Strategies of ideological polarisation in the online news media: A social actor analysis of Megawati Soekarnoputri

Abstract

This article examines strategies of ideological polarisation in the discourse of the Indonesian online news media site, Kompas.com. Applying Van Leeuwen’s model of social actor analysis and van Dijk’s concept of the ideological square, the study focuses on the representation of Megawati Soekarnoputri, leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) as an icon of ideological contestation during the 2014 presidential election. Situated in the era of digital platform convergence, the analysis uncovers a pattern of strategically ambiguous representations of Megawati and her apparently transgressive actions and interactions. This practice entices readers to ‘read between the lines’ and activate their ideological repertoire to determine in-group and out-group members. It also enables Kompas.com to pursue commercial objectives and navigate journalistic constraints by obscuring explicitly ideological content. The implications are discussed in terms of the impact of online news media discourse upon democratic political engagement, and women’s political participation.

Keywords

Discourse gender ideology Indonesia online news media polarisation social actor analysis

Introduction

The emergence of online news media and the 24-hour media cycle, and the subsequent decline of print media have impacted upon patterns of news production, consumption and dissemination patterns worldwide. As news media outlets converge with social media platforms, news is far more spreadable and interactive than ever before (Jenkins et al., 2013). In the new mediascape, internet users engage with the news by acts of monitoring, reading, scanning, clicking, commenting, sharing and re-sharing across a range of digital media platforms (Costera Meijer and Groot Kormelink, 2015). Operating within a business model targeting instantaneous audience engagement, news reports are often characterised by bite-sized information, simplified narratives, a focus on controversy, and the presence of polarising social actors and opinions (Lim, 2013b; Mihailidis and Viotty, 2017; Turner, 2018). While far more interactive and accessible than the traditional print media, online news media oriented towards reactive engagement can produce potentially undemocratic side effects.

As a highly influential institution, the news media can reflect, reinforce, or transform public opinion, ideological groupings and relations of power through its discourse. Ideological discourse is typically organised in a polarised way, which can in turn, sustain and reproduce social conflict, domination and inequality (van Dijk, 1998: 62). Van Dijk (1998: 267) explains that ideological discourse generally adheres to an ideological square, which emphasises the ‘good things’ of the in-group, and the ‘bad things’ of the out-group, and deemphasises the ‘bad things’ of the in-group, and the ‘good things’ of the out-group. Ultimately, polarisation in discourse can undermine inclusive and critical political participation, as groups simply seek to reproduce their own power and protect their own interests, while undermining the power and legitimacy of other groups (van Dijk, 2006). The critical study of polarisation in the rapidly expanding field of online news discourse is therefore crucial to evaluating conditions of democratic participation in political life.

Ideological discourse takes both explicit and implicit forms. In the online realm, the online dissemination of ‘fake news’ has become a way of challenging the legitimacy of rival groups, while reinforcing the legitimacy of the in-group through ‘hoax-based stories that perpetuate hearsay, rumors, and misinformation’ about ideological rivals (Mihailidis and Viotty, 2017: 444). While fake news is an area of global concern for the preservation of democratic political life (Turner, 2018), it is possible to debunk it through short investigation, and the identification of clear signs of inauthenticity. Less explicit, yet highly polarising representations of events and social actors are arguably more problematic, as readers may not immediately recognise the ideological messages embedded in the text. The concealment of biased information increases the likelihood of readers accepting journalistic opinions as true and correct, and aligning with an ideology ‘that is not necessarily in their best interests’ (van Dijk, 1995b: 11). Through exposure to strategically embedded ideological content ‘active consensus will replace passive or tacit consent’ (van Dijk, 1995b: 16), whereby ‘ideological control becomes virtually total, or hegemonic’ (van Dijk, 1995b: 16).

This article presents findings from the analysis of the representation of the prominent female Indonesian politician, Megawati Soekarnoputri at the centre of ideological contestation in the discourse of the mainstream Indonesian online news site, Kompas.com. The analysis spans the 24-months surrounding the 2014 presidential election from July 2014 to June 2015, and incorporates knowledge of the broader political context. In this antagonistic period, the legacy of authoritarian-era arche-politics incited the construction of a threatening out-group to consolidate in-group power (Duile and Bens, 2017), while individual political actors became icons of ideological contestation (Melissa, 2019). Using Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) as a theoretical and methodological framework, the analysis seeks out new evidence of how the emerging online news media portrays polarisation, while fulfilling commercial goals and navigating contextual constraints. This study goes beyond the superficial level of content, and conducts a detailed linguistic analysis of the discursive representation of Megawati, along with her actions and interactions with others in the online news discourse. In doing so, the study increases knowledge of the political significance of the online news media in Indonesia, and contributes to a growing transnational body of literature on the influence of online media discourse upon political life.

Focusing on a female social actor in a post-authoritarian, non-western context also delivers a more nuanced understanding of the practice of ideological polarisation, and increases knowledge of the role the online news media plays in determining women’s access to political power. Globally, women political leaders have gained heightened levels of public visibility and media attention due to their marked difference from the dominant male political norm (Raicheva-Stover and Ibroscheva, 2014). In Indonesia, biologically determined norms of wifehood and motherhood (kodrat), and obeying the husband (ikut suami) have long been a part of national gender ideology, and positioned women in a subordinate role to that of men (Bennett, 2005; Suryakusuma, 2011). Since 1998, however, Indonesian women have challenged the norm of depoliticised, subordinate womanhood, by gaining prominent roles in the Indonesian public discourse (Brenner, 2011; Hatley, 2008; Heryanto, 2008; Lim, 2013b; Robinson, 2015; White and Anshor, 2008).

Discourse practices in a digital media ecosystem

The growth of online news media and the effects of changing modes of news media production and consumption have attracted the attention of media scholars worldwide. Recognising the rapid changes taking place, Turner (2018) surmises that the activities of major news organisations online have ‘generated a wide range of potential social, cultural and political impacts, some of which at this point we can identify but do not sufficiently understand’ (p.10). As online media platforms converge with social media, media organisations move towards a business model based online audience reactions. The growing tendency to access online news on a mobile device rather than on a laptop (Costera Meijer and Groot Kormelink, 2015; Lim, 2013b) further reduces the depth of engagement, as audiences skim read news stories and moving rapidly between online media platforms. Hasell and Weeks (2016) suggest that news institutions produce reports focus on transgression, threat and conflict in a bid to stimulate an emotional response and information spreading online. Mihailidis and Viotty (2017) assert that during the 2016 US presidential election media reports like these perpetuated partisan ideologies, and reinforced boundaries between groups. Similar discourse practices are also evident in Indonesia. Lim (2017) identifies the formation of ‘algorithmic enclaves’ among Indonesian ‘netizens’ through their rapid-fire, continuous interaction with media online. Reflective of van Dijk’s ideological square, Lim asserts that self-perpetuating ideological-based groupings emerge as users seek to reinforce, express and defend their group-based beliefs, and denigrate the beliefs of others. Lim concludes that sectarianism and ideological polarisation flourish in Indonesia, eliminating space for critical political engagement.

Despite a preoccupation with audience reactions, scholars have also identified a somewhat paradoxical culture of self-censorship in the digital era, as journalists respond to commercial and political pressure. Hayes and Silke (2019) claim that an increasing reliance on freelance journalists has impacted on news production patterns. They assert that due to time and resource constraints and a precarious job market, freelancers self-censor, and avoid engaging in in-depth investigative journalism in order to maintain opportunities to work and meet deadlines. In Indonesian newsrooms, self-censorship also prevails; not only as a legacy of the 32 years of political oppression of the authoritarian New Order regime that ended in 1998, but also because of pressure on journalists from powerful alliances between national media conglomerates, business and political parties (Haryanto, 2010; Ida, 2009; Steele, 2013; Tapsell, 2012; Wijayanto, 2015). Further constraining journalistic freedom in the digital era, the 2008 Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) law contains a provision criminalising defamation and insult on the internet (Balfas, 2014). This law has been used opportunistically ‘against individuals and groups who express [critical] opinions on the internet and social media’ (Lim, 2013a: 134).

Understanding online news discourse through CDA

While scholars in media studies have provided insight into the changing patterns of journalism in the digital era, the micro-level characteristics of online news media discourse remain largely understudied. The detailed, critical analysis of this emergent discourse can provide evidence of its role in defining ideological groupings and political engagement in a changing social-political and commercial environment. CDA practitioners have begun to turn their attention to online news media; however, few studies examine its distinctive linguistic characteristics. The small number of scholars who do acknowledge the uniqueness of the genre advocate for the use of multimodal analysis to better comprehend the process of media convergence, and the changing mechanisms of online production, consumption and interaction (see Caple and Knox, 2015; Kelsey, 2018). While multimodal analysis is indeed valuable, a more traditional focus on the linguistic features of discourse is also highly relevant, given the centrality of language to conveying ideological meaning, and influencing political engagement.

In a rare example of a linguistic-based study of online news media discourse, Molek-Kozakowska (2013, 2014) focuses on the strategy of sensationalism used by online media outlets to attract reader interest within the framework of an attention economy. In both studies, Molek-Kozakowska (2013) analysed headlines, viewing them as sensationalising devices rather than as accurate summaries of the stories they lead (p. 18). The analysis revealed a focus on elites, polarisation, a sense of immediacy, negative evaluations, and reference to emotion as key features of sensationalist headlines. Molek-Kozakowska (2014) concludes that sensationalism in the headlines ‘is not likely to help foster an informed debate about public issues’ (p. 326). Studies like these focusing on the micro-linguistic features of the upper structures of news reports can provide a clearer understanding of how online news media outlets contribute to ideological contestation. Nevertheless, knowledge of both the context and discourse practices need to be included in order to triangulate the analysis and interpretation.

Journalism in the online news environment is clearly governed by a range of contextual constraints, and political and commercial goals. CDA scholars recognise that ideology in text and talk is not always expressed explicitly as a result of both constraints upon, and the goals of the text producers. Wodak (2002), for example, discovered that far-right Austrian politicians used allusions, or calculated ambivalence, to absolve themselves of responsibility in the expression of anti-Semitic opinions as they navigated a taboo on Nazi ideology in official domains. Instead of expressing these ideas explicitly, allusions invited audiences to activate their personal repertoire of collective knowledge to grasp the anti-Semitic message embedded within the utterance (pp. 496, 501). Hansson (2015) highlights the role of the obfuscation of agency and vagueness in US government texts to navigate problematic social processes; in particular, the avoidance of personal or institutional blame (p. 302). Hansson advocates the use of van Leeuwen’s (1996, 2008) social actor analysis as way of highlighting exclusion, suppression and backgrounding of social actors to conceal responsibility for their negative actions. Studies of political discourse in Indonesia reveal a history of vagueness in expression as a means of manufacturing public consensus, and achieving hegemonic control of the population. Matheson Hooker’s (1993) analysis of former president, Suharto’s speeches revealed the use of impersonalised, institutional discourse, devoid of clear markings of human agency. Matheson Hooker argues that the blurring of agency when discussing state goals invited audiences to identify themselves with the state, and unquestioningly align themselves with the hegemonic goals of national development.

The 2014 presidential election

Sixteen years since the fall the New Order government, the 2014 presidential election proved to be a turning point in the Indonesian political and media scene. It was the first election where digital news media and social media played an integral part in facilitating political engagement and influencing electoral outcomes, particularly among Indonesia’s emerging middle class (Tapsell, 2015). Bearing similarities to the 2016 US presidential race, the 2014 Indonesian presidential campaign was characterised by intense political contestation and polarisation played out in part in the new mediascape, through iconic political actors. Two distinct kubu (camps) emerged between the final candidates: the governor of Jakarta, and eventual winner, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), and former military general and ex-son-in-law of Suharto, Prabowo Subianto. Armed with an array of populist strategies, both candidates pledged reform in Indonesia, and set themselves apart from the incumbent and perceivably out-of-touch Yudhoyono government.

Megawati Soekarnoputri was already a well-known political figure prior to the 2014 presidential election, as the long-term leader and founder of the PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle), former president of the Republic of Indonesia, and daughter of Indonesia’s charismatic first president, Soekarno. Her crucial role in securing support for Jokowi’s nomination, and her subsequent involvement in the presidential campaign elevated her to an increasingly prominent position (Ahlstrand, 2019). Despite her alliance with Jokowi, Megawati received significant negative media attention. Concern over her purported influence on Jokowi, her perpetual role as party leader, her troubled relationship with other male politicians, and the appointment of her daughter, Puan Maharani to a ministerial role were circulated in news media as well as public discourse (Ahlstrand, 2019).

Data analysis

The data for the analysis were sourced from the free to access, online news website, Kompas.com, a product of the media conglomerate, PT Kompas Gramedia. The original print version, Kompas, is ‘Indonesia’s most prestigious and largest-selling daily newspaper’, consumed by a middle-class, urban, secular readership (Sen and Hill, 2007: 57). The majority of Kompas.com readers were made up of the young, predominantly male, urban-based middle class (Kompas.com, 2016), many of whom supported Jokowi in the 2014 election (Tapsell, 2015). Like Kompas.com readers, the typical Indonesian journalist is male, university educated, and in his mid-30s (Hanitzsch, 2006; Hanitzsch and Hidayat, 2012). Kompas.com is freely accessible to those with an internet connection, and reports can be read and shared directly from the website, or through social media platforms. Unlike the print version that works to daily deadlines, Kompas.com has an entirely different newsroom, and uploads regular news updates throughout the day and night (Tapsell, 2015). Despite the differences, the familiarity and perceived quality of the Kompas Gramedia brand is nevertheless likely to apply to Kompas.com.

The analysis applies van Dijk’s model of the ideological square, which can legitimise or delegitimise access to power for certain groups and individuals based on their positioning as members of the in-group or out-group (van Dijk, 1995a). Recognising the importance of discourse practice, the analysis integrates an understanding of ‘the practices of producing, distributing, and consuming texts’ (Fairclough, 1992: 269) in the digital era in Indonesia. The incorporation of the social-political structure is also crucial to the analysis, and from a CDA perspective, there are many ways to bridge the gap between discourse and social structure. This study applies Van Leeuwen’s (1995, 1996, 2008) social actor analysis as the primary analytical tool to link the social and the linguistic. Van Leeuwen’s framework is especially useful given the importance of social actors, and in particular, iconic women in the post-authoritarian Indonesian public realm (Brenner, 2011; Dewi, 2015)

A total of 225 reports featuring Megawati as the main social actor were sourced from Kompas.com within the 24-month period. Focusing on the important upper structures of the news reports, such as the headline and lead paragraph, clusters of unique co-occurring social actor representations were identified in accordance with van Leeuwen’s typology of social actor representations. The clusters of representations formed the ‘building blocks’ of discourse strategies, which are defined as ‘the planned discursive activities, the political aims and functions of these activities, and the linguistic means designed to help realise these aims’ (Wodak et al., 2009: 34). The discourse strategies functioned as the linguistic means in the realisation of the broader practice of ideological polarsiation between groups. Figure 1 below illustrates the relationship between ideological polarisation, a discourse strategy and its unique combination of co-occurring social actor representations.

Figure 1.

The relationship between social actor representations, discourse strategies and ideological polarisation.

Of the 225 news reports collected, 123 contained evidence of ideological polarisation. The reports portrayed Megawati as a point of differentiation from the ideological in-group of the typical Kompas.com readership made up of urban, middle-class, educated men, predominantly in support of Jokowi. Kompas.com mainly activated Megawati in the role as transgressor in the portrayal of her relationship with others, her political ambitions, and in the formation and running of the new government following the election. Three major discourse strategies were identified; namely, constructing conjecture, indirect conflict and criticism, and reproducing transgression through denial. These strategies co-occurred at times in a single report, and functioned to subtly incite ideological polarisation, while navigating contextual constraints and journalistic goals of audience engagement. Readers were invited to ‘read between the lines’, and to activate their own repertoire of knowledge, beliefs, values and opinions in order to interpret the discourse.

Constructing conjecture

The strategy of Constructing Conjecture was identified in 78 instances in the analysis. It involved the use of indirect language to not only topicalise rumours, speculation and opinions alluding to Megawati’s alleged transgressions, but also to enhance the perceived truth-value behind the conjecture, while maintaining an impression of journalistic disinterest. This strategy commonly featured impersonalisation as a means of construing rumours or half-truths as fact. Impersonalisation involves the representation of social actors by ‘abstract nouns or by concrete nouns, whose meanings do not include the semantic feature “human”’ (van Leeuwen, 2008: 46). It often takes the form of nominalisation, which Fairclough (2003) argues serves to obfuscate agency, and therefore responsibility through the direct exclusion of social actors. Nominalisation not only results in the loss of human agency, but also tense and modality, making actions appear both timeless and doubtless (Fairclough, 2003: 143–144).

A common example in this strategy in the data involved reference to social actors’ thoughts and feelings in the portrayal of potentially controversial actions. This component was labelled ‘affectual autonomisation’. While this category does not appear in van Leeuwen’s (2008) original typology of objectivation types, it demonstrates similar characteristics to the other metonymic objectivations described therein, and builds upon the existing typology of social actor representations. Through this representational choice, thoughts and feelings became the focus of news headlines rather than facts, while the human agent responsible was backgrounded or hidden.

Affectual autonomisation did not occur on its own; it was combined with other modes of indirect representation of social actors, including aggregation and indetermination to construe rumours as fact in an objective news report. According to van Leeuwen (2008: 38), ‘aggregation is realized by the presence of definite or indefinite quantifiers which either function as the numerative or as the head of the nominal group’. By reference to a vague, but large number of people, aggregation can manufacture consensus (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37) without the need to substantiate claims. Often co-occurring with aggregation in Kompas.com reports, indetermination involves the representation of social actors ‘as unspecified, “anonymous” individuals or groups’ (van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). This representational choice can add further weight to an opinion expressed an aggregated group, by endowing the social actors behind the opinion ‘with a kind of impersonal authority’, and thereby portraying them as ‘a powerful, unseen coercive force’ (van Leeuwen, 2008: 40).

Further contributing to the strategic construal of rumours, Kompas.com frequently deagentalised (van Leeuwen, 1996) social actors at key points in the discourse. The removal of agency took place through the grammatical operations of nominalisation or passive agent deletion. van Leeuwen (1996) asserts that passive agent deletion is a form of suppression, and can be a deliberate attempt to block detailed access to knowledge. Obscuring agency is also regarded as a common linguistic means of risk aversion, as highlighted by Hansson (2015: 302) when examining strategies of blame avoidance.

An example of the combination of affectual autonomisation, aggregation and indetermination, along with passive agent deletion can be found in the lead paragraph of a report conveying conjecture over Megawati’s role in the appointment of her daughter, Puan Maharani, to a cabinet position in the new government.

Seperti dugaan banyak pihak , Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (DPP) PDI-P Puan Maharani akhirnya dipilih sebagai salah satu menteri dalam Kabinet Kerja pemerintahan Presiden Joko Widodo dan Wakil Presiden Jusuf Kalla.

Confirming the suspicions of many parties, the Chair of the Central Board of the PDI-P, Puan Maharani has finally been chosen as a minister in the cabinet of President Joko Widodo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla.

The lead begins by implying that Puan’s selection as minister was already common knowledge through the use of affectual autonomisation in the noun, dugaan (suspicions). The noun does not assign agency to or identify a particular individual or group behind the suspicions by portraying social actors by reference to their thoughts. The absence of identity and agency creates a sense of broad consensus, and removes an entry point for challenge, while averting impressions of internal bias at Kompas.com. The sense of consensus is enhanced by aggregation and indetermination through reference to a vague group made up of banyak pihak (many parties), which could include the reader. The agent responsible for Puan’s selection as a cabinet minister is also suppressed by passive agent deletion, leaving it up to the reader to infer their identity.

President Joko Widodo is included in the sentence through possessivation in ‘the cabinet of President Joko Widodo’. While mentioned, his active role in the appointment of Puan is concealed through passive agent deletion, and backgrounded through possessivation. Given the broader discourse surrounding Megawati’s personal political ambitions and her interference in Jokowi’s presidential campaign (Ahlstrand, 2019), the reader is more likely to infer that Puan’s appointment was Megawati’s doing, and absolve Jokowi of responsibility in appointing her. Kompas.com thus creates a divide between a self-serving Megawati and the supposedly innocent Jokowi.

The rumours about Megawati’s ambitions were also fuelled by reference to survey data conducted by an external body to enhance the truth behind suggestions of Megawati’s ambition for greater power. Similar to the process of aggregation and indetermination described above, the inclusion of survey results concealed the identity of individual citizens, and abstracted their level of agency in holding the belief, while the reference to survey data and the inclusion of measurable percentages contributed to a sense of consensus. The example below was published prior to the official nomination of Jokowi as presidential candidate, and positions Megawati as the political figure most likely to run.

Menurut hasil survei t ersebut, sebanyak 33,8 persen responden menilai Megawati lebih layak ‘nyapres.’ Sedangkan Jokowi, mendapatkan suara sekitar 24,6 persen. Posisi ketiga ditempati putri Megawati, Puan Maharani dengan 6,5 persen.

According to the survey results, 33.8 percent of respondents consider Megawati to be more likely to run for president. On the other hand, Jokowi received 24.6 of the votes. Third position was occupied by Megawati’s daughter, Puan Maharani with 6.5 percent.

Rather than explicitly asserting that Megawati has presidential ambitions, Kompas.com relies on the legitimising effect of an opinion poll. In the first clause, Kompas.com activates the survey results, before referring to an aggregated number of respondents. Kompas.com does not identify the source of the data, and instead functionalises the participants according to their act of ‘responding’ to the survey. The quantifiable comparison of Megawati’s ambitions to Jokowi’s creates tension between the two, while the inclusion of her daughter, Puan Maharani, in third position, qualified by a percentage vote propagates an impression of nepotism. Overall, Kompas.com places Megawati as a threat to Jokowi in the presidential race, and in doing so, reinforces his desirability as presidential candidate to his existing supporters.

Indirect conflict and criticism

The strategy of indirect conflict and criticism was identified 34 times in the data, and positioned Megawati in situations of interpersonal conflict with other members of the political elite, as a target or purveyor of criticism, or in a position of ideological dissonance with other social groups. As part of this strategy, the coverage of Megawati’s apparent interpersonal problems simultaneously fulfilled news values favouring scandal at the elite level (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013: 176), while the use of indirect language helped navigate the contextually inappropriate (van Dijk, 1998) portrayal of elite-level conflict. Kompas.com achieved these dual objectives with a discourse strategy that simultaneously avoided the direct portrayal of conflict and criticism, while implying its existence.

Instead of positioning social actors in direct acts of conflict with clearly delineated roles, Kompas.com journalists often placed a metonymic ‘barrier’ between the actors involved. While identifying and activating an agent in a verbal act of critique, the target of the attack was replaced by a metonymical representation. Such representations included foregrounding the utterances of the actor through utterance autonomisation (van Leeuwen, 2008) or instrumentalisation (van Leeuwen, 2008). Utterance autonomisation may, for example, position an actor’s ‘speech’ as the direct object of criticism. Meanwhile, in the case of instrumentalisation, a policy or product of the social actors’ actions becomes the target. While these acts of impersonalisation abstracted the social actors’ level of participation in the events, Kompas.com maintained a connection with the actor through possessivation, or the demonstration of ownership between the agent and the object. By contrast to direct activation, possessivation, backgrounds agency, by transforming the representation into the ‘possession’ of a reified process (van Leeuwen, 2008: 33). In Indonesian, the ‘owner’ is positioned directly after the object, thereby ‘shielding’ them from direct attack.

The headline below is a straightforward example of the use of this technique to indirectly portray Megawati’s involvement in elite-level conflict and criticism. Published a month before the 2014 presidential election, the report perpetuates rumours of a long-term feud between Megawati and the then incumbent president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). This feud allegedly began in 2004 when Megawati was president, and SBY the coordinating minister of political and security affairs.

Di Hadapan Menteri, Megawati Kritik Pemerintahan SBY

In front of Ministers, Megawati Criticises the SBY Government

When read at a glance, the headline suggests that Megawati actively criticised SBY. The critique appears particularly brazen given that it is said to have occurred before ministers. Megawati is clearly positioned in the role of subject, and activated in the hostile verbal process of ‘criticising’; however, a closer reading of the text reveals that SBY is not the direct recipient of Megawati’s criticism. Instead, SBY’s government becomes the target. While Kompas.com maintains SBY’s connection to the criticism through possessivation, it strategically avoids positioning Megawati in a direct act of criticising SBY. The headline attempts to attract reader interest by foregrounding an elite-level scandal, while maintaining a ‘safe’ distance between the social actors involved. From an ideological perspective, the focus on interpersonal conflict between members of distinct political groups is an open invitation for readers to take sides. From a commercial point of view, the focus on conflict also prompts readers to engage with the report reactively. The ongoing negative coverage of Megawati during the time this report was published contributes to the likelihood of an unfavourable impression of her role in causing or perpetuating the conflict, and promotes the belief that she is petty for holding a grudge against another politician.

This strategy also problematised Megawati’s role in social conflict by contrasting her behaviour against other ‘correct’ examples of social interaction, combined with the careful abstraction of her direct participation in the event. In the final month of the election campaign, public contestation had reached its peak, and the rivalry between the two kubu (camps) was perpetuated across media outlets. In addition to her alleged feud with SBY, Megawati is rumoured to have fallen-out with Prabowo, who was in fact her running mate in her 2009 bid for the presidency. In the 2014 election, Megawati’s support for Jokowi positioned her at odds with Prabowo. The example below describes an interaction between the two kubu at a meeting to determine their order of on the ballot paper, and problematises Megawati’s behaviour in contrast to all other participants.

. . . Prabowo-Hatta datang terakhir. Sadar kubu pesaingnya hadir lebih dulu, pasangan tersebut lantas berinisiatif mendatangi serta mengulurkan tangan untuk berjabat .

. . .Prabowo-Hatta arrived last. Realising the Jokowi campaign team had arrived first, the pair straight away took the initiative to approach the group, reaching out to shake hands.

Jokowi, JK, Surya Paloh, Muhaimin, dan Sutiyoso sontak berdiri untuk menyambut iktikad baik Prabowo-Hatta.

Jokowi, JK, Surya Paloh, Muhaimin, and Sutiyoso immediately stood up to welcome Prabowo-Hatta’s well-meaning gesture.

Namun , Megawati tampak terlihat membalas salam capres yang diusung Koalisi Merah Putih tersebut sembari tetap duduk.

However, Megawati seemed to appear to respond to presidential candidate’s greeting from the Red and White Coalition while still seated.

Kompas.com describes the positive actions of both presidential teams, including Prabowo and his vice-presidential candidates’ ‘well-meaning’ handshake, and Jokowi and his team’s ‘immediate’ welcoming response. Kompas.com signals the contrast between both presidential candidates and Megawati with ‘however’, before describing her comparatively antisocial response. The specification of her simultaneous act of remaining seated while shaking hands contrasts against both Prabowo’s act of ‘straight away taking the initiative to approach the group, reaching out to shake hands’, and Jokowi’s act of ‘immediately standing’ to welcome the Prabowo entourage. The language used by Kompas.com portrays Megawati’s negative behaviour cautiously. The curious use of tampak terlihat (seemed to appear) suggests some reluctance to explicitly foreground her transgression of social norms. Moreover, rather than positioning Megawati in direct conflict with Prabowo, Kompas.com refers to the behaviouralised ‘greeting’ as the target of her jaded response. Through a combination of contrast and the abstraction of direct human interaction in the event, Kompas.com subtly positions Megawati as a political outsider who defies the rules of social etiquette.

Reproducing transgression through denial

In addition to the constructing conjecture and the portrayal of indirect criticism and conflict, the strategy of reproducing transgression through denial covertly reiterated Megawati’s alleged misdeeds. The strategy occurred 32 times in the data, whereby either Megawati or her allies were portrayed in defensive verbal processes such as denial, or in dissenting mental processes such as rejection. van Leeuwen (1995) recognises the importance of sociological role theory to discourse analysis, in that a social role carries associated emotions and actions, as well as consequences for relations of power. Reactive social processes, he argues, carry different social consequences, depending on the specific process, and in particular, ‘as the power of social actors decreases, the amount of emotive reactions attributed to them increases’ (van Leeuwen, 1995: 86).

In this strategy, rather than redressing negative perceptions, by adhering to a common pattern of reaction, followed by an iteration of Megawati’s alleged transgression, Kompas.com maintained the topical relevance of her wrongdoing. In conjunction with the foregrounding of her allies’ denials, the ‘barrier’ technique was also employed between social actors which mitigated the perceived impact of the action, as well as agentless passives which avoided need to allocate responsibility in the representation of certain controversial social actions. The lack of detail created space for audience-initiated interpretation. The excerpt below was taken from the lead of a report published during the presidential campaign. While Kompas.com places Megawati in an active role, she performs a reaction, which is followed by the reiteration of rumours of her excessive influence on Jokowi.

Ketua Umum Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Megawati Soekarnoputri mengomentari isu yang menyebut bahwa calon presiden Joko Widodo adalah capres boneka. Jokowi dianggap tak mandiri karena selalu di-back up Mega.

Chair of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Megawati Soekarnoputri commented on the issue that claims the presidential candidate, Joko Widodo is a puppet. Jokowi is considered not to be independent because he is always backed up by Mega.

The opening activates Megawati in the verbal process of ‘commenting’; however, as in the examples discussed above, Megawati does not engage directly with a human in her interaction, but responds to an impersonalised ‘issue’. Meanwhile, the agents responsible for making the claim that Jokowi is under her control are concealed. Instead of an individual or group, the ‘issue’ is positioned as the recipient of Megawati’s comments, and activated in the claim-making, creating a sense of universality behind the belief. In the sentence that follows, the humans behind the claim of Jokowi’s lack of independence are also concealed through passive agent deletion in the verb, ‘considered’. The concealment of agency and identity has the effect of sheltering those behind this controversial opinion, while relying on vagueness to perpetuate a generalised view that Megawati is indeed trying to control Jokowi. Overall, Kompas.com marks Megawati as the transgressor, and a threat of the democratically-elected Jokowi government.

As part of this strategy, Kompas.com published responses from Megawati’s allies. In doing so, Kompas.com positioned her allies in a defensive role, while reiterating her transgressions. Published 2 months after the inauguration of the Jokowi government, the excerpt below presents a denial of Megawati’s influence upon the new government in the form of an indirect quote from a prominent member of the PDI-P. Kompas.com engages a mix of direct and indirect language to create a perceived division between a deviant Megawati, and the righteous Jokowi government.

Pelaksana Tugas (Plt) Sekjen DPP PDI Perjuangan Hasto Kristyanto membantah jika Ketua Umum PDI Perjuangan Megawati Soekarnoputri disebut selalu mengintervensi kebijakan yang diambil pemerintahan Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla. Menurutnya, isu intervensi Megawati itu sengaja dibuat untuk menjatuhkan Jokowi pada saat pemilu lalu.

Acting Secretary General of the PDI-P, Hasto Kristyanto denied that the PDI-P Chair Megawati Soekarnoputri is said to always intervene in policies of the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla government. According to Hasto, the issue of Megawati’s intervention was deliberately created to bring down Jokowi in the election.

As in the pattern of Megawati’s response above, Hasto is activated in a defensive verbal process in the lead, where he denies her undue political influence. Kompas.com also includes the claim of Megawati’s intervention in the clause that follows, thus perpetuating existing knowledge of her influence despite the denial. After activating Hasto, Kompas.com uses indirect language to portray the claim of her influence. The identity of the agent responsible for the claim is concealed through the use of the agentless passive verb, disebut (is said to), leaving readers to interpret the identity of the agent themselves, while the lack of clarity ensnares the reader in a sweeping sense of universality. The indirect language in this clause also lowers the perlocutionary force of Hasto’s rejection. Instead of denying Megawati’s influence, Hasto rejects the claim of her influence.

In the next sentence, ‘According to Hasto, the issue of Megawati’s intervention was deliberately created to bring down Jokowi in the election’, Kompas.com manages to perpetuate the tenuous claim of Megawati’s influence while avoiding the allocation of blame through indirect language choices. Rather than activating Megawati in a social process, Kompas.com first refers to an impersonalised ‘issue’, followed by the nominalised and possessivated ‘intervention’. Kompas.com presents an ostensibly objective portrayal of Megawati’s relationship with the Jokowi government by giving voice to a key member of her party; however, the non-specific representation of her alleged transgressions and the source of allegations entices readers to apply their own ideological reasoning in the interpretation of the discourse.

Conclusion

The social actor analysis conducted on Kompas.com reports on Megawati during the 2014 Indonesian presidential campaign reveals that the strategic portrayal of Megawati in acts of transgression served as a counterpoint through which to create and reinforce boundaries between the ideological in-group and the out-group. The analysis illustrated that van Dijk’s (1998) concept of the ideological square can be enacted implicitly to incite polarisation, and perpetuate an unhealthy paradigm of arche-politics in the democratic era. The open-endedness of the representations social actors combined with the pitting of Megawati against others encouraged online audience engagement, while fuelling polarisation, and the alienation of Megawati from the political realm. Through subtle representational strategies reminiscent of those identified by Wodak (2002), Hansson (2015), and Matheson Hooker (1993), Megawati became a symbol of undemocratic values of self-interest, nepotism, and perpetual power, and thereby, a threat to the new and desirable political order under a Jokowi government.

Comparable to Wodak’s (2002) concept of calculated ambivalence, strategic ambiguity in the Kompas.com reports prompted readers to activate their personal ideological repertoire to fill in the blanks to interpret the discourse. This practice fostered a sense of synthetic autonomy among readers in their engagement with the discourse, while making them complicit in the production and reinforcement of polarised in-group and out-group relations. In accordance with van Dijk’s (1995b) analysis of ideology in news media discourse in, the ongoing pattern of implicit ideological polarisation in Kompas.com discourse contributed to the formation of active consensus among the readers regarding Megawati’s position as an icon of the out-group.

The study went beyond Molek-Kozakowska’s 2013 and 2014 examinations of sensationalising rhetorical devices in the online news media, by acknowledging the implicit connections between linguistic features, discourse practice, and the social political context. In New Order Indonesia, open critique of elite figures in the news media was a risky act, and thereby couched in cautious language (Steele, 2011). In a post-authoritarian social-political environment favouring partisan discourse and ideological contestation, the analysis demonstrates that cautious language strategies appeared to prevail in the Kompas.com reports, albeit fulfilling a mix of new and residual journalistic goals. Subtle representational strategies enabled journalists to produce controversial reports based on subjective opinion, often with scant evidence, navigate potential legal constraints, and appeal to a reactive online readership.

In the adversarial political context of this study, the portrayal of interpersonal conflict between polarising social actors invited the readers to take sides. A close reading of the texts, however, showed that Kompas.com did not portray conflict explicitly, and shielded the social actors from direct responsibility. Overall, this practice contributed to a form of reactive, emotional discourse that provided readers with scant resources for meaningful political engagement. The simplified stories readers to activate their pre-existing ideological schema to interpret the events required, which potentially fuelled contention and polarisation in an online environment. This discourse contributes to the formation and consolidation of ‘algorithmic enclaves’ as identified by Lim (2017). In order to better understand the role of online news media in contributing to polarisation, however, further comparative research between the print media and online media is recommended.

As a powerful woman operating in the male-dominated political realm, in close proximity to the presidential candidate, and later president, the role of gender in the ideological representation of Megawati cannot be understated. The legacy of women’s subordination, and exclusion from the political realm (Bennett, 2005; Suryakusuma, 2011) permeates the Kompas.com portrayal of Megawati. In reports produced and consumed predominantly by men, Kompas.com reinforced her undesirable presence in the world of politics. Through subtle discourse strategies, Megawati was positioned as a threat to the political order because of her apparent excessive ambition for power, favouring her daughter, her involvement in interpersonal conflict, and overall failure to adhere to the norms of the political realm. Despite their shared political alignment, suggestions of Megawati’s transgressions arguably reinforced Jokowi’s claim to power, and persuaded his supporters, or, in other words, Kompas.com readers, to rally around him as presidential candidate, and later president. Rather than Megawati, however, the subtle perpetuation of ideological polarisation in Kompas.com discourse poses a greater threat to the quality of democracy in Indonesia, by encouraging a superficial mode of political engagement rooted in arche-politics, and the normalisation of masculine political power.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author biography

Jane Louise Ahlstrand is a lecturer in Indonesian at the University of New England. She completed her PhD at the University of Queensland in 2019. Her doctoral dissertation focused on the representation of Indonesian women politicians and their relationship with power in online news media discourse. She has skills in critical discourse analysis, and specialises in social actor analysis and the Indonesian language.

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