Abstract
Compromise is usually associated with concerns about expedience and feelings of regret. It is seen as requiring the surrender of principle in order to avoid a worse outcome. This article proposes an alternative concept of compromise, one that complements without wholly replacing traditional notions of it. It focuses on the intrapersonal aspect of compromise, and envisions it as concerned with maintaining a sense of coherence in how one sees oneself as an ethical agent. This involves consideration of ethical identity, and of the nature of principles as guides for action. The alternative conception proposed hopefully leads to a more affirmative idea of compromise, one less burdened with a sense of remorse.
Introduction
What place does compromise have in ethical deliberation? Opinions are divided. Some consider it important if not indispensable; others dismiss it as unworthy and a sign of moral lassitude. It is both celebrated (Georg Simmel: ‘Compromise is one of the greatest discoveries of humanity’) and condemned (Bonhoeffer: ‘Compromise always springs from a hatred of the ultimate’). 1 Attitudes about compromise are, to a significant extent, contextual. 2 In politics, compromise is considered necessary but susceptible to being rotten—to being motivated by expedience. In business affairs, it may at times be a necessary evil, but more often it is an exercise in prudence. In personal interactions, compromise exemplifies reasonableness and flexibility.
Colloquial usage of ‘compromise’ reflects an underlying ambivalence about it. To be inclined to compromise suggests that one is pragmatic and realistic. To be uncompromising suggests that one adheres to principle, and is unwilling to make concessions or engage in circumvention and evasion. From this perspective, readiness to compromise is readiness to surrender. 3 Both views—affirmative or negative—share three assumptions. First, compromise is borne of conflict. At best, it is a means of managing conflict; at worst, it is a kind of capitulation to it. Second, compromise involves loss because one must give up something of value in order to gain something else, or to avoid some greater loss. Third, compromise entails regret. 4 Underlying these divergent appraisals of compromise is a sense that compromise inevitably involves a concession of something of significance for the sake of some desirable goal. 5 To compromise is to concede, abandon and surrender something valued. And this leads to regret.
This article proposes a different slant on compromise. 6 It expands the traditional notion of compromise based on conflict and concession. Rather than being fundamentally a means of conflict resolution, compromise can be seen as a deliberative process related to maintaining one's ethical integrity. Rather than a coerced response to situational necessity, it can be an affirmative means of preserving one's sense of who one is, ethically speaking. Though compromise is prompted by the pressure of circumstances, it is more than simply a response to them. Instead, it is a reflective activity in which ethical principles are reexamined, reconceived and reconfigured. Their scope may, for example, be broadened or limited in the course of dealing with a problem. Their content may be reconceived in some way. These moves allow the agent to maintain a sense of ethical coherence in challenging circumstances. 7 Such a revised understanding of compromise is connected with the idea of a sense of ethical identity. Identity presupposes a certain degree of continuity and intactness and the minimization of dissonance. 8 In this sense, compromise provides a means for responding to decisional dilemmas in a way that is not characterized (at least not primarily) by loss and regret but by reexamination and reaffirmation of principles important to the agent, even if some of them cannot be applied in a given case.
This notion suggests that the process of examination, revision and realignment of principles, rather than disavowal of one conflicting principle in favor of another, belongs to the essence of compromise. As a deliberative technique, compromise arbitrates among various values and commitments, prioritizing one or more of them in a specific situation without conceding or relinquishing others. This requires the agent to consider not only the demands of a specific situation, but also one's understanding of who one is and intends to be, what she considers to be ethically important, what is fitting, what is appropriate. In a word, it involves one's ethical identity. Ethical identity is the way we see ourselves, ethically speaking.
Why does it matter how we conceive of compromise, whether in terms of concession or coherence? It bears on what we expect of it as a deliberative technique. If compromise is seen as a means of conflict resolution involving disregard of one or more principles in favor of another, it comes to resemble an act of tragic necessity. One can't simultaneously observe two value commitments, so one of them must be disregarded. The result is a sense of discomfort and regret. Even if prudent in a given situation, compromise is not something one would otherwise choose to do. If a more affirmative view of compromise can be developed, it counterbalances this basically negative view. It may free compromise from nagging suspicions of expedience and the negative affect of regret. It would not avoid or eliminate ethical conflicts, but would provide a more constructive and affirmative manner of dealing with them.
Varieties of Compromise
Most definitions of compromise coalesce around the core concept of compromise as the relinquishment, pro tanto, of a right or claim in order to obtain a reciprocal relinquishment by another of a right or claim. 9 Typically, it arises in interpersonal situations of conflict. As Nicholas Rescher contends, compromise ‘means to accommodate an opponent in matters of disagreement or conflict by accepting a less preferred outcome in the interest of achieving a reciprocally acceptable accommodation’. 10 Framed in these terms, compromise is a transactional event between persons who ‘compromise with’ each other. 11
Some writers contrast this interpersonal notion with the category of intrapersonal compromise. 12 This is an interior, deliberative occurrence, specifically a decision by an agent to forego a principle or value, often antecedent to entering into an interpersonal compromise. In Chia Lepora's conception, an intrapersonal compromise is a compromise among principles, a ‘compromise of’ one principle in favor of others. 13 The elements in both kinds of compromise are essentially the same: a clash of principles, a decision in favor of one and disregard of the other. In both cases, a deontological element (a principle or value) is suspended or surrendered for the sake of a consequence.
The temporal frame of a compromise varies according to its kind. Interpersonal compromises are in most cases discrete transactions. Though they may continue to resonate with the participants, they present themselves as unique situations that result in a conclusion. Intrapersonal compromises resonate with an agent over time and have implications for future compromises. 14 Because of their intrapersonal character, such compromises may have a continuing, cumulative effect on the agent. They may negatively affect one's sense of ethical selfhood long after being made, particularly if they are difficult. As D.M. Yeager and Stewart Herman see it: ‘The act of compromising may produce such dissonance between conviction and behavior as to undermine the person's sense of agency and integrity’. 15
Most analyses deal with interpersonal compromises since they involve circumstances in which compromises typically arise: politics, law and commerce. But as Lepora suggests, before entering into compromises with others, individuals must first enter into compromises with themselves in order to deal with conflicts they experience between values and commitments they hold and situations in which they find themselves. The two are therefore connected: intrapersonal compromises relate to interpersonal compromises in that an agent will often have to make a preceding internal compromise in order to arrive at an interpersonal compromise. 16 One might argue that intrapersonal compromises express the essential character of compromise more directly than do interpersonal compromises, which often shade off into other kinds of transactional agreements. 17 Indeed, Lepora asserts that intrapersonal compromise is the ‘defining feature of compromise’. 18
What, then, is at stake in an intrapersonal compromise? Lepora speaks of ‘matters of principled concern’ which she defines as ‘the truths, rules or assumptions of interest to an individual, as a basis for moral conduct’. 19 This definition points out that compromise has to do not only with political disputes and material interests but matters of personal value and concern. I would add that it involves even more: compromises not only involve adjustment of a contingent amalgam of concerns, but bear on a more or less ordered assemblage of values and principles that align with and express one's sense of ethical selfhood. It involves ethical identity. In this sense, compromises, asserts Avishai Margalit, ‘tell us who we are’. 20 This aggregation of values, principles and concerns can be and is affected by the compromises one makes. And it can and does influence deliberation about compromises. It brings a future dimension to the deliberative process. It affects how we balance matters of principled concern, how we may revise them, whether they are honored in a given case, and how they remain significant for us even if they are not, on occasion, observed.
An adequate notion of compromise must take account of three elements: 1) the character of the compromise (internal or external), 2) the nature of the good at stake, and 3) the context of decision. If interpersonal, a compromise involves a model of bargaining and negotiation; if it is intrapersonal it inclines to a model of accommodation in which an agent must reconcile a set of circumstances with a principled sense of identity. Of course, other persons may figure in those circumstances, but one must first assess those circumstances internally.
Concentration on interpersonal compromise emphasizes a transactional model. This, in turn, leads to a notion of compromise as largely concerned with weighing and balancing greater or lesser goods. A key task is to draw the boundary between acceptable-legitimate and unacceptable-illegitimate compromises. In contrast, if the focus is intrapersonal, then other considerations arise, such as integrity and the agent's sense of self. It is then more a matter of accommodation and implementation than of resolving a conflict. For some, this is the essence of compromise. Hans Steubing contends that the problem of genuine compromise always involves the question: ‘How can general moral principles be implemented in practice and thus be realized?’ 21 In this light, the inquiry is primarily concerned with loyalty to principle, its interpretation and implementation. The process of thought is more interior, more concerned with the effect of the compromise on one's self-understanding and crucially with the indistinct boundary between tolerable concession and surrender.
The nature of the good at stake affects one's willingness to make adjustments in one’s pursuit of it. If it is a material good, it can be quantified financially. It is calculable and to some extent concerns fungible elements such as money. In contrast, a non-material good is neither quantifiable nor fungible. If, for example, one fails to keep a promise, this bears on one’s self-regard and sense of integrity, raising doubts about one's sincerity and commitment in practice to ideals embraced generally. It may lead to a sense of dissonance between one's ethical identity and action, to self-doubt and demoralization. The consequences are of a different character from those involved with the loss of a material object.
As noted, intrapersonal compromise precedes the process of interpersonal compromise, and considerably affects a participant's willingness to enter into a compromise. The argument below proposes that 1) in the intrapersonal context, a more expansive, richer notion of compromise is both necessary and possible, and 2) it can be based on a notion that intrapersonal compromise is meaningfully concerned with maintaining the coherence of one's ethical identity.
In ethical deliberation, the self must sort out a plurality of ethical commitments and values that cannot be simultaneously and equally honored in a given situation, yet remain important for the agent. This process is demanding since the agent must mediate among the conflicting principles relevant to the situation at hand. Unlike interpersonal compromises in which opposing interests are advanced by autonomous agents, an intrapersonal compromise involves interests held by a single agent. She must assess the circumstances, and identify, interpret and apply relevant principles. She must be wary of the same temptation of expedience that complicates interpersonal compromise: a desire to escape the dissonance of inconsistent obligations by opting for a convenient resolution rather than a principled one. 22
Before proceeding further, we might stop and ask: is this concept of compromise fundamentally different from other kinds of ethical decision-making? Many ethical decisions involve the challenge of reconciling competing interests. Compromise does so as well, but more acutely. It involves not only interests, but principles. The deliberative adjustments to principles that may be triggered by compromise affect values of significant concern to the agent, not peripheral considerations. Once made, those adjustments may lead to feelings of discomfort and regret. 23 Further, situations in which compromise is necessary compel action and do not allow evasion. 24 These characteristics endow compromise with a particular intensity.
We turn now to a deeper examination of a conventional understanding of compromise as concession, followed by consideration of a revised concept of compromise concerned with the maintenance of coherence.
Model I: The Concessional Model of Compromise
Compromise and Conflict
The concessional model aligns with conventional assumptions about compromise. It captures many of the experiences that surround compromise: conflict, compulsion, constraint and sacrifice. For many, these experiences define the phenomenon of compromise. It comports with its ambiguous reputation and with suspicions about its susceptibility to the temptation of expedience.
As already noted, conventional understandings of compromise describe it as a situation in which two or more principles cannot be simultaneously realized, and therefore one must be given up in whole or in part (the ‘concessional model’). 25 In essence, it posits two elements: the existence of a conflict, and the inevitability of some kind of sacrifice on the part of an agent for the sake of a better outcome than would foreseeably result in the absence of a compromise. The surrender of something valued is, in the eyes of some writers, a defining element. For example, Nigel Biggar states: ‘I take a compromise to be a decision that involves a loss of good—that is, an evil. It involves either conceding an opportunity to maintain or promote a good or becoming a part-cause of evil’. 26
The situations which prompt compromises are often adversarial: you are somehow prevented from acting in a certain way by another, who is, in turn, likewise prevented by you from acting in a desired way. Similar situations can also occur intrapersonally. A simple example is a conflict of commitments. You are asked to write a letter of recommendation for a student for a competitive position she applied for. While you believe her to be deserving and are willing to recommend her in good conscience, you also know that she also has some shortcomings that should, in all honesty, be mentioned. You believe that the reference letter must be honest. At the same time, you are aware that letters of recommendation are often filled with inflated appraisals and rarely if ever mention deficiencies. To refer to them in the letter would likely doom her chances for the position. You want to be honest, yet you want to assist a deserving student. You must, somehow, find a compromise between your obligation of honesty and your loyalty to the student.
A central concern of the concessional model is the distinction between good and bad (a.k.a. rotten) compromises. This often amounts to a boundary conflict between principle and expedience. 27 Various tests have been proposed for determining rottenness. One criterion is whether the compromise involves acceptance of a lesser good or value at the expense of a greater one, but this presupposes some kind of objective hierarchy of values. 28 Or a test may be based on the presence of a feeling of regret or bad conscience. But feelings are changeable and ephemeral, and even good compromises can leave a residue of moral regret. Alternatively, one may distinguish good and bad compromises in light of utilitarian considerations, but they seem to minimize the significance of the disregard of principle. Other criteria have also been proposed. 29
While the concession-based model certainly accords with conventional notions of compromise as a circumstantially coerced sacrifice of something valuable in order to avoid a worse outcome, its view of compromise seems too cramped. Its focus on the resolution of principled conflict is understandable; conflict between principles or values is paradigmatic for compromise. But it is not the only context in which compromise arises. It also involves the nature of a principle itself, such as how it should be interpreted and adapted to specific circumstances.
Consider the implementation of a principle. It entails the prospect of dissonance between the principle and the physical, social, personal and cultural circumstances that affect the ability to act on it. To act without exception on a principle of utter honesty, for example, would quickly create all kinds of problems. Consequently, principles are conceptualized in such a manner that they are malleable in a way that simple directives (such as rules) are not: principles allow for, and indeed require, interpretation and application in differing directions. 30 They must take account of the circumstances of their implementation, and this often gives them an abstract quality. 31 Consequently, their implementation has been seen to require the exercise of prudence, in that a principle must be appropriately and pertinently fitted to the context of its exercise. The virtue of prudence, classically expressed, emphasizes the importance of accommodation to necessity: ‘That is prudent which is in keeping with reality’, writes Josef Pieper. 32
The concessional model prompts several concerns. One is its rather rigid concepts of prudence and principle; another is its limited temporal frame and restrictive notion of conflict. One of the elements of prudence is circumspection, the ability to take relevant circumstances appropriately into account. 33 This is also applicable to the implementation of a principle, and this requires the adjustment of principle to reality. The concessional model says little about this.
A further difficulty with the concession-based model is that it posits an overly static understanding of how principles are affected by conflict. It assumes, by and large, that principles remain unchanged by their conflict with each other and with circumstances. But the process of compromise often causes reconsideration of the content of a principle in a way that may broaden, deepen or complexify it. As Paul Ricoeur contends, compromise is honest ‘if it recognizes power of the claim of both sides, and at the same time, it is creative, because it opens the way to finding new, and wider principles’. 34 In short, compromises are conditioned not only by the conflict of principles but also by the nature of principles themselves. How principles guide action, how they are practically implemented, how they relate to each other, and how those relations evolve in varying times and circumstances: all of these things have a bearing on compromise because they bear on how principles are related to contexts.
Furthermore, understanding compromise primarily in terms of concession is too temporally limited. Since compromise is seen primarily, if not exclusively, as involving discrete situations, this inclines one to see it as confined to situationally specific circumstances. In this view, a conflict presents itself, is resolved by the agent's elevation of one principle or obligation over another, and then the agent moves on. There may be some lingering regret over the disregard of a conflicting principle, but this is simply to be tolerated. It need not have any continuing effect beyond a residue of discomfort, and it need not necessarily have any prospective implications for either the agent's self-understanding or subsequent conduct. The crux of the compromise is a specific conflict and its resolution. The longer-term consequences of the resolution, and their implications for ethical identity, are secondary at best.
Finally, the concessional model is too narrow in its view of the underlying conflict as an incongruence of two (or more) principles. Often multiple principles are involved in a moral conflict. For example, the oft-cited scenario of lying to protect a person from a pursuer bent on doing her harm involves several principles. Suppose it occurs in a wartime setting, and the pursued is a member of a French underground resistance group and the pursuer is an SS officer. The bystander, perhaps a shopkeeper, not only knows the whereabouts of the pursued; he is hiding her in his lodgings. The pursued possesses knowledge of resistance activities, and will face torture if caught. The shopkeeper is queried by the SS officer and will face torture or death if he gives false information or refuses to answer. This would devastate the shopkeeper's family. If the pursued is not located and acts of resistance occur in the village, ten villagers will be executed for every German casualty. If the pursued is apprehended and divulges information about the resistance group, it could be wiped out. The shopkeeper has one hour to decide whether to cooperate.
In one way or the other, he must react to the SS officer's demand for information. The dilemma is not only between truthfulness and protection of life of the pursued. Other principled concerns are at stake: resistance to an evil regime, protection of the innocent and vulnerable, opposition to an unjust demand, and preservation of one's self, family and community. Resolution of the dilemma requires identifying the most relevant principles, and reaching some kind of equilibrium among them. Clearly, multiple interests—and human lives—are at stake. Some of those lives are obviously more important to the shopkeeper than others. In the pressure of the moment he is not likely to be concerned with abstract considerations of coherence or identity. But if he manages to survive the situation, he knows the decision he makes will affect how he sees himself in the future. His thinking will move toward a decision that tries to do justice to the competing concerns at stake. Some will be prioritized over others, others will be subordinated, some will be re-examined and re-conceived, others will be deepened and intensified. The process of weighing different concerns will be complex, involving the interpretation and implementation of principles. This scenario certainly involves a conflict of principles, but also consideration of the content of the principles themselves. When does one principle give way to another? When is it overridden by consequences? Too close a focus on the element of conflict between principles may obscure the complexity of this intrapersonal reflection. 35
This example, dramatically exaggerated though it may be, suggests that the concessional model rests on a constricted view of what happens in a compromise. Some would nevertheless claim that the concessional model reflects the actual experience of many people when they enter into a compromise. Initially unwilling to disregard a principle, they end up doing so in the belief that it is the best option and put up with the resulting discomfort. 36 This is what Lepora and Robert Goodin term the paradox of compromise: feeling bad about entering into a compromise while at the same time knowing that it is the right thing to do. 37
Yet more is involved than that. The agent must consider, among other things, goals and consequences, the stringency of certain obligations and duties, and her personal ability to live with the consequences of her decision. It is not clear that the compromise she reaches will be defined by a sense of wrongness, either in the sense of committing an action incongruent with one's principles, or failing to adhere to a deeply-held principle or value.
Undoubtedly, in a compromise something has been given up in that a principle (or more than one) has been disregarded. But this is not unusual when one's actions are guided by any abstractly formulated criterion; it is also not unique to compromises. Adherence to principle is shaped by circumstances; their enactment requires adaptation. When, as is often the case, a compromise is not wholly voluntary but is compelled by circumstance, it seems misleading to view concessions one makes in that compromise as a kind of wrongdoing.
What is at stake, it appears, in acting on principle is less the avoidance of wrongdoing than the effort to maintain a sense of coherence. It involves preservation of a sense of integrity regarding one's ethical sense of self, of maintaining the congruence of the narrative of one's self-understanding. And this may require that a principle be suspended in a given case without being abandoned. A sense of wrongdoing may still follow, but that does not constitute its central characteristic. A different model may prove useful.
Model II: A Coherence Model of Compromise
Coherence and Identity
An alternative model of intrapersonal compromise stresses the importance of coherence in one's ethical identity, and envisions a role for compromise in promoting it. Viewed from this perspective, the challenge addressed by compromise is less the resolution of conflict between principles than their coordination in some kind of coherent, non-contradictory manner. In the example of the French shopkeeper, he is confronted with the task of aligning several contending principles. He must balance the values of 1) truth-telling with that of 2) protecting someone resisting evil, 3) protecting innocent bystanders and 4) resisting a murderous regime.
As noted above, embedded in the concept of principle is the question of its relation to other principles. 38 Principles are not solitary and autonomous; they interact with other principles. They may be limited, reinforced or counterbalanced by them. At times, perhaps even often, the principles at stake must remain in tension with each other. Kenneth Kirk contends that ‘the most obvious danger of compromise’ is ‘its tendency to harden imperceptibly into an acceptance of one of the two alternatives between which it was intended to mediate’. 39 To respect this tension is, paradoxically, to maintain a certain coherence between the principles in that they exert pressure on each other, each circumscribing and refining the other. The relationship between them may appear antagonistic, but each contributes to comprehension of the other. This is a coherence not of simple congruence but of illuminative tension. The shopkeeper must align, in some manner, the situationally-relevant principles such that the weight given to each acknowledges the weight given to the others.
As also mentioned above, another challenge presented by principles is their implementation. In part, this concerns the relation of principles to each other. But a principle must also be adapted to specific circumstances in order to serve as a guide for action. The very notion of a principle implies that it must be implemented with nuance and not woodenly. To do so requires a sensitive appraisal of the relevant context. Adaptation may also entail interpretation and reconceptualization of the principle at stake. An example of this is Bonhoeffer's reflection on truth-telling. He contends that the principle of truthfulness must reflect the situation in which it arises, meaning that it must vary as situations vary. This requires attention to circumstance. He writes: ‘The ethical cannot be detached from reality, and consequently continual progress in learning to appreciate reality is a necessary ingredient in ethical action’. 40 The adjustment of a principle does not mean it has been forsaken but reconsidered and revised.
If compromise is seen as connected with coherence in this way, it avoids some of the limitations of the concessional model of compromise. First, it expands the temporal context in which a compromise is assessed. It views the compromise not only in terms of a discrete conflict and its resolution but also as an action with continuing implications for the future. It prompts consideration of how one views and revises the principles at stake. And not the least, it can deepen one's self-understanding as an ethical actor.
Second, it allows for a more affirmative interpretation of moral regret—the feeling that in compromising one has committed a wrong, or has lost or surrendered something of value. It enables this by providing an alternative to the concessional model in which principles are pitted against each other. In that case, one will be disregarded, leading to a sense of loss. Instead, a coherence model posits a more complex notion of ethical deliberation.
Third, a sense of ethical coherence/identity underlines the importance of sound deliberation. It invites recognition of the role of coherence in ethical self-understanding. If compromise is essentially a matter of sacrificing one principle for some other value or good, it may result in a sense of ethical dissonance, namely a gap between the ethical principles one embraces and one's practices. If one soundly deliberates about a compromise, reconsidering the scope and nature of principles, weighing and prioritizing them in light of the circumstances, this lessens the sense of regret about the compromise.
This is not to suggest that compromise, conceived in this way, avoids conflict among principles. Obviously, conflicts remain. The question is whether the essence of compromise is best understood as the resolution of pointed, principled conflicts through suspension or concession of one or more of the conflicting principles. The proposal here is that compromise is better seen as a deliberative process of orienting multiple principles in the direction of coherence through adjustment of their content and their relation to other principles. This, rather than the observance/non-observance of a principle, provides a more satisfying account of what compromising involves. This model of compromise depends crucially on two anchoring concepts: coherence and ethical identity.
Coherence
The notion that compromise is concerned with the maintenance of ethical coherence as well as the resolution of conflict raises the question: what exactly is ethical coherence? To cohere is to exist in relation, and accordingly ethical coherence refers to a state in which an agent's ethical values and commitments exist in some kind of ordered, internal relation. 41 This order is capacious: it excludes ultimate contradiction but includes dialectic tension; it allows for prioritization but eschews rigid hierarchy. The conceptual antonym to ethical coherence is segmentation and compartmentalization. In this sense coherence bears a family resemblance to integrity in the sense of bringing constituent elements into holistic relation. 42 Both point to wholeness. In the case of integrity, wholeness represents a state of integrative intactness, while with coherence it derives from a closely fitting relation of constituent parts. Both qualities are apposite to ethical reflection and action in that they express ways of aligning values and actions. 43
Obviously, integrity has a spectrum of connotations; one involves shape and purpose. As John Cottingham contends, ‘The person of integrity has a shape to their life. Instead of conflict and compartmentalization, they have discovered, or at least are partly on the way to discovering, their true self, the person they most truly and sincerely want to be’. 44 In this sense, ethical coherence is an attribute of selves who aspire to integration of their values, commitments and actions. But coherence is not consistency. When taken most literally, consistency connotes a tendency to uniformity across contexts. It forgoes the hard work of deliberation in favor of a reflexive insistence on the unvarying application of a principle—regardless of circumstances.
While the role of coherence is not often given much attention in ethical deliberation, there are exceptions. Ronald Dworkin, for one, assigns it an important role in his moral philosophy. His concern with coherence occurs in the context of his argument in favor of a unitary system of value (what he calls ‘value holism’) rather than in relation to ethical identity. But his account of coherence in moral reflection is similar to the position advanced here. He considers it a key element in moral responsibility, one that involves awareness of our moral convictions as well as an effort to bring them into relation to each other. This requires, he contends, ‘that we seek a thorough coherence of value among our convictions’. 45 The seeming incongruity of values we hold presents us with a dilemma and requires a continual process of their interpretation. ‘We reinterpret our concepts to resolve our dilemma: the direction of our thought is toward unity, not fragmentation. However we decide, we have taken a step toward a more integrated understanding of our moral responsibilities’. 46
Dworkin refers approvingly in various writings to John Rawls’s notion of reflective equilibrium. Dworkin describes it as an interpretative enterprise in which we try to generate principles of some general scope and match them with our concrete judgments, ‘shifting our views about either principles or concrete judgments, or both, as becomes necessary to achieve an interpretive fit’. 47 This implies, similar to a coherence concept of compromise, that coherence is an ongoing, constructive process in which specific and general, abstract and concrete considerations interact, prompting revisions and adjustments in what is considered right and good in a given situation. This suggests that ethical identity is not fixed and intractable, but developmental and dependent on refinement and revision.
Ethical Identity
Identity, ethical or otherwise, is a complex concept. For present purposes, I interpret it along the lines proposed by Ralph Ruddock. He sees it as one of six conceptual components of an individual: self, personality, identity, role, perspective and project. ‘Identity is seen as chosen by the self for the purpose of organizing and integrating the other components’. 48 Here, the emphasis is on this organizing and integrative function of identity. In this sense, identity is an integrative construct of self-perception that possesses a degree of continuity over time.
In common parlance, the terms ‘identity’, ‘self’ and ‘selfhood’ are often used interchangeably. I propose here that identity refers to one's sense of who one is. It is therefore an interior understanding. But it goes without saying that identity is not the creation of a solitary self; it is significantly conditioned, inter alia, by social context and interpersonal interaction. 49 It is a socially grounded undertaking that has a responsive, as well as an expressive, dimension. Further, identity is both continuing as well as evolutionary. 50 It is more than a bundle of preferences or discrete self-images based on one arena of conduct (e.g., personal, professional, religious or social) unrelated to any other one.
The ethical dimension of the concept of identity has to do with how a person views oneself in the course of reflecting and acting in ethically salient matters, including what considerations are seen as important for making ethical decisions. While the notion of ethical identity appears infrequently in recent writing, the idea of moral identity is more common. One definition of moral identity states that ‘it can generally be defined as the degree to which moral emotions, thoughts, behaviors, or traits are important to an individual's identity’. 51 The difference between the two identities (ethical and moral) parallels the difference between ethics and morals. In line with a commonly-drawn distinction between them, ethical identity is the result of an agent's effort to integrate, in a coherent, sustained manner, the fundamental principles and values that guide moral action and reflection. 52 The use of ‘ethical identity’ here seeks to emphasize the fundamental character of the principles and values involved.
How does ethical identity figure in ethical deliberation? Its role is indirect and mediate rather than direct and proximate. It can help an agent orient herself to a problem by clarifying the ethical issue at stake; it can provide cognitive resources for analyzing it; it may stimulate motivation for action and help determine what a desirable outcome might be.
For example: if one chooses on occasion to lie simply because it is more expedient than being honest, then one must either 1) acknowledge that it goes against conduct to which one usually aspires, or 2) write off the lie as a one-time exception. This first may prove a challenging task; the second will tend to undermine one's sense of ethical coherence. As suggested above, coherence is an aspect of identity, and to have a sense of ethical self is to consider one's actions as elements of a continuing project of actualizing one's ethical ambitions.
In this sense, ethical identity is aspirational. Contemporary life exerts partitioning pressures on holistic projects such as the formation of identity. Those pressures tend to segment ethical reflection and sense of self, subjecting the agent to a diversity of norms and modes of behavior. The result, Alasdair MacIntyre observes, is that persons become sensitive to ‘the distinctiveness of each [segment], and not the unity of life of the individual who passes through those parts’. 53
The antipode to such segmentation is integration. In an integrative state, the multiple principles that constitute one's ethical identity stand in some degree of relational tension with each other. In challenging situations, some principles will be observed and other principles will be held in abeyance without being disavowed. When confronting these situations, we may view them in terms of conflict, in which one must suspend one or more principles in favor of another principle. We may feel discomfort about that act of disregard. Or we may see what we do in a more nuanced manner as involving the prioritizing of one or more principles over other competing principles. That prioritization is less an act of concession and more a determination about the implementation of a principle in a specific situation. Even if a principle is not observed in the situation, it remains important in the repertoire comprising one's sense of ethical self. The remorse and inconsistency one may feel about such prioritization may be counterbalanced by that affirmation.
If this understanding of the connection between compromise, coherence and ethical identity is plausible, then we can adjust the notion of compromise in a way that deepens it. It becomes less a matter of resolving conflicts between two or more principles and experiencing regret over disregard of one principle in favor of another. Rather, it is more a means of navigating discrepancies and dissonance among principles, and between principles and circumstances. This may involve re-conception of a principle's content—as Bonhoeffer does with truth-telling. He discards the notion of truthfulness as factual correspondence in favor of responsiveness to situational reality. This leads to a fuller understanding of what is involved in the implementation of principles. It may even involve interpreting a conflict between principles as a valuable step in their clarification. As Dworkin suggests: ‘It might be that for some reason the best interpretation of our values requires that they conflict: that they serve our underlying moral responsibilities best if we conceive them in such a way that from time to time we must compromise one to serve another’. 54 In this sense, conflict may be a form of ‘deeper collaboration’. 55
This is not to deny that moral regret has no place in compromise, as if the cultivation of coherence and identity comes without tension and discomfort. Regret may arise from frustration engendered by constraints one confronts in a situation. But such regret need not trigger a feeling that one has done wrong. The discomfort relates more to disappointed aspiration than to blameworthiness.
The notion of ethical identity and its connection to coherence and integrity have affinities with other, explicitly theological, understandings of moral selfhood. One example is Tillich's concept of the centered character of an actualized self. Although his concept is grounded in a complex ontological structure, his comments about morality and selfhood align with the present proposal. He writes: ‘Morality is the function of life in which the centered self constitutes itself as a person; it is the totality of those acts in which a potentially personal life process becomes an actual person’. 56 Like the notion of identity here, Tillich's selfhood develops through action without being dissipated by it. ‘The self-identity remains in the self-alteration’. 57 This suggests that ethical action can and does contribute to the constitutive definition of oneself as an ethical actor, a suggestion that underlies the coherence model of compromise as well.
Decisional Criteria
According to what criteria might an agent evaluate compromises understood as concerned with coherence and identity? A key criterion is the weight of a principle, meaning its importance to an agent in light of her ethical sense of self. Weightier principles have precedence over less weightier ones. Weight, in this sense, does not depend on an objective scale of value but on significance to and congruence with ethical identity. 58 Principles that are better able to be integrated with each other in light of the context of decision are accorded priority.
Prioritization involves two contemporaneous determinations: a) assessment of the circumstances of an ethical problem, and b) identification and application of the relevant decisional principle(s.) The first step involves identification of the available options for action/inaction, the persons affected and the consequences to be achieved or avoided. The second step is to identify and weight the principles relevant to the situation. This reflects, in significant part, the relative importance of a principle in light of an agent's sense of ethical self. This is not a self-centered criterion. A responsible idea of identity includes due concern for others and for the consequences of one's actions on them.
In some situations, this prioritization may result in a conclusion that a principle is not relevant for a given situation, or that it should be subordinated to another principle. Principles will not remain static in this course of deliberation. They may be narrowed, broadened or qualified. In the shopkeeper/SS scenario, principles of truthfulness, protection of others, concern for oneself, and resistance to evil are all relevant, but they cannot all be applied with equal weight. If the principle of truthfulness is understood in terms of congruence between thought and speech, then that understanding needs to be revised to align with the other principles of avoidance of harm to others and oneself, and of resistance to evil. Bonhoeffer deliberates in this manner in his essay on truthfulness. 59 Truthfulness as principle is interpretively compromised—made to cohere better with the other principles at stake and with how the shopkeeper sees himself: as one concerned with preventing harm to the innocent, protecting those who depend on him, and resisting evil.
Even though a principle may be found irrelevant or subordinate in a situation, it may nevertheless remain important to the agent. This differs from the notion of compromise as a zero-sum conflict of principles that requires surrender of one or more principles and a consequent sense of regret and loss. The idea of compromise as concerned with coherence mitigates these negative stigmata. A principle may be subordinated in a situation without being surrendered. Is this not also the case with the concessional model of compromise? No, because it lacks a structural frame, such as ethical identity, for situating the values and principles that continue to be important to an agent over time.
In short, relating a potential compromise to one's sense of ethical coherence and identity is helpful in assessing it intrapersonally. The notion of a continuing ethical orientation can also help restrain self-serving ethical deliberation by expanding the time frame of assessment beyond the immediate context of a specific situation. It forces one to reconcile one's actions with how one sees oneself as a moral actor enduring over time.
A further consideration requires attention: distinguishing good/worthy compromises from bad/rotten ones.
Rotten Compromises?
Where should the line be drawn between good and bad compromises in the coherence model? This distinction points up the vulnerability of compromise: it can be undermined by unworthy motives and coopted for unworthy ends. In that case, it is rotten.
Elaborate criteria have been advanced for distinguishing between good and rotten compromises. Margalit refers to a rotten compromise as one that should in all cases be avoided. 60 The essential question then is whether one evades the demands of one's ethical commitments for the sake of expedience, or whether, on balance, compromising produces an ethically better outcome than not compromising. An ‘ethically better’ outcome depends not only on the consequences of the compromise but also on its impact on one's ethical identity.
Undoubtedly, many compromises are rotten. Typically, rottenness is a consequence of blameworthy motives or regrettable outcomes, viewed from the agent's perspective. For example, a compromise motivated by laxness in the face of ethical obligation is rotten. It is not an example of ethical action but a refusal of ethical action deliberation. It is an evasion of the work of ethical deliberation. This is not to embrace rigorism, as in Ibsen's Brand, in which the eponymous main character equates compromise with the shirking of the absoluteness of ethical demands. ‘I lost myself in compromise’, declares Brand. ‘Compromise is the way of Satan!’ 61 It is, rather, to forgo an ethical principle in favor of some less troublesome standard. It is as if one tries to circumvent a compromise by refusing to see it as an ethical necessity. It is to deny, in effect, the unavoidability of compromise. Compromise is rooted in the experience of reality as contradictory, as Martin Honecker contends. 62 By this, he suggests that circumstances often thwart our aspirations, and defects in knowledge and capacities (among other things) conspire to limit the realization of ethical aspirations. To attempt to evade these constraints on ethical action is, paradoxically, to indulge in a kind of rotten compromise with them.
The second aspect of rottenness is consequentialist. According to one formulation, an outcome is rotten if it produces a result that is less good—by some measure or other—than what is compromised. In other words, a rotten compromise is foreseeably worse in consequence than no compromise at all. 63 While the basic intuition of this notion is accurate, there are two problems with it. First, it involves a retrospective view of compromise. Every decision to compromise or not is prospective, so there is some unfairness in judging it based on information that was unavailable at the time of decision. Second, like the first model of compromise, it temporally limits its view to an individual act of compromise. As we have seen, consideration of ethical identity forces one to take a longer-term view of individual compromises.
These limitations could be addressed by a more capacious test of rottenness that would include concern with consequences of a compromise and concern with the integrity of a compromise in light of the agent's ethical identity. It would consider the merits of a compromise not only retrospectively but also as they appeared at the time of decision. This would involve considering the quality of the agent's deliberation and action. It would take into account whether the agent, to the extent she is able under the circumstances, is acting in congruence with the kind of ethical person she aspires to be. This is a question of integrity.
To sum up: rottenness may infect a compromise through expedience or lassitude, unacceptable consequences (meaning they are foreseeably worse than if there had been no compromise), or if a violation of an agent's integrity occurs that was, in some way, preventable by the agent.
Some Possible Objections
Several objections to a coherence-based concept of compromise deserve attention.
First, one might object that a coherence-oriented understanding of compromise rests on a fatuous or inflated idea of coherence. Pure situationalism would deny that coherence is relevant for ethical deliberation. Others may argue that the idea of ethical identity based on a coherent set of principles is chimerical. Any such aggregation is constantly in flux, is unstable and lacks continuity. It therefore is not coherent in any meaningful way and does not amount to an identity. Both of these challenges imply, however, that ethical actions are discrete events and are not guided or influenced by any continuous sense of purpose and value on the part of an agent. It assumes that an agent does not mature or develop ethically, and does not accumulate insights and gain deliberative finesse through experience. But this does seem to be the case. Many people see themselves as ethical agents who act over time, and whose thinking about the right and the good develops through those acts. It is not easy to see how we can do without some notion of coherence in relation to how we see ourselves as ethical actors. Our actions are not wholly discrete undertakings concerned only with individual outcomes; they are also efforts concerned with maintaining a sense of ethical identity and integrity over time.
Another objection might be that coherence actually has little or nothing to do with compromise. It relates to a mental or psychological state of wholeness and roundedness and has little to say about dealing with sacrificing principles or ferreting out rottenness. But coherence and compromise do, in fact, relate to each other. Hesitation about a compromise is often prompted by apprehensions about what it may say about ourselves, as Margalit puts it. Have we capitulated to circumstance? Have we taken the path of least resistance, have we failed to adhere to a deeply held principle for reasons of expedience? A concern for coherence would seem to play a role in these questions.
Others may challenge the idea of ethical identity. It may seem too ambitious, strong and definite. Terminology should not be the decisive consideration; perhaps a more modest idea (such as ‘aspiration’) would be more appropriate. The underlying point is that it is hard to imagine someone reflecting conscientiously on ethical decisions who does not embrace, to some degree, a set of principles and values that are important across different situations. This falls short of an ethical identity, but it does express a sense of continuity that is a significant component of identity.
Further, an argument may be made that the coherence model does not face up to the fact that compromises involve losses: the abandonment of a good in connection with the compromise. Writers such as Biggar suggest that the threat of loss is a fundamental attribute of a compromise. While Biggar qualifies the criterion of loss by contending that many such losses are actually not final but only temporary, the fact remains that compromise entails forgoing something an agent would like to retain. 64 The coherence model acknowledges this, but follows Biggar's lead in viewing loss as a temporally contingent phenomenon. Losses are often, but not always, temporary in the sense that whatever is surrendered in a compromise is not irrevocably forsaken. A principle subordinated in one compromise may find application in another compromise. The notion of ethical identity provides a basis for acknowledging the continuing viability of principles even when they are not honored on a given occasion.
Yet another question is whether the intrapersonal deliberative process proposed here should be considered as an act of compromising at all, or whether it is simply a method of moral reasoning. It could be seen as amounting to nothing more than a balancing of competing principles. While balancing is certainly part of the proposed manner of deliberation, it is different from coherence. Balance is based on the comparative weights of principles in a given situation while coherence aims at maintaining an overall relation of congruence and non-contradiction among them. To consider coherence in connection with a potential compromise is, as suggested, to take the longer-range implications for self-understanding into account, and balance is not concerned with this.
Finally, one might object that the coherence model does not avoid the regret connected with the sacrifice of one or more principles to achieve a compromise. In this sense, it is not different from the concessional model. The difference between the models here seems to be one of degree. The concessional model emphasizes the element of loss and regret as a result of its focus on the specific case, and this is precisely what the coherence account resists. Ethical identity is concerned not only with actions and outcomes in specific cases but also with integrative continuity. To be sure, the circumstances of compromises prevent important principles from finding application, and this will always be regrettable. But this need not also prompt feelings of guilt or wrongdoing. Compromises are, to some degree, coerced decisions, and principles reflect values that cannot be implemented to our satisfaction in every situation. They are not inherently culpable acts.
Conclusion
The argument advanced here is that understanding intrapersonal compromise as concerned with maintaining ethical coherence leads us to recognize its value in ethical deliberation. It helpfully expands the traditional idea of compromise by widening the relevant context for decision beyond the immediate circumstances of decision to include an agent's longer-term concern with her ethical identity. Further, it advances beyond the binary alternative of observance/disregard of principles by envisioning compromise as entailing the interpretative development of principles. This helps dispel the remorse traditionally associated with compromise.
Obviously, this idea of compromise diverges from customary understandings of compromise as a concession of a principled concern in order to avoid a worse outcome. It does so in the sense that points to the multipolar context of compromise. It sees compromise as affecting an aggregation of principles. It does not consist only or necessarily in the renunciation or limitation of one principle so much as a reconfiguration of multiple principles in light of a situation of conflict. This involves sacrifices. The coherence model acknowledges this and therefore does not invalidate the concessional idea of compromise but expands it.
The position developed here aligns with some recent writing on the positive role compromise can play in ethical deliberation. 65 It builds on these analyses by suggesting a significant connection between compromise and coherence and ethical identity.
Footnotes
Notes
2.
According to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Compromise is a concept with different and often conflicting definitions and value valences in different settings’. See ‘Ethics of Compromise’, in A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Affairs, Public Administration, Public Policy and Governance (Berlin: Springer, 2010), p. 1.
3.
Hans Steubing, Der Kompromiss als ethisches Problem (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1955) refers to this as a false compromise, which is ‘the thoughtless adaptation to the given’, p. 67 (my translation).
4.
Chiara Lepora, ‘On Compromise and Being Compromised’, Journal of Political Philosophy 20.1 (2012), p. 22.
5.
‘Compromise as a concept assumes that one is “conceding” something to someone else, usually in order to achieve some goal’. Menkel-Meadow, ‘Ethics of Compromise’, p. 2. Similarly, Michele Moody-Adams writes: ‘A compromise is a way of responding to conflict by means of an agreement that involves mutual sacrifice in order to improve on existing circumstances’. Michele Moody-Adams, ‘Democratic Conflict and the Political Morality of Compromise’, in Jack Knight (ed.), Compromise (New York: NYU Press, 2018), p. 190.
6.
Compromise can signify more than a technique of dispute resolution or an element in ethical decision-making. It can also express a metaphysical attitude to the world in which reality is ineluctably conflicted between ultimate and penultimate. Helmut Thielicke, for example, sees compromise in this way. See his Theologische Ethik, vol. II/1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1965), p. 59. Intriguing as this proposition is, it is not explored further in this article, which is concerned with the role of compromise in ethical deliberation and not with its theological/metaphysical implications, which appear more commonly in Germanophone literature. For some of these theological interpretations of compromise, see Joachim Wiebering, ‘Kompromiss als christliche Kategorie’, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik (1978), pp. 296–306; Dieter Walther, ‘Zur Behandlung des Kompromissproblems in der Geschichte der evangelisch-lutherisch Ethik’, Kerygma und Dogma 4.2 (1958), pp. 73–111; and Wolfgang Trillhaas, ‘Zum Problem des Kompromisses’, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik (1960), pp. 355–64.
7.
The concept of coherence is discussed below, under ‘Coherence’.
8.
There is both a profusion and confusion of terminology surrounding this concept of ethical identity. One set of alternative expressions is ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’. Following a somewhat familiar distinction between the two, I refer to ‘ethical identity’ here on the assumption that ethics relate to the principles and values that guide moral practices.
9.
David Archard defines compromise as ‘the making of mutual concessions by two or more parties who disagree in respect of some matter’. David Archard, ‘Moral Compromise’, Philosophy 87 (2012), pp. 403–20.
10.
Nicholas Rescher, ‘On Compromise and Obligation’, in idem, Ethics Matters: Ethical Issues in Pragmatic Perspective (Berlin: Springer, 2021), p. 87.
11.
Lepora, ‘On Compromise and Being Compromised’, p. 2.
12.
See, e.g., Lepora, ‘On Compromise and Being Compromised’, pp. 3–4; Rescher, ‘On Compromise and Obligation’, p. 87.
13.
Lepora, ‘On Compromise and Being Compromised’, p. 3.
14.
Barry Hoffmaster and Cliff Hooker state: ‘Life is a continual compromise among a plethora of conflicting values’. See Barry Hoffmaster and Cliff Hooker, ‘The Nature of Moral Compromise’, Social Theory and Practice 43.1 (2017), p. 55.
15.
D.M. Yeager and Stewart Herman, ‘The Virtue of Selling Out: Compromise as a Moral Transaction’, Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 37.1 (2017), p. 15.
16.
This view is not as widely accepted as one might expect. Some writers, for example J.P. Day, posit that compromises are necessarily interpersonal in character. J.P. Day, ‘Compromise’, Philosophy 64.25 (October 1989), pp. 471–85. This article presumes the contrary, following the position of Lepora and others.
17.
For example, Lepora distinguishes between compromise and bargain by arguing that the former involves a matter of principle rather than a material interest. This is helpful, but should not be taken too categorically. Even bargaining over material interests may involve matters of moral concern. For example, the concept of a fair price is a normative notion. The fact that it relates to a material interest does not eliminate its ethical implications.
18.
Lepora, ‘On Compromise and Being Compromised’, p. 2.
19.
Lepora, ‘On Compromise and Being Compromised’, p. 3. For the sake of convenience, ‘principle’ is used here as a catch-all term for all of what Lepora terms ‘matters of principled concern’. In contrast, Rescher contends that only duties and obligations, not principles, should be subject to compromise. Rescher, ‘On Compromise and Obligation’, p. 96. But principles are also implicated in compromises involving duties or obligations since they are either grounded in or reflect principles.
20.
Avishai Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 5.
21.
Steubing, Der Kompromiss, p. 3 (my translation).
22.
For all of these reasons, Lepora calls intrapersonal compromise ‘the most troubling and morally problematic sort of compromise’. Lepora, ‘On Compromise and Being Compromised’, p. 2.
23.
Lepora, ‘On Compromise and Being Compromised’, p. 2.
24.
A separate, intriguing, question is how to determine which conflicts are unsuitable for compromise. Undoubtedly, such situations exist. For example, consider the case of Franz Jägerstätter, an Austrian farmer who was executed by the Nazi regime in World War II for objecting to military service on religious grounds. His execution left his wife and children without a husband and father. See generally, Gordon Zahn, In Solitary Witness: The Life and Death of Franz Jägerstätter (Springfield, IL: Templegate, 1986).
25.
‘Compromise is occasioned when not all of the several obligations we acknowledge in a situation can be fully met and we cannot avoid the conflict because inaction will generate a worse outcome’. Hoffmaster and Hooker, ‘Nature of Moral Compromise’, p. 57.
26.
Nigel Biggar, ‘Compromise: What Makes It Bad?’, Studies in Christian Ethics 31.1 (2018), p. 35.
27.
Morley asserts in one of the classic texts on compromise that compromises are ‘a matter of boundaries’. John Morley, On Compromise (London: Chapman & Hall, 1874), p. 4.
28.
See, for example, Martin Honecker, ‘Kompromiss und Güterabwägung im Normenkonflikt’, in idem, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), p. 242: ‘An appeal to a supposedly objective value order is problematic. This follows from the historicity and changeability of norms and values’ (my translation).
29.
Biggar proposes eight criteria for determining acceptable from unacceptable (rotten) compromises. They are: lack of regret, a preference for less rather than more of a good, a preference for an inferior to a superior good, violation of an absolute moral rule, abandonment of a strategic defense or promotion of a good, tactical suspension of the defense or promotion of a good for insufficiently weighty reasons, complicity in an unjust project, and violation of a basic principle of justice. Biggar, ‘Compromise’, pp. 46–47.
30.
See Ronald Dworkin, ‘A Model of Rules I’, in idem, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 24–27.
31.
Another variable in the decisional matrix is the nature of the ethical idea or principle being acted upon. More demanding ideals collide more fiercely with reality than more quotidian ones. To act in accord with a principle of kindness to others allows for greater leeway in implementation than, for example, a strict principle of pacificism. The intensity of the ideal inversely relates to the difficulty of its implementation. Ethical ideals of religions have been labeled as perfectionistic because of their transcendent aspirations, and this makes their confrontation with stubborn reality all the starker. For this reason, Troeltsch believed that compromise is a continuing necessity for Christianity. See John Hanson, ‘Troeltsch's Concept of Compromise’, The Lutheran Quarterly XVIII (1966), pp. 351–61.
32.
Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 9.
33.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, chapter 3, discusses phronesis, which involves, inter alia, the appraisal of circumstances as an element of ethical deliberation.
34.
Paul Ricoeur, ‘Pour une éthique du compromis. Interview de Paul Ricoeur’, quoted in Marianne Moyaert, ‘Ricoeur on the (Im)Possibility of a Global Ethic: Toward an Ethic of Fragile Interreligious Compromises’, Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie 54 (2010), p. 459. Ricoeur speaks here of interpersonal compromise, but an analogous process of principle transformation can occur in intrapersonal compromises.
35.
For example, Rescher states: ‘The prime reason for compromise is that this serves to avert or at least mitigate the conflict inherent in adversarial situations’. ‘On Compromise and Obligation’, p. 86. While this is certainly true, it does not go far enough in acknowledging the reflective scrutiny of principles that the experience of conflict can trigger. While this may not be a reason for compromising, it is a part of the process of compromise.
36.
Yeager and Herman, ‘The Virtue of Selling Out’, p. 15.
37.
Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin, On Complicity and Compromise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 46: ‘Even if she is convinced that on balance compromising was the right thing to do, she nonetheless feels there is something deeply wrong about doing so’.
38.
The concept of principle here follows that of Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 26. He contends that a principle ‘argues in certain direction’ but does not prescribe a particular course of action. Further, it has what he terms a dimension of weight or importance. This requires principles to be considered in relation to other principles. This notion is reflected here by the concept of coherence.
39.
Kenneth Kirk, Conscience and Its Problems (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1927), p. 365.
40.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Neville Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 365.
41.
The notion of coherence proposed here should not be confused with the doctrine of coherentism, which posits coherence as the criterion of justification of moral principles. Epistemological questions about the justification of moral principles are beyond the scope of this article.
42.
Integrity and coherence are, clearly, separate characteristics. But both words have to do with wholeness and completeness as opposed to segmentation. This can be seen in the quotes immediately following from Cottingham and Dworkin.
43.
Regarding the etymology of integrity and coherence, see their respective entries in Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English (New York: Greenwich House, 1983).
44.
John Cottingham, ‘Integrity and Fragmentation’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 27.1 (2010), pp. 2–14 (9).
45.
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 108.
46.
Dworkin, Justice, p. 199.
47.
Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rawls and the Law’, Fordham Law Review 72.5 (2004), p. 1391.
48.
See Ralph Ruddock, ‘Conditions of Personal Identity’, in idem (ed.), Six Theories of the Person (London: Routledge, 1972), p. 92.
49.
Though this is important, it cannot be pursued here further. For one analysis of the relationship between individual and social dimensions of identity, see James Nelson, Moral Nexus: Ethics of Christian Identity and Community (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996).
50.
A classic treatment is Erik Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968).
51.
Sam Hardy, Tobias Krettenauer and Natasha Hunt, ‘Moral Identity Development’, in Lene Jensen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Development: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 129. See also Bradley Shingleton, ‘Ethical Dissonance, Ethical Disjunction and the Autonomous Spheres’, Journal of Religious Ethics 49.4 (2021), p. 694–714, and Augusto Blasi, ‘Development of Identity: Some Implications for Moral Functioning’, in Gil Noam and Thomas Wren (eds.), The Moral Self (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p. 93. Blasi contends that moral identity plays a central role, and that self-consistency is the basic motivational spring of moral action.
52.
Regarding this distinction, see, for example, William Frankena, Ethics ( New York: Prentice Hall, 1963)
53.
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd edn (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), p. 205.
54.
Dworkin, Justice, p. 120.
55.
Dworkin, Justice, p. 120.
56.
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 3 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 38.
57.
Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, p. 30.
58.
Some moral theories envision some kind of objective ranking of value, but the status of such a ranking is contested except where the goods at stake are disproportionate (for example, the preservation of life versus mere convenience). For example, Biggar implicitly refers to such a hierarchy in speaking of inferior and superior goods, implying that it is obvious or self-evident in some way. Biggar, ‘Compromise’, p. 41. This position has been challenged; see note 28 above.
59.
See Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 368.
60.
Margalit, On Compromise, p. 23.
61.
Henrik Ibsen, Brand, trans. Michael Meyer (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), p. 140.
62.
Honecker, Theologische Ethik, pp. 234–35. ‘Reality is contradictory … Compromises are … caused by the contradictoriness of reality (Wirklichkeit)’ (my translation).
63.
The element of foreseeability is included in order to link this aspect of rottenness to some failing on the part of the agent. Clearly, there are many compromises that yield bad results and are therefore rotten, but that were not foreseeably rotten. The focus here is on delineating an agent's responsibility for rotten compromises.
64.
Biggar, ‘Compromise’, p. 40.
65.
For example, Hoffmaster and Hooker have argued for a more affirmative understanding of compromise in moral life. In their words: ‘Compromise plays a key role in framing the adaptation and improvement of ethical decision-making in individual and social life … [it] offers a way to manage tensions among conflicting obligations while seeking options that both admit new creative constructions’. Hoffmaster and Hooker, ‘Nature of Moral Compromise’, p. 59.