Abstract
There has been a renewed interest, in the academy and in the church, in the teaching of the Church Fathers on social and economic questions, and in particular on the proper distribution of material goods. This article attempts to provide an overview of the social teaching of Origen of Alexandria, with a special focus on the question of distributive justice. It explores Origen’s view of the relationship between justice and charity, of the moral burdens of riches and the spiritual benefits of poverty, on the roles of the wealthy and the poor in the church, and on the obligations of all believers to ensure a distribution of material goods which is in accord with the demands of justice and charity. This article concludes that, even if Origen never systematizes his own answers to these questions, his occasional and frequent reflections on them are consistent enough to provide a profound and well-balanced teaching on distributive justice, which exerted an undeniable influence on later thinkers.
As Origen never enunciates a systematic theory of distributive justice, it would be tempting to conclude that he never developed one, and yet both the constancy and consistency of his remarks on the topic, as well as the generally expansive and cohesive scope of his thought, weigh against this conclusion. I would suggest that, even if Origen himself never had the opportunity to express a systematic theory of distributive justice, it would be possible to extrapolate one, given the conditions just mentioned. This article will attempt to explore Origen’s understanding of how the Christian faith showed the proper use and distribution of material goods. This exploration will focus on Origen’s understanding of the virtue of justice as a mean between excessive and inadequate material goods, which will also illuminate the burdens of wealth and the corresponding benefits of poverty. Origen will root this understanding of justice in the harmonious testimony of the Old and New Testaments, while also pointing out the relation between justice and charity, which entails the sharing of such material goods with others.
By way of organization, this article will begin by drawing attention to the relation of the virtues 1 of love and justice in Origen’s thought, showing that Origen conceives of justice as properly ordered love. It will proceed by analyzing how this love is ordered rightly both toward oneself and toward others, and then how love toward others is manifested concretely in the avoidance of avarice, in the ideal of self-sufficiency, and in the voluntary renunciation of property.
Origen’s ethical teaching has rarely been the subject of direct scholarly attention. 2 Although Origen was certainly aware of the vast body of ethical reflection carried on in the Hellenistic philosophical schools, and was capable of vigorous dialogue with those schools, 3 he preferred to cast ethics in a Christocentric mold, emphasizing the solidarity of all virtues in Jesus Christ and the love of the Father revealed in and through Jesus Christ. 4 What is more, ethics for Origen was a practical rather than a theoretical exercise: the school of Alexandria was less an ethics classroom than a full-scale ascetic and philosophical regimen devoted to the conversion of its students—what Robert Wilken dubs a ‘school for training in virtue.’ 5 Origen’s approach to Christian ethics was part and parcel of a charged project of moral and spiritual formation rooted in his own highly personal spirituality. 6
Identification of Love and Justice
Before taking up a treatment of the practical outworkings of justice, it will be worthwhile to explore the meaning of the term for Origen, along with the relation of justice to the other virtues. The first remark to make in this direction is that, for Origen, not only are all of the virtues interrelated, but they are substantively unified, inasmuch as they are all identifiable with the selfsame Logos who is the source of all virtue: ‘we are wont to regard Christ as Himself the substance of those very virtues.’
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As all virtues cohere in Christ, to have one is to have the others.
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Hence, Origen is constantly concerned to interrelate the virtues of charity and equity/justice.
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If charity, for Origen, is a kind of ‘other-oriented’ impulse which seeks the good of the other,
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and justice or equity is that which respects the precise rights and obligations of the other,
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then the harmony between the two should become clearer.
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Hence, finding in the Song of Songs the phrase, ‘Equity hath loved thee,’ Origen remarks, The words imply self-blame: the maidens have not yet so cast away iniquity [inaequitas] and come to equity [aequitas], as to be able to love the Bridegroom’s breasts more than wine now; and they know that it is wholly unfitting for any trace of iniquity to remain in a person who has reached the perfection of spiritual and mystical teaching. Therefore, because the height of perfection consists in charity, and charity allows nothing of iniquity – and where there is no iniquity, there surely is equity – it is rightly said to be Equity that loves the Bridegroom.
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Hence, love which fails to attain equity is a disordered love, which loves the other either more or less than the other’s due. As he notes in his Homilies on Luke, ‘If someone loves another, he should consider the nature and the cause of his loving, and not love that person more than he deserves. For, if he goes beyond the measure and the limit of charity, then both he who loves and he who is loved will be in sin.’ 14 This, in fact, is the very nature of idolatry, which gives to a created being the love due only to the Creator: ‘Do you honor silver and the wealth here below as a great good?,’ asks Origen. ‘Your god and lord is Mammon.’ 15 Commenting on another phrase in the Song of Songs, ‘set ye in order charity in me,’ Origen continues, ‘It is a graceful phrase – “set ye in order …” For truly, the charity of many is in a state of disorder; they accord the second place in their loving to that which ought to have the first, and to that which should come second they give the first ….” 16 He goes on to recall the Gospel admonitions not to love mother, father, son, daughter, children or wife more than one loves Christ. God alone is to be loved ‘with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole strength, with the whole mind,’ the neighbor ‘as thyself,’ and so on. 17 In short, justice is nothing more than properly ordered love.
This means, in the end, that others always have claims on our love, which Origen can describe as ‘debts.’ In his treatise On Prayer, he comments on the phrase, ‘Forgive us our debts,’ noting, ‘We owe debts, therefore, in that we have certain duties … towards others. Either, then, we discharge these debts by carrying out the injunctions of God’s law, or if we despise sane reason and do not discharge them, we continue to remain in debt.’ 18 He goes on to expostulate the specific and varied debts which we owe fellow Christians, family members, fellow citizens, all men, strangers, the elderly, the poor widows, the clergy, and chief of all God Himself. 19 Importantly, however, Origen does not omit from consideration that ‘towards ourselves also we have debts’—not only to maintain the integrity of the soul, but of the body as well. Commenting on St. Paul’s insistence that we are not ‘debtors to the flesh’ (Rom. 8:12), Origen admits that it is a ‘necessity of nature’ that we provide nourishment and clothing for our bodies: so long as we do not pursue excessive lustful appetites, the ‘necessary matters’ which our bodies require are obtained without sin. 20 In sum, the human person must make an honest assessment of his place in the economy of creation, ascertaining the relative place and value of each other being to which he finds himself related, and respond with the degree of ‘well-ordered love’ which this being requires: God, others, and his own embodied self. In this way, charity will find its proper expression according to the order of justice.
This well-ordered love can easily slip into disordered love if either of these relationships (self and God, or self and neighbor) becomes disjointed or disharmonized. In other words, the virtue of justice, among other things, is a mean between inadequate love of self, which fails to do justice to one’s own legitimate material and bodily needs, and excessive love of self, which avariciously seeks to appropriate excessive material goods without regard for the needs of others. We will next treat, in order, the inadequate love of self which Origen identifies with the heresy of Gnosticism, and then the excessive love of self (or rather, of material goods for one’s own consumption) which he identifies with the Jewish dispensation.
Love as Justice Toward Oneself
First, an exaggerated dualism could easily lead to a repudiation of the body, to the point of denying it even its most basic needs. But owing to Origen’s conviction that man is composed of body and soul, both being created by God, he insists that everything necessary for the body’s sustenance is properly due the body, as part of the debt of love mentioned above. He contrasts Christian ascetics with those of the Pythagoreans, admitting that both abstain from eating certain foods, but from very different motivations. The Pythagoreans, he says, do so to liberate the soul from the body, ‘on account of the myth about the soul’s reincarnation,’ to the point that they even desire the death of their loved ones, whereas Christians merely seek to ‘bruise the body and keep it into subjection.’ 21 Likewise, in an allegorical exegesis of Matthew 22, Origen describes this provision of bodily sustenance as part of ‘paying tribute to Caesar,’ and he likens Gnostic dualists to the Pharisees, who are unwilling to give Caesar his due. 22 So long as the present material dispensation continues, the virtue of justice will consider the necessary debt toward oneself as including at least a modicum of material goods, for the sustenance of one’s own body. 23
Love as Justice Toward Others: Avarice
Origen spends far more time, however, criticizing the disordered love of material goods, which for him is a symptom of excessive love of oneself, seeking to overindulge one’s bodily appetites at the expense of the honor due to God and others. For Origen, the true blessings God wishes to give are not corporeal, but spiritual. 24 Though it may be tempting to discard this as only so much Platonizing, for Origen it always has a Christological and biblical basis: ‘How can the spirit that has considered the immovable kingdom of Christ, do otherwise than contemn as utterly worthless every earthly kingdom?’ 25 What is more, true riches are found not in some disembodied ‘spiritual realm,’ but rather in a life of virtue and holiness, like the man who is ‘rich … in all wisdom and every good work, lend[ing] out of his wealth and utterance and wisdom and knowledge to many nations.’ 26 For Origen, true riches do not consist in material goods at all, but in virtue. 27
As noted above, Origen frequently identifies the tendency to exalt corporeal riches with the Jewish dispensation, inasmuch as he finds such a tendency dominating the literal sense of the Old Testament, with all of its promises of land, wealth, and temporal success. Origen, in his typical fashion, insists on the allegorization of these texts as a condition for their appropriation by Christians. 28 He complains that ‘some men, who reject the labor of thinking and seek after the outward and literal meaning of the law, or rather give way to their own desires and lusts, disciples of the mere letter, consider that the promises of the future are to be looked for in the form of pleasure and bodily luxury … understand[ing] the divine scriptures in a Judaistic sense.’ 29 Of the Sadducees, he complains that ‘they do not understand that it is spiritual blessings that have been prophesied,’ 30 and Origen criticizes Celsus for making the same mistake: ‘If, then, the letter of the law promises wealth to the righteous, Celsus may follow the letter that kills and think that the promise is speaking of blind wealth. But we regard it as the riches that have keen sight, according as a person is rich in all utterance and all knowledge ….’ 31 Similarly, the patriarchs’ relentless pursuit of property is said to illustrate the Christians’ pursuit of Gentile converts, 32 and the houses owned by the Levitical priests are said to signify the ‘eternal house in heaven not made by hand,’ of which St. Paul speaks. 33 But Origen’s dismissal of temporal blessings does not stop at his exegesis of the Old Testament: he is equally concerned to rule out a ‘Jewish’ interpretation of the New Testament. He famously spiritualizes the ‘daily bread’ of the Lord’s Prayer, 34 and generally rules out any prayerful petition for temporal gifts: ‘Everyone, then, that asks God for the things of the earth and what is small disobeys Him who bids us ask from God for the things of heaven and what is great, and who does not grant favours that are of the earth and small.’ 35
Many of the Church Fathers, such as Clement of Alexandria, have been accused of soft-pedaling the Christian teaching on poverty by over-emphasizing the possibility of ‘the detachment of the owner,’ such that a Christian could be wealthy, so long as he remained ‘detached’ from his riches. 36 Such an attitude could lay the groundwork for a kind of ‘bourgeoise Christianity’—‘a more secure Christianity, one which had no risk of revolutionary or radical change of the social structure for its rich members.’ 37 Origen does, indeed, often target one’s moral attachment to wealth—speaking, for example, of ‘the man who is distracted by wealth,’ 38 or of the tendency of wealth to make one ‘too confident … full of pride.’ 39 Yet, this is not something Origen emphasizes, and Origen’s critique is typically of the mere possession of excessive wealth or property: he typically tolerates the possession of extraneous wealth only on the assumption that it is routinely and habitually dispensed to others. That is to say, for Origen, a detachment from one’s riches was indicated by one’s willingness to part with them if others have need of them. 40 Indeed, contemporary scholars have generally found Origen’s position much more radical than that of both his predecessors and successors. 41 Distributive justice, inasmuch as it is well-ordered charity, rules out any avaricious hoarding of material goods.
Thus, in his moral and pastoral admonitions Origen does not hesitate to condemn greed and avarice—the seeking, acquiring or retaining of material goods beyond what one requires for one’s self-subsistence. His tirades against avarice are constant and uncompromising, and tend to follow the following themes: avarice is a form of quasi-Satanic idolatry, it entangles the soul in worldly affairs, it eviscerates the spiritual health of the soul, and its related vices (such as pride) cause needless divisions in society. These points will be explored in turn.
First, to relate to the pivotal point of Origen’s social teaching, avarice reflects a disordered or inequitable state of charity, in which ‘there is something that weighs more [than God] on the scale of love,’ in which case, says Origen, ‘this is God to you.’ 42 The excessively wealthy thus prize worldly goods as their supreme goal, disregarding their heavenly homeland, ‘as if it is the age of eternity now.’ 43 Origen identifies this ‘deification’ of wealth with the pseudo-deity ‘Mammon,’ which in turn can represent the very opposite of God, the devil himself, or even Judas the betrayer of Christ. 44 As for those, says Origen, ‘burning with desire for money and love of greed, they call the god of that desire Mammon … Therefore, you see that not only to worship an image but to strive after greed is considered to be worship and servitude to idols.’ 45
Origen does not leave this on the level of abstraction, however, but describes in concrete details how an obsession with the cultivation of wealth and property will inevitably ‘distract and drag away the soul from the things which are better and diviner, and bring it down and fix it fast to the deceit of this age, in wealth and glory.’ 46 Whereas Jesus’ disciples are called to be ‘not of this world’ (John 17:16), love for possessions makes them ‘occasions of stumbling,’ 47 mundane affairs and cares make them ‘a slave to that affair and care to which [they are] bound,’ 48 and demonic powers extinguish their baptismal grace by drowning it in secular affairs. 49 In practical terms, their preoccupation with business, marketplaces, and lawsuits gives them no time to hear the word of God, 50 and thus distracted they are interiorly ‘turned away’ when the Scriptures are proclaimed, 51 or else when they hear it they do not understand it. 52 For this reason, Origen insists that his hearers ‘do not mix mundane things with divine; do not introduce worldly matters into the mysteries of the Church,’ 53 and priests for their part should renounce all earthly possessions entirely, 54 for unless they do so they cannot serve the Lord. 55
The spiritual soul itself is also weakened—diseased—by such entanglements. Avarice generates ‘worms’ which breed sickness in the soul.
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Not every sin has this sickening effect on the soul, but only those which ‘settle down’ and spread their effect throughout the entire soul. Among these ‘sicknesses of the soul’ Origen includes avarice, along with ambition and pederasty.
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By such a sickness the soul is choked, and cannot be brought to perfection.
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Allegorizing the Gospel account of the stater
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found in the fish’s mouth (Matt. 17:24–26), Origen makes the fish represent the lover of money, who is adrift ‘in the waves of the cares and anxieties of avarice,’ his mouth filled with the stater, ‘which is the symbol of avarice.’
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Origen astutely observes how, from the desire for money, countless other vices sprout: It is thus that the fall into avarice at last takes place, men first longing for a little money and then increasing in greed as the vice grows. Afterwards their passion is succeeded by a mental blindness and, with the hostile powers stimulating and urging them on, money is now not merely longed for but even seized by force or acquired through the shedding of human blood.
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The influence of ‘hostile powers’ refers to the devil, for the lover of money is a ‘soldier for the king of Egypt,’ who drives him on to agitations, lawsuits, altercations, unchastity, cruelty, and countless other moral crimes. 62 Owing to these especial dangers associated with avarice, Origen advises that all lovers of money be immediately expelled from the Church, 63 because such vices pollute the sanctuary and are incompatible with its sacred character. 64 What is more, Origen has no doubt that the ultimate end of these preoccupations is ‘the loss of the soul and its eternal reproach,’ 65 because ‘the rich man will be punished after his death.’ 66
Of the many vices which spring from avarice, Origen seemed to have a special disdain for the social divisiveness caused by the arrogance of the rich vis-à-vis the poor: There are some who are proud because they are sons of rulers and because they are descended from those who are great by earthly standards. Such ones, proud for purposeless and indifferent matters, do not have a good explanation for what incites them to be proud. They are proud because they have the power to kill men and they are proud because they have acquired what among themselves is labeled such a dignified position that they can cut off the heads of men. The glory of such people is their shame. Others are proud about wealth—not about the true wealth but the wealth below—and others are proud, so to speak, about having a beautiful house or many fields. None of these things is worthy of discussion.
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Such boasting is ‘alien to the boasting of the saints,’ 68 who, Origen describes, have ‘renounced every boast here below,’ and boast in Christ alone. 69 Thus, Origen does not permit such social divisions to enter the Church, because—like the little children Jesus preferred—Christians are indifferent to differences ‘on the ground of wealth, or raiment, [or] noble birth.’ 70 Rather, the Christian ‘does not show partiality to any person – neither a rich one, nor a powerful one, nor a king, nor a priest.’ 71
Love as Justice Toward Others: Self-Sufficiency
If Origen, then, finds the pursuit or possession of excessive material goods to be morally repugnant, while finding equally repugnant the pursuit of inadequate material goods, then where, exactly, does one draw the line between these evils? Does Origen, in other words, have a positive notion of a middle ground between the vices of avarice and masochistic self-deprivation? A brief comparison with Stoic ethics, which will be developed below, will readily show that Origen did have a very clear concept of such a mean: the possession of a modicum of material goods adequate to meet one’s material needs and render one materially self-sufficient.
The ancient Stoics had developed an ethical system revolving around the well-known ideal of ‘self-sufficiency’ (autarkeia), which, operating under the assumption that virtue alone was sufficient to constitute the good life, frowned on the vain pursuit of excessive material goods, beyond the minimum necessary for a life consonant with human dignity. This was predicated on the assumption that such natural goods (‘necessities of life’) were made readily and easily available in the world around us (water, game, and fruit, for example), whereas extravagant and unnecessary goods (e.g. gold and silver) require strenuous effort to obtain, thus involving the soul in greed or excessive passion. 72 Thus, all that the wise man will seek are ‘necessities’ (chrēseōs, or anankaiou); anything beyond this he will freely part with, because they go beyond what is necessary for self-sufficiency. 73
Early Christian writers, even before Origen, had adopted this Stoic ethic, and Clement of Alexandria is perhaps the most emblematic of this adoption: ‘All that we possess is given to us for necessities (chrēseōs), and necessities for self-sufficiency (autarkeias).’ 74 Although Origen only infrequently uses the term ‘self-sufficiency,’ he frequently speaks of man’s right and obligation to seek and obtain those material goods which are necessary for the sustenance of bodily life (tēs tou biou chreias), 75 which he contrasts with luxurious goods which are ‘useful for nothing.’ 76 Elsewhere, in a Latin manuscript, he contrasts the ‘necessities of the flesh’ (necessariis) with its ‘lusts’ (concupiscentiis). 77 Similarly, he will describe the specific point where a man, desiring to become ‘as free and rich and noble as he can,’ achieves the point where he is self-sufficient (sibi sufficiat). 78 Origen is also remarkably consistent in his insistence that those who lack such a standard of living have a right to receive these goods from others. Such has always been the practice of pagan philosophers, Origen remarks, and it was also the practice of Jesus and His disciples, 79 who likewise criticized the Jewish authorities for undermining this standard by the practice of Corban. 80 St. Paul received such support from his patrons, 81 and the early Christian missionaries, ‘if ever they are compelled to do so by want in this respect, they are content with what is necessary and no more [chreia], even if several people are willing to share with them and give them more than they need.’ 82 Likewise, the poor within the Church may take money from the Church’s purse ‘for necessary uses’ (pro usibus necessariis), 83 just as the landless clergy receive support from the laity for ‘the necessities of life’ (quae necessaria sunt). 84 In sum, Origen lays down as a general rule, ‘may your abundance be for the need of those others … and may their abundance be for your need.’ 85 Thus, as should be readily clear, Origen lays down as a consistent rule that, avoiding both inadequate and excessive material goods, every man has both a right and a duty to seek and obtain those goods he requires for a dignified bodily existence. To provide such is strictly a duty of distributive justice.
Origen does not, however, hold that it is always and everywhere illegitimate to possess material goods in excess of the ‘necessities of life’: although the possession of such excess of goods is morally regrettable and preferably avoided, it does not disqualify one for the kingdom of God, providing one uses such goods well. In his comments on the Gospel passage of the rich young ruler (Matt. 19:23), Origen draws attention to the wording, ‘A rich man will barely enter the kingdom of heaven’: In this case man must notice how strict is the written word of the Savior. Namely, he did not say, a rich man will not enter the kingdom of heaven. That is to say, if he had said so, then he would have excluded the rich from the kingdom of heaven. But he said: A rich man will barely enter in it. He showed with it that it is difficult for the rich, but not impossible to reach salvation.
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What is more, Origen assumes that the rich have as much right to a place in the Church as the poor, and even boasts that in his own day ‘even rich men and persons in positions of honour, and ladies of refinement and high birth, favourably regard adherents of the faith.’ 87 In passing comments on the persecution of the Church, he often refers to the plundering of Christians’ property, 88 revealing his assumption that Christians were not entirely without such possessions. Although he warns the rich not to become proud of their worldly status, and not to misuse their riches for evil purposes, he does not for that reason deny their right to their riches, providing they are used properly. 89 When speaking of worldly status, he notes that just as sight, hearing, and rationality, although they can be used for evil purposes, are nonetheless gifts of God which can be used for good purposes as well, in the same way, ‘though we have these things from God, it nevertheless is in our authority to make use of [these things] for good things or evil things.’ 90 He is even able to cite examples of saintly rich men, such as Job: ‘Job was also rich, but he did not pass his life in luxury and lack of compassion,’ thus showing the possibility of ‘just rich men.’ 91 Thus, in speaking of the wealthy patrons who support the work of the Church, Origen notes that, for all their infamy, ‘our Lord Jesus certainly permits [their] salvation.’ 92
The possession of property, of course, immerses one in the daily cares of this material world, and imposes upon the possessor various duties and ‘debts’ to his fellow citizens that he might not otherwise have. Origen is not without his praise for just and upright societies, laws and governments: ‘Cities with many arts and legislation have come to exist among men. States and positions of authority and leadership among men are what are properly speaking called good dispositions and activities.’ 93 Likewise, following St. Paul, he expects Christians to pay taxes and to offer obedience to all kings and worldly authorities, 94 and he praises those who cooperate with magistrates to ‘care or provide for the common good’ and entering ‘the service of the State.’ 95 Those who refuse to pay justly levied taxes, for Origen, even though they be Christians, are ‘worthy of death’! 96
Such responsibilities and obligations, however, are relevant only to those who possess a considerable amount of possessions, and cannot occur without some level of moral compromise. Commenting on St. Paul’s admonition, ‘Let every soul be subject to the higher authorities’ (Rom. 13:1), Origen points out, ‘It does not seem very commendable to me here that what he commands to be subject to the authorities he calls the soul. For he would never have said, Let every spirit be subject to authority, but “every soul.”’ 97 Elsewhere Origen has enunciated his distinction between the soul and spirit, the former being an imperfect, defective and morally diminished form of the latter. 98 Thus, the ‘soul’ comes to signify that which ‘still possesses something of this world … a soul shackled by pre-occupations,’ which ‘seeks the things of the flesh’ and ‘live[s] according to the flesh.’ 99 Those who are in this morally compromised position, i.e. ‘certain souls which are less perfect,’ 100 must pay the inevitable price: ‘He who has money or possessions or any worldly preoccupations should listen up: “Let every soul be subject to the higher authorities.”’ 101 But there is, for Origen, another alternative: ‘Peter and John used to have nothing to render to Caesar; for Peter says, “Gold and silver I do not have.” He who does not have this has nothing to render to Caesar, nor therefore, what he should subject to the higher authorities.’ 102 Origen thus introduces a moral hierarchy: the propertied Christians who remain under the temporal jurisdiction of Caesar, and the ‘blessed poor among the saints,’ who are entirely freed from Caesar’s jurisdiction. 103 There are, therefore, gradations of justice—different degrees of well-ordered love—all of which have a role to play in the Church.
Origen has many profound reflections on the role of these ‘blessed poor’ in the Church, but another question must be settled first. Having established that a Christian may own a considerable amount of property (i.e. beyond the ‘necessities of life’) without thereby forfeiting his salvation (even if he does thereby forfeit the highest levels of Christian perfection), it remains to consider what the ‘right use’ of such property might be. What are the positive duties and responsibilities, in other words, of the wealthy Christian? It must be recalled, from the beginning of this article, that justice requires that certain debts be paid to others, in order that love be equitable rather than iniquitous. The just and ordered dispensation of material goods, or what we would today call ‘distributive justice,’ is obviously not a concern of the ‘blessed poor’ who possess no such goods, yet it remains a strict obligation on those with even relative wealth. Well-ordered love, in other words, puts real, concrete demands on the wealthy to distribute their material goods to those who have need of them.
In his Commentary on Matthew, Origen makes reference to the ‘bag of the Church,’ which was entrusted in his time to the care of a designated minister. 104 This ‘bag’ would have depended entirely upon the contributions of the wealthy, thus serving as a means of uniting the ‘poor man who petitions God for his wants,’ and ‘those who have acquired more than sufficient of the needs of life.’ 105 These, Origen says, will always receive support ‘from the sanctuary for necessary uses,’ 106 so long as the wealthy are ever ‘ready to distribute, willing to communicate,’ 107 imitating the ‘great kindness of God’ which has bestowed these gifts upon them. 108 Likewise, and with more specificity, Origen recalls Christ’s commandment to ‘clothe the naked with our own spare tunic,’ 109 to imitate the righteous Job in furnishing ‘the things needed for life to widows and orphans,’ 110 and the hospitality of Lot who ‘escapes the conflagration for this reason alone: because he opened his house to strangers.’ 111 The wealthy should not be content to respond to requests of this kind: rather, they must eagerly ‘look around for the poor, the weak, the needy, in order to show them mercy,’ and ‘inquire after, and be anxiously concerned about, and pursue, and make diligent search for strangers, wherever they may be, lest perchance they may be sitting on the street or lying somewhere without a roof over their heads.’ 112
Beyond the care of the impoverished, Origen also stresses the obligations of the wealthy toward the material upkeep of the church and her clergy, of especial importance during a time when ecclesiastical institutions would have lacked the legal status enabling financial self-subsistence. In addition, as will be discussed below, Origen assumes that the clergy will have embraced voluntary poverty. Thus, Origen speaks of ‘the prayers and offerings which are presented in the churches of God for the use of the saints and the ministry of the priesthood.’ 113 Origen frequently compares the relationship between the laity and clergy to that between the Israelite tribes and the Levitical priests in the Old Covenant, in which case, ‘Those from the tribes, on the one hand, offer tithes and firstfruits to God through the Levites and priests.’ 114 In this way a happy exchange of goods takes place, ‘so that the priest and the Levite may obtain from the Israelite earthly things that they do not have, and so the Israelites may obtain from the priest and Levite heavenly and divine things that they do not have.’ 115 The wealthy, then, ‘are conscientious towards the servants of God and desire to serve them, for they are also fully ready and prepared for the furnishing of the Church or for the ministry … [and] even bring something for the decoration of the altar or church.’ 116 This symbiotic relationship is made possible only by the ‘excess’ wealth possessed by these patrons, and it is precisely this ‘right usage’ of this wealth that justifies its existence at all.
Almsgiving, however, is more than a mere economic exchange: it is a spiritual transaction which serves as a font of grace for the giver. When enumerating the various means of obtaining the remission of sins in the Gospel, Origen lists, immediately after baptism and martyrdom, the giving of alms, whereby the giver is rendered ‘clean’ by his gift.
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Those who break bread for the hungry, clothe the naked, and judge justly will ‘make their lot with the Lord,’ and will thereby spiritually prosper.
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Christians can imitate the patriarchs of the Old Testament by gathering virtues the way that the former gathered wives: ‘if you freely practice hospitality, you will appear to have taken her as your wife. If you shall add to this care of the poor, you will appear to have obtained a second wife.’
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Likewise, Origen describes almsgiving as one of the gifts given by the Spirit, making its practitioners ‘hands’ and ‘feet’ of the Body of Christ.
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Even if wealthy patrons of the Church are deficient in virtue, their patronage redounds to their spiritual credit, as Origen illustrates with an image drawn from the Shepherd of Hermas: For [the Shepherd] says that there is a certain tree called the elm that does not produce fruit. Nevertheless, it supports a vine that produces a large amount of fruit. Since the vine flourishes strong and produces or preserves very much fruit, even the elm, which is unfruitful, seems necessary and useful because it serves as a prop for the fruitful vine … [T]hey wait upon the saints, and serve, and provide something useful; and, by some such arrangement from Jesus, they receive salvation.
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It should go without saying, of course, that such almsgiving is of spiritual value only inasmuch as its motivations are sincere. Origen has nothing but scorn for wealthy patrons who remain unreformed and unrepentant as they pay their tithes, 122 and as for those who give alms ‘that it may be noted by men,’ all the credit for their almsgiving is ‘snatched away by the Egyptians’ and amounts to nothing. 123 Almsgiving must be carried out with ‘simplicity of heart,’ cheerfully and joyfully, in order to obtain spiritual wealth in return for one’s material wealth. 124
It should be noted that these previous considerations underline the distinctively Christian nature of Origen’s ethic, as distinguished from the more common late antique concern for euergetism, or civic benefaction. Certainly Christian almsgiving and Roman euergetism were animated by many common motivations: a distaste for greed and excessive luxury, a summons to greater self-control and moderation, and a desire to assist one’s fellow-citizen. Yet, as Peter Brown demonstrates in his recent work, Through the Eye of a Needle, 125 the object of Roman euergetism was always one’s fellow Roman citizen, and usually one’s family: never do we find any particular mystique surrounding ‘the poor’ as such. 126 Furthermore, the latter practice was usually tied up with the appropriation of civic honors for the benefactor, for which honors a barely-concealed rivalry often ensued between wealthy families. 127 Origen’s rhetoric, on the other hand, always concerns generosity to the economically destitute, while insisting upon no other motivation than the gaining of ‘treasure in heaven.’ Additionally, Origen’s conception of almsgiving is ecclesial in shape, because the Christian clergy normally serve as mediators of distribution, and the Christian poor are assumed to have a special claim on such alms, as will be noted below.
Love as Justice Toward Others: Voluntary Renunciation of Property
Yet, as has already been made clear, such wealthy patrons of the church, and benefactors of the poor, function at a diminished level of moral virtue: to use the terms from the Commentary on the Song of Songs, their love falls short of the aequitas which is perfectly ordered. This latter, well-ordered love is manifested by those who have dispossessed themselves of all material wealth: ‘an exchange for his own life is given by the man who after his sins has given up his whole substance, that his property may feed the poor.’ 128 Origen seems to refer to this duality in On Prayer, where he speaks of our debts to others, which may be paid either all at once or slowly over time. Wealthy Christians ‘pay a little and remain in debt,’ whereas those who embrace voluntary poverty ‘owe nothing to anybody.’ 129 Although Origen speaks highly of material poverty as a virtue in itself—he speaks of the poor as the object of God’s special love, whom God prizes above the wealthy 130 —he is well aware that many of the poor lead wicked lives, 131 and that poverty only brings virtue when it is embraced with a virtuous motivation. Those who do so, and obey Christ’s injunction to the rich young man, are ‘found to be perfect,’ 132 exemplary in their ‘manly virtue’ which outshines feminine weakness. 133 Their sacrifice is compared by Origen to a ‘whole burnt offering,’ which is acceptable at the altar of God. 134 As mentioned above, when a man can say with Peter and John, ‘Gold and silver I do not have,’ then ‘he has nothing to render to Caesar,’ and is removed entirely from earthly jurisdiction, dwelling rather ‘in Jerusalem while possessing spiritual riches.’ 135
Origen does not possess as strict a distinction between the clerical, lay, and monastic states as would characterize later generations, but his writings do generally seem to assume that those who serve the Church ‘full-time’ will do so within the context of a commitment to voluntary poverty. In his Homilies on Genesis, Origen uses this assumption to contrast ‘the Lord’s priests’ with the priests of Pharaoh: Indeed do you wish to know what the difference is between the priests of God and the priests of Pharao [sic]? Pharao grants land to his priests. The Lord, on the other hand, does not grant his priests a portion in the land, but says to them, ‘I am your portion’ [Num. 18:20]. You, therefore, who read these words, observe all the priests of the Lord and notice what difference there is between the priests, lest perhaps they who have a portion in the land and have time for earthly cares and pursuits may appear not so much to be priests of the Lord as priests of Pharao. For it is Pharao who wishes his priests to have possessions of lands and to work at the cultivation of the soil not of the soul, to give attention to the fields, and not to the Law. But let us hear what Christ our Lord admonishes his priests: ‘He who has not renounced all he possesses,’ he says, ‘cannot be my disciple.’
136
Only those who have sold their possessions and embraced spiritual perfection, thereby freeing themselves from all ‘earthly activities and from mundane possession,’ can ‘follow Christ,’ 137 because only on this condition can they ‘devote their work to this alone and that they may have time for the word of God apart from any care.’ 138 Origen also applies this requirement to those who ‘devote themselves to the divine Word and truly exist by the service of God alone,’ a description which may be broader than the ministerial priesthood and may include catechists and teachers (didaskaloi) like himself. 139 As mentioned above, this state of poverty will force the clergy to be economically dependent upon the wealthier members of the laity: ‘in order that they may be able to have the time, they must use the services of the laity.’ 140 This relationship of mutual dependence is well illustrated by Origen’s own career: upon entering the service of the Church, he immediately dispossessed himself of all his possessions, including his library, arranging only for a daily ‘allowance’ of four obols from his patrons. 141 Even more, those who enter this way of life will be forced into a more radical dependence upon divine Providence, aware that the Lord provides for those who trust Him. 142 Thus, in Origen’s view, a just and well-ordered distribution of goods ought to be flexible enough not only to provide for those involuntarily indigent, but also for those who voluntarily dispossess themselves of material goods for religious purposes.
To bring these reflections to a close, it has been demonstrated that, even if Origen never enunciated a systematic theory of distributive justice, his occasional remarks on this topic possess a consistency and a coherency that indicate a high degree of reflection on this topic. Origen consistently approaches the topic of the material economy from the perspective of the interrelated demands of charity, equity, and justice. He assumes that the place of the human person in the economy of creation places upon him concrete demands of ‘well-ordered love,’ both in relation to himself and to others. The execution of this ‘well-ordered love’ will require not only obtaining provision of one’s own basic necessities of life while avoiding an avaricious pursuit of excessive goods, but also using one’s excess goods to provide such necessities to others. This tension opens up the possibility of a moral hierarchy in Origen’s ecclesial vision, whereby the more perfect Christians enact a more radical dispossession of material goods (even the necessities of life!), which is made possible by the support of less perfect Christians, whose more than ample supply of goods enable them to act as patrons. Thus Origen’s vision of distributive justice is, at heart, a vision of the dramatic interactions of acts of well-ordered love.
Footnotes
1.
Origen does not normally use the term ‘virtue,’ yet he was certainly familiar with the concept: the term is used here in a non-technical sense for the sake of convenience.
2.
‘Origen’s ascetical and ethical doctrine is one of the most neglected areas of his thought.’ Henri Crouzel, Origen (trans. A. S. Worrall; San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1989), p. 135. In his comprehensive survey of contemporary Origen scholarship in 1988, Crouzel noted only a single work devoted to Origen’s ethics, which remained then (and remains now!) unpublished. ‘The Literature on Origen 1979–1988,’ Theological Studies 49 (1988), p. 513.
3.
See, among other works, John Dillon, ‘Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtue,’ in H.-D. Blume and F. Mann (eds.), Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie (Münster Westfalen, 1983), pp. 92–105.
4.
Henri Crouzel, ‘Anthropologie et cosmologie d’Origène et de Plotin,’ in Elizabeth A. Livingstone (ed.), Studia Patristica, vol. XXVI (Louvain-Paris: Peeters, 1993), pp. 239–40.
5.
‘Alexandria: A School for Training in Virtue,’ in Patrick Henry (ed.), Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition (Minneapolis, MN.: Fortress Press, 1984), 19.
6.
See Charles Kannengiesser, ‘A Century in Quest of Origen’s Spirituality,’ in Luigi F. Pizzolato and Marco Rizzi (eds.), Origene maestro di vita spirituale (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2001), pp. 15–18. This is also the approach taken by the classic study of Origen’s mystical ideal, W. Völker, Das Vollkommenheitsideal des Origenes (Tübingen, 1931).
7.
Commentary on the Song of Songs (trans. R. P. Lawson), vol. 26 of Ancient Christian Writers (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1957), 1.5 (Lawson, p. 89).
8.
See Commentary on Romans (trans. Thomas P. Scheck), vol. 104 of Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2001), 7.3; Crouzel, ‘Anthropologie,’ pp. 239–40.
9.
The precise distinction between ‘equity’ and ‘justice,’ which was never the object of consensus among ancient ethicists, is not described to any degree of satisfaction by Origen. Hence, they will be treated more or less as equivalent in this article.
10.
Hannah Hunt, ‘Love,’ in John McGuckin (ed.), Westminster Handbook to Origen (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), p. 146.
11.
‘… which observes the social rights of neighbors and relatives ….’ Against Celsus (trans. Henry Chadwick; Cambridge University Press, 1953), 4.26 (Chadwick, p. 202).
12.
The recent attempt of Pope Benedict XVI to interrelate justice and charity in Caritas et veritate 6 is relevant here: ‘Not only is justice not extraneous to charity, not only is it not an alternative or parallel path to charity: justice is inseparable from charity, and intrinsic to it. Justice is the primary way of charity ….’
13.
ComCt 1.5 (Lawson, pp. 88–89). Inasmuch as the present article primarily intends to present a survey of Origen’s thought, rather than a close analysis of particular texts, references to Origen’s Greek and Latin will generally be omitted, except when they are included in translations themselves, or in those rare cases when the present discussion hinges on the meaning of such terms.
14.
Homilies on Luke (trans. Joseph T. Lienhard; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1993), 25.1 (Lienhard, p. 105).
15.
Homilies on Jeremiah (trans. John Clark Smith; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1998), 7.3.2 (Smith, pp. 71–72).
16.
Homilies on the Song of Songs, trans. R. P. Lawson (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1957), 2.8 (Lawson, pp. 294–295).
17.
Ibid.
18.
On Prayer (trans. John J. O’Meara), vol. 19 of Ancient Christian Writers (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1954), 28.1 (O’Meara, p. 168). Cf. HomJr 14.1: ‘He who pays to all their dues – taxes to whom taxes are due, revenue to whom revenue is due, respect to whom respect is due, honor to whom honor is due … for example, parents and parents, brothers as brothers, sons as sons, bishops as bishops, presbyters as presbyters, deacons as deacons, the faithful as the faithful, catechumens as catechumens, if he pays all of the duties, he does not owe’ (Smith, p. 138).
19.
Ibid., 28.2–4.
20.
ComRm 6.14.2 (Scheck, p. 58).
21.
CCels 5.49 (Chadwick, p. 303).
22.
As cited in Gerard E. Caspary, Politics and Exegesis: Origen and the Two Swords (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), p. 155. Cf. also pp. 163–64: ‘The excesses of the flesh must no doubt be resisted, but so must the exaggerated puritanism, the immoderate zeal for the spirit, which refuses to grant to the body what is its lawful due … mediating between these extremes: extremes which by ignoring the necessary duality between body and soul or between state and Church also ignore the special requirements of the “time in-between.”’
23.
‘[W]e are forced by the necessity of nature to provide both nourishment and clothing for [the body].’ ComRm 6.14.2 (Scheck, p. 58).
24.
CCels 6.70: ‘All these expressions are allegorical, and are meant to show the nature of the intelligible world by the terms usually applied to corporeal things’ (Chadwick, p. 384).
25.
PEuch 17.2 (O’Meara, p. 64). Cf. Exhortation to Martyrdom (trans. John J. O’Meara), vol. 19 of Ancient Christian Writers (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1954), 15, where Origen speaks of the ‘rich martyrs’ as those who are truly wealthy, despite being ‘poor in the goods of this life’ (O’Meara, p. 156).
26.
CCels 7.21 (Chadwick, p. 412).
27.
The theme of wealth as ‘false riches’ and virtue as ‘true riches’ would become a favorite of many later Christian writers. See, for example, Augustine, Sermon 63.4.
28.
Not all early Christian writers were so eager to allegorize these texts: others found them a convenient excuse to justify worldly wealth. See G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, ‘Early Christian Attitudes to Property and Slavery,’ in Derek Baker (ed.) Church, Society and Politics (Ecclesiastical History Society, 1975), p. 29.
29.
On First Principles (trans. G. W. Butterworth; Gloucester, MA: Harper & Row, 1966), 2.11.2 (Butterworth, p. 148).
30.
HomLc 39.3 (Lienhard, p. 160).
31.
CCels 7.21 (Chadwick, pp. 411–12).
32.
Ibid., 4.43.
33.
Homilies on Leviticus (trans. Gary Wayne Barkley), vol. 83 of Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2004), 15.2.1–3.
34.
‘How can the one who says we should ask for heavenly and great things bid us to ask for bread? He means the bread that is true, intelligible, and spiritual.’ Fragments on Luke (trans. Joseph T. Lienhard), vol. 94 of Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1993), 114 (Lienhard, p. 194).
35.
PEuch 16.2 (O’Meara, p. 61). Cf. ComRm 6.14.6.
36.
See the typical remarks in Pauline Allen, ‘Challenges in Approaching Patristic Texts from the Perspective of Contemporary Catholic Social Teaching,’ in Johan Leemans and Brian J. Matz (eds.) Reading Patristic Texts on Social Ethics: Issues and Challenges for Twenty-First Century Christian Social Thought (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2011), p. 38.
37.
Miyako Demura, ‘Poverty and Asceticism in Clement and Origen of Alexandria,’ in Geoffrey Dunn, David Luckensmeyer, and Lawrence Cross (eds.), Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church, vol. 5: ‘Poverty and Riches’ (Strathfield, Canada: St. Pauls Publications, 2009), p. 128. Cf., however, the defense of Clement by Justo Gonzáles, Faith and Wealth: A History of Early Christian Ideas on the Origin, Significance, and Use of Money (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 111–118.
38.
CCels 7.23 (Chadwick, p. 413).
39.
PEuch 29.5 (O’Meara, pp. 115–116).
40.
‘Exhort those who are rich in this present world … that they be ready to distribute, willing to communicate ….’ CCels 7.21 (Chadwick, p. 412). Origen’s acceptance of almsgiving by the wealthy as an ‘acceptable compromise’ will be discussed below: it is clear enough that any possession of extraneous wealth represents a deficiency of virtue for Origen.
41.
Richard Newhauser, for example, has concluded that Origen’s economic radicalism is what tainted his theological legacy: ‘Origen is uncompromising in demanding complete, material poverty as a prerequisite for avoiding the sin [of avarice] and achieving perfection, nor is he willing to make any metaphorical compromises in his hermeneutics on behalf of the wealthy. Such radicalism did little to help his standing among these classes, which would later find his writings theologically suspect.’ Early History of Greed: The Sin of Avarice in Early Medieval Thought and Literature (Port Chester, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 13. As support for this rather severe interpretation of Origen’s views, Newhauser cites HomJr 7.3, where Origen orders the avaricious to be expelled from the Church.
42.
Homilies on Judges (trans. Elizabeth Ann Dively Lauro), vol. 119 of Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2010), 2.3 (Lauro, p. 56).
43.
HomJd 1.1 (Lauro, p. 43).
44.
‘For it is not possible to be friend at the same time with opposites, and just as “no one can serve two masters,” so no one can be a friend to God and to mammon, a friend both to Christ and to the Serpent.’ HomJr 20.7.4 (Smith, p. 237). Such ‘lovers of money … deserve the same fate as Judas.’ Commentary on Matthew (trans. John Patrick; ed. Allen Menzies), Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 9 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1896), 11.9 (Patrick, p. 438). Cf. Homilies on Exodus (trans. Ronald E. Heine), vol. 71 of Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1984), 3.3.
45.
HomJd 2.3 (Lauro, p. 57).
46.
ComMt 12.36 (Patrick, p. 469).
47.
Ibid. 13.21 (Patrick, pp. 487–88).
48.
HomEx 12.4 (Heine, p. 375).
49.
HomEx 8.4.
50.
Homilies on Genesis (trans. Ronald E. Heine), vol. 71 of Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1984), 16.6.
51.
HomEx 12.2 (Heine, p. 368).
52.
HomEx 13.3. Note that ‘wealth’ may have meant something different in the ancient world than it meant today. In the second century Roman imperium, wealth did not mean the mere possession of money, but rather took the form of agrarian landholdings, involving the wealthy in the oversight and maintenance of numerous tenant farmers. See the helpful summary in Avila, pp. 14–32. Also, for classifications on the scale between rich and poor, see Peter Oakes, ‘Constructing Poverty Scales in Graeco-Roman Society: A Response to Steven Friesen,’ Journal for the Study of the New Testament 26.3 (2004), pp. 367–71.
53.
Homilies on Joshua (trans. Barbara J. Bruce), vol. 105 of Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2002), 7.4 (Bruce, p. 78).
54.
HomGn 16.6.
55.
HomEx 8.4. The voluntary poverty of clergy will be discussed in the last part of this article.
56.
HomEx 7.6.
57.
‘And if you wish to see of what nature are the sicknesses of the soul, contemplate with me lovers of money, lovers of ambition, and the lovers of boys … For not every sin is to be considered a sickness, but that which has settled down in the whole soul. For so you may see the lovers of money wholly intent upon money and upon preserving and gathering it … [are] suffering from something worse than weakness, and are sickly.’ ComMt 10.24 (Patrick, p. 430).
58.
Commentary on John (trans. Ronald E. Heine), vol. 80 of Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1989), 1.12.
59.
A stater was a coin used in Greek currency, usually made from silver.
60.
ComMt 13.12 (Patrick, p. 482).
61.
PArch 3.2.2 (Butterworth, p. 214).
62.
HomEx 1.5 (Heine, p. 234).
63.
HomJr 7.2. Origen does, naturally, permit the wealthy to act as financial patrons of the Church and her clergy, and the careful conditions in which this is permitted will be discussed below.
64.
HomLev 4.2.2.
65.
ComRm 6.14.6 (Scheck, p. 82).
66.
Fragments on Luke (trans. Joseph T. Lienhard; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1993), 111 (Lienhard, p. 172).
67.
HomJr 12.8.1 (Smith, pp. 120–21).
68.
Ibid. 11.4.1 (Smith, p. 106).
69.
Ibid. 17.5 (Smith, p. 186).
70.
ComMt 13.16 (Patrick, p. 484).
71.
HomLev 9.4.3 (Barkley, p. 183).
72.
‘And we believe that self-sufficiency is a great good, not in order that we might make do with few things under all circumstances, but so that if we do not have a lot we can make do with a few, being genuinely convinced that those who least need extravagance enjoy it the most; and that everything natural is easy to obtain and whatever is groundless is hard to obtain; and that simple flavours provide a pleasure equal to that of an extravagant life-style when all pain from want is removed.’ Diogenes Laertius, Letter to Menoeceus 10.130.
73.
‘A free life cannot acquire great wealth, because the task is not easy without slavery to the mob or those in power … And if it does somehow achieve great wealth, one could easily share this out in order to obtain the good will of one’s neighbors.’ The Vatican Collection of Epicurean Sayings, 67. ‘When the wise man is brought face to face with the necessities of life, he knows how to give rather than receive—such a treasury of self-sufficiency has he found.’ Ibid., 44. Granted, a diversity of positions can be found among the Stoics as to the extent to which even the ‘necessities’ may be legitimately pursued. Cicero, for example, implies that the wise man ought to be content with virtue; see On Moral Ends 3.10.
74.
The Instructor 2.3, cf. 3.7, Miscellanies 4.13. ‘Those concerned for their salvation should take this as their first principle, that all property is ours to use and every possession is for the sake of self-sufficiency, which anyone can acquire by a few things.’ The Instructor 2. Cf. Charles Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983), pp. 35–37. Note the criticism of this concept by Ste. Croix, who complains that it was so vaguely defined that ‘anyone except the ancient equivalent of a multi-millionaire could feel that he had no superfluity.’ ‘Early Christian Attitudes,’ p. 28.
75.
PEuch 11.4 (O’Meara, p. 45; PG 11:452).
76.
FragmLc 239 (Lienhard, p. 222). Here he is speaking specifically about money, mocking merchants who trade useful goods for useless ones.
77.
ComRm 6.14.2 (Scheck, p. 58; PG 14:1100–1101).
78.
HomJos 10.3 (Bruce, p. 113; PG 12:882). Presumably Origen’s Greek term was autarkeia, but this must unfortunately remain speculative.
79.
‘What philosopher who was devoted to the benefit of his pupils did not receive from them money for his needs?’ CCels 1.65 (Chadwick, p. 60).
80.
ComMt 11.9. Parents, he says, who were ‘in extreme need for the necessaries of life (tōn anankaiōn)’ found their children’s potential contributions withheld by Corban (Patrick, p. 438; PG 13:932).
81.
Channeling St. Paul, Origen writes that his patron Phoebe ‘gave assistance to me in my necessities.’ ComRm 10.17.2 (Scheck, p. 291).
82.
CCels 3.9 (Chadwick, p. 134; PG 11:932).
83.
HomLev 3.6.3 (Barkley, p. 64; PG 12:431).
84.
HomJos 17.3 (Bruce, p. 162; PG 12:913).
85.
Ibid. (Bruce, p. 161).
86.
ComMt 15.20, quoted in Miyako Demura, ‘Poverty and Asceticism,’ 130. Demura interprets Origen to mean that ‘the rich are never excluded from [the kingdom of heaven],’ which seems excessive. ‘Not always necessarily excluded’ might be a better parsing of Origen’s meaning.
87.
CCels 3.9 (Chadwick, p. 134).
88.
See, for example, PArch 4.2; CCels 2.41; cf. Pamphilus, Apology for Origen 84.
89.
See On Prayer 29.5–6. The ‘proper use’ of such goods, which in short entails their regular and routine distribution to the needy, will be discussed below.
90.
ComRm 9.26 (Scheck, p. 223).
91.
FragmLc 222 (Lienhard, p. 217).
92.
HomJos 10.1 (Bruce, p. 110).
93.
CCels 4.81 (Chadwick, p. 248).
94.
See, for example, FragmLc 230.
95.
PArch 2.11.1 (Butterworth, p. 147).
96.
ComRm 9.29 (Scheck, p. 226).
97.
Ibid. 9.25 (Scheck, p. 222).
98.
PArch 2.8.2–3.
99.
ComRm 9.25.2 (Scheck, p. 222); 9.30.2 (Scheck, p. 227). Cf. HomGn 16.6: ‘If you still serve the carnal senses, if you still pay tax … and look to those things which are ‘visible’ and ‘temporal’ and do not look to those things which are ‘invisible’ and ‘eternal’, know that you are of the Egyptian people’ (Heine, 223).
100.
ComRm 10.14.6 (Scheck, p. 286).
101.
Ibid. 9.25.2 (Scheck, p. 223).
102.
Ibid. (Scheck, pp. 222-–223).
103.
Ibid. 10.14.6 (Scheck, p. 285). Note the comments of Gerard Caspary: ‘the pneumatic saint, who at baptism or later has truly become a son of the Church and given up everything that belongs to the world, is totally freed from all such subjection … [while] the psychic or half-worldling does seem to mediate between the pagan and the true pneumatic.’ Caspary, p. 148.
104.
11.9 (Patrick, p. 438).
105.
PEuch 11.4 (O’Meara, p. 45).
106.
HomLev 3.6.3 (Barkley, p. 64).
107.
CCels 7.21 (Chadwick, p. 412).
108.
PArch 3.1.12 (Butterworth, p. 177).
109.
HomLc 23.4 (Lienhard, p. 98).
110.
FragmLc 222 (Lienhard, p. 217).
111.
HomGn 5.1 (Heine, p. 112).
112.
ComRm 6.4.2 (Scheck, p. 11); 9.13 (Scheck, pp. 214–15).
113.
HomLev 2.6.3 (Barkley, pp. 63–64).
114.
ComJn 1.9 (Heine, p. 33).
115.
HomJos 17.3 (Bruce, p. 161).
116.
Ibid. 10.1; 10.3 (Bruce, pp. 110–113).
117.
HomLev 2.4. Classical ethicists noted the moral distinction between ‘almsgiving’ (eleēmosyne), a merciful action born from kindness, and ‘sharing’ (koinōnía), which presumes a common ownership, i.e. that the other person has a right to ‘co-communicate’ with oneself in one’s goods. See Gonzáles, p. 127. Origen is accustomed to using the former term, although he seems aware of the distinction, at least in ComRm 9.15.12: ‘For to supply the needs of the saints, sincerely and becomingly, not as if they crave alms, but as those who possess our wealth, so to speak, in common with them ….’
118.
HomLev 9.4.3 (Barkley, p. 183).
119.
HomGn 11.2 (Heine, p. 170).
120.
ComRm 9.2.12–14.
121.
HomJos 10.1 (Bruce, p. 110). Cf. Shepherd of Hermas, Similitudes 2.
122.
See HomJos 10.1; 10.3.
123.
HomEx 2.3 (Heine, p. 245).
124.
ComRm 9.5.13 (Scheck, p. 210). Richard Finn does not think Origen gives enough attention to the need for such ‘simplicity of heart,’ and contrasts Origen unfavorably with the author of the Shepherd. See Richard Finn, ‘Almsgiving for the Pure of Heart: Continuity and Change in Early Christian Teaching,’ in Simon Swain (ed.) Severan Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 419–29.
125.
Through the Eye of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the West, 350-550AD (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), especially pp. 53–71. Brown’s monumental work focuses on Latin Christianity in the fourth through sixth centuries, yet on these points his observations remain true for the third-century East as well. Cf. Richard Finn, Almsgiving in the Later Roman Empire: Christian Promotion and Practice (313–450) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), especially pp. 236–49.
126.
Brown, pp. 68–69.
127.
Ibid.
128.
ComMt 12.28 (Patrick, p. 465). Cf. 10.6: ‘those who give up all things and follow Him have, as it were in another way, sold their possessions, in order that, by having sold and surrendered them … they may purchase, at great cost worthy of the field, the field containing the treasure hidden in itself’ (Patrick, p. 416).
129.
28.5 (O’Meara, p. 109).
130.
See ComJn 1.13; 1.38; 6.37; HomJr 8.4.1.
131.
CCels 6.16; PEuch 29.6.
132.
HomJos 17.2 (Bruce, p. 160).
133.
‘[T]hat man must be judged among “women” who says, “I am not able to observe those things that are written, I am not able to ‘sell what I have and give to the poor’ ….” The one who says, ‘I am not able to accomplish,’ what else does it seem to you than that he must be counted among women, who can do nothing manly.’ Ibid. 9.9 (Bruce, pp. 106–107). He does point out, of course, that ‘many out of the sex of women are counted among the strong men before God.’
134.
HomLev 9.4.
135.
ComRm 9.25.2 (Scheck, p. 223); 10.14.6 (Scheck, p. 286).
136.
16.5 (Heine, pp. 221–22).
137.
HomEx 5.2 (Heine, p. 277); HomGn 16.6.
138.
HomJos 17.3 (Bruce, p. 162).
139.
ComJn 1.10 (Heine, p. 33); cf. HomLev 15.2.1: ‘[T]he law of Christ, if we follow it, permits us neither to have possessions on earth nor houses in the cities’ (Barkley, p. 257).
140.
HomJos 17.3 (Bruce, p. 162); cf. ComJn 1.3.
141.
See Eusebius, The History of the Church 6.2–3; 6.23. Cf. Pamphilus, Apology for Origen (trans. Thomas Scheck; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2010), p. 9: ‘no one hesitates to affirm that the office of priesthood in the Church was conferred on Origen and that he led a “philosophical” manner of life, that he practiced extreme self-denial, and that he observed the pure discipline of [our] religion.’ See also Gonzáles, p. 118. Richard Finn claims that Origen’s example and writings ‘probably did most to fix radical dispossession through almsgiving as the dominant form of entry into asceticism in the following centuries.’ See ‘Early Christian Asceticism,’ Studia Patristica 45 (2007), p. 20.
142.
See HomJos 4.1; HomEx 7.4.
