under which people are positively oriented toward and pursue epistemic goods, and how knowers are formed in religious communities. As we have seen, some recent work in virtue epistemology has unpacked and clarified the role of the intellectual virtues in the cognitive economy (e.g., the cognitive ideal model, the regulative function of virtue, and the personal worth account of intellectual virtue). In my estimation, Kvanvig, Roberts, Wood, and Baehr have offered fresh epistemological perspectives that warrant greater theological attention and appropriation. They take up the question of how the intellectual virtues factor into the process of inquiry. More importantly, their character-based accounts are profoundly relevant for thinking about how the virtues foster a positive orientation toward epistemic goods in religious communities.

Along these lines, Harriett Harris makes an astute observation about the need for richer accounts of the role that religious practice and spiritual disciplines play in the formation of epistemic agents and in the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods:

Virtue epistemologists are exploring how the development of intellectual, moral and spiritual virtues (these categories blend into each other) bears on the development of understanding… Could there even be room within mainstream philosophy of religion to acknowledge that spiritual disciplines such as forms of contemplation can be significant in developing one’s understanding of matters at the heart of philosophy of religion’s concerns… How programming in religious practice and spiritual disciplines, such as prayer and contemplation, help us to become more competent knowers (or seers, or hearers or perceivers—no term is adequate) of religious realities is a project awaiting our attention. ⁵⁴

As we have seen, Maximus offers a fascinating account of how virtuous and contemplative features of deiform existence are inextricably linked to one another, especially as the self cultivates a positive orientation toward knowledge of God, illumination of divine truths, wisdom, and so forth. The self must be cognitively and volitionally transformed as it pursues these epistemic goods. In addition, a time-slice approach does not provide a robust account of the cognitive and volitional aspects of deiform existence. A more expansive approach includes reflection on the role that the virtues play in the cognitive life of deiform existence.

In this regard, I have explored (in a preliminary way) Maximus’s understanding of the relationship between the virtues and the relevant epistemic goods and have clarified how the former cultivates a positive orientation toward the latter. More specifically, he envisions a synthetic unity of praktike and theoria in which the virtues contribute to the redirection of misguided desires, the right employment of the faculties, the formation of a praiseworthy disposition, and the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods. A unity of this sort does not sanction a complete separation of the practical and the contemplative (and of the volitional and the cognitive), nor does it blur the distinction between the epistemic and the moral.

I think that the time is ripe for putting patristic writers such as Maximus in conversation with recent developments in virtue epistemology and the broader landscape of epistemology. The field of epistemology has been revolutionized over the last forty years. One refreshing feature of recent work in epistemology is the expansion of its features, aims, and goals. ⁵⁵ With this in mind, we need to explore some viable interdisciplinary opportunities in which theologians, historians, and philosophers can engage in rigorous reflection on all the epistemological issues raised by the full range of topics pursued within theology (e.g., the virtues, testimony, discernment, knowledge of God, and wisdom). This kind of collaboration creates space for creative work in epistemology as it crops up within theology. In terms of Maximus’s conception of the virtues, for instance, we need further work on the nature, structure, and role of each virtue in the cognitive economy of deiform existence. What is the nature and structure of virtues such as humility, practical wisdom, love, and dispassion, and how do they contribute to the self’s intellectual goodness and to the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods? How are the moral and the epistemic related? ⁵⁶ An additional fruitful area of inquiry may involve deciphering if there is a link between a character-based virtue epistemology and the contours of spiritual formation. It is my hope that this essay will provoke further reflection and development toward the constructive task at hand.