Abstract
In the domain of moral theology conscience is a concept fraught with many misunderstandings. Its long and winding history, together with the seemingly elusive nature of the concept witness to this. The Abuse of Conscience is an attempt to solve the riddle of conscience. While doing a good job at outlining its history, in the end, due to some inconsistencies that I will indicate below, in my view, sadly, it only adds to the confusion on conscience.
The author, Matthew Levering, is a theologian born and bred in the US, where he studied and has lectured in several branches of theology in a number of seminaries and universities, now as professor. He is also a prolific author of academic and popular works in different fields of theology, specializing in Thomistic thought.
The book is divided into an Introduction, in which an overview of the entire project is given, followed by four long chapters. Each of the chapters evaluates the concept of conscience throughout the ages (biblical times, the moral manuals, Thomism, and German existentialism respectively) through the lens of no less than 29 theologians of the twentieth century. These chapters are further divided into subsections, with each one dedicated to the work of a particular theologian. The Conclusion, which carries the sub-heading ‘The Way Forward’, is divided into two subsections (one theologian each). Each chapter helpfully begins with a background to the thought of the theologians, explaining why they are grouped together in that chapter. Levering also ends every chapter with his own analysis of the theologians discussed there.
The text is a bit demanding at times when the more technical arguments (for example the German existentialists) are discussed, but this is thankfully compensated for by a language that is clear and direct. The endnotes take up almost one third of the book (92 pages out of 301 pages), indicating the rigour and honesty with which Levering undertakes his endeavour.
Levering of course has in mind the landmark book by Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). He describes the aim of the book as an introduction to ‘the main paths taken by Catholic moral theology in the twentieth century and to expose the deficiencies of the dominant academic versions of conscience-centred Catholic moral theology’ (p. 1).
Early on in his book Levering puts forward his agenda: ‘the path forward today consists in integrating the best Biblical and Thomistic insights with an existentialist emphasis on personal encounter with the Lord Jesus Christ. Conscience will continue to have a significant role, but now within the virtue of prudence’ (p. 16).
Although Levering claims to present a history of moral theology, it is certainly not a disinterested history. Although I cannot say that it is a biased history, he does not shy away from making his own comments and reactions as he does the recounting. One such comment is when he takes aim at what he considers to be a ‘new conscience-centred morality’ (p. 3, emphasis original) which, according to him, ‘emerged immediately after the Council, almost as though there had never been a critique of conscience-centred morality!’ (p. 3). In my opinion Levering creates a straw-man argument which he then attempts to criticize, perhaps because a priori he is distrustful of the developments in moral theology in the post-Second Vatican Council era.
In chapter 1, the work of eight theologians is discussed, namely George Tyrrell, Hastings Rashdall, Rudolf Bultmann, C.A. Pierce, Yves Congar, OP, Johannes Stelzenberger, Philippe Delhaye, and Richard B. Hays. After meticulously comparing and contrasting the widely differing and at times rather original views of each of the above theologians with regard to conscience in the New Testament, Levering concludes that ‘conscience is not the centre of Christian moral life according to the New Testament, nor is conscience (individual or collective) the main way in which Christians know what is right to do, let alone determinative of what it means to be the church’ (p. 49). Yet he does admit that the New Testament allows for a role for conscience, albeit a limited one, and its importance is superseded by the virtues of ‘faith, hope and cruciform love’ (p. 48). For Levering, it seems that if there is any function for conscience, it is mostly that it serves as an ‘interior judgement … for both Christians and non-Christians in differentiating good from evil actions’ (p. 48).
When he discusses ‘Conscience and the Moral Manuals’ in chapter 2, he presents the work of Austin Fagothey, SJ, Thomas J. Higgins, SJ, Michael Cronin, Antony Koch, and Dominic M. Prümmer, OP. This is an important chapter because it helps us understand what Levering understands by conscience. He borrows Servais Pinckaers’ words in the context of the moral manuals, that conscience is ‘an intermediate faculty placed between law and freedom’, which, acting as a judge, ‘had to act as an interpreter of the law, so as to determine with precision the line between the allowable and the prohibited’ (p. 82). Everything indicates that this is the definition that Levering continues to support. Of course, nobody can argue with him that ‘the better path consists in apprehending the Decalogue and the moral precepts taught in the New Testament within a virtue-centred work, constituted by communion with Christ and the grace of the Holy Spirit’, and which is overseen by love, ‘along the paths sketched in Christ's Sermon on the Mount’ (pp. 82–83). Where I tend to disagree is that for Levering, conscience remains an added optional faculty, rather than one that is part and parcel of—and can never be dissociated from—striving for perfection.
This is even more evident in the third chapter, ‘Conscience and the Thomists’, where Levering goes to great lengths to retell how Aquinas conceived of conscience through the work of several neo-Thomists, namely Benoît-Henri Merkelbach, OP, Michel Labourdette, OP, Eric D’Arcy, Reginald G. Doherty, OP, and Servais Pinckaers, OP. The subtle differences between neo-scholastic terms including conscience, synderesis and prudence are discussed at length. Finally, he settles for Labourdette and Pinckaers, who he believes, ‘provide a rich understanding of conscience within prudence and within the Christian moral life as a whole’ (p. 124).
Chapter 4 can be considered to be a turning point in Levering's book. Titled ‘Conscience and German Thought’, Levering discusses the work of Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, SJ, Josef Fuchs, SJ, Bernard Häring, CSsR, and Josef Ratzinger. I consider it to be a watershed in the book because Levering helps us come to terms with the existentialist dimension of conscience that was thus far lacking. ‘Conscience’, Levering writes, while reflecting on Jaspers’ take on the topic, ‘is our deepest self trying to keep us on the right path. At the deepest core of the self, we choose our basic stance: for or against Existenz’ (p. 133). By this he (Jaspers) means, ‘the subject … freely existing, an existential phenomenon rather than an object for intellectual dissection’ (p. 132). Levering demonstrates how Rahner and Fuchs develop their understanding of conscience within the same existentialist framework. When it comes to discussing Häring, conscience takes on a much more comprehensive dimension than that formerly described, including ‘emotions, intellectual powers, and volitional energies’ (p. 179). In contrast, Ratzinger's reflections on conscience are intimately bound to Christ as a truth that is received through ‘anamnesis’. In his analysis at the end of this chapter, Levering judges the existentialist conception of conscience as a threat which leads to moral relativism characteristic of the post-Second Vatican Council era. Instead, he praises Pope Benedict's ‘recovery of the reality of human nature and universal moral norms’, as this is what will ultimately lead to ‘true liberation’ (p. 192).
The Conclusion is titled ‘The Path Forward’ and in it Levering compares and contrasts the views of James F. Keenan, SJ, and Reinhard Hütter. The importance that Keenan gives to the primacy of conscience is underscored, together with its relationship to the sensus fidelium, and the inextricable link to truth, justice, and the call to discipleship. Levering acknowledges that Keenan's emphasis on conscience is due to his awareness of the historicity of the human person, considering it ‘the universal human moral ground, the core of our being where we make our act of faith and take our fundamental stance. Conscience is where we commit ourselves to Christ’ (p. 200). Levering then discusses the slightly different perspective of Hütter on conscience. For him, conscience is ‘counterfeit’ when it is ‘not ruled by law as expressive of God's teleological ordering for our flourishing’ and when it ‘reflects the strong impulses or notions of our culture or of our personal experience’ (p. 203). ‘Such a conscience’, Hütter insists, according to Levering, ‘will be on the alert not to be overrun by “extrinsic” authorities such as God or Scripture or church, on ground that ultimately only the self can determine for the self what is good’ (p. 203).
Herein lies the problem with Levering's book. By comparing and contrasting theologians, he draws a caricature of a conscience-centred post-Second Vatican Council morality, presenting it as though it were solipsistic and completely detached from God, the Holy Scriptures, the magisterium, and the ecclesial community. He also presents it as though it is a less demanding morality, and as though it were a faculty that one can decide whether to use or not. Nothing can be further from the truth.
With the Second Vatican Council and the developments that happened thereafter, conscience has finally come of age. Contrary to what Levering has us believe, it is not the vestiges of a manualist morality that seeks to exonerate persons when the norms are not applicable. Rather, conscience is indeed the innermost core of one's own being, the indivisible point that constantly prods us to do good and to avoid evil, so long, that is, as we are sensitive to the summoning of God who created, guides, and sustains it.
In my opinion, the weakest link in Levering's argument is that he still conceives of conscience in the context of an act-oriented moral theology, rather than a personalist, agent-oriented one. Ironically, this makes him closer to the moral manualist tradition than the theologians that give primary importance to conscience and that he criticizes for still being bound to the manualist tradition. Post-Second Vatican Council moral theologians who reaffirm the centrality of conscience always do so in the key of virtue.
Another shortcoming of the book is that women theologians get very little mention if any, and even then, this is done only in passing or are relegated to footnotes. One striking exception is the example of Sidney Callahan, who argues against a conscience-centred morality because of the risk of individual decision-makers who might have control over nuclear weapons or a virus, thus presenting a global threat. To my mind, it is hard to understand how a person would more readily obey a prohibitive norm on such grave issues, rather than being sensitive to their conscience. This only shows how poorly conscience is understood.
Overall, The Abuse of Conscience deserves merit for its detailed and well-researched work on conscience from such a vast array of moral theologians spanning a century. However, the readers would do well to read the author's analysis with a critical eye. In doing so they might even arrive at conclusions different from Levering's. Nonetheless, it guarantees a stimulating and thought-provoking read to anyone interested in the academic subject of moral theology and the pursuit of the good life in general.