Abstract
A wall of red brick pried open, exposing different layers of paint, plaster, stone and cement: the cover of Benno Herzog’s book aptly illustrates what is at stake in Discourse Analysis as Social Critique. Like builders, critical discourse analysts are confronted with different materialities that form a complex whole. Like archaeologists, they have to look beneath the apparently smooth surface of the social world to understand its conditions of production and reproduction. And like architects, they have to account for the structural (in-)stabilities of the object they are looking at, the way its building blocks can constitute hard walls, crumbling ruins or largely imperceptible structures. On top of these tasks, Herzog calls on discourse analysts to extract the norms and principles to be used for social critique from the very object they look at, and not from another, external realm.
Herzog aims at contributing a new approach to critical strands of discourse studies (DS) by articulating empirical discourse analysis and post-structuralist discourse theory with Critical Theory in the Frankfurt School tradition. The volume’s contribution is twofold: on the one hand, it brings immanent critique – one of the key concepts of Critical Theory – into conversation with post-structuralist discourse theories in order to create a more thorough theoretical foundation for discourse analytic critique (Chapter 1). On the other, it applies the tools developed in discourse analysis to overcome the perceived empirical deficit of immanent critique (Chapter 2). A wealth of examples analysing discourses on meritocracy and same-sex marriage, practices of migration and aesthetic production well illustrate both aspects, making the argument refreshingly accessible at the same time (Chapter 3).
This well-written volume explores the epistemological, ontological and methodological coordinates of social critique. Building on the convincing argument that critique is a deeply social and discursive endeavour, Herzog specifies social critique as a practice that is anchored and aims at intervening in material realities in order to bring about change. In his exhaustive review, it becomes evident that critique can operate with different normative points of reference, making it necessary to distinguish between external, procedural, internal and immanent variants. While external critique works with norms that are not derived from the object of critique itself (classical critique of religion is cited as an example), procedural critique is mainly concerned with matters of process, and internal critique focuses on internal incoherences or contradictions of a given object (Herzog sees this at work in what is called ‘immanent critique’ in critical discourse analysis; p. 28).
For Herzog these modes of critique are ultimately flawed, because they risk leading to an infinitely regressive battle of (often implicit) norms, circular forms of reasoning or arbitrary standpoints (pp. 56–57). In contrast, he advocates for immanent critique, defined as a normative position that is developed from existing society that not only reveals prospects for social change but also contributes to that change. In this type of critique, the norms that we use are not taken from outside or from a specific procedure but directly from the object of critique. (pp. 28–29)
This allows for a dialectical analysis of the ‘normative surplus’ that is inherent in discourse and of the material conditions that structurally impede its realization.
Discourse analysis is introduced as a method that serves to scrutinize discursive and non-discursive realities alongside their normative anchoring in society, which eventually allows the formulation of a transformative critique. On one side, Herzog makes a powerful case for a materialist approach to discourse that, beyond its often clichéd representations as a mere textual analysis, is well capable of accounting for and intervening in discursive and non-discursive, even imperceptible realities. On the other side, his insistence on immanent critique also challenges the often lax and comfortable practice of critique in DS, which is indeed surprisingly ‘anti-discursive’ and mechanical at times. Against this background, conceiving of social critique as a discursive practice that works best when latched onto suitable points of connection – norms that are already established in society – is a convincing and useful strategy for discourse analysts who are interested in social change.
However, it could be argued that immanent critique hinges on a particular conceptualization of social change in terms of a transformative process of social learning and reproduction (p. 194), which might not be suitable and practicable in every context. Furthermore, Herzog’s own practice of immanent critique is ultimately tied to a meta-norm: ‘My hypothesis is that ultimately there is only one universal social norm: (human-made, i.e. social) suffering should be avoided. This norm can be used as a superlative norm with which to measure all other norms’ (p. 117). Especially against the background of Herzog’s discourse-theoretical framework, declaring this norm as ‘pre-scientific’ (p. 48) is not fully convincing. For instance, it does not sufficiently become clear how this norm substantially stands out against norms such as autonomy and liberty, which Herzog exemplarily criticizes in his book.
Discourse Analysis as Social Critique provides a balancing act that makes a highly valuable contribution to interdisciplinary DS: combining a thorough and convincing theoretical and methodological argument with accessible hands-on examples, this book is equally interesting as a teaching resource for students and scholars looking for a workable critical approach to discourse, as well as an inspiration for more advanced discourse analysts who seek to enrich their own practice of critique. Beyond DS, Herzog’s argument resonates with broader debates on criticality, reflexivity and materialist social theory, which form an ongoing concern across the social sciences and humanities.