Abstract
Original article: Jeong, M., Minson, J. A., & Gino, F. (2020). In generous offers I trust: The effect of first-offer value on economically vulnerable behaviors. Psychological Science, 31, 644–653. doi:10.1177/0956797620916705
Recently, the authors became aware of some minor errors that occurred while they were merging the different .csv files provided by the research assistants who coded the data. These errors, which occurred only in Study 1, do not affect the interpretation of the results or the wording of the text. This Corrigendum is correcting the affected values in the following passages:
In the final paragraph of the Study 1 Method (p. 647), the fourth sentence is being updated as follows: “The two research assistants had a high agreement rate: They agreed with respect to test rides on 92.3% of the messages and with respect to negative disclosures on 95.0% of the messages.”
The first three paragraphs of the Study 1 Results (p. 647) are being replaced with the following: Not surprisingly, high first offers generated more replies (79.4%) than did low first offers (62.1%), χ2(1, N = 513) = 18.48, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the odds ratio (OR) = [1.58, 3.48], p < .001, Cramér’s V = .190. In their responses to the buyer, 43.3% of sellers overall included a counteroffer; 45.6% of sellers who received high offers and 40.3% of sellers who received low offers responded with a counteroffer, χ2(1) = 1.04, p = .309.1 Importantly, among the sellers who responded, 46.1% of those who received high first offers agreed to a test ride with no collateral, whereas only 32.1% of sellers who received low first offers agreed to this condition, χ2(1, N = 363) = 7.30, 95% CI for the OR = [1.18, 2.79], p = .007, Cramér’s V = .142. Our results held when we considered the entire population of sellers contacted: 36.6% of sellers who received high first offers agreed to a test ride, compared with only 19.9% of sellers who received low first offers, χ2(1, N = 513) = 17.54, 95% CI for the OR = [1.56, 3.45], p < .001, Cramér’s V = .184. Interestingly, we also found that 16.7% of the sellers who received high first offers disclosed negative information about the bike in their responses, whereas only 6.9% of the responses from sellers who received low first offers did so, χ2(1, N = 363) = 7.82, 95% CI for the OR = [1.32, 5.50], p = .005, Cramér’s V = .147. Again, our effect held when we looked at the original sample size: 13.2% of sellers who received high offers disclosed negative information, compared with only 4.3% of sellers who received low offers, χ2(1, N = 513) = 12.79, 95% CI for the OR = [1.68, 6.86], p < .001, Cramér’s V = .151. Thus, receiving a more desirable first offer led sellers to disclose more undesirable information about their bike, such as information about dents, scratches, and flat tires. The more favorable a deal was, the more willing participants seemed to be to disclose information that could potentially jeopardize that deal.
Relatedly, in Note 1 (p. 653), the original first sentence is being deleted, and the values are being updated in the remaining sentence. The full note will thus read, “Sellers who received low offers counteroffered with 82.41% of the list price, whereas sellers who received high offers counteroffered with 88.27% of the list price, t(89.02) = −4.64, p < .001.”