Abstract
Contemporary historians examining moral theology in the Middle Ages question whether the practice of proscribing certain kinds of human acts as intrinsic moral evils has a legitimate basis in the Christian ethical tradition. John Dedek argues that this proscription does not fully emerge until the work of the fourteenth-century thinker Durandus of St. Pourçain. Dedek’s historical focus, however, is upon theological discussions which consider God’s absolute power and his ability to dispense from or command any human act whatsoever. The focus for addressing this question should be instead to examine how medieval thinkers understand the structural elements of a human act, especially in response to the ethical intentionalism promoted by the twelfth-century thinker Peter Abelard. An examination of Peter Lombard’s response to Abelard reveals that certain human acts were proscribed as intrinsic moral evils long prior to Durandus, and that Augustine serves as a source for this doctrine.
Introduction: The Rejection of Intrinsic Moral Evils in Contemporary Moral Theology
Contemporary Catholic moral theologian James Keenan explains the rejection of the doctrine of intrinsic moral evils among revisionist thinkers as follows: [T]he innovators perceived in the wake of Humanae vitae that the notion of moral absolutes in general and intrinsic evil in particular had to be critiqued and rejected, rather than assumed. Of the many critiques of absolutes, three are particularly noteworthy … The first was Charles Curran’s edited collection Absolutes in Moral Theology? The second was embodied in individual articles … For example, Josef Fuchs argued that no specific moral judgment could be rendered by the simple direct application of an a priori, universal principle … The third was John Dedek’s historical study of the development of the concept of intrinsic evil.
1
Keenan proceeds to contend that ‘with the claims of intrinsic evil somewhat undermined, Peter Knauer introduced an argument for a form of moral reasoning’, viz., a new moral methodology known as proportionalism. 2 In relation to the ascendancy of proportionalism as a school of moral thought, the present study focuses on the third critique of moral absolutes which Keenan outlines in his quote above, namely, the historical studies of John Dedek. While Dedek’s first study treats early thirteenth-century thinkers, his second study focuses predominantly upon Aquinas. 3 The third and final installment surveys thinkers after Aquinas until the era of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain. 4 In all of these studies, Dedek’s emphasis is upon the question of whether God in accordance with his absolute power can dispense from or command any human act whatsoever. Dedek’s investigation assumes that if it can be established that the thinkers in the thirteenth century believed God can do this, then it follows that such thinkers did not hold any act to be intrinsically moral evil in and of itself. 5
What was so influential about the historical claims of Dedek in these studies was not an advocacy of a change in the moral order by way of appeal to God’s absolute power but rather the implication that he had recovered a more genuine moral theology from a tradition which had later become distorted. As Keenan summarizes, ‘Dedek found that the concept of intrinsic evil originated with none other than Thomas Aquinas’s greatest historical detractor, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, O.P.’ 6 Dedek makes a similar claim in the conclusion of his third study: ‘This is the doctrine on intrinsically evil acts commonly found in nineteenth and early twentieth-century textbooks of Catholic moral theology: certain material actions are so intrinsically disordered in their natures that not even God can allow them. It is the doctrine, not of St. Thomas Aquinas, but of the fourteenth-century anti-Thomist, Durand of St. Pourçain.’ 7 Dedek’s implication is that the teaching of the Catholic seminary manuals of moral theology prior to Vatican II lacks a historical basis and communicates instead something of a doctrinal aberration when looking at the actual teachings of the thirteenth-century Doctors. Keenan elsewhere writes that ‘manualists referred to Thomas’s use of the concept [of intrinsic moral evil], though he never had the concept and never would have used it’. 8
Do Dedek’s studies compellingly support his claim that a moral proscription against intrinsic moral evils is a doctrinal aberration? The hermeneutical key which Dedek selects (namely, the issue of God’s absolute power and his ability to dispense from the moral law) arguably does not provide the proper context for examining the basis in tradition for the proscription against intrinsic moral evils. The issue of divine dispensation pertains foremost to the theological question of God’s omnipotence rather than to the analysis of the structure of human acts which comprises fundamental moral theology. The question, then, whether thinkers in the thirteenth century could have entertained a doctrine proscribing certain kinds of human acts as intrinsic moral evils should be set in a new context, namely, that of their reception of and response to two distinct currents of ethical thought coming from the twelfth century, the work of Peter Abelard and that of Peter Lombard. 9 When studying the writings of the latter, contemporary scholars Servais Pinckaers and Marcia Colish have noted that, in response to Abelard’s ethics, Lombard quotes Augustine at length to support the teaching that some kinds of human actions involve intrinsic moral evil. 10 The observations of Pinckaers and Colish thus contradict Dedek’s historical claim that the doctrine proscribing intrinsic moral evil originates in the era after Aquinas.
The treatment which Pinckaers and Colish give to Lombard on this issue is relatively brief. Lombard’s doctrine needs to be explored in more detail and brought into an explicit comparison with Dedek’s historical arguments. In what follows, after providing an overview of Dedek’s studies and a few general observations, I consider first the moral doctrine of Abelard. Then, in relation to Abelard, I examine particular sections of Lombard’s influential Libri sententiarum, especially the passage noted by Pinckaers and Colish where Lombard provides an extended quote from Augustine. I argue on the basis of this examination that Augustine, as mediated by Lombard, serves as an ancient theological source for the medieval doctrine proscribing certain kinds of human acts as intrinsic moral evils. The moral doctrine does not, therefore, originate from Durandus.
The Dedek Studies
In Dedek’s first study, he reviews the works of twelve authors prior to Aquinas. Beginning with Peter of Poitiers’s Sententiarum libri quinque (c.1168–1176), Dedek focuses predominantly upon Parisian theologians including two anonymous codices. 11 For each author, Dedek follows the methodological lead of his contemporaries Milhaven and Scholz and focuses primarily upon the issue of divine dispensation. 12 In this respect, Dedek calls attention to a technical distinction of William of Auxerre who maintains that God can command any act which is a malum in se (evil but capable of becoming good with the addition of a circumstance) but not any act which is a malum secundum se (evil irrespective of added circumstances). 13 Dedek also gives emphasis to William of Auxerre’s doctrine that what makes a particular kind of act evil is that that act is performed ex libidine, i.e., ‘out of a selfish desire to delight in a creature’. 14 These focal points then provide the general orientation of Dedek’s interpretation of other thirteenth-century authors. 15 Dedek maintains that such thinkers for the most part collectively teach that, while God cannot dispense from any act performed ex libidine, God can separate that act from its libidinous end and reorient that act to a new and morally good end. 16 The implication is that only an act performed ex libidine is an act which is a malum secundum se, whereas the same act detached from libidinous desire becomes merely a malum in se capable of divine dispensation. Further, since any act can be reoriented in such a way, no act in and of itself is an intrinsic moral evil. Of the twelve authors Dedek surveys, he maintains that this conclusion expresses the explicit doctrine of six thinkers, the implicit doctrine of two others, and that no contradiction is discernible in the work of the remaining four. 17
In Dedek’s second study, he reviews his first study in order to establish the historical context in which Aquinas wrote. 18 Dedek focuses on nine of the same thinkers (omitting three of the four who made no positive contribution to his general thesis) and adds a new consideration of Bonaventure. Dedek’s focus is again upon divine dispensation and William of Auxerre’s doctrine that an act is absolutely morally evil only if performed ex libidine. 19 In this essay, Dedek explicitly connects any act performed ex libidine with an act which is malum secundum se. 20 He extends this technical distinction to other thinkers, such as Hugh of St. Cher, Roland of Cremona, the authors of the Summa Fratris Alexandri, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Aquinas. 21 He maintains that any act qua moral evil must be understood formally so, i.e., as a malum secundum se emerging from the agent’s libidinous will, and not simply materially so with respect to the act’s intrinsic elements only. 22
In Dedek’s third study, he surveys eighteen thinkers contemporary with (or subsequent to) Aquinas, ending with Durandus of St. Pouçain. Dedek argues that Durandus is the first medieval thinker to place a doctrine proscribing intrinsic moral evils ‘into full and coherent form’, following nascent lines of thought which emerged after Aquinas with Hannibald of Hannibald, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton. 23 Dedek’s focus is again on the issue of divine dispensation but in such a way that one comes to discern more clearly what Dedek understands by the phrase intrinsic moral evil: such would be any act for which God can offer no dispensation and which God cannot command. But since Dedek’s previous studies concluded that thinkers in the thirteenth century up to and including Aquinas maintained that God can command any act, there is therefore no traditional doctrine proscribing intrinsic moral evils.
A first observation of Dedek’s studies concerns their scope. On one hand, the scope is too broad: his work surveys thirty-two thinkers over the span of roughly one hundred and fifty years. For many of the thinkers whom Dedek considers, he provides only a short paragraph summarizing that thinker’s doctrine. While Dedek’s studies are of high scholarly quality, it is improbable that he has evaluated the doctrine of so many thinkers to such an extent so to justify adequately the claim that there is no historical evidence prior to Hannibald of a doctrine proscribing intrinsic moral evils. Who, for example, are the other theologians to whom Peter of Tarentaise refers (as summarized by Dedek) that advance such a teaching? 24
On the other hand, Dedek’s selected starting point of Peter of Poitiers is not early enough. Dedek should have considered Peter Lombard also, especially given the importance of Lombard’s Libri sententiarum among thirteenth-century thinkers. Equally important would have been for Dedek to have considered the moral theology of Abelard. Such is because Dedek consistently refers to acts as such (in precision from their end which the agent intends) as material and with the implication that such material acts are always and only pre-moral and physical. 25 As is clear below, Dedek’s interpretation of the various thirteenth-century thinkers on this point is Abelardian in character. 26
Aside from the scope of his studies, one should also note Dedek’s focus. His primary approach, following the methodology of Milhaven and Scholz, is to emphasize texts which treat the issue of divine dispensations from the moral law. The issue of divine dispensation, however, should not serve as the primary context for examining the question of the basis in tradition for the doctrine proscribing intrinsic moral evils. This perspective is flawed as the primary viewpoint in fundamental moral theology because it emerges from consideration of a set of exceptional and unique narratives found in the Old Testament. 27 Would not basing one’s primary moral viewpoint on such exceptional narratives commit a kind of fallacy of converse accident (the fallacy of formulating a general conclusion on the basis of atypical or irregular cases)? 28
This methodological focus involves a further ontological problem in that it presupposes without question that any act remains ontologically the same even when directly ordained by God by way of a unique supernatural intervention. 29 The issue of divine dispensation is a distinct problem in Christian theology concerning God’s omnipotence and the suspension of the ordinary providential order. Since this problem also involves the interpretation of the aforementioned narratives in the Old Testament, it is simultaneously a problem for biblical exegesis. Yet these issues must be addressed separately from the examination of the basic structure of human acts as conducted in fundamental moral theology. 30 Dedek’s focus on divine dispensation leads him to overlook positive evidence which supports the view that thinkers prior to and including Aquinas did encounter a doctrine which proscribed certain kinds of human acts as intrinsic moral evils. 31 Such a doctrine is found with Lombard’s use of Augustine when reacting to the moral theology of Abelard.
An Overview of Abelard on Moral Acts
In his mature work Scito te ipsum or Ethica (1133–1138), Abelard teaches that when God evaluates the moral character of a person, God is concerned with that agent’s intention, not with his or her action. 32 He writes, ‘God thinks not of what is done but in what mind it may be done, and the merit or the glory of the doer lies in the intention, not in the deed’. 33 While for Abelard there are objective criteria regulating the morality of intentions, no human act considered in precision from the agent’s intention has a moral character in itself. 34 He writes, ‘works in fact … are all indifferent in themselves (in se indifferentia) and should be called good or bad only on account of the intention of the agent’. 35 The implication is that no kind of act can be genuinely qualified as an intrinsic moral good or an intrinsic moral evil without further consideration of the agent’s intended remote end or goal. As Abelard succinctly states: ‘anyone’s intention is called good in itself (bona in se), although the work is not called good by itself (bonum ex se) but because it proceeds from a good intention’. 36 For Abelard, the act or work has no moral character in itself; it is simply physical. 37 Only by extension and by an improper use of language can an act be called morally good or morally evil. 38
Some contemporary scholars generalize Abelard’s thesis and maintain that such expresses the common medieval viewpoint. 39 However, some of Abelard’s contemporaries reacted with concern about his ethical doctrine, especially with respect to the implication that Abelard, in connecting sin (as he understood it) with the agent’s intention only, thereby denied the existence of sins of ignorance. 40 While Abelard did recognize moral ignorance in terms of a mistaken intention, he did not maintain that one can perform an exterior act which has a moral character in itself in precision from the agent’s intention. 41 Regardless, the debate culminated at the local council of Sens in 1140 or 1141 with a condemnation of the purportedly Abelardian thesis that there are no sins of ignorance. 42
Lombard in Response to Abelard
Several passages important for the history of moral theology may be found in the second book of Lombard’s Libri sententiarum (1155–1157). 43 A first passage of Lombard important for the question under consideration is found in distinctions thirty-five through thirty-six of Book II. 44 In these distinctions, Lombard establishes a kind of hierarchy of goodness, referring to a natural or essential level, a generic moral level which considers the moral act only, and then an absolute moral level which also takes into consideration the cause and end of the moral act (i.e., the agent’s will and intention). He begins first in distinction thirty-five by considering three different understandings of sin: ‘some said that an evil will alone is sin, and not exterior actions; others that it is the will and the acts; others that it is neither, saying that all actions are good and by God and from God as their source, while evil is nothing’. 45 According to the editors of the recent Grottaferrata critical edition, these three viewpoints should be associated respectively with Abelard, Lombard himself, and Abelard’s teacher Anselm of Laon. 46 Lombard’s endorsement of the second understanding of sin (that it pertains to both the exterior act and the interior act of the will) is evident in what follows.
Shortly thereafter in the same distinction, Lombard summarizes the doctrine that an action can be a good nature (inasmuch as it exists) but at the same time it can be morally evil, inasmuch as it transgresses the moral law and/or lacks a due end. On this point, Lombard writes: some … not unlearnedly teach that an evil will and evil actions, insofar as they are, or insofar as they are actions, are goods; but insofar as they are evils, they are sins. They say that every will and every action is a good nature of God insofar as it is an action or a will, and it is from God as author. But insofar as it is done in a disorderly manner and against the law and lacks a due end, it is a sin.
47
Later, at the end of the next distinction, Lombard provides a summary of his discussion where he introduces the intermediary kind of goodness between that of natural goodness and absolute moral goodness, viz., generic moral goodness which pertains to the exterior act considered in itself apart from the agent’s will and intention. First, he reiterates what he had previously outlined: We have very diligently set out the view of those who say that all actions are good natures, and that, insofar as they are, they are good … And we have fortified these teachings with the testimonies of authorities and with the reasons of the same, who say that all actions are good by their essence, that is, insofar as they are; but some actions, insofar as they are done in a disorderly way, are sins.
48
Then Lombard supplements this discussion, stating: They also add that some actions are good not only by essence, but also generically, as to feed the hungry, which is an action of the genus [or category] of the works of mercy. Some actions, however, they call absolutely and perfectly good, which are commended not only by essence or genus, but also by cause and end, as are those actions which proceed from a good will and achieve a good end.
49
It is here that one finds the three levels of goodness explicitly stated, viz., natural or essential goodness, the generic moral goodness of the exterior act, and absolute moral goodness which also considers the agent’s will and intention. Since the will and intention (i.e., the cause and end) pertain to the interior act of the agent, the question of whether a moral act is in itself a bonum in se or malum in se is to be associated with the second level of generic moral goodness.
Lombard’s teaching that certain kinds of human acts can be either good in themselves or evil in themselves is further evident in distinction forty of Book II. This comprises the passage of Lombard which Pinckaers and Colish both cite, as discussed above. In distinction forty, Lombard states, ‘it is asked whether all the works of man are good or evil from affective disposition and end’. 50 In response to this question, Lombard considers three options regarding whether a human act can be morally good or evil in itself apart from its cause and its end. The first option seems to be the doctrine of Abelard and answers the question affirmatively: acts in themselves are neither morally good nor morally evil but rather morally indifferent. Thus, in this view, moral goodness and evil derive from the agent’s intended end. 51 The second option which Lombard considers is that human acts are morally good or morally evil in themselves—but to such an extent that any act which is morally good remains morally good even when it has an evil cause or an evil end. 52 According to Pinckaers, this is the viewpoint of Abelard’s adversaries. 53 Having established these sic et non options for the question posed, Lombard then rejects both of the options and endorses a third viewpoint, namely, the teaching of Augustine as found in the Contra mendacium. 54 The overall thrust of the distinction may thus be interpreted as Lombard’s effort to address both sides, but where Lombard’s solution primarily involves an Augustinian rejection of Abelard’s moral intentionalism. 55
The exact teaching of Augustine which Lombard quotes is worth considering in detail. In chapter seven of Contra mendacium, a letter which Augustine wrote around 420 It is always relevant for what cause, to what end, with what intention something is done. But those things which we know to be sins are not to be done with any claim of a good cause, for any apparent good end, with any allegedly good intention. For those works of men which are not in themselves sins are now good, now evil, according to whether they have good or evil causes.
59
Here Augustine states that some kinds of human acts are ‘not in themselves sins’ (non sunt per se ipsa peccata) and become morally good or evil depending upon their end. He gives examples such as giving food to the poor and sexual intercourse within marriage.
Augustine next indicates that other kinds of human acts are, however, ‘in themselves sins’ regardless of their end. On this point, Augustine states: ‘But when the works themselves are sins (opera ipsa peccata sunt), like thefts, rapes, blasphemies, who would say that they are to be done for good causes, or are not sins, or, what is more absurd, that they are righteous sins?’ 60 Although Augustine omits the per se here, one is warranted in pointing to his contrast of works which are non per se peccata and works which are. Augustine then proceeds to give examples of acts which involve committing sins for the sake of good ends, such as stealing to give to the poor, lying to protect the innocent, committing adultery to save a life, or forging a will so it benefits a charitable person. At the closing of the passage which Lombard quotes, Augustine then concludes that it is just to punish one who commits a work which is a peccatum per se for the sake of a good end. 61
Lombard closes out the entire distinction by summarizing Augustine’s account in such a way that one may interpret the summary to be an expression of Lombard’s own doctrinal conviction. Lombard writes: Attend, reader, to the words here set out with the whole consideration of your mind because they contain an exercise which is far from useless; and you will recognize which action is a sin, namely one which has an evil cause; and not only that one, because there are some actions which, although they have a good cause, are nevertheless sins, as is set out above.
62
Lombard then proceeds to describe evil actions which proceed from a good will by using Augustine’s phrase, peccata per se. Lombard writes, From this it seems to follow that a will or action is not always judged to be evil from its end, as is the case with those things which are sins in themselves (per se peccata sunt). For when one has done these things for some good cause, they appear to have a good end; and the will is not evil as a result of the end, nor is the action made evil as a result of the will, but the will is made depraved as a result of the action.
63
At the end of this discussion, Lombard then reformulates peccata per se as mala per se. Earlier in the distinction, he had considered the statement of Ambrose of Milan that, ‘“Your disposition gives a name to your deed.”’
64
Referring back to Ambrose’s quote at the end of the section, Lombard states, when it is said that the name is given to the deed from the disposition, this rule is generally true as to good works, but, as to evil ones, those are excepted which are evil in themselves (per se mala). And so all the works of man are judged good or evil according to intention and cause, except for those which are evil in themselves (per se mala), that is, which cannot be done without transgression.
65
Given that the context of this passage involves a response to Abelard, that it resolves into a discussion of Augustine’s doctrine that some acts are peccata per se apart from the agent’s intended end, and that Lombard employs the phrase mala per se as equivalent to peccata per se, one may affirm that in this passage Lombard maintains a doctrine which proscribes certain kinds of human acts as intrinsic moral evils. Lombard’s account further indicates that he understands Augustine to be a source of this doctrine.
Closing Remarks
The general influence of Lombard’s Libri sententiarum upon the early secular theologians at the University of Paris is well known. 66 A complete response to the Dedek studies should trace the reception of the passages discussed above in book two of Lombard’s work as found in the commentaries of thirteenth-century authors. The current claim here is not—without a thorough consideration of these texts—that all of these thinkers maintained an explicit doctrine proscribing intrinsic moral evils. Rather, my claim is that Lombard’s influence was pervasive and that he communicated the Augustinian doctrine proscribing intrinsic moral evils to the thirteenth century. In the discussion above, I explored this doctrine in detail so to expand the brief observations of Pinckaers and Colish and contrast these with Dedek’s historical studies. As distinct from Dedek’s perspective which emphasizes God’s absolute power, the Augustinian doctrine mediated by Lombard is not found in the context of a reflection upon God’s ability to dispense from the moral law. Rather, it emerges in the context of Lombard responding to Abelard regarding the structural components of a moral act.
Footnotes
1.
James Keenan, ‘The Moral Agent: Actions and Normative Decision Making’, in James J. Walter, Timothy E. O’Connell and Thomas A. Shannon (eds.), A Call to Fidelity: On the Moral Theology of Charles E. Curran (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 2002), pp. 38–39.
2.
Regarding proportionalism as a school of Catholic moral thought, see Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism: The American Debate and its European Roots (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1987); Christopher Kaczor, Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2010); Christopher Kaczor (ed.), Proportionalism: For and Against (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University, 1999). Keenan’s description of how proportionalism developed is somewhat out of chronological sequence. The English translation of Knauer’s watershed article actually appears before the studies of Fuchs and Dedek. See Peter Knauer, ‘The Hermeneutical Function of the Principle of Double Effect’, Natural Law Forum 12 (1967), pp. 132–62. Knauer states in a note on p. 132 that an early form of this work appeared as Peter Knauer, ‘La détermination du bien et du mal moral par le principe du double effet’, Nouvelle revue théologique 87 (1965), pp. 356–76. He then developed this account further in Peter Knauer, ‘Das rechtverstandene Prinzip von der Doppelwirkung als Grundnorm jeder Gewissensentscheidung’, Theologie und Glaube 57 (1967), pp. 107–133. This second article provides the basis for his influential ‘The Hermeneutical Function’. Then followed Curran’s anthology entitled Absolutes in Moral Theology? See Charles E. Curran (ed.), Absolutes in Moral Theology? (Washington DC: Corpus, 1968). Curran’s anthology contained an important historical study on Aquinas and moral absolutes by John Milhaven which was influential upon Dedek. See John G. Milhaven, ‘Moral Absolutes and Thomas Aquinas’, in Absolutes in Moral Theology?, pp. 154–85, pp. 279–97. Next appeared Josef Fuchs’s first theological study concerning intrinsic moral evils. See Josef Fuchs, ‘The Absoluteness of Behavioral Moral Norms’, Gregorianum 52 (1971), pp. 415–57, reprinted in Josef Fuchs, Personal Responsibility and Christian Morality (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1983), pp. 115–52. Regarding this study, Keenan elsewhere writes: ‘In this article, Fuchs undid not only the credibility of the concept of intrinsic evil, but also the claims of any metaphysical a prioris that could diminish the range of consideration necessary to make a prudential judgment.’ See James F. Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences (New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 153. Note that this first study of Fuchs (‘Absoluteness’) was also reprinted in a second anthology which Curran edited. See Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick (eds.), Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition (New York: Paulist, 1979), pp. 94–137. In this same anthology, one finds a historical study by Scholz which serves as a sequel to Milhaven’s work. Scholz’s study was also influential upon Dedek. See Franz Scholz, ‘Problems on Norms Raised by Ethical Borderline Situations: Beginnings of a Solution in Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure’, in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1, pp. 158–83. For the original, see Franz Scholz, ‘Durch Ethische Grenzsituationen aufgeworfene Normenprobleme’, Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift 123 (1975), pp. 341–55.
3.
For the first article, see John Dedek, ‘Moral Absolutes in the Predecessors of St Thomas’, Theological Studies 38.4 (1977), pp. 654–80. Dedek places his historical study within its contemporary context by explicitly citing numerous revisionist moral theologians (Dedek, ‘Moral Absolutes’, p. 654 nn. 1–3). The only omission in this list of citations is Fuchs’s second theological study on intrinsic moral evils which appears later in 1984. See Josef Fuchs, ‘An On-going Discussion in Christian Ethics: “Intrinsically Evil Acts”?’ in idem, Christian Ethics in a Secular Arena (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1984), pp. 73–90. For the second article, see John Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil Acts: An Historical Study of the Mind of St. Thomas’, The Thomist 43.3 (1979), pp. 385–413.
4.
See John Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil Acts: The Emergence of a Doctrine’, Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 50 (1983), pp. 191–226.
5.
Milhaven draws out a further implication: If God can dispense from certain kinds of action commonly proscribed, why can human persons not also grant such dispensations? ‘That certain negative moral absolutes do not bind God should cast light on why and how they bind man.’ Milhaven, ‘Moral Absolutes’, p. 159.
6.
Keenan, ‘The Moral Agent’, p. 39. As a qualification of Keenan’s claim, what Dedek argues is that Durandus put the doctrine into ‘full and coherent form’, building on partial discussions found in the works of Hannibald of Hannibald, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton. See Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … Emergence’, p. 225.
7.
Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … Emergence’, p. 226.
8.
Keenan, History of Catholic Moral Theology, p. 45; cf. p. 151.
9.
Regarding these ‘two currents’, see José Rojas, ‘St. Thomas’ Treatise on Self-Defense Revisited’, in E. Manning (ed.), Thomistica: Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, Supplementa 1 (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), p. 103. For Rojas’s summary of the two currents, see pp. 102–112. At p. 103 n. 38, Rojas in turn cites Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, Tome IV, Problèmes de morale, Troisième partie I (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont-César, 1954), pp. 309–486.
10.
For Pinckaers, see Servais Pinckaers, ‘A Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts’, in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, trans. Mary Thomas Noble (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2005), pp. 185–235 (199). For a shorter version of his original essay, see Servais Pinckaers, ‘Le problème de l’Intrinsece Malum: Esquisse historique’, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 29 (1982), pp. 373–88. For Colish, see Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, Vol. 2 (New York: E. J. Brill, 1994), p. 483.
11.
See Petrus Pictaviensis, Sententiarum libri quinque, in J. P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Paris, 1844–64), vol. 211, pp. 783–1286. For dating this work, see Philip S. Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers: Master of Theology and Chancellor of Paris (1193–1205) (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1936), pp. 39–41. Regarding how he selected the sources used in his research, see Dedek, ‘Moral Absolutes’, p. 655 n. 5; Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … Emergence’, p. 192 n. 3.
12.
See Milhaven, ‘Moral Absolutes’, p. 158; Scholz, ‘Problems on Norms’, pp. 165–75.
13.
Dedek, ‘Moral Absolutes’, p. 660.
14.
Dedek, ‘Moral Absolutes’, p. 658.
15.
See Dedek, ‘Moral Absolutes’, pp. 665 and 670.
16.
Dedek, ‘Moral Absolutes’, p. 679.
17.
Dedek, ‘Moral Absolutes’, p. 679.
18.
Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … St. Thomas’, pp. 388–401.
19.
For the latter, see Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … St. Thomas’, p. 390.
20.
Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … St. Thomas’, p. 391.
21.
Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … St. Thomas’, pp. 393–408.
22.
For discussion of the formal sense in which a moral proscription should be understood, see Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … St. Thomas’, p. 389 (in relation to Peter of Poitiers) and p. 405 and pp. 408–10 (in relation to Aquinas); Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … Emergence’, p. 197 (in relation to Peter of Tarentaise).
23.
Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … Emergence’, p. 225.
24.
Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … Emergence’, p. 196.
25.
See, for example, his discussion of Peter of Tarentaise on killing, taking property, or engaging in sexual intercourse: Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … Emergence’, p. 390. Or his discussion of William of Auxerre on stealing and fornication: Dedek, ‘Intrinsically Evil … Emergence’, p. 391.
26.
For an Abelardian interpretation of Aquinas, see Louis Janssens, ‘Ontic Evil and Moral Evil’, in Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick (eds.), Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition (New York: Paulist, 1979), p. 40, originally published in Louvain Studies 4 (1972); Louis Janssens, ‘Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Proportionality’, Louvain Studies 9.1 (1982), pp. 27–28; José Rojas, ‘St. Thomas on the Direct/Indirect Distinction’, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 64 (1988), p. 376 n. 20; Rojas, ‘St. Thomas’ Treatise’, pp. 113 and 115. For critiques of Janssens’s Abelardian interpretation of Aquinas, see William E. May, ‘Aquinas and Janssens on the Moral Meaning of Human Acts’, The Thomist 48 (1984), pp. 572–73 and pp. 577–78, and Chad Ripperger, ‘The Morality of the Exterior Act (Part I)’, Angelicum 76.2 (1999), p. 201 n. 36.
27.
The standard examples involve God’s command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac (Gen. 22:2), the command of Moses to the Hebrews to despoil the Egyptians (Exod. 12:35–36), God’s command to Saul via Samuel to eradicate the tribe of Amalek, including infants and livestock (1 Sam. 15:3), and God’s command to Hosea to fornicate with a prostitute (Hos. 1:2–3). By connection, the question of whether God dispensed Samson from his apparent suicide is also raised (Judg. 16:28–31).
28.
In relation to historiography, see Ch. 4 ‘Fallacies of Generalization’, in David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 109–10.
29.
On this issue, see Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia IIae q.100 a.8 ad 3. For the Latin, see Thomae de Aquino, Summa theologiae, 5 vols. (Ottawa: Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis, 1941). For the English see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 5 vols., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948).
30.
For a discussion of Aquinas on this issue, see Patrick Lee, ‘Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His Modern Commentators’, Theological Studies 42.3 (1981), pp. 422–43 (428–37); Jean Porter, ‘Moral Rules and Moral Actions: A Comparison of Aquinas and Modern Moral Theology’, Journal of Religious Ethics 17.1 (1989), pp. 123–49 (145); Matthew R. McWhorter, ‘Aquinas and Inherently Privative Moral Acts’, Angelicum 89.3–4 (2012), pp. 715–34 (731–33).
31.
Also see May’s similar criticism of Scholz and Dedek: William E. May, Moral Absolutes: Catholic Tradition, Current Trends, and the Truth (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University, 1989), p. 11.
32.
For the Latin and English, see D. E. Luscombe (trans.), Peter Abelard’s Ethics (New York: Clarendon, 1971). For an alternate English translation, see Peter Abelard, Ethics, in Ethical Writings, trans. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995). For dating this work, see Luscombe, ‘Peter Abelard and Twelfth Century Ethics’, in Abelard’s Ethics, p. xxx. For an overview of the topics in Abelard’s moral doctrine under consideration, see John Marenbon, ‘Act, Intention, and Consent’, in idem, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (New York: Cambridge University, 1999), pp. 251–64. Following Marenbon, Porter argues that Abelard’s ethical emphasis is on the moment of consent, against a stage theory of sin held by previous thinkers such as Anselm of Laon. See Jean Porter, ‘Responsibility, Passion, and Sin: A Reassessment of Abelard’s Ethics’, Journal of Religious Ethics 28.3 (2000), pp. 367–94 (373). For a summary of Anselm of Laon’s doctrine, Porter cites Marenbon, ‘Act, Intention, and Consent’, pp. 253–55. For a general overview of Abelard’s ethics, see William E. Mann, ‘Ethics’, in Jeffrey E. Brower and Kevin Guilfoy (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Abelard (New York: Cambridge University, 2004), pp. 279–304.
33.
Luscombe, Abelard’s Ethics, pp. 28–29. ‘Non enim quae fiunt, sed quo animo fiant pensat Deus, nec in opere sed in intentione meritum operantis vel laus consistit.’ See also Abelard, Ethics, §57. Later, Abelard expands this doctrine, stating, ‘God considers only the mind in rewarding good or evil, not the results of deeds, and he thinks not of what comes forth from fault or from our good will, but judges the mind itself in the design of its intention, not in the outcome of an outward deed.’ Luscombe, Abelard’s Ethics, pp. 44–45. ‘Solum quippe animum in remuneratione boni vel mali, non effecta operum, Deus adtendit, ne quid de culpa vel de bona voluntate nostra proveniat pensat, sed ipsum animum in proposito suae intentionis, non in effectu exterioris operis, diiudicat.’ See also Abelard, Ethics, §90.
34.
Regarding objective moral criteria for Abelard, see Luscombe, Abelard’s Ethics, pp. 54–55. See also Abelard, Ethics, §107. Hoffman calls attention to this passage. See Tobias Hoffman, ‘Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Duns Scotus’, The Thomist 67.1 (2003), p. 76 and p. 94 n. 5.
35.
Luscombe, Abelard’s Ethics, pp. 44–45. ‘Opera quippe … omnia in se indifferentia sunt nec nisi pro intentione agentis bona vel mala dicenda sunt …’ See also Abelard, Ethics, §90.
36.
Luscombe, Abelard’s Ethics, pp. 46–47. ‘cuiusque intentio bona in se vocatur, opus vero bonum non ex se appellatur sed quod ex bona procedit intentione.’ See also Abelard, Ethics, §91.
37.
‘if the intention was right, the whole mass of works coming from it, which like physical things can be seen, will be worthy of the light, that is, good …’ Luscombe, Abelard’s Ethics, p. 55. ‘si intentio recta fuerit, tota massa operum inde provenientium, quae more corporalium rerum videri possit, erit luce digna, hoc est, bona.’ See also Abelard, Ethics, §108; István Bejczy, ‘Deeds without Value: Exploring a Weak Spot in Abelard’s Ethics’, Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 70.1 (2003), pp. 1–21.
38.
‘it should be realized that the name “sin” is understood in various ways. Properly, as we observed above, sin is said to be that contempt of God or consent to evil … We sometimes also say that the very works of sin, or whatever we do not rightly do or will, are sins. For what does it means for someone to have committed a sin if not that he has completed the execution of a sin?’ Luscombe, Abelard’s Ethics, pp. 56–59. ‘sciendum est nomen peccati diversis modis accipi. Proprie tamen peccatum dicitur ipse Dei contemptus vel consensus in malum … Opera quoque ipsa peccati, vel quicquid non recte facimus aut volumus, non numquam peccata dicimus. Quid est enim aliquem fecisse peccatum, nisi peccati implesse effectum?’ See also Abelard, Ethics, §113 and §116. See discussion of this passage in Bonnie Kent, ‘Evil in Later Medieval Philosophy’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 (2007), pp. 177–205 (179).
39.
See, for example, Kent, ‘Evil in Later Medieval Philosophy’, p. 179. See also the discussion above regarding Abelardian readings of Aquinas.
40.
See Bernard of Clairvaux, On Baptism and Other Questions, in On Baptism and the Office of Bishops, trans. Pauline Matarasso (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian, 2004), pp. 170–72. For the Latin, see Bernardus Claraevallensis, Ad Hugonem de Sancto Victore epistola seu tractatus de baptismo, Cap. IV, §16–§17, in J. P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Paris, 1844–64), vol. 182, pp. 1041c–1042c.
41.
See Luscombe, Abelard’s Ethics, pp. 54–55. See also Abelard, Ethics, §107.
42.
For dating this local council, see Constant J. Mews, ‘The Council of Sens (1141): Abelard, Bernard, and the Fear of Social Upheaval’, Speculum 77.2 (2002), pp. 342–82. For the condemned doctrine regarding sins of ignorance, see Council of Sens, ‘The Errors of Peter Abelard’, Error 10, in Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, §377, trans. Roy J. Deferrari from Enchiridion symbolorum, 30th ed. (Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2004), p. 150. Luscombe treats this proposition as the ninth capitulum condemned at Sens. See D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard’s Thought in the Early Scholastic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 130–31. See also discussion of the twelfth capitulum on the moral indifference of acts, at p. 139. The error regarding sins of ignorance is listed as the eleventh capitulum in the Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi. See Life and Works of Saint Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, Vol. II, trans. Samuel J. Eales (London: 1889–1896), p. 563. Also see Matthew R. McWhorter, ‘Aquinas and the Sins of Ignorance’, Nova et Vetera (English edition) 14.1 (2016), pp. 276–77.
43.
For dating Lombard’s Libri sententiarum, see Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, Vol. 1 (New York: E. J. Brill, 1994), p. 25. Rosemann gives the date range of 1154–1158. See Philipp Rosemann, Peter Lombard (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 55. For a general overview of the Libri sententiarum, see Philipp Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s Sentences (Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto, 2007).
44.
For the Latin, see Magistri Petri Lombardi, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, Tom. I, Pars II, Liber I et II, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV (Grottaferrata, Italy: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), p. 557. For an English translation, see Peter Lombard, The Sentences: Book 2, On Creation, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto, Ont.: Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, 2008), p. 199.
45.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 35, c. 2, §1 (Silano, p. 175). ‘Alii enim dixerunt voluntatem malam tantum peccatum esse, et non actus exteriores; alii voluntatem et actus; alii neutrum, dicentes omnes actus esse bonos et a Deo et ex Deo auctore esse, malum autem nihil esse …’
46.
See Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 35, c. 2, §1, fn, pp. 530–31.
47.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 35, c. 2, §4 (Silano, p. 176). ‘Quidam … non indocte tradunt voluntatem malam et actus malos, in quantum sunt vel in quantum actus sunt, bona esse; in quantum vero mala sunt, peccata esse. Qui voluntatem et actum quemcumque bonam Dei naturam esse dicunt in quantum actus est vel voluntas, et ex Deo auctore esse; in quantum vero inordinate et contra legem fit et fine debito caret, peccatum est …’
48.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 36, c. 6, §5 (Silano, p. 186). ‘Satis diligenter eorum posuimus sententiam, qui dicunt omnes actus naturas bonas esse, et in quantum sunt bonos esse … Atque auctoritatum testimoniis et rationibus eorundem traditionem munivimus, qui dicunt omnes actus essentia sui, id est in quantum sunt, esse bonos; quosdam vero, in quantum inordinate fiunt, peccata esse.’
49.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 36, c. 6, §5 (Silano, p. 186). ‘Addunt quoque quosdam non tantum essentia, sed etiam genere bonos esse, ut reficere esurientem, qui actus est de genere operum misericordiae. Quosdam vero actus absolute ac perfecte bonos dicunt, quos non solum essentia vel genus, sed etiam causa et finis commendat, ut sunt illi qui ex bona voluntate proveniunt et bonum finem metiuntur.’
50.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §4 (Silano, p. 199). The section header is ‘Utrum omnia opera hominis ex affectu et fine sint bona et mala’.
51.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §5 (Silano, p. 199). The section header is: ‘Opinio quorundam qui dicunt omnes indifferentes’. Pinckaers describes this option as that of the Abelardian school. See Pinckaers, ‘Historical Perspective’, p. 198.
52.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §6 (Silano, p. 199). The section header is: ‘Aliorum opinio qui trifarium faciunt actuum differentiam’.
53.
Pinckaers, ‘Historical Perspective’, p. 198.
54.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §7 (Silano, p. 200). The summary and quotations of Augustine below derive from Lombard, Sentences, II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §7 (Silano, p. 200). For an alternate English translation, see Augustine, Against Lying, trans. Harold B. Jaffee, in Saint Augustine, Treatises on Various Subjects, ed. Roy J. Deferrari (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2002), pp. 111–79. The Latin of Augustine quoted below is derived from Lombardi, Sententiae (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV), cited above. For an alternate edition of the Latin of Augustine’s text, see Augustini, Ad Consentium contra mendacium, Ch. 7, §18, in Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vol. 41, ed. Joseph Zycha (Vienna and Prague: F. Tempsky, 1900), pp. 489–91. For a general discussion of Augustine’s Contra mendacium in relation to the topic of intrinsic moral evil, see Pinckaers, ‘Historical Perspective’, p. 193.
55.
For further discussion on this point, see Hoffman, ‘Moral Action as Human Action’, pp. 78–79; Pinckaers, ‘Historical Perspective’, p. 199.
56.
Regarding the date and purpose of the letter, see Jaffee’s introduction to his translation, in Augustine, Against Lying, pp. 115–16.
57.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §7 (Silano, p. 200). ‘Sed Augustinus evidentissime docet in libro Contra mendacium omnes actus secundum intentionem et causam iudicandos bonos vel malos, praeter quosdam qui ita sunt mali ut nunquam possint esse boni, etiam si bonam videantur habere causam.’
58.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §7–§9 (Silano, pp. 200–201).
59.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §7 (Silano, p. 200). ‘Interest, inquit, plurimum qua causa, quo fine, qua intentione quid fiat. Sed ea quae constat esse peccata, nullo bonae causae obtentu, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda sunt. Ea quippe opera hominum, si causas habuerint bonas vel malas, nunc sunt bona, nunc mala, quae non sunt per se ipsa peccata.’
60.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §7 (Silano, p. 200). ‘Cum vero opera ipsa peccata sunt, ut furta, stupra, blasphemiae, quis dicat causis bonis esse facienda, vel peccata non esse, vel quod est absurdius, iusta peccata esse?’
61.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §8 (Silano, pp. 200–201). ‘But justice deservedly punishes him who says that he took superfluous things from a rich person to give them to a poor one; and the forger who falsified someone’s will so that he who would give large alms should be the heir, and not he who would give none; and also the one who declares that he committed adultery to free a man from death through the woman with whom he committed it.’
62.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §10 (Silano, p. 201). ‘Intende, lector, propositis verbis tota mentis consideratione, quae non inutilem habent exercitationem; et dignosces quis actus sit peccatum: qui scilicet malam habet causam; nec ille tantum, quia sunt nonnulli actus, qui etsi bonam habeant causam, tamen peccata sunt, ut supra positum est.’
63.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §11 (Silano, p. 201). ‘Ex quo consequi videtur quod semper ex fine iudicatur voluntas sive actio mala, sicut in illis quae per se peccata sunt. Illa enim cum quis gesserit pro aliqua bona causa, bonum videntur habere finem; nec ex fine voluntas est mala, nec ex voluntate actio fit mala, sed ex actione voluntas fit prava.’ See also discussion of this passage in Kevin L. Flannery, ‘The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas’, The Thomist 67 (2003), pp. 95–118 (p. 101).
64.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §2 (Silano, p. 198). According to Silano at p. 198 n. 2, the quote from Ambrose derives from Ambrose, De officiis, Book I, Ch. 30, §147.
65.
Lombardi, Sententiae, Liber II, d. 40, Ch. 1, §12 (Silano, pp. 201–202). ‘Ideoque, cum ex affectu dicitur imponi nomen operi, in bonis operibus generaliter vera est haec regula; sed in malis illa excipiuntur quae per se mala sunt. Omnia igitur hominis opera secundum intentionem et causam iudicantur bona vel mala, exceptis his quae per se mala sunt, id est quae sine praevaricatione fieri nequeunt.’
66.
For a general study of the reception of Lombard’s Libri sententiarum, see G. R. Evans (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Philipp Rosemann (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Vols. 2 and 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2009 and 2014). See also Hoffman, ‘Moral Action as Human Action’, p. 77.