Abstract
For some, the steady and regrettable decline in affiliation and religious observance that the Church of England has experienced since the early 1960s can be explained—at least in part—by an alleged over-preoccupation with tackling internal issues: the ordination of women priests and bishops; debates on gay marriage; the introduction of ‘managerialism’ into its organisational structures and practices; the excessive preoccupation with decline and ‘mission’ attempts to reverse the trend, being just four examples. Why, they might ask, would it want to unleash a further round of ‘naval gazing’ in the form of a major project to examine whether it should remain an established church, when there are other—arguably more pressing—matters to consider, such as the social threats posed by climate emergency, growing poverty and a welfare state in crisis? Yet this is precisely what Jonathan Chaplin advocates for the Church of England in his latest book.
The reasons for this are set out early in his analysis. Chaplin is of the view that the decline in membership in the Church of England—part of a wider growth in secularisation and pluralisation in British society—means that it has become increasingly problematic for it to present itself (let alone be seen as) ‘the Church of the nation’ (p. 2). What is more, according to Chaplin, the increasing secularisation that we have been witnessing makes it difficult to argue that England is any longer a ‘Christian nation’ in need of an established church. Yet it is not just these ‘empirical’ realties that underpin his call for a change of direction. He is of the view that there are theologically principled reasons why establishment should be dispensed with, and a need for ‘a theologically principled reconsideration of the proper jurisdictional spheres of Church and State’ (p. 4). Accordingly, he devotes an entire chapter to fleshing them out, by formulating what he describes as a theology of disestablishment.
Essentially, Chaplin considers the state to be religiously incompetent, believing that it is not equipped to make judgements on matters of religious truth-claims. Therefore, logically it follows that the state's claim to authority to decide that a particular faith or church should be in a special relationship to it is rendered implausible. As such, the state should remain religiously impartial, not least in the interests of securing the religious freedom of citizens. Consequently, it is vital that churches are empowered to exercise the capacity for free self-governance, as it is they, and not the state, that are competent in that regard. Chaplin further argues that this positioning is directly in line with the New Testament's vision of the church as a voluntary organisation, not constrained or defined by national boundaries. As such, the Church's loyalty is to Christ and ‘the freedom of the church over against both state and nation’ (p. 68).
Bringing about Church disestablishment would not be easy. Chaplin succinctly sets out what it would entail: nullifying what remains of the legacy of the Act of Supremacy of 1559 and other statutes; ending Protestant succession; discontinuing the Church's role in the coronation service; abolishing the state's role in Church appointments; ending parliamentary involvement in the Church's law-making; ending the right of the Church to initiate parliamentary legislation; renouncing the element of privilege in the status of the Lords Spiritual; ending legal obligations on parishes; converting Church law to voluntary status. Unsurprisingly, given the large scale of this undertaking, he calls for ‘a planned sequence of steps towards “disestablishment”’, whilst remaining adamant that ‘the Church should not wait on events, or dither around until the state comes knocking on its door’ (p. 3).
So, what are the key lines of argument that Chaplin develops in support of his position? As we have seen, he is of the view that establishment ‘is founded on biblically and theologically untenable notions of the Christian nation and the national Church’ (p. 207). The result has been that the Church of England has—throughout its history—received special forms of privilege and responsibility, such as the sacral coronation and the public-legal status of Church law. These are an infringement of the principle of state religious impartiality and church autonomy, in ways that he considers have been—and remain—theologically incoherent and theo-politically problematic.
In defending this position, Chaplin critiques inter alia three key lines of argument that advocates of establishment have marshalled in support of their cause. First, that disestablishment would be perceived by many as a ‘concession to secularism’, leading to a damaging retreat of faith from the public square. Chaplin counters this contention, arguing that disestablishment would result in a religiously impartial state; one that the Church of England—in partnership with other churches and religious organisations—could seize upon, as an opportunity to strengthen its contribution to debates in the public square. Indeed, it could do this by utilising its increased autonomy in ways that would enhance its perceived authenticity and relevance. Second, that disestablishment would open the door to the possibility that the secular state might adopt a worldview very different from a Christian one, and, by implication, a worldview lacking in the moral underpinning that an established church provides. Chaplin counters this contention, arguing that whilst states must aspire to matters of impartiality on matters of religious (or other) truth, this does not prevent them from embodying principles (such as the rule of law or respect for the democratic process) that are moral. Third, that disestablishment would equate to an abandonment of the Church of England's commitment to ‘the spiritual welfare of the whole nation’ (p. 209). On the contrary, Chaplin argues that the Church of England could sustain such a commitment after disestablishment, and, in support of that contention, he adduces how the Church in Wales has achieved that since 1920 and the Church of Ireland since 1871.
Essentially, Chaplin is of the view that disestablishment would create new possibilities for the Church of England to speak more prophetically on a range of national issues, by being unburdened of the expectations that its established status places upon it. Surprisingly, though, he does not explore—at least in explicit terms—the implications that disestablishment might have for the Church of England's commitment to ‘middle axiom’ thinking and practice. This is an approach to church–state relations that it has utilised since the early 1940s, as a way of avoiding being seen as formulating political policy or allying itself with one particular political party or stance. It does this by steering a path that focuses more on Christian principles than on policy-making in its advice to governments, for example. Chaplin's lines of argument in support of the greater freedom he argues disestablishment would afford the Church of England when debating in the public square, would, arguably, weaken the case for its continued commitment to middle axiom thinking and practice. However, for many advocates of the middle axiom method, I suspect it would not rule it out.
Chaplin is also at pains to reassure those who might conceive of disestablishment as being a threat to the British monarchy, that this is not so. He argues that it would leave the British monarchy in England in essentially the same position as it currently occupies in Wales. Likewise, it would leave the Church of England in a similar position to that of the Church in Wales, in so far as the monarchy exercises no formal role in the latter. Therefore, he calls for a complete reset of the relationship between the British monarchy and the Church of England; one that would result in a formal ‘divorce’ between the two. Under this scenario, the British monarch would relinquish its status as Supreme Governor of the Church of England, and sacral coronation would be replaced by a ceremony of civil investiture.
Chaplin also calls for a reset of the constitutional relationships that the Church of England has with parliament. This would entail dispensing with the remaining legacy of parliamentary involvement in its own law-making. By the same token, the Church of England's constitutional right to initiate parliamentary legislation would be ended, and with it the Ecclesiastical Committee. Consistent with this, would be a need for the Church of England to formally acknowledge that it is no longer equipped or entitled to represent the whole nation (if it ever was) when it comes to matters of faith. Yet Chaplin is adamant that a disestablished church would not involve a withdrawal from public life; on the contrary, by relinquishing the shackles of political control, it would enable it to re-engage ‘more forcefully and critically with the ways of the world’ (p. 199) and, specifically, the religious affairs of the nation.
Clearly, this is a bold project; one that, from Chaplin's perspective, would require the Church of England to clarify whether it wants to move ‘beyond Establishment’. He therefore calls for the setting up of a fully representative body, tasked with formulating a new theology of church–state relations. Its remit would include mapping out the initial proposals for disestablishment and the sequence of events necessary to bring it about, in the event that a consensus were to emerge in the Church on the desirability for it.
Chaplin has produced an erudite, accessible and spirited case for why he believes the Church of England should be disestablished, which will help those who profess an interest in these matters, to interrogate and clarify their position.