Abstract
Israelites lived intimately with their livestock, as members of a single household, and this had an effect on their understanding of human identity—as Leviticus expresses it, of God’s call to Israel to be holy. Leviticus treats eating and ritual sacrifice as practices of embodied holiness, elements of an enacted symbol system designed to enable Israelites to live with integrity before God and in relation to nonhuman animals. The understanding expressed through that system is genuinely agrarian: humans find their wellbeing and their identity in relation to the wellbeing of the land and its nonhuman inhabitants. Through the Eucharist, Christians identify with Christ the Lamb. Understood in light of Leviticus, that identification challenges us to see the connection between sacramental eating and our relation to other animals.
A Peculiar Intimacy
The title for our conference 1 presents modern Christians with an immense challenge that is both theological and cultural, namely situating ourselves as animals among nonhuman animals—or in more theological terms, as creatures among all other animate creatures. Situating ourselves among the other animals is an effort that we moderns rarely (if ever) make. We do have dearly beloved pets, but we normally situate them among ourselves, not vice versa. Our house pets—at least the mammals among them—get their identity from us. We might well think of the dog as an adopted member of our family, as something like a human, but that proposition is not reversible; we are not a member of its family. In the urbanized and industrialized world, living with an animal, even learning in limited ways from its mode of being in the world, does not make the normal adult human think of herself as an animal. As John Berger observes, in the culture of capitalism, humans ‘belong to a species which has at last been isolated’.” 2
In the present century this might seem the unalterable way of things, but the people who wrote the Bible over something like a millennium would have seen it somewhat differently. The line between animal existence and human existence was not as bright as it is for us, for the simple reason that humans lived in immediate proximity to the animals on which they depended for their livelihood, for survival. Humans and livestock dwelt often in the same small building. In the typical Israelite household, the youngest animals, or the most precious ones, spent winter nights (at least) inside, in the lower courtyard of the house, their body heat and odor enveloping the people sleeping just above. 3 There is little indication that Israelites customarily kept household pets in the sense that we do, although the prophet Nathan’s parable to King David of the man with the beloved ewe lamb (2 Sam. 12:1-4) indicates that such a practice might occasionally be seen as poignant rather than simply odd.
It is telling that the very first reference to humans interacting with other animals suggests a pronounced affinity, even kinship, between them. In the second chapter of the Bible, ‘YHWH God shaped the human, dust from the fertile soil …, and the human became, נפש חיה “a living being”’ (Gen. 2:7). Just twelve verses later YHWH God shaped from the same fertile soil all manner of creatures of field and sky, and they too are designated נפש חיה, ‘living being[s]’. The implication of kinship is reinforced by God’s act, curious in both senses, of bringing each new creature to the human, ‘to see what he would call it, and every one that the human called-by-name, a living being, that was its name’ (2:19). Naming creatures, which in the first chapter of the Bible was one of God’s signature actions, is now delegated to the human being. As is well known, naming is throughout the Bible a primary way of laying claim to relationship with someone, especially a newborn, or sometimes pointing to a new phase of life and therefore of relationship. Naming is an act of both recognition and intimacy. Part of the point in this particular naming scene, of course, is that no nonhuman companion can be a full partner for the human, and so God provides עזר כנגדו, ‘a help’ or even (in the translation of Richard Elliott Friedman 4 ) ‘a strength corresponding to him’ (2:18; emphasis mine). Nonetheless, the fact that a deeper kind of intimacy is desirable does not undercut the reality of genuine relationship between humans and other living beings that God has formed from the soil.
In the towns and villages of Israel, ‘a close, noisy, often smelly intimacy’ 5 between humans and livestock persisted for many centuries, common to all but the wealthiest. As a result, argues Roland Boer, the Israelite understanding of what constituted the kinship group, the household or clan, was informed by a certain ‘creative malleability’; domestic animals of various kinds were included. 6 We find numerous traces of such a flexible understanding in the Bible. For instance, some ambiguity about who are the essential members of the household underlies the notorious scene where Jephthah, going off to battle against the Ammonites, vows to make a burnt offering of ‘the one that shall come out from the doors of my house to greet me when I return safely’ (Jud. 11:30). We must assume that animals outnumbered people chez Jephthah—Boer posits between four and twenty animals housed in a single dwelling 7 —and therefore the returning warrior expected one of them to be the first to tumble out of the doorway.
Another unhappy confusion between humans and animals can be glimpsed through the major legal codes in the Bible, each of which condemns in explicit terms a practice that must have been common enough, namely of both men and women having sexual intercourse with domestic beasts (Exod. 22:18 [Eng. 19]; Lev. 18:23, 20:15-16; Deut. 27:21). In Leviticus and Deuteronomy, the prohibition on bestiality sits adjacent to others banning intercourse among family members in various relations, as well as sex with the married neighbor-lady (Lev. 18:20). Notably, bestiality receives slightly more emphasis than intercourse between two males (18:22; 20:13). In short, in the Israelite village, the circle of intimates and therefore of potential sexual partners was not limited to human beings.
These aspects of the Iron Age domestic scene may seem so far from the modern urban imagination as to be irrelevant to our reading of the Bible. Yet we might consider that living spaces for humans and other animals had not changed drastically when, several centuries later, Jesus was birthed among the animal pens and laid in a manger—‘Christ and other animals’, to paraphrase Luke’s Gospel (2:11-12) and our conference title. Doubtless many more ordinary Jewish babies were kept safe and warm in feeding-trough incubators for some hours or days, until better accommodation could be arranged. Probably Jesus and all those others had a fuller appreciation of animal life, their own included, than do most of us.
Embodied Holiness: Leviticus
In order to explore in greater depth how the biblical writers and the people they addressed thought about human identity in relation to other domestic animals, I shall focus the rest of this article on Leviticus, the book that gives most concentrated attention to various aspects of animal relations, especially through detailed priestly instruction about eating and sacrifice. Eating and sacrifice are equally construed as religious acts; both are elements of a highly complex and theologically rich symbol system whereby Israelites may take their proper place within the created order. Through sacrifice and eating, Israelites locate themselves in a particular land and among its indigenous species, thus giving specificity and dimensionality to their embodied existence before YHWH.
Before beginning that exploration, I note here its purpose and limits. My aim is to show how eating and sacrifice may bear on an understanding of human identity within the textual world that Leviticus delineates, a theologically constructed world of enacted symbols. While I give some slight attention to the nature of these animal practices in the social world of ancient Israel, my goal is not historical reconstruction, even of the (small?) ‘Leviticus community’, whatever that might have been. Further, literary reconstruction, tracing the complex compositional history of the book over generations and possibly centuries of development, plays no part in my argument here, which focuses on the final form of the text. Rather, the goal is scriptural interpretation by and for contemporary Christians. I am interested in considering in the company of ethicists how this book, which is at least nominally authoritative for the church—although ignored or despised (even on principle) by most of its members—might yet inform the Christian imagination. Although I make no attempt here at applied exegesis, I expect that this major biblical witness can help us reflect on our vocation to holiness in relation to other animals in ways that are ethically consequential for Christians, as reading Leviticus has long been for Jews.
It should be acknowledged that the Christian practice of ignoring Leviticus, which has been more or less consistent since the third century—that is, after Origen 8 —is itself ethically consequential, in a negative sense. In my own (Protestant) theological education, the book was routinely passed over without apology. ‘There is nothing there but laws’, observed one of my professors, at a commendable university divinity school. I recall reading the comment of a respectable non-Jewish scholar at another illustrious university, to the effect that it is ‘abnormal’ not to take a personal dislike to the ‘author’ of Leviticus. 9 That comment is ignorant, of course; he might have reflected that Jesus unapologetically and in good rabbinic fashion draws his summary of the Law (Mark 12:28-31) from Deuteronomy (6:5) and Leviticus (19:18). But worse, the comment is ominous, granting readers implicit permission to hold in some contempt those who revere Leviticus, namely observant Jews. Traditionally this is the place where Jewish children have begun the study of Torah—logically enough, for it makes sense that six-year-olds should begin with what they eat. Surely Leviticus chapter 11, the lengthy priestly instruction on eating animals, is among Jews the most widely influential legal discourse in Torah, and that in itself reflects a practice of careful scriptural interpretation. It is notable and probably no coincidence that this chapter constitutes the literal center of the five books of Moses. If you are counting Hebrew letters (as Jewish tradition does), the half-way point falls precisely in chapter 11, verse 42—nearly at the end of the torah-with-a-little-t, the ‘instruction on animals and fowl and every living being that creeps in the water and all life that swarms on the earth’ (11:46).
It might be objected that for Christians to take much interest in the dietary regulations would be distracting and even perverse, since the very first generation of Jewish Christians abolished them, thus opening the way for the mission to gentiles (Acts 11:1-18). Yet, even if Christians should not try to reclaim these regulations in direct practice, we can and should ask what we might learn from them and from Leviticus altogether. For this is the biblical book with the greatest potential to shape our theological thinking about our bodies and what we put into them, about how we treat our land and the animals we eat, and also what their wellbeing means for the wellbeing of human communities. Concerns such as these belong to the mindset and lifestyle called agrarianism. As I have argued elsewhere, 10 Leviticus articulates a genuinely agrarian perspective; it looks at the wellbeing of humans and other animals in relation both to each other and to the land they inhabit. Further, its agrarian perspective is derived from a robust theology of creation; Leviticus recognizes that all animal life, human and nonhuman, is creaturely, God-given and wholly dependent on God’s favor.
The principle underlying all the priestly instruction in Leviticus is that YHWH is the Lord of Life, who gives Israel the statutes so ‘the human can do them and live by them’ (Lev. 18:5). That principle is given forceful and prominent expression in the prohibition on consuming blood (Lev. 17:10-14):
Anyone from the house of Israel or any of the sojourners among you who eats blood in any form—I shall set my face against the life [literally: ‘throat’] that consumes blood and cut it off from the company of its people. For the life of flesh is in the blood, and I have set it for you upon the altar, to effect ransom for your lives… (vv. 10-11a)
Despite the early Christians’ decision to relax the dietary regulations, this blood prohibition was retained. It is one of only three restrictions that the Jewish church in Jerusalem promulgated to the new Gentile believers, along with the related ban on eating the meat of strangled animals, and the more obviously ‘religious’ prohibition on food sacrificed to idols (Acts 15:29). On all three grounds, Leviticus and the early church both would likely judge most of our meat counters and butcher shops to be abominable, specifically because they violate the blood prohibition and more broadly because in our buying and eating, most of us practice idolatry, treating animal life as a commodity created by the God-almighty industry, and not as a gift and privilege granted by the Creator of heaven and earth.
Christian ethicists might be forgiven if they are not immediately drawn to Leviticus as a crucial source for their work, since in fact it offers few explicitly moral prescriptions or exhortations. In contrast to Deuteronomy, for instance, this book does little preaching. With respect to our subject, one might feel the lack of any statements about animal rights, rest or relief for our fellow creatures. While Deuteronomy exhorts Israel to pursue justice (Deut. 16:20), the central preoccupation of Leviticus is creaturely integrity—in its terminology, holiness. Everything that Leviticus has to say about animal slaughter, animal sacrifice and meat consumption is related to its insistence that Israel first observe God’s holiness and then seek to embody holiness in the ordinary course of human living. ‘For I am YHWH your God, and you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, for I am holy’ (11:44; see v. 45). That Israel itself could achieve holiness is a wildly daring notion, as the priestly authors know, for they recognize a basic tension built into the structure of the world and Israel’s place in it. On the one hand, God’s holiness at its fullest intensity—as it is experienced at the sanctuary and especially in the Holy of Holies (see Lev. 16)—is almost too much for human beings to bear. On the other hand, ordinary human sinfulness, including Israel’s sinfulness, gradually accumulates until it is too much for God to bear. Sins, whether deliberate or inadvertent, are inevitable, yet they are fundamentally incompatible with God’s nature—which Leviticus names, without explanation, as holy. This is the problematic of holiness, as Leviticus presents it: How can humans, and Israel in particular, live in such a way as to overcome that basic incompatibility between God and ourselves? How can Israel host the Deity who aspires to ‘walk around among them’ (Lev. 26:12), as YHWH puts it, in language that is strikingly anthropomorphic, even incarnational? In answer, Leviticus sets forth the essentials of holy living primarily in terms of the sacrificial cult (chs 1–7) and the purity regulations (chs 11–17). It is noteworthy for our topic that pride of place among the purity regulations is given to the detailed
One of the reasons that few Western Christians are drawn to Leviticus is that it does not seem to make a lot of sense, as we normally make sense. Leviticus shows what enacted holiness might look like but never really explains how it works. How do the particular practices enjoined here conduce to holiness? When reading other books of Torah, we can readily appreciate the practical value of lifting a fallen donkey or ox (Deut. 22:4; cf. Exod. 23:5), not muzzling the ox that treads out the grain (Deut. 25:4), or granting Sabbath rest to all household members, including livestock (Exod. 20:10; Deut. 5:14). It is much harder to see the practical value in Leviticus’ insistence on restricting meat consumption to the three domesticated quadrupeds—cattle, sheep and goats—that have both a split hoof and chew cud (Lev. 11:3), thus eliminating some locally available food sources (such as pigs). Again, there is no obvious rationale for discarding high-protein animal blood (17:13) or farming in monoculture rather than the more productive methods of polyculture (19:19). In the environment of ancient Israel, where an abundant food supply could never be taken for granted, one can imagine that it would have taken some persuasion to win people to such forms of self-limitation. While there is likely a symbolic logic or even ethical significance to them, as insightful scholars such as Jacob Milgrom or the wonderfully inquisitive anthropologist Mary Douglas have argued, 11 the important point to make here is that Leviticus does not employ the kind of hortatory speeches and logical explanations that make Deuteronomy so much more appealing to Christians. Instead of explanation the priestly writers offer a kind of showing, in the form of detailed rituals that constitute the enacted symbol system of holiness living.
The most concise and comprehensive statement of embodied holiness is chapter 19 of Leviticus. The carefully crafted chapter is formulated as God’s call to ‘the whole congregation of Israelites’, without exception, to ‘be holy, for holy am I, YHWH your God’ (19:2). The chapter is a summary of the basic teachings of Torah, with many parallels to the Ten Commandments, as the early rabbinic commentators noted. 12 Accordingly, Jesus’ own summary of Torah draws on it as a source: ‘Do not take vengeance and do not bear a grudge against your kinfolk, but be-loving to your covenant-fellow as one like yourself. I am YHWH. My statutes you shall keep’ (19:18-19a). 13 Hearing that, Christians might for a moment feel at home in Leviticus. Yet, reading on to the end of that same verse, we are confounded by a complete breakdown in the distinction, often vaunted by Christians, between the so-called moral law and ceremonial law in Leviticus. Hear, O Israel: ‘Your farm-animals, you shall not breed in two-kinds; your fields, you shall not sow in two-kinds…’—no cross-breeding of animals or plants; mules are out. And further, ‘clothing in two-kinds, sha‘atnez-fabric—shall not be put on you’. Forget that nice wool and linen blend.
This would seem to be a drastic decline from the sublime to the truly ridiculous, but the text does not blink. There is no indication that acting in love toward your human neighbor is more important than or even separable from how you manage your fields or your flocks. Both are practices of holiness, as Leviticus symbolizes it, practices of human integrity that aim to mirror something of the oneness of God. Jacob Milgrom may well be right to suggest that Leviticus forbids cross-breeding, inter-planting and blended fabric because mixtures were conceived as belonging to the sphere of the divine (e.g., the cherubim were mixed creatures, and the hangings of the tabernacle are a blend of linen and wool). 14 Yet, as anyone who lives within any religious symbol system knows, explanations are far less important than repeated experience, and especially bodily actions, in shaping the religious imagination.
Symbols, both physical and verbal, are indispensable for dealing with anything too profound to comprehend in purely rationalistic terms, such as taking bread and wine as the body and blood of Christ, or removing a foreskin as a sign of the covenant between God and Israel. Human imitation of God’s own holiness is a mystery of comparable depth. The various prescriptions and prohibitions are not rationalized, yet their selection and juxtaposition suggest interactions among the creatures and correspondences between different facets of our material existence. Holy living is not fully subject to explanation, yet neither is it abstract. It is an all-encompassing commitment. As they perform or even envision these actions, Israelites may begin to see the fuller dimensions of their material existence, lived out day by day, season by season, in the presence of YHWH and also in relation to the other creatures belonging to God (cf. Lev. 25:23, 42), their human neighbors as well as the land and animals on which their lives depend.
Holy Eating: Three Principles
As Leviticus shows, the enactment of holiness begins at the sacrificial altar. The first seven chapters outline all the different sacrifices one might offer, for different kinds of occasions and according to differing economic means. Not everyone can afford a cow, but two pigeons will suffice, and if you cannot afford that, then offer some finely ground flour (2:1-10). Leviticus foregrounds sacrifice (chs 1–7), and a few chapters later it makes the longest statements in Torah about which animals are ‘pure’ for human consumption (ch. 11). Sacrifice and eating are connected, because Israelites sacrificed the same animals they ate—and most sacrifices were not consumed by flames but rather eaten, by the priests and the families who offered them. In the final section of this article I offer three related postulates that may express some of what Leviticus understands about how human identity is expressed through these twin animal acts of sacrifice and eating. Together they constitute a syllogism:
A. You are what you eat.
B. What you eat is what you sacrifice.
C. Therefore, you are what you sacrifice.
A. You are What You Eat
Probably neither Ludwig Feuerbach, who may have coined the phrase ‘You are what you eat’ in the nineteenth century, nor Gillian McKeith, who has reclaimed it in the twenty-first, would have much appreciation for Leviticus—McKeith’s Food Bible 15 notwithstanding. Yet the saying captures something basic to the original ‘food Bible’, namely that our identity in the eyes of God, our real identity, is constituted in some essential if inexplicable way by our eating practices. Israel’s essential, albeit aspirational, identity is holiness. It is noteworthy that three of the four times the charge to be holy occurs in Leviticus, the immediate reference is to observing the injunction to consume only ‘clean’ animals (11:44; 11:45; 20:26). 16 One might infer that holiness entails eating within divinely set limits—precisely the failure that led the first humans to be expelled from Eden and thus from the immediate presence of God. Jewish artist and interpreter Ilene Winn-Lederer draws attention to this insight: ‘Oddly enough, scholars and rabbis reasoned, the first couple were not punished merely for eating forbidden fruit, but for the way in which they ate it; without the intention of holiness, without gratitude for its Source’. 17 Holiness is fundamentally grounded in gratitude, awareness that our material existence is wholly contingent. There need not be food for us to eat; when there is, it should be received as gift.
Reflecting further on the same story in light of Leviticus, we could add that holiness is grounded in humility, a healthy awareness of limits. There is only one prohibition in Eden—tellingly, for the reader of Leviticus, a dietary restriction—and the first humans willfully ignore it. If we are what we eat, and if YHWH’s commandments are given for the sake of life (Lev. 18:5), then eating outside the limits they set constitutes a kind of death. This is precisely what is implied when that limit is first imposed: ‘From the tree of knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for on the day that you eat from it, you will assuredly die’ (Gen. 2:17). Norman Wirzba comments on how Dietrich Bonhoeffer read the Eden story as an idolatrous denial of limits:
Bonhoeffer is clear that the death spoken about by God is not cessation of biological existence. Instead it is a dishonest and damaging way of existing. It is dishonest because it denies that we daily depend on others and upon God for life. It is damaging because it transforms a world of grace into an arena of competitive grasping and self-glorifying manipulation, … a place for the exercise of multiple idolatries … Deathly ‘life’, the existence that disrespects and violates limits, is marked by the obligation to live from out of oneself, and is witnessed in the exploitation of others …
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In 1932, writing in Berlin, Bonhoeffer named the most deadly characteristic of modernity: the refusal to see the limits that apply to our material existence as anything other than a temporary obstacle, meant to be overcome by those deemed bold and therefore heroic. To be thoroughly modern in that sense is, as Wirzba observes: ‘to install oneself as a god’. 19
B. What You Eat is What You Sacrifice
Eating is our primary point of contact and interpenetration with the whole created order. The repeated insistence on avoiding ingestion of blood (Lev. 3:17, 7:26-27, 17:10-14, 19:26; also Deut. 12:16, 23-24) underscores the reality that eating animal flesh also necessarily brings us into interaction with the Creator, the Author of all life. Further, most scholars maintain that Leviticus forbids Israelites from slaughtering any edible animal without offering sacrifice: 20 ‘If there is anyone from the house of Israel who slaughters an ox or sheep or goat … and does not bring it to the opening of the Tent of Meeting to make an offering to YHWH before the Tabernacle of YHWH, blood shall be reckoned to that man. He has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people’ (Lev. 17:3-4). That is a murder charge; as the medieval commentator Rashi observed, it is ‘equivalent to the one who by spilling the blood of a human being forfeits his life’ 21 (cf. Gen. 9:4-6). Proper animal slaughter and sacrifice thus becomes a matter of utmost seriousness, seriousness that is life-giving rather than ‘deadly’. Eating meat cannot be viewed simply as a casual private choice—‘So what’s for dinner?’ From the perspective of Leviticus, there is no direct linkage connecting hunger for meat, killing and eating; sacrifice is the necessary sacred interruption in that chain.
This perspective makes sense when we consider the conditions for meat consumption in Iron Age Israel. Animals were rarely bred for distance transport and sale; almost always the slaughtered animal had been raised in or near the home of the people who ate it. 22 As we have seen, Israelites knew not just what they were eating, but even whom: their neighbors and housemates. The sacrificial ritual took place at the nearby sanctuary, and the meal was shared among family and friends. The total picture that emerges is of meat consumption as a deliberate, localized and ritualized action; it is a community activity, one that is personal yet not private. This is exactly the opposite of our experience in industrialized society, where for most of us eating meat is a private matter, yet wholly impersonal.
C. Therefore, You are What You Sacrifice
As Leviticus describes it, the performance of the sacrifice is itself a personally involving event; a lay person who offers an animal is a full partner with the priest who officiates at the altar. Jacob Milgrom asserts that every action preliminary to the altar ritual itself—slaughtering, flaying, quartering and washing the carcass—is done by the lay person. 23 The priest dashes the blood on the altar, prepares the fire and the wood, and arranges the pieces to be turned into smoke. The moment that is most telling of personal involvement is when the one who makes the offering lays one hand on the head of the animal: ‘He shall lay his hand on the head of the offering, so it may be acceptable [or, ‘credited’] on his behalf, to serve as expiation for him’ (Lev. 1:4; cf. 3:2, 8, 12, etc.). Milgrom calls it a gesture of ‘ownership, signifying that the animal belongs to the offerer’. 24 However, our ordinary notion of ownership is inadequate; the sacrificial animal represents the human ‘before YHWH’ (1:3) and its blood serves as ransom for the human life (17:11). There is at work here some degree of identification; divine acceptance of the animal offering connotes acceptance of the human offerer, as the prophet Malachi attests (Mal. 1:8). A similar identification of human with animal may have been operative in our own time among traditional Nuer and Dinka cattle-herders of South Sudan. Until the destruction of their traditional culture in the wars of the late twentieth century, it was not uncommon for someone to self-identify with a treasured cow or bull—a potential sacrificial offering—by assuming the animal’s name or description as a personal name. The relation between human and domestic animals was one of mutual belonging rather than conventional ownership.
In her ‘visual commentary’ on Torah, Jewish artist Ilene Winn-Lederer suggests some such identification with the sacrificial animal. Her image ‘Of Men and Beasts’ illustrates the reparation offering, whose purpose is to atone for an act of deceit (Lev. 5:26). The humans hold up masks representing the sacrificial beasts and also, as Winn-Lederer says, ‘that part of us shared with all living creatures, the part that drives our physical needs and material desires’. 25 Thus the animals are the ‘face’ with which the humans approach the altar; you are what you sacrifice. The artist portrays each offerer barefoot, signaling humility, with hand held over the heart. This is the traditional posture for the confession of sin (the al chet prayer) recited on Yom Kippur in the modern synagogue—a prayer that includes an appeal to God for forgiveness ‘for the sin which we have committed before You by eating and drinking’.
In her illumination, Winn-Lederer conceives sacrifice as human identification with nonhuman animals, and thus as an embrace of sincere humility. Literal sacrifice has not been part of Jewish observance for two millennia. Therefore her visual representation of identification between the one offering and the one sacrificed is akin to the most striking verbal expression of sacrificial identification known to me, the Eucharistic prayer written by Thomas Cranmer in the sixteenth century:
We offer and present unto thee, O Lord, our selves, our souls and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy, and living sacrifice unto thee; humbly beseeching thee that we, and all others who shall be partakers of this Holy Communion, may worthily receive the most precious Body and Blood of thy Son Jesus Christ, be filled with thy grace and heavenly benediction, and made one body with him, that he may dwell in us, and we in him (Thomas Cranmer, 1549 Book of Common Prayer).
In identification with Christ the Lamb of God, Christians offer themselves, body and soul. With Christ, and like the people Winn-Lederer portrays, we take our place among the animals as we approach the altar.
Most of us would not consider that such identification with Christ the Lamb has any bearing on how we think about eating meat. Yet we say that we are formed as people of faith by what we eat at the altar, by the body of Christ sacrificed on our behalf. And our Scriptures challenge us to draw that connection with eating meat. If Leviticus is right that eating meat and ritual sacrifice are intertwined, then there is no such thing as meat consumption disconnected from the practice of holiness. Some observant Jews, schooled in the thought world of Leviticus, now speak about eco-kashrut as an extension of ordinary practices of kosher eating. The concern is not just what foods can be eaten and in what combinations, but also how food is produced; not just how animals are slaughtered, but also how they are treated throughout their lives. It is meet and right that Christians also engage in that kind of analogical thinking. I find an instructive example of it in Wendell Berry’s 1979 essay, ‘The Gift of Good Land’, in which he draws upon Scripture, including Leviticus, to contrast two perspectives: on the one hand, ‘industrial heroism’, and on the other, a comprehensive understanding of charity, based on the insight that ‘between any two humans, or any two creatures, all Creation exists as a bond’.
26
I shall use the final words of Berry’s essay to end my own:
we depend upon other creatures and survive by their deaths. To live, we must daily break the body and shed the blood of Creation. When we do this knowingly, lovingly, skillfully, reverently, it is a sacrament. When we do it ignorantly, greedily, clumsily, destructively, it is a desecration. In such desecration we condemn ourselves to spiritual and moral loneliness, and others to want.
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Footnotes
1.
‘Christians and Other Animals’ was the theme of the annual conference of the Society for the Study of Christian Ethics, held 9-11 September 2016, in Cambridge, UK.
2.
John Berger, ‘Why Look at Animals’, in About Looking (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 28.
3.
See Philip J. King and Lawrence E. Stager, Life in Biblical Israel (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), p. 15. More generally, see Oded Borowski, Every Living Thing: Daily Use of Animals in Ancient Israel (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 1998).
4.
See Richard Elliott Friedman, Commentary on the Torah (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), p. 19.
5.
Roland Boer, The Sacred Economy of Ancient Israel (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2015), p. 94, quoting Brian Roberts.
6.
Boer, Sacred Economy, pp. 90–94.
7.
Boer, Sacred Economy, p. 94, n. 43, citing Lily Singer-Avitz.
8.
See Origen, Homilies on Leviticus 1–16, trans. Gary Wayne Barkley; The Fathers of the Church series (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1990).
9.
Delbert R. Hillers, Covenant: The History of a Biblical Idea (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), p. 87.
10.
Ellen F. Davis, Scripture, Culture, and Agriculture: An Agrarian Reading of the Bible (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
11.
See (among other works) Mary Douglas, Leviticus as Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus: A Book of Ritual and Ethics (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004) and his three-volume Anchor Bible commentary (1991–2000).
12.
See Baruch A. Levine, The JPS Torah Commentary: Leviticus (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), pp. 124–25.
13.
The unusual verbal phrase אהב ל-, marked by a preposition rather than a direct object marker, here and in Lev. 19:34, denotes not a loving feeling primarily but rather action, the concrete demonstration of profound regard (cf. 1 Kgs 5:15; 2 Chron. 19:2). See Milgrom, Leviticus, p. 218.
14.
Milgrom, Leviticus, pp. 236–38.
15.
Gillian McKeith, Food Bible: How to Use Food to Cure What Ails You (New York: Plume, 2009).
16.
The other occurrences of the imperative to be holy are at Lev. 19:2, where it functions as a general introduction to the summary of the priestly instruction, and at 20:7, where it is the hinge between proscriptions on false worship and abusive relations within the family or clan, including incest.
18.
Norman Wirzba, From Nature to Creation: A Christian Vision for Understanding and Loving Our World (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), p. 109. Emphasis original.
19.
Wirzba, From Nature to Creation, p. 113.
20.
Baruch Levine does not agree that Leviticus bans all non-sacral slaughter; he argues, following some ancient sources, that Leviticus 17 is concerned only to restrict sacrificial slaughter to one authorized shrine (JPS Torah Commentary, pp. 112–13).
21.
Quoted by Milgrom, Leviticus, p. 190.
22.
On the local, household-based food economy of the southern Levant in the Late Bronze and Iron Ages, see Boer, Sacred Economy, pp. 62–63.
23.
Milgrom, Leviticus, p. 2.
24.
Milgrom, Leviticus, p. 24; emphasis original.
25.
Ilene Winn-Lederer, Between Heaven and Earth: An Illuminated Torah Commentary (Petaluma, CA: Pomegranate, 2009), p. 155.
26.
Wendell Berry, The Gift of Good Land (San Francisco, CA: North Point Press, 1981), p. 273.
27.
Berry, Gift of Good Land, p. 281.
