Abstract
This article discusses the nature of and challenges to the theological virtue of hope in the Ars moriendi or ‘art of dying’. It proposes a renewed ascesis of hope whose shared eschatological vision and set of practices help sustain from despair and prepare Christians for a hopeful and ‘good death’.
Introduction
A praiseworthy goal of the medieval Ars moriendi tradition was to validate the agency of the dying: to say that dying is something you do, not just something that happens to you. Obviously death might not be obliging. You might die suddenly, deliriously, or in dotage; but the ideal was for the dying to be agents who consciously enacted dying as a role instead of just enduring it as an event. The astonishing notion of dying as an ‘art’ validates agency but also makes demands on it, since it takes skill to practice any art. In the Ars moriendi tradition, the skills needed for the art of dying are the virtues, which are stable character traits that perfect their possessors through inclining them to act well and by directing them to happiness. The virtue of hope has a major but neglected role here that I wish to reassert and refurbish.
The Theological Virtue of Hope
Unsurprisingly, Christians see theological hope as essential to dying well. But why is such hope relevant? In answering this question, my account of hope here as elsewhere draws generously on Aquinas. 1 Unlike Augustine, Aquinas thought we could be happy in this world through a virtuous life that is characteristically enjoyable (ST I-II.3.2). This strikes me as both sound and as rhetorically deft since it preserves hope from a sour grapes attitude to the world. Nevertheless, in this life we cannot be fully, securely and permanently happy. Our share in the good life is limited by bad fortune and moral evils: by sickness, suffering, injustice, broken relationships, failures, tragedy, sin and death. Since these frustrate not just idle whims but important and good priorities, the result is that we cannot be as happy in this life as we reasonably wish. I call this melancholy consequence the ‘eudaimonia gap’. Hope appeals to the restless heart with the promise of future beatitude in which we will cross this gap and attain perfect happiness through loving union with God in the heavenly city. By such hope Christians receive an added identity: that of homo viator or the ‘human wayfarer’ on a journey to the heavenly patria.
Aquinas specifies the object of hope as ‘a future good possible but arduous to attain’ (ST II-II.17.1). A mean between the vices of despair and presumption, theological hope is not a feeling but a virtue—specifically, a virtue of the will which braces us to persevere in the Christian journey. Hope does this in two ways, making its object two-fold. First, hope’s end, or ‘final cause’, is ‘eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God’. Second, hope’s means or ‘efficient cause’ is ‘the divine [grace] … on whose help (hope) relies’ (ST II-II.17.5). By hope’s ‘final cause’ we committedly seek and confidently expect to find perfect beatitude in God, which preserves from despair. By hope’s ‘efficient cause’ we trust in God’s promises and rely upon grace to reach that end, which fends off presumption. As this suggests, God is the direct ‘object’ of hope, making it a ‘theological’ virtue along with faith and charity. In contrast to the natural or ‘acquired’ virtues won through habituation, hope is also a supernatural or ‘infused’ virtue gratuitously poured out in grace.
A Hopeful Dying
Such hope subverts the meaning of death and it is distinctly Christian. 2 It is founded resolutely on Jesus Christ, especially on the Nicene Creed profession that ‘on the third day he rose again’ and that we may therefore ‘look forward to the life of the world to come’. From this perspective, vague afterlife notions of simply ‘going into the light’ are mere eschatological smudge and blur, and may bespeak the vice of presumption.
Christ’s subversion of death is nowhere better put than in The Exsultet proclamation of the Easter Vigil. There the candle-lit assembly, liturgically brokenhearted since Good Friday’s ‘pitch of grief’, suddenly hears the joyous reversal: ‘exalt, let them exalt’ and ‘be glad, let earth be glad’, for Christ ‘broke the prison-bars of death and rose victorious from the underworld’! This crescendo of the liturgical year announces an epistemology of the resurrection according to which the Easter mystery alters the meaning of death itself, demoting it from conqueror to conquered. The Pauline taunting of death, unforgettably set to music in Handel’s Messiah, captures hope’s hermeneutic of dying: ‘O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?’ Only through hope in the risen Christ can such audacity manage not to be ridiculous. Yet hope’s rejoicing never turns into a cheap levity which forgets the tragedy of sin or costliness of redemption. The fact that Christ still bears his wounds even when raised—that even in apocalyptic imagery he is the ‘lamb standing as if slain’ (Rev. 5:6)—suggests that the resurrection does not require forgetting or trivializing the forces of sin and death which mar human life until the eschaton and which Christ took on in his Passion.
Hope ultimately looks to the resurrection and meanwhile trusts in God’s grace to help one complete the journey and be received into ‘those heavenly habitations, where the souls of them that sleep in the Lord Jesus enjoy perpetual rest and felicity’. 3 What this will look like matters less for present purposes than the immense hope implied. Mortality raises questions of ultimate meaning, such as whether we were purposed or are the product of blind chance, whether everything we do has any permanent significance, or whether when I, my children and my loved ones die and rot, will everything precious and lovable about us be blotted out forever after a few brief years? Hope addresses such nagging anxieties by ascribing a transcendent meaning and dignity to our lives, and by assuring us that we were created by love and for love, and are bound not for annihilation but for glory. Crucially, such hope is not just for the flourishing, but for those whose lives are tragically lost or ruined, such as victims of horrific abuse, injustice, tragedy, famine or natural disaster. Though they may have no chance of healing in this world, we refuse to despair of them as ciphers or write-offs, hoping in their future redemption.
Overall, therefore, hope offers a very different vision and experience of dying. It provides what Kenneth Burke calls a ‘structure of encouragement’: one which assures those in an end-of-life battle of attrition that ‘a personal tomorrow still exists’ for them and their loved ones in contrast to ‘the disastrous feeling of “not worth while”’ that fosters despair. 4 A growing body of evidence in empirical psychology suggests much the same, pointing out the beneficial effects of religious hope on the mental and even physical health of terminally ill patients. 5
Challenges to a Hopeful Dying
Maintaining the virtue of hope is not guaranteed or easy. As a virtue of the will which seeks an arduous good, hope empowers agents to persevere amid the challenges of the journey to God. But just as courage, honesty or justice can be vitiated by their opposing vices, so hope can be vitiated by despair. 6 Sudden tragedy, crushed dreams, mounting disappointments, and the weary slog of the years all test our hope. As a rational rather than a physical appetite, the will knowingly regards these troubles which frustrate the yearning for happiness and whose configuration over time is fraught with bewildering uncertainties. Hope therefore remains vulnerable, and without renewed commitments it may wither in trials. The Ars moriendi tradition, with some plausibility, held that we are especially prone to despair as death approaches and we face what Newman calls ‘That sense of ruin, which is worse than pain / That masterful negation and collapse / Of all that makes me man’. 7
Dying was never easy, to put it mildly. But today’s social and medical context poses particular challenges. Death and dying are routinely ignored, hidden, or denied in our youth, entertainment, and consumer culture. The spiritual geography charted by traditional eschatology has blurred for most, making death an impenetrable enigma at whose approach there seem few options beyond melancholy resignation or outright despair. Death has gone from an inevitability prepared for beforehand and given public liturgical meaning afterward to a monstrosity we can make no sense of.
Moreover, with ‘the triumph of medicalised death’ the site of dying moved from the security and familiarity of the home to the mechanised and alien hospital. In a trade-off of agency the main actor in death is no longer the dying but the doctor, who as William May puts it, goes from being a ‘caretaker of the sick’ to ‘the enemy of death’: ‘The patient’, he writes, lies ‘helpless between two rival powers [death and medicine] that fight out their battle across relatively defenceless terrain’. 8 That inarticulate helplessness sums up countless people’s experience of dying today. However unintentionally and mingled with saving care we gratefully acknowledge, this social and medical context often makes dying not just traumatic but, what’s worse, unintelligible: a landscape without signposts, an event without meaning, in which bewildered agency often frays. This setting can reinforce the demoralisation and brooding that tempt to acedia and the horror of despair. 9
Towards an Ascesis of Hope
Ours is not an auspicious context in which to leave hope weak and undeveloped. But in practice hope gets only trifling lip-service. Even many Christians regard hope in the afterlife the way a pilot regards a parachute: as a morbid thought best avoided until disaster threatens. But this is a costly error. True, the example of ‘the good thief’ crucified with Jesus stresses that grace can overcome existing vice with a good death. But it is not hope—it is sinful presumption—to complacently expect heavenly glory while refusing to develop a hopeful character. The Ars moriendi functions best not as a last-minute spiritual ambulance but as the flip-side of a hope-filled ars vivendi or ‘art of living’.
The Ars moriendi claimed that dying could be an ‘art’. It takes skill to practice any art, and practice to develop a skill. Hence our best guides here, such as Erasmus and Jeremy Taylor, focus less on the deathbed as the make-or-break moment and more on the lifelong cultivation of the skills necessary to practice an art of dying. 10 This is asceticism in the original sense of spiritual and moral exercises analogous to an athlete’s training. 11 The skills, of course, are the virtues, which render characteristically excellent our modes of acting, perceiving, feeling, willing and interacting with the world. Like all virtues, hope requires practice to develop. Preparation for a hopeful death should therefore begin well before dying; ideally by young adulthood.
In underscoring human agency, I am not clothing hope in Pelagian garb. From start to finish hope is a gift of grace. But as our virtue, its retention and growth are works of cooperative grace. Hope’s maintenance depends upon a delicate balance of attitudes and habits formed through acquiescence in and response to God’s initiative. As such, a hopeful character will be cultivated by types of education and practices which encourage the modes of perception and stock responses proper to hope. To effect this we require an ascesis of hope which at present we lack. Sustained and given meaning in the Church, this ascesis would consist in regular spiritual practices and forms of education which cultivate a vision and way of life that take death and the eschaton seriously.
Such practices would correspond to hope’s twofold causality: its ‘final cause’ or end of eternal happiness in God, and its ‘efficient cause’ or means of divine grace. Some practices would specialise in hope. For example, liturgical celebrations of the Resurrection, prayers for the dead, meditation on death and last things, self-examination with a view to the coming judgment, recollection of divine mercies, ‘rejoicing in hope’ through divine praises and spiritual hymns, and entrusting oneself to God for strength. But many would be familiar practices done in a new way. For instance, reading Scripture, liturgical participation, listening to preaching, intercessory prayer, observing feast and fast days, receiving the Eucharist, and so forth. Countless Christians do these already, but not necessarily in a hope-shaped way. To make these part of an ascesis of hope one would attend to those eschatological elements within them which exercise awareness and attachment to eternal life (hope’s ‘final cause’), and which express trust and reliance upon divine grace to reach it (hope’s ‘efficient cause’). To paraphrase Jeremy Taylor, the best way to enable a ‘hopeful dying’ is by a ‘hopeful living’. Hence our need for a renewed ascesis of hope in the Church. 12
Reaffirming Hope
The Reliance of Hope
I close by examining ways to reaffirm hope in dying. The spiritual practices just mentioned are ideal expressions of hope towards death. At the same time, many require more lucidity than we can bank on while dying. What then? There remains the primary act which defines the virtue of hope—namely, to seek and to rely upon God as one’s ultimate end and divine helper. Requiring little more cognition than it takes to cry for help, it is available to many who cannot practice elaborate spiritual exercises at death, and may occur in and through prayers of petition, reception of sacraments, and so forth. In this prayer of hope one recalls that God is trustworthy in light of the mercies shown throughout salvation history, from the Red Sea to the empty tomb. This makes credible the belief that one’s own journey can be completed with divine help, which may impinge upon the will with a sense of encouragement, trust and resilience (as in ‘I can do all things in him who strengthens me’, Phil. 4:13). While sensible consolations may arrive like water in the desert, properly speaking hope’s motion is in the will. The corollary is that losing feelings of hope does not entail losing the virtue of hope. However horrible it may seem, those who feel no hope can still go on hoping. The example of saints who endured the ‘dark night’ is instructive here. If we complete this act of hope, trust in God’s strength prompts renewed commitment to doggedly persevere in the journey while remaining consciously dependent upon God’s grace to sustain us. The book of Psalms is of course the paradigm for relying on God this way. Without gilding the lily, the psalms voice total confidence in God as one’s rock, refuge and fortress despite tragedy and at death.
The Role of the Church and the Commendation of the Dying
In addition to one’s own agency, the Church has to be there for you. A hopeful death is not just about ‘doing’ various practices as a lone ascetic, but being situated in the ecclesial context that sustains and gives hope meaning. The minister and one’s fellow Christians must validate and encourage hope, especially when the mind is at the end of its tether. A virtue may be present but its operation impeded (ST I-II.65.3). For instance, the dying sometimes want to express hope but find it difficult, and tell a loved one ‘You must hope for me’. So we must, and they may then trust in our hope, adopting it themselves.
Many cannot consciously practice an art of dying due to mental deterioration. 13 In such cases the role of the Church is all the more important. Being comatose or seriously demented does not remove one from the body of Christ, and one’s death is an event in that body of which Christ is the head. As a baptised infant is placed in the faith of the church, the comatose or demented may be placed in the hope of the church, particularly through ongoing care which treats them as intended for future glory, and through loving prayers on their behalf. Allen Verhey has stressed the need for patients rather than doctors to be the main actors at death. 14 But if we take a wider view of agency which mental incapacity requires—one which takes the communion of the saints seriously—then in a different respect we can say that the Church as a whole, the body of Christ in union with its head, is itself the primary actor at death.
Nevertheless, most can consciously enact the role of ‘die-er’ or Moriens to an appreciable degree. Sacramentally, the virtue of hope comes to a head in the last rites for Roman Catholics, and this is paralleled by prayers for the sick in the Book of Common Prayer. The last rites apply the sacraments of Anointing of the Sick, Penance, and the Eucharist in a hope-specialised way. 15 The Eucharist gets a hope-specific name, viaticum, or ‘food for the journey’, in a way that tracks our hope-specific identity, homo viator. Moreover, the ‘Commendation of the Dying’ which follows viaticum is a treasury of readings and prayers for hope taken from Scripture and the psalms.
Ranging from the serene trust of ‘The Lord is my shepherd’ to Job’s words of agony, they provide an overall script for a hopeful death which hovers at the borderline between fear, rage, lament, pleading and feelings of abandonment, on the one hand; and trust, confidence, assurance and longing for God, on the other. They remind us that fellow travellers have been there before, and in the litany of saints, they recall that we are surrounded by that same cloud of witnesses. Taken together such texts give full expression to hope’s basic act of steadfast reliance upon God, and they give full scope to the tonalities of hope, from trust to lament to anticipation, making this virtue’s exercise far from monolithic.
From a Christian perspective, such prayers of reliance do what needs doing with a greater spiritual richness and psychological rawness than Kubler-Rossian stages of grief. The ‘Commendation’ or comparable texts should be worked into the life of hope not just on the deathbed, but throughout the dying process. Contemplating scriptural exemplars of a good death and finding words for one’s struggles in the psalms give a canonical script for hope to fall back on that helps the dying cope with outrageous circumstances and encourages them with the promise of resurrection. The final and supreme act for which the ascesis of hope trains us, and in which the virtue of hope culminates, is the act of surrendering one’s life back to God in the hope that the grain of wheat dies to bear much fruit. In the lives of some saints, this has been serene, even ecstatic. 16 But consolations cannot be reckoned upon, and the example of Christ himself suggests we can follow up ‘Why have you forsaken me?’ with the supremely hopeful ‘Into your hands I commend my spirit’.
Footnotes
1.
For a sustained treatment of theological hope, see David Elliot, Hope and Christian Ethics, New Studies in Christian Ethics series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
2.
Secular hopes are of course many—from idolatrous hopes in medical technology to the lofty hopes proper to magnanimity, the natural virtue which most resembles theological hope—but are outside my scope here. For a helpful discussion, see Josef Pieper, On Hope (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1986), pp. 26–30.
3.
Church of England, Book of Common Prayer, Pew edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 383.
4.
Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1974), p. 160.
5.
See David Clarke, ‘Faith and Hope’, Australasian Psychiatry 11.2 (2003), pp. 164–68; Terry Bunston et al., ‘Facilitating Hopefulness’, Journal of Psychosocial Oncology 13.4 (1996), pp. 79–103; L.A. Gottschalk, ‘Hope and Other Deterrents to Illness’, American Journal of Psychotherapy 39.4 (1985), pp. 515–24.
6.
This article focuses on the risk of despair. For more on hope’s second opposed vice of presumption, see Elliot, Hope and Christian Ethics, ch. 6, ‘Presumption and Moral Reform’.
7.
John Henry Newman, Dream of Gerontius (New York: Schwartz, Kirwin & Fauss, 1916), p. 8.
8.
William F. May as quoted in Jeffrey Stout’s Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), at p. 275.
9.
Aquinas notes that despair often arises from forms of acedia to which misery tempts us; see ST II–II.20.4.
10.
See Christopher Vogt, Patience, Compassion, Hope, and the Christian Art of Dying Well (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 17–25, 36–39.
11.
I am indebted here to work on virtue cultivation in J. Herdt, ‘Frailty, Fragmentation, and Social Dependency in the Cultivation of Christian Virtue’, in Nancy Snow (ed.), Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 227–49.
12.
I develop this at greater length in ch. 4 of Hope and Christian Ethics, and in Elliot, ‘The Christian as Homo Viator: A Resource in Aquinas for Overcoming “Worldly Sin and Sorrow”’, Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 34.2 (2014), pp. 113–21.
13.
For an excellent and pioneering treatment of this problem, see Michael Banner, The Ethics of Everyday Life: Moral Theology, Social Anthropology, and the Imagination of the Human (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 107–134.
14.
Allen Verhey, The Christian Art of Dying: Learning from Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 11–23.
15.
ICEL, Pastoral Care of the Sick (Totowa, NJ: Catholic Book Publishing Corp., 1991).
16.
For example, St Francis of Assisi spoke words of welcome to ‘our Sister Bodily Death’. It bears mentioning that he also stressed the need for repentance given the possibility of damnation to prevent hope from lapsing into complacent presumption (Letter to All the Faithful, v. 82).
