Abstract
The philosopher Max Scheler (1874–1928) set out a hierarchical theory of values and emotions in the early twentieth century. This inspired Kurt Schneider to distinguish two sorts of depressive illness, each conforming to a Störung (disorder) in different levels of Scheler’s hierarchy. No other psychopathologist, except Stanghellini, gave the matter much attention. I believe that Scheler’s theory is a rich source of insight into psychopathology, general and neuropsychiatric. I therefore give an account of Scheler’s scheme, review its extant applications (Schneider’s, Stanghellini’s), and present suggestions as to its continuing potential relevance in a wide range of psychopathological conditions.
Introduction
Max Scheler (1874–1928) published his most famous work Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values) in two sections in Husserl’s journal of phenomenology, one in 1913 and the other in 1916. It was translated into English in 1973 and is usually referenced ‘Formalism’ (Scheler, 1913–1916/1973). The presentation of Scheler’s hierarchical scheme of values is in the first part (1973: 81–110), that on emotions in the second part (1973: 239–369). There is some discussion of the same matters as they apply to love and sympathy in his next most well known work, Zur Phänomenologie der Sympathiegefühl und von Liebe und Hass (On the Phenomenology of Feelings of Sympathy and on Love and Hate). This was also published in 1913, later editions being retitled Wesen und Formen der Sympathie and translated as The Nature of Sympathy (Scheler, 1913/1954). Formalism, however, sets out the matter comprehensively and succinctly, as nowhere else in Scheler’s writings.
There were four levels in the hierarchy. Frings (1997) – the joint translator of Formalism, the editor of Scheler’s Collected Works for decades, and his most knowledgeable commentator – saw ramifications of this hierarchy throughout Scheler’s philosophy. But all such ramifications, also hierarchically arranged, for example sort of emotion experienced, sets of iconic human figures embodying such values and who subconsciously influence a human being’s course of life, derive from the primacy, and the independence from any knower, of value. I shall discuss all this in the following. Sometimes Scheler mentions a fifth level of value – usefulness – whose position in the scheme is uncertain and which has no correlative feeling. I shall discuss this too, along with a further problem concerning the different labels given to the four sets of values in sections 1 and 2 of Formalism.
I do not intend to consider Scheler’s place in philosophy as a whole, nor to pigeonhole him as representing some form of ‘ism’. What I do want to stress, however, is that my encounter with his writings was quite revelatory, and I wish to convey this to the reader with the hope that he or she will be tempted to explore Scheler’s writings on this and other topics. Something in Scheler’s works – whether stemming from his profound acquaintance with psychology and psychiatry, or whether arising from his superb insights into the nature of the human being – seemed to open a door into the theoretical basis of psychopathology that I had not found hitherto in anything I had read.
The structure of the present article is as follows: first an account of Scheler’s hierarchical systems of value, emotion and the iconic human types who embody them is presented; then the writings of the few psychopathologists who have appreciated his construct; and finally, suggestions as to Scheler’s potential relevance to various sorts of psychopathology.
Scheler’s hierarchy of values (and ramifications of this throughout the human being)
There are, according to Scheler (1913–1916/1973), four fundamentally different sorts of values available to the human being, two of which are also open to the non-human animal. They are organized in a hierarchy, separate levels of which contain values restricted to agreeableness, vitality, mentality, or holiness, respectively, from bottom to top (of which non-human animals can only partake of the bottom two). There are positive and negative examples of the generic values at each level. What is evaluated at the lowest level is confined to whether something is agreeable or disagreeable. At the vital level there is a cluster of values, the common denominator of which is the beneficial quality of something to promote life. To this end, something can be noble or vulgar, vigorous or lethargic, excellent or tawdry, wholesome or rotten, or invite appetite or disgust. The mental level encompasses all those values which are known only to someone in possession of Geist (always tricky to translate into English, but meaning something like ‘spirit and higher mind’). Scheler actually calls these values ‘geistigen Werte’, and gives various examples: (1) the sense of beauty or ugliness and aesthetic values in general; (2) the appreciation that something can be right or wrong in a legal or moral sense (as opposed to correct or incorrect), which grounds the notions of society and statehood; (3) the ability to grasp that things can be true or false, which underpins the very possibility of philosophy and science; (4) awareness of culture in general; and (5) the facility to love or hate (as opposed to simply liking or not liking something – see below). The fourth level of values refers exclusively to those pertaining to the heilig (holy) and unheilig (unholy, sacrilegious(?) might be better in English).
The higher levels of values are distinguished from the lower in four respects: (1) the higher endure more – compare a work of art with the taste of wine; (2) the higher are less divisible – compare again a work of art (whose value is ruined if cut up) with a piece of cloth (whose value only halves if cut in two); (3) the higher found the lower – ‘the value of what is useful is founded on what is agreeable’, Scheler (1913–1916/1973: 94) says, indicating that this occasionally introduced fifth level in his scheme is the lowest of all); and (4) the higher evoke a greater ‘depth of contentment … nothing to do with pleasure’ (p. 96).
To each level of value there corresponds, in any knower capable of grasping the value, a specific set of feelings, also positive or negative. To agreeableness there are sensible feelings (sinnlichen Fühlens) such as pleasure or pain. To vitality (Lebenswerten) there are feelings (Lebensgefühle) of liveliness or languor, being glad or gloomy about something, a sense of courage or anxiety, and appetite or disgust. To mental values there correspond aesthetic feelings of a sense of beauty or ugliness, joy or sorrow (as opposed to being ‘gay’ or ‘not gay’) and respect or disrespect. Holiness or its absence are registered by feelings of bliss or despair.
These fundamental sorts of feelings, moreover, are also distinguished from one another by certain characteristics. The sensible feelings of pleasure or pain are localized in parts of the body, are impervious to any act of attention or control, are not directly related to the human being as a person but are rather simply there as ‘dead’ facts present in time now as opposed to auguring some future event, and are incapable of being reproduced in the same form either in ourselves at some later date or contagiously from others at the actual time. Vital feelings, such as vigour or fatigue, are not localized, but suffuse the ‘lived body’ (Leib); they manifest a unity unlike the patchy disposition of sensible feelings, and they have an intentional nature that can reveal advantages or dangers yet to come (think of anxiety). Mental feelings are directly connected to the self (‘Ich’; the translators used the word ‘Ego’) so that the feeler says ‘I feel sad’, whereas vital feelings pervade the body rather than the self. Feelings derived from the registering of values of holiness are independent even of the self and are not about anything at all (which mental feelings are), but bathe everything in inner and outer worlds with their effects. They are the ‘correlates of the moral value of our personal being, and for this reason they are the metaphysical and religious self-feelings par excellence’ (p. 343).
To complement all this, there are clusters of iconic people who personify these levels of values and feelings, who influence an individual human being in a profound and subtle way throughout life, and who essentially form their character through actual meetings with larger-than-life exemplars (think Uncle Bertie) or through fictional encounters (James Bond or Kafka’s K). This is set out in an article entitled Vorbilder und Führer (Exemplars of person and leaders; Scheler, 1933/1987). Personifying the value of agreeableness and the feeling of pleasure is the man-about-town (who knows where to buy the best oysters, for example). The vital level is represented by the hero (whose courage is tested to the limit). Then come the artist, jurist and scientist who embody aesthetic, legal and truth-seeking values at a mental level. Above all these, there is the founder of a religion – Christ or Mohammed, and their saints and sages – whose very lives personify the human being as a moralist.
All this is spell-binding and remarkably coherent, save for a few inconsistencies and questionable translations. One is the labelling of the third level of values in section 1 of Formalism as geistigen Werte, but in section 2 of the book the emotions corresponding to values of holiness are referred to as geistigen Gefühle. The translators render seelischen as ‘psychic’, but this does not properly denote what Scheler is talking about and I prefer the term ‘mental’. Scheler’s overall scheme (ambiguous in English because the untranslatable word geistig) seems best conveyed by values of agreeableness, vitality, mentality and holiness, with the corresponding emotions being sensible, vital, ‘mental’ and religious. As for ‘usefulness’, Frings (1997) confidently places this between values of agreeableness and vital values, but Scheler says quite specifically that values of agreeableness found usefulness. Furthermore, what Scheler appreciates, more than anyone else, is the fundamental difference in certain feelings yet the superficial similarity in the vocabulary used to refer to them. This becomes particularly important when we move on to discuss Schneider’s separation of two sorts of depressive illness. Positive feelings occur at all four levels – pleasure, being glad about something (Sichfreuen), joy (Freude) and blissfulness (Seligkeit) – as do negative feelings – displeasure, gloominess (Betrübtheit), sadness (Traurigkeit) and despair (Verzweiflung). Frings and Funk translate betrübt as sad, which is not what Scheler meant, as he said that vital feelings are directed to the future which sadness is not, whereas gloominess is. We shall see that one psychopathologist actually considered that the loss of the ability to experience Traurigkeit (sadness) was at the core of endogenous depression. This makes no sense unless sadness and gloominess are separate emotional states, and makes no sense either of Schneider’s pinpointing endogenous depression to the vital level of emotion unless gloominess is a vital emotion and sadness a mental emotion – see below. It is therefore crucial to be aware of phenomenological differences between emotions if we are to make any sense out of psychopathology.
Extant applications of Scheler’s hierarchy of values and emotions
The only two psychopathologists to have seen the potential psychopathological relevance of Scheler’s scheme are Kurt Schneider (1920/2012) and Stanghellini and Ballerini (2007).
Kurt Schneider knew Scheler personally and professionally. In his 1920 article he gives a good account of the section on emotion in Formalism which was summarized earlier. He then moves on to a discussion as to how two sorts of depressive illness – endogenous depression and reactive depression – might be characterized by a Störung (disturbance) in different layers of Scheler’s scheme. An endogenous depression, according to Schneider (1920/2012: 205–6), is one where there are:
disturbances of feelings of the lived body and vital feelings can come to dominate the clinical picture of endogenous depression … Matters are different in reactive depression. It is not as if disturbances of vital feelings … are totally absent in reactive depression; however, they are much rarer and most importantly they are exclusively secondary symptoms. The primary disturbance in reactive depression is the disturbance of mental feelings.
What Schneider further appreciates from Scheler’s formulation is that a person can simultaneously experience several emotions, if each is from a different layer. We have not covered this so far, but it is something that Scheler brings forward in support of his stratified system. Someone grieving, for example, whose sadness is a negative emotion at the mental level, can nevertheless experience a positive feeling of pleasure, at the sensible level, on tasting a glass of wine. If all feelings (we are using emotions and feelings interchangeably in this article) were on the same level, with merely different intensities and incidental qualities being invoked to explain their different nature, as virtually all previous theorists of emotion assumed, this simultaneous having of two contrasting emotions would be impossible. Scheler gives other examples – the martyred saint blissfully accepting pain. Schneider then realizes that this aspect of Scheler’s theory neatly explains the otherwise paradoxical situation of someone in the throes of an endogenous depression who complains bitterly that he or she has no feelings, a not uncommon psychopathological fact, and one which no-one else has been able to explain. But if the endogenous depressive is feeling something – whether appropriately or inappropriately (see below) – at the vital level, but is not feeling anything at the mental level, then Scheler’s scheme, which allows preservation of feelings at one level and dilapidation of feelings at another level, is tailor-made to account for this.
Schneider’s application of Scheler’s philosophical notions about emotions seems, therefore, quite revolutionary and revelatory. They have, furthermore, a bearing on the long-standing nosological debate about whether depressive illness is unitary or manifold (e.g. Kendell, 1976): there are at least two varieties according to this Schelerian-Schneiderian exegesis. The explication of a hitherto inexplicable aspect of depressive psychopathology – anhedonia with distress about this very anhedonia – seems to be a further bonus. No-one else ever took up these nuggets of wisdom, which seem now quite astounding.
It should be said, as critique, however, that it is not clear what Schneider meant by a disturbance (Störung) at the mental and vital levels. He says that:
It is possible that the disturbance of the vital feelings is so severe that psychic [mental, in our scheme] feelings cannot actually manifest themselves, in a similar way to how people can come to be dominated by strong feelings of pain. (Schneider, 1920/2012: 206)
In other words, he is saying that emotions at one level are so overwhelming that they swamp emotions at another level. If so, and it is not at all certain that this can explain the overall psychopathology of a depressive illness (see below), why does he keep referring to the primary problem in both endogenous and reactive depression as a Störung (disturbance) at some level? Or, perhaps more to the point, what does he mean by Störung? Is it a quantitative change – too much, too little? Or could it be, as I argue below, that in the case of endogenous depression the vital layer of feelings is unimpaired, whereas the mental feelings are defunct or dilapidated? As a result, the human being thus afflicted would be running on an intrinsically normal vital layer of feelings. This would only be apparently morbid because their companion layer of mental feeling, which complements this and contributes to the overall panoply of feelings any normal person has available, would be non-effective. Any Störung in endogenous depression would not then be at the level of vital feelings but one level above.
In favour of this formulation is the article by Schulte (1961) entitled ‘Nicht-traurig-sein-können im Kern melancholischer Erlebens’ (not-to-be-able-to-be-sad as the core of the melancholic’s experience), which, without invoking anything that Scheler wrote, proposes that Traurigkeit (sadness), a mental emotion in Scheler’s scheme, is not only lost in at least one sort of depressive illness but is the very core psychopathological phenomenon that needs explaining. Both Schulte and Schneider refer to the fact that someone in the middle of an endogenous depressive illness who hears of the death of someone they would hitherto have grieved for cannot do this, that is, cannot experience Traurigkeit, until they recover from the depressive illness. Schulte even says that in his experience the onset of grieving is the first sign that the depressive illness is on the mend, in other words, the return of the ability to experience sadness heralds the remission of the illness. The ‘depressive’ is not therefore sad at all, but is he or she who cannot be sad. Mourning and melancholia (Freud, 1917/1957) and the entire evidence base for cognitive psychology’s intervention in depression are utterly undermined by this simple psychopathological observation. Scheler’s thesis, Schneider’s application of it and Schulte’s independent insight all look to be critical stages in what should be a comprehensive psychopathological re-evaluation of depressive illness. Not a bit of it: a recent, mainstream American textbook on Melancholia (Taylor and Fink, 2006: 15) repeats the establishment view that melancholia is based on ‘pervasive sadness’.
Stanghellini and Ballerini’s (2007) study of ‘values in persons with schizophrenia’ is the only other psychopathological investigation in the entire 100 years since Scheler’s Formalism appeared which acknowledges his, Scheler’s, philosophical feat. It is not so closely linked to Scheler’s scheme of values as was Schneider’s, and the concept of value adopted by the authors deviates from Scheler’s. Nevertheless, it is an arresting counterpoint to Schneider’s take on Scheler. The authors are interested in what, at root, makes the schizophrenic who he or she is: what is the ‘anthropological and existential matrix they arise from’, as the authors put it. They find, during in-depth interviews, that the schizophrenic has feelings of radical uniqueness and exceptionality, and that this stems from a sense of being beholden to values which are ‘eccentric’ vis-a-vis the commonality of values which drive their contemporaries. The schizophrenic feels the weight of ‘metaphysical concerns’ and feels excluded from ‘socially shared values’. Stanghellini and Ballerini do not place all this precisely in Scheler’s hierarchy, but it is clear from their findings and remarks that, unlike their ‘normal’ contemporaries, the schizophrenic is over-reliant in their life on the highest values in Scheler’s system – geistig as opposed to vital.
Potential applications of Schelerian philosophy of values and emotions
Scheler’s scheme of values and emotions is only one aspect of a rich philosophical body of thought of potential relevance to psychopathology. Even restricting discussion to the topic of values and emotions, there are sufficient untapped veins to inform our subject much more than the meagre examples so far would suggest.
Anorexia nervosa
The psychopathology of this serious and life-threatening condition has been woefully neglected by the great psychopathologists of the twentieth century. British and North American researchers have been most active in the field, and the competing psychopathological theories which have emerged can be boiled down to the following: (a) ‘morbid fear of fatness’ (Russell, 1970, although he changed his view later; see below) or a ‘phobia’ of the same ilk (Crisp, 1970); (b) a variety of depression (Cantwell et al., 1977); (c) an obsessive-compulsive neurosis (Holden, 1990); (d) a disorder of body image (Bruch, 1974: ch. 6); and (e) ‘abstinence from food (from) some emotion’ (Lasègue, 1873), ‘want of appetite … due to a morbid mental state’ (Gull, 1874) and ‘lack of appetite … non-eating … inappetency’ (Russell, 1995). If the two originators of the condition and the most distinguished contemporary authority all concur that the essence of the condition has something to do with a lack of appetite, expressed precisely in the name of the condition – anorexia nervosa – then we should take this seriously. They had no acquaintance with philosophical notions of appetite, but it seems to me that they were right to concentrate on this aspect and to eschew any claim that the condition was a mere variety of some other neurotic condition.
Invoking Scheler’s scheme of values and emotions, anorexia nervosa is indeed a disorder of the valuation of food and the feelings engendered by this negative appraisal. Appetite, according to him, is a vital feeling, and therefore anorexia nervosa is a disorder of the vital evaluation of food and all its consequences. The other proposed explanations largely fall away when this crucial fact is appreciated. The core feeling engendered by food is not, however, disgust. Consider this autobiographical account:
I ate my breakfast. I ate 51 flakes … How do they make them, I wonder, each one, if you look carefully, as rugged and pitted as a rock face … look at the tray … A grilled cheese sandwich. Cheese is the hardest food to digest and it contaminates everything you eat it with … Everything sits on the tray, approximate, self-sufficient, unbreachable, as if sealed in an invisible skin … when the lunch tray arrives I decide I have to eat something … I choose a green apple and a cube of nondescript yellow cheese … First I slice the apple into quarters, then eighths, then sixteenths … I am too frightened to put a forkful of this in my mouth. At the moment I would rather die than eat. (Shute, 1992: 38, 46)
What we see here is rather a transformation of food into something inanimate – like a ‘rock face’, ‘unbreachable’, ‘sealed in an invisible skin’. It seems as if the whole vital lure of the food has been wiped out, just as in depressive illness the entire gamut of feelings at a mental level – joy and sadness – were obliterated.
The other explanations for anorexia nervosa – phobia, obsessional neurosis, depressive equivalent, body image disorder – cannot do justice to the psychopathological facts. For example, Von Gebsattel (1938/1958) made out a case for the obsessive-compulsive subject’s being at root disgusted with the seediness of everything, and engaged in cleaning rituals to ward all this off. But the anorexic, in the extract above at least, makes no mention of the sliminess or filthiness of food but is rather preoccupied with its non-vital nature. Anomalous bodily experiences of inappropriately deemed fatness are also on the cards as a primary trigger for the entire condition, but if this were so, why is it that a whole host of neuropsychiatric conditions with quite extreme body image disorders (Cutting, 1997: 260–3) do not lead to anorexia? The suggestions that anorexia nervosa is a phobia or a form of depression are, in my view, way off beam, because in both cases vital feelings – anxiety predominantly – are preserved, or exaggerated, not lost.
In summary, I propose that anorexia tout court is indeed the psychopathological core of anorexia nervosa and should inform further research and treatment.
Anxiety neurosis
Here there is no mystery, no radically competing hypotheses. Yet a Schelerian take on the condition seems to me to encapsulate the matter best of all. In Scheler’s scheme, anxiety is a vital feeling, largely experienced in the body, that something awful is about to happen. As a morbid state of affairs it must then be a mis-evaluation of the potential harm of some thing or situation. Vital feelings point to the future, predicting positive or negative outcomes of some developing situation, and morbid anxiety is therefore a feeling that something speciously untoward is about to happen.
Depressive illness (further considerations)
Schneider’s and Schulte’s deliberations on the nature of a depressive illness, considered above, were hugely insightful. But there are other aspects of this condition which are illuminated by Scheler’s hierarchy of values and emotions. Assuming, as I do, that an endogenous depressive illness (melancholia in other schemes) is characterized by a loss of feelings at the mental level (Schulte) and a preservation or exaggeration of feelings at the vital level (Schneider’s Störung being interpreted as an exaggeration here), then there might be other hitherto inexplicable psychopathological features which can be accommodated. One such is the sense of hopelessness or despair experienced by many such subjects.
Ratcliffe’s (2013) paper ‘What is it to lose hope?’ crystallizes the problem. He quotes autobiographical accounts of depressives who experienced ‘a paralysis of hope’, that ‘all sense of hope had vanished’ and that ‘there were no words to explain the depths of my despair’. Ratcliffe emphasizes that the depressive’s experience is not ‘loss of hopes’, but ‘loss of hope’. In other words, it is the not-being-able-to experience hope, not the particular things that one could hope for, that is at stake.
Schizophrenia (further considerations)
The relevance of Scheler’s scheme of values and emotions for the understanding of schizophrenia was first touched upon by Stanghellini and Ballerini (2007). The schizophrenic is he or she who is overly liable to evaluate their situation within a metaphysical, scientific or artistic paradigm. There is a considerable literature supporting this, from Minkowski’s (1927/1987) observations through to the vignettes on the matter provided by Naudin et al. (2000). What is not so well appreciated is that the loose collection of areas in which the schizophrenic exhibits compromised knowledge – known in mainstream psychiatry as negative symptoms and variously formulated within psychopathology as ‘lack of common sense’ (Blankenburg, 1969/2001) or a ‘loss of vital contact with reality’ (Minkowski, 1927/1987) – is best seen as de-valuations or mis-valuations of a whole region of values open to the human being. Minkowski’s core psychopathological insight about schizophrenia would carry more weight, in my view, if he had framed it within Scheler’s scheme of values. The schizophrenic, according to this revamped view, is he or she who lacks the wherewithal to evaluate the vital values in anything in his environment and world. Thus, he or she does not lack contact with reality, the nature of which and the means of grasping which Minkowski anyway leaves up in the air, but simply loses out on a whole realm of values concerning what is of vital concern to him or her.
Conclusions
Further suggested applications of Scheler’s scheme would be speculative, but I hope I have given enough information to inspire future psychopathological formulations based on his ideas.
Psychopathology always seems to be at a crossroads. Many articles during the twentieth century, for example Janzarik (1976/1987), reported a ‘crisis in psychopathology’. The thrust of these is that either biological or psychological or pragmatic solutions – the last geared to benefit pharmaceutical or legal parties – threaten to sideline and obscure what should be a pure scientific endeavour. Much of this criticism is itself a biased plea for some specific viewpoint.
What the deliberations in the present article show, I hope, is that if one takes the highest possible analysis of the human being – the philosophical – and chooses a philosopher who is exquisitely au fait with the topic of our concern, then a lot of the peculiarities of our subject simply melt away with the insight that such philosophy provides.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
