Salience and satisfaction are important factors in determining the comparisons that people make. We hypothesized that people make salient comparisons first, and then make satisfying comparisons only if salient comparisons leave them unsatisfied. This hypothesis suggests an asymmetry between winning and losing. For winners, comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., losing) brings satisfaction. Therefore, winners should be sensitive only to the relative value of their outcomes. For losers, comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., winning) brings little satisfaction. Therefore, losers should be drawn to compare outcomes with additional standards, which should make them sensitive to both relative and absolute values of their outcomes. In Experiment 1, participants won one of two cash prizes on a scratch-off ticket. Winners were sensitive to the relative value of their prizes, whereas losers were sensitive to both the relative and the absolute values of their prizes. In Experiment 2, losers were sensitive to the absolute value of their prize only when they had sufficient cognitive resources to engage in effortful comparison.
ClarkA.E.FrijtersP.ShieldsM.A. (2008). Relative income, happiness, and utility: An explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and other puzzles. Journal of Economic Literature, 46, 95–144.
2.
DunningD.HayesA.F. (1996). Evidence for egocentric comparison in social judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 213–229.
3.
EganL.C.SantosL.R.BloomP. (2007). The origins of cognitive dissonance: Evidence from children and monkeys. Psychological Science, 18, 978–983.
4.
EpstudeK.RoeseN.J. (2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12, 168–192.
5.
FazioR.H.ZannaM.P.CooperJ. (1977). Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view of each theory’s proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 464–479.
6.
GilbertD.T. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46, 107–119.
7.
GilbertD.T.GieslerR.B.MorrisK.A. (1995). When comparisons arise. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 227–236.
8.
GilbertD.T.LiebermanM.D.MorewedgeC.K.WilsonT.D. (2004). The peculiar longevity of things not so bad. Psychological Science, 15, 14–19.
9.
HseeC.K.ZhangJ. (2010). General evaluability theory. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 343–355.
10.
KahnemanD.MillerD.T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136–153.
11.
KrugerJ. (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The “below-average effect” and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 221–232.
12.
LarsenJ.T.McGrawA.P.MellersB.A.CacioppoJ.T. (2004). The agony of victory and thrill of defeat: Mixed emotional reactions to disappointing wins and relieving losses. Psychological Science, 15, 325–330.
13.
LiebermanM.D.OchsnerK.N.GilbertD.T.SchacterD.L. (2001). Do amnesics exhibit cognitive dissonance reduction? The role of explicit memory and attention in attitude change. Psychological Science, 12, 135–140.
14.
LoomesG.SugdenR. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.
15.
LyubomirskyS.RossL. (1997). Hedonic consequences of social comparison: A contrast of happy and unhappy people. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 1141–1157.
16.
MellersB.A.SchwartzA.HoK.RitovI. (1997). Decision affect theory: Emotional reactions to the outcomes of risky options. Psychological Science, 8, 210–214.
17.
MorewedgeC.K.GilbertD.T.MyrsethK.O.R.KassamK.S.WilsonT.D. (2010). Consuming experience: Why affective forecasters overestimate comparative value. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 986–992.
18.
MoyerR.S.LandauerT.K. (1967). Time required for judgments of numerical inequality. Nature, 215, 1519–1520.
19.
MussweilerT. (2003). Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and consequences. Psychological Review, 110, 472–489.
20.
MussweilerT.RuterK.EpstudeK. (2004). The ups and downs of social comparison: Mechanisms of assimilation and contrast. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 832–844.
21.
PyszczynskiT.GreenbergJ.LaPrelleJ. (1985). Social comparison after success and failure: Biased search for information consistent with a self-serving conclusion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 195–211.
22.
RoeseN. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 805–818.
23.
ShepperdJ.A.TaylorK.M. (1999). Social loafing and expectancy-value theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1147–1158.
24.
StapelD.A.BlantonH. (2004). From seeing to being: Subliminal social comparisons affect implicit and explicit self-evaluations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 468–481.
25.
StrackF.SchwarzN.ChasseinB.KernD.WagnerD. (1990). Salience of comparison standards and the activation of social norms: Consequences of judgments of happiness and their communication. British Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 303–314.
26.
StrackF.SchwarzN.GschneidingerE. (1985). Happiness and reminiscing: The role of time perspective, affect, and mode of thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1460–1469.
27.
TaylorS.E.WoodJ.V.LichtmanR.R. (1983). It could be worse: Selective evaluation as a response to victimization. Journal of Social Issues, 39, 19–40.
28.
TesserA.SmithJ. (1980). Some effects of task relevance and friendship on helping: You don’t always help the one you like. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16, 582–590.
29.
TverskyA.KahnemanD. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1039–1061.
30.
WilsonA.E.RossM. (2001). From chump to champ: People’s appraisals of their earlier and present selves. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 572–584.
