Rising Stars and Sinking Ships

Abstract

Differences in rank are a ubiquitous feature of social life. Moving beyond the traditional static view of social hierarchy, five studies spanning multiple contexts examined how intertemporal changes in rank influenced people’s status judgments. When final rank was held constant, people, products, and institutions were judged as higher status when they had arrived at this position by ascending, rather than descending, the hierarchy; moreover, these judgments affected downstream pricing recommendations, willingness to pay for products, and influence accepted from others. This impact of rank history on status judgments was accounted for by expectations of future status and moderated by the involvement of the self: The self and others are afforded an equivalent status boost for ascending to a given rank; however, only the self is pardoned the status tax that is levied on others for descending to the same rank. The theoretical utility of a dynamic approach to social hierarchy is discussed.

Keywords

social structure social perception status change status judgments social hierarchy rankings

Systems of rank pervade our social landscape. Publications ranging from U.S. News & World Report’s university rankings and ESPN’s football “Power Rankings” to Forbes’s listing of wealthiest people pander to our inherent desire to organize the elements of our environment from best to worst or most to least. Constructing and accurately perceiving such rank differences is fundamental to human nature (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006; Barkow, 1975). This compulsion to know “where things stand” is not, however, satiated in a single sitting but is instead updated and vigilantly monitored (see, e.g., annual university rankings and weekly athletic rankings). Implicit in peoples’ continuous attention to rank is the notion that rankings can and do change (Pettit, Yong, & Spataro, 2010; Sivanathan, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008).

Despite the multidisciplinary interest in social hierarchy and an emergent understanding that jockeying occurs within hierarchies (Bendersky & Hays, 2012; Porath, Overbeck, & Pearson, 2008), a consideration of rank change is conspicuously absent. We therefore asked a fundamental question about how rank change influences social judgments: Are those who have ascended the hierarchy viewed differently than those who have descended to an equivalent rank? We contend that hierarchical change provides an important context for both the calculus of status judgment and its downstream behaviors.

Status Momentum

People’s evaluations of others are shaped by their knowledge of and preexisting beliefs about the social world (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Sherman, Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000). Instead of evaluating an individual on the basis of an attribute or a constellation of attributes, perceivers often rely on contextual and categorical factors to guide their valuation (Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Tajfel, 1969). That is, generic beliefs and schemas about the world steer how new information is processed (Neisser, 1976; Schank & Abelson, 1977).

A neglected but pervasive contextual feature of social hierarchy—one likely to impact status judgments—is whether an actor’s current rank has been preceded by a rank-based change (i.e., ascent or descent). Specifically, humans have internalized the physical principle of momentum (Finke & Shyi, 1988; Freyd & Finke, 1984): Much as objects in motion may not stop immediately upon application of a resisting force, so too can mental representations of social objects continue on their trajectory, thanks to an analogous momentum (Markman & Guenther, 2007). For this reason, evaluative judgments about, for example, an actor’s status are embellished by schematic forces that guide information processing in an expectancy-consistent manner. Given the dynamic nature in which actors within hierarchies soar and sink, intertemporal changes in rank may provide a historical context that is analogous to physical movement, leading observers’ valuations of an actor’s status to be colored by schematic expectations drawn from physical principles of momentum. Thus, actors who have recently ascended the hierarchy will be seen as higher status, and actors who have descended the hierarchy will be seen as lower status, than will those who maintained their position, even if they hold an objectively equivalent final rank.

Study 1

In Study 1, we tested the prediction above and also sought to rule out an alternative framing-based account. Specifically, actors ascending in rank may be seen as higher status and actors descending in rank may be seen as lower status simply because lower and higher comparison points, respectively, have been made salient for each. If such effects are due to framing, then making salient another actor at a lower rank should yield status judgments that are similar to those reported for actors who ascended from that rank, and similarly, making salient another actor at a higher rank should yield status judgments that are similar to those reported for actors who descended from that rank.

We predicted instead that actors ascending in rank are seen as higher status and actors descending in rank are seen as lower status because of the extrapolation of their hierarchical trajectory and consequent expectations of an even higher future rank in the former case and lower future rank in the latter. Although an implicit comparison to another position exists for both accounts, we contend that schematic expectations of momentum go beyond simple framing, such that actors ascending in rank will be seen as higher in status than those implicitly compared with another actor of lower rank, and actors descending in rank will be seen as lower in status than those implicitly compared with another actor of higher rank.

Method

Participants (N = 269) were randomly assigned either to experimental conditions or to a control condition. The experimental conditions had a 2 (rank change, framing) × 2 (positive, negative) design.¹

Participants in the rank-change conditions were instructed to imagine “Lee” as a member of a 10-person informal work group in which differences in status (i.e., respect, prestige, admiration) existed but there were no differences in power or titles. In the positive-rank-change condition, Lee was described as previously having been ranked the sixth-highest status group member; however, Lee’s rank had recently risen a great deal, leaving Lee ranked fourth. For participants in the negative-rank-change condition, Lee was described as previously having been ranked the second-highest status group member; however, Lee’s rank had recently dropped a great deal, leaving Lee ranked fourth.

Participants in the framing conditions were instructed to simply imagine two members of a 10-person informal workgroup: Lee, ranked fourth, and another member ranked sixth (positive-framing condition) or second (negative-framing condition) in status. In the control condition, Lee was ranked fourth over time.

Participants then rated Lee’s status and prestige and the degree to which Lee was respected and admired, compared with other group members, using item anchors from 1 (lowest) to 9 (highest). Scores for these four items were averaged to create a composite measure of status (α = .92).

Results

A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 205) = 24.38, p < .001. As predicted, Lee was judged as higher status in the positive-change condition (M = 6.60, SD = 0.66) than in the no-change control condition (M = 6.05, SD = 1.06), t(264) = 3.26, p = .013, d = 0.61, and as higher status in the no-change control condition than in the negative-change condition (M = 5.24, SD = 0.85), t(264) = 4.63, p < .001, d = 0.83. Critically, and ruling out a framing-based account, results showed that Lee was judged as higher status in the positive-change condition than in the positive-framing condition (M = 5.90, SD = 1.04), t(264) = 3.86, p = .001, d = 0.80, and as lower status in the negative-change condition than in the negative-framing condition (M = 5.73, SD = 0.86), t(264) = 2.73, p = .068, d = 0.57. Neither of the framing conditions differed from the control condition, ps > .50.²

Study 2

Changes in rank are a reality for many universities, as exemplified by annual academic ranking guides. We anticipated that universities that had recently ascended the hierarchy would be seen as higher status than would those that had descended to arrive at the same rank. Moreover, because status can signal value (Podolny, 1993), we predicted that tuition recommendations would be higher for ascending universities than descending ones, a relationship accounted for by differential status evaluations.

Method

Participants (N = 103) who had been randomly assigned to either a positive-rank-change condition or a negative-rank-change condition received instructions to imagine themselves as a consultant helping University X set its tuition for the coming year. Participants in the positive-rank-change condition read that although University X was ranked 15th in 2011, it had moved up four places in the 2012 rankings and was currently ranked higher, as the 11th-best university in the United States. Participants in the negative-rank-change condition read that although University X was ranked 7th in 2011, it had moved down four places in the 2012 rankings and was currently ranked lower, as the 11th-best university in the United States.

After reading the passage, participants rated University X’s status and prestige and the degree to which it was respected and admired, compared with other universities, using a 100-point drop-down menu (1 = lowest, 100 = highest); scores were averaged to create a composite measure of status (α = .89). Participants then indicated how much (if any) its tuition should be adjusted, using a scale from 1 (decrease 20%) to 9 (increase 20%), with a midpoint of 5 (no change).

Results

University X was judged as higher status in the positive-change condition (M = 82.33, SD = 8.77) than in the negative-change condition (M = 77.54, SD = 14.24), F(1, 102) = 4.38, p = .039, d = 0.41. Moreover, participants in the positive-change condition (M = 5.60, SD = 1.08) and the negative-change condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.26) differed in their tuition recommendations, F(1, 102) = 24.37, p < .001, d = 0.97. Compared with recommending no change, positive-change participants recommended a tuition increase, t(56) = 4.16, p < .001, whereas negative-change participants recommended a decrease, t(45) = 2.93, p = .005. As anticipated, bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) indicated that recommendations to adjust tuition based on changes in rank were explained by status judgments (95% confidence interval, CI = [0.014, 0.430]).

Study 3

Consumer decision making is an arena in which status inexorably influences both purchasing decisions (Frank, 2000; Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010) and pricing strategies (Shankar & Bolton, 2004). We anticipated that the amount of money people would be willing to pay (WTP) would be higher for a product that had ascended the hierarchy than for one that had descended it, even if the two products arrived at the same final rank, and that status judgments would mediate this relationship.

Method

Participants (N = 55) were assigned to either a positive-rank-change condition or a negative-rank-change condition. In the positive-rank-change condition, participants read that a luxury-lifestyle magazine’s “2009 Best of the Best” watch ranking ranked TAG Heuer in sixth place. TAG steadily increased in ranking over the next 2 years. After being ranked sixth in 2009, TAG moved up to be ranked fifth in 2010 and is currently ranked fourth in 2011. In the negative-rank-change condition, participants read that a luxury-lifestyle magazine’s “2009 Best of the Best” watch ranking ranked TAG Heuer in second place. TAG steadily decreased in ranking over the next 2 years. After being ranked second in 2009, TAG moved down to be ranked third in 2010 and is currently ranked fourth in 2011.

Participants rated TAG’s status and prestige and the degree to which it was respected and admired, in relation to other luxury watch brands, using a 100-point drop-down menu (1 = lowest, 100 = highest); scores for these four items were averaged to create a composite measure of status (α = .93). Participants then reported the maximum WTP (in U.S. dollars) for a new TAG watch.

Results

Status judgments of TAG were higher in the positive-change condition (M = 80.55, SD = 9.94) than in the negative-change condition (M = 71.95, SD = 13.66), F(1, 54) = 7.17, p = .010, d = 0.72. WTP for a TAG watch was also higher in the positive-change condition (M = $1,484.46, SD = $1,506.78) than in the negative-change condition (M = $736.67, SD = $820.64), F(1, 54) = 5.17, p = .027, d = 0.62. As predicted, bootstrapping indicated that the effect of rank-based change on WTP for a TAG watch was explained by judgments of TAG’s current status (95% CI = [133.61, 623.84]).

Study 4

One palpable social benefit of status is that it affords an actor the ability to influence other people’s behavior (Berger & Conner, 1974). We therefore predicted that actors who had ascended the hierarchy would have more influence than would those who had descended it—despite holding the same rank—and that status judgments would mediate the relationship between rank change and influence.

Method

Participants (N = 121) were seated at laboratory computer terminals with the understanding that they were participating in a study on general knowledge. Participants were told that they had been assigned a partner—described as a student who played in a trivia league—who would advise them on their answer to a trivia question. Players in this trivia league were assigned to subleagues on the basis of their performance; in order from highest to lowest status, these were Platinum, Gold, Silver, Bronze, and Copper Leagues. Participants in the positive-change condition learned that their partner had initially been in the Bronze League but had since moved up to the Silver League. Participants in the negative-change condition learned that their partner had initially been in the Gold League but had since moved down to the Silver League.

Participants were then asked “What year was Mozart born?” and offered an initial guess. After responding, participants received their partner’s advice of 1770 and then provided their final answer. Participants also reported their partner’s status in relation to the other trivia players, using a scale from 1 (lowest) to 9 (highest).

Results

Partners were judged to have higher status in the positive-change condition (M = 5.68, SD = 1.18) than in the negative-change condition (M = 5.08, SD = 1.19), F(1, 120) = 7.52, p = .007, d = 0.51.³ Critically, partners were more influential (as indicated by a smaller difference between the partner’s advice and participants’ final answers) in the positive-change condition (M = 20.79, SD = 28.33) than in the negative-change condition (M = 37.75, SD = 46.92), F(1, 120) = 5.86, p = .017, d = 0.44. This effect held when we controlled for differences in initial estimates. Finally, bootstrapping again indicated that the effect of rank change on acceptance of the partner’s influence was explained by status judgments (95% CI = [1.10, 9.25]).

Study 5

The basis for our predictions in our first four studies was that the principle of momentum is internalized and applied to social objects, thereby allowing schema-driven beliefs—those which extrapolate an actors’ trajectory to predict his or her ranking at a future point in time—to shape judgments of the actor’s present status. Therefore, we predicted that expectations of future status would mediate the relationship between rank change and current-status judgments.

In Study 5, we also sought to rule out demand effects as an alternative explanation for the effects observed in previous studies by considering participants’ status evaluations of both others and themselves. An explanation based on demand effects would imply that judgments of one’s own status and that of others should be equivalent; however, an explanation rooted in individuals’ reliance on schematic beliefs would imply that status judgments are susceptible to people’s enduring motivation to protect the integrity of the self (Baumeister, 1998; Kunda, 1990). This motive should therefore influence when people use or abandon schematic beliefs. The reliance on schematic processing when judging an ascent in rank—which results in assigning a status premium to others—should also hold for the self, given that this would support the need for self-integrity. However, when judging a descent in rank, assigning the same status tax to the self as would be levied on others is counter to people’s motive to protect their egos, and should then lead to a break from schema reliance. Therefore, we predicted that participants would give an equivalent status boost to themselves and to others for an ascent in hierarchy; however, counter to both demand-effect and framing-based accounts, the usual tax levied on others for descent should be relaxed when this judgment concerns the self.

Method

Participants (N = 248) were randomly assigned to a 3 (rank change: positive, negative, no change) × 2 (focal actor: self, other) factorial design. Participants in the self condition saw the word you in all descriptions of scenarios and measures, and participants in the other condition saw the name Lee in all descriptions of scenarios and measures.

Participants in the self positive-rank-change condition were instructed to imagine that they were part of an 11-person group and that, based on the value they had initially brought to the group, they had been ranked eighth in status. However, they had gained status over time, first gaining one spot to become ranked seventh and then another to become ranked sixth. Participants in the other positive-rank-change condition were instructed to imagine a scenario that was the same except that it involved Lee rather than themselves.

Participants in the self negative-rank-change condition were instructed to imagine that they were part of an 11-person group and that, based on the value they had initially brought to the group, they had been ranked fourth in status. However, they had lost status over time, first losing one spot to become ranked fifth and then another to become ranked sixth. Participants in the other negative-rank-change condition were instructed to imagine a scenario that was the same except that it involved Lee rather than themselves.

In the self no-change control condition, participants were instructed to imagine that they were part of a group and that, based on the value they had initially brought to the group, they had been ranked sixth in status. There had been no change in their rank at any point in time. In the other no-change control condition, participants were instructed to imagine a scenario that was the same except that it involved Lee rather than themselves.

Participants then rated, using a 100-point drop-down menu (1 = lowest; 100 = highest), their own or Lee’s current status and prestige and the degree to which they or Lee were currently respected and admired, and the degree of status, prestige, respect, and admiration they expected themselves or Lee to have in the future. Scores for these items were averaged to create composite measures of current status (α = .93) and expected future status (α = .97).

Results

As would be expected given peoples’ tendency not to overestimate their status in comparison to that of others under stable conditions (Anderson et al., 2006), we observed no differences between status judgments of the self (M = 53.54, SD = 9.99) and of Lee (M = 52.86, SD = 10.13) in the no-change control conditions, t(248) < 1, n.s. These conditions were collapsed into a single comparison control condition.

A 2 (rank change: positive vs. negative) × 2 (focal actor: self vs. other) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 192) = 4.67, p = .032. As anticipated, current-status judgments of the self (M = 62.30, SD = 13.83) and of Lee (M = 62.83, SD = 15.30) in the positive-change conditions did not differ, and each were higher than current-status judgments in the control condition, ts(243) > 3.5, ps < .006, ds > 0.74. Moreover, current-status judgments in the self negative-change condition (M = 54.37, SD = 13.41) did not differ from those in the control condition, t(243) < 1, n.s., and were higher than status judgments in the other negative-change condition (M = 46.07, SD = 13.98), t(243) = 3.03, p = .028, d = 0.61. Further, status judgments in the other negative-change condition were lower than they were in the control condition, t(243) = 2.73, p = .069, d = 0.58. Finally, and in support of our proposed mechanism, bootstrapping indicated that the interactive effect (Rank Change × Focal Actor) on current status judgments was explained by expectations of future status (95% CI = [0.54, 4.00]).

General Discussion

Across five studies, people, institutions, and products were judged as higher status when their current position had been preceded by a hierarchical ascent rather than a descent—a judgment rooted in expectations of an actor’s future status—with significant downstream consequences (for, i.e., pricing recommendations, WTP, and influence accepted from someone else). These effects were moderated by the involvement of the self: Participants afforded themselves and others an equivalent status premium for ascending the hierarchy; however they pardoned themselves the status tax levied on others for a descent.

With these results we offer, to our knowledge, the first demonstration of how rank change affects how an actor’s current status is judged and acted upon. Specifically, whereas much is known about how ordinal rank-based status differences—examined at a single snapshot in time—impact an array of outcomes, we instead examined how prior hierarchical change informs people’s expectations about the future and thus guides their current status judgments. In doing so, we empirically demonstrated the utility of developing a perspective on social status that is more nuanced and dynamic than the predominant static approach.

Whereas the physical world is governed by formal laws, the architecture of humans’ social world seems to be administered through schematic beliefs that shape their understanding. Knowledge of how status judgments are formed in a dynamic world offers insights into a range of important phenomena (e.g., consumption, promotion or demotion, and college application and decisions) poised for future study.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We thank Joe Magee, Evan Polman, and Yuval Rottenstreich for helpful comments on a prior version of this manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.

Notes

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