Abstract
This paper is to analyse 180 speeches of the Iranian Supreme Leader (SL), Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, from 2005 to 2013 which are concentrated upon characterising the threats of doshman [enemy] and depicting the future space of Iran. Adopting the Proximisation Theory, the investigation of the Iranian Supreme Leader’s speeches reveals that doshman poses futuristic spatial-axiological threats to the central values, programmes and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Furthermore, the future space of Iran is figured in multifarious policies to preempt the construed spatial-axiological threats of doshman. In this regard, I indicated that the Supreme Leader resorts to the characterisation of the pre-revolutionary states of affairs (the past) to analogously characterise the opposite futures space of the IRI. Therefore, the SL programmes to mould the futures based on the present time values and programmes in order to abort the re-birth of the past. It was also indicated that the future space in this discourse serves to preempt the reification of the construed threats in the future.
Keywords
‘The past is a foreign country: They do things differently there’.
‘The Place where there is no darkness was the imagined future, which one would never see, but which, by foreknowledge, one could mystically share in’.
Introduction
Ever since the Islamic Republic of Iran (henceforth the IRI) was settled as a revolution-born political and governing system, the notion of ‘doshman’ [the enemy] has always been present as a pivotal key term at the heart of the discourse of the Iranian topmost political actors such as the then and present Supreme Leaders: Ayatollah Sayyid Rohollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, respectively. In respective discourses, doshman [the enemy] has always been construed to be historically aggressive to Iran during pre- and post-revolutionary eras. As Ayatollah Khamenei says:
The Supreme Leader, Feb. 8, 2010 (emphasis added)
Not only has doshman allegedly programmed and set off certain threats to the IRI during the contemporary history, but also it has been construed to be casting disruptive measures to the IRI’s future. For instance, in early days of being succeeded to the position of Supreme Leadership, Ayatollah Khamenei says:
Due to the representation of doshman [the enemy] in the Supreme Leader’s (hereinafter the SL) discourse as a ubiquitous antagonistic entity in Iran’s historical space, it is of indubitable importance to investigate discursive mechanisms of construing the pre-configuration of the future vis-a-vis the recontextualisation of the past and evaluation of the present. The importance rises from the fact that the future, as Dunmire (2007: 19) argues, ‘represents an ideologically significant site in which dominant political actors and institutions can exert political power and control’. In so doing, political actors and institutions constitute the future and its ideological aura based on the recounts of the past (Halbwachs, 1992, cited in Achugar, 2009: 289). The past is itself a social reflection of heteroglossia in which it is constructed and reconstructed and the present states of affairs and social circumstances impose their influence upon its reproduction (Coffin, 2003: 219). In fact, the construction of the past is manufactured by the present goals looking towards the future (Achugar, 2008: 22). On these accounts, this study will examine the representation and reconstruction of the past and the future as being influenced by the present political, economic, strategic and social statuses of the IRI as well as the existing series of actions that are regarded as threats of doshman. Therefore, I shall ponder upon the particular function the future space is destined to serve in connection with long-existing past-to-future threats of doshman. In so doing, it is necessary to go over the particularities of the discursively characterised values, policies and programmes of doshman and the IRI (the Islamic Republic of Iran). Moreover, it begs to recognise the typology of the construed threats that allegedly encroach upon the IRI to lay certain impacts.
Thus said, guided by the Proximisation Theory (PT) (Cap, 2013), this paper aims to indicate that the SL’s discourse represents certain miscellaneous physical and ideological threats that have been construed to target the IRI. I shall show that the construed threats have been encroaching upon the ideological and material values, policies and programmes of the IRI in an extensive temporal scale. I shall also indicate that the construal of doshman’s threats via linguistic, pragmatic and cognitive toolkit will contribute to obtaining public legitimsation to certain measures and proceedings that would give birth to a specific future space in the IRI. Furthermore, I argue that in the SL’s discourse, the future is designated to preempt the revitalisation of Iran’s pre-revolutionary past in the future and neutralise the threats that are generated in the aftermath of the Iranian 1979 Islamic Revolution. Lastly, the future space construction may arguably lead to stabilise and strengthen the roots of great socio-political changes that occurred as a consequence of the Islamic Revolution.
Methodologically, to take into account what I have sketched thus far, I shall start with analysing the discursive characterisations of doshman-IRI spaces within the SL’s discourse space. Then, I shall be concerned with analysing the construals of threats of doshman towards the IRI which are assumed to result in destructive consequences. Finally, I shall sketch the discursive configuration of the future space and the intended function it is ordained to serve. To these ends, recruiting the Proximisation Theory (Cap, 2013) as a theoretical framework, I approach a corpus of 180 speeches of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, extended from 2005 to 2013. The presented excerpts from 2005 to 2013 are translated into English by the author and are checked by three experts in translation to minimise the author’s bias towards the original excerpts. However, regarding the analyses, I considered original versions of the excerpts in Farsi.
According to the Article 110 of the Constitution of the IRI, the Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic of Iran is in charge of ‘determining the overall policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consulting the Expediency Discernment Council [Majma’ Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam]’ (the Constitution of the IRI: 75). The responsibility necessitates the designation of certain policies and programmes for the future of the IRI in relation to the present political, economic, strategic and social circumstances. On this account, the SL’s discourse appears to be a fine locus to mull over and investigate how certain vision of the future is constructed. The full list of his speeches can be retrieved from www.leader.ir
The timespan 2005–2013 accords with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-term presidency and it is rightly a phenomenal historical point in the IRI’s political history. This era is widely recognised with Iran’s record political isolation and heavy tides of the US, Europe, and the United Nation’s unprecedented economic sanctions as well as the possibility of the US’s military intervention with Iran. Iran’s political entanglement as well as these sanctions were in response to Iran’s partly-covert pursuit of nuclear programmes, proclamation of Israel’s elimination, denial of Holocaust and vast support of the Hezbollah and other militia forces in the Middle East. What followed from the imposition of multifarious global pressures on Iran was nothing but extensive mutual mistrust that surmounted little hope of appeasement in the rough Iran-west relations. Of more importance to this era, which makes it more significant to study, is that the SL did not cut short his full-fledged support of the recurrent policies regarding the pursuit of the nuclear programmes and reinforcement of the Hezbollah and militia forces. In consequence, unabating pessimism prevailed and still does, the conception of the west and the US in Iran’s ruling political environment. Since then, two important topics has become far more stereotypical in the SL’s discourse: construing the west and the US as historical and future enemies of the IRI and calling for strenuous pursuit of certain economic programmes, such as resistive economy, and technological-scientific developments with a hope to loosen the west’s heavy influence upon Iran’s economy.
Designing the future on account of the past exhumation
Studying the future involves creating certain alternative possibilities for the future (Bell, 2009 [1997]). The main trend in this field of inquiry is to ‘make the possibilities of the future more known to us and increase human control over the future’ (Bell, 2009 [1997]: 2). From a critical perspective, Inayatullah (1990: 115) asserts that the discourse of the future ‘creates new epistemological spaces that enable the formation of alternative future’ through historicising and deconstructing the future. Studying the future from a critical stance in political and cultural terrains has rendered ‘the future as a site for analysing and a framework for critiquing dominant political discourses’ (Dunmire, 2008: 83). In this outlook, the future space is monopolised by panoply of strategic policies, strategies and discursive practices ordained to ‘design and shape the world system so as to maintain the particular balance of power’ (Dunmire, 2014: 340). For example, in the field of policy and planning discourse, pure technological visions towards urban futures attempt to cast utopian visions of the cities (Bina et al., 2020: 2). Critical position-taking against such future constructions, therefore, may contribute to deconstructing the utopian theory and speculative fictions concerning the constructed future of urban life (Bina et al., 2020: 2).
Political discourses delineate the overall architecture of the future space by setting an ideologically-tainted framework. Edelman (1964, 1971, 1988) notes that it is intended to sort out certain strategic actions, behaviours, and policies that should be taken as reinforcing and warranting the desired future space while particular realities/actions must be prevented to take place (Dunmire, 2005: 483). Following this track, Dunmire (2008: 81) contends that the future space is a discursive construct and the linguistic organisation of the politicians’ discourse functions as a persuasive instrument. Further, she observes that power-holding institutions exploit future representations in their policy documents so as to legitimise particular policies and actions (Dunmire, 2008: 81).
The persuasive and legitimising functions of the future space construction, thus, take their root from ‘the material and ideological stakes embedded in representation of the future’ (Dunmire, 2008, p. 83). Relatedly, for instance, Dunmire (2015: 298) assumes that the United States has long programmed to serve its national political, economic and security interests and affairs by invoking to re-shaping the future of the US and the world. Therefore, the post-cold war national policy of the US, Dunmire (2014) suggests, should be understood as ‘global shaping activities’ that seek to ‘maintain a particular balance of power and particular division of global economic production’ (p. 340). Moreover, in her seminal work, Dunmire (2011) critically investigates the discourses of politicians and institutions as universalising the future realities through the ideological working of their rhetoric. Critically studying the Bush doctrine, she indicates that in Bush national security policy, the future is constructed as a site abound with threats and it is exploited to invoke vast public legitimisation to the US preventive measures (Dunmire, 2011: 98–99). Accordingly, as McAllum (2017: 15) shows, threat-based orientation to the future in the presence of Europe’s others is followed in populist and authoritarian solutions that are proposed to resolve EU’s systemic dysfunctions.
Considering the ideological, persuasive and preemptive functions of the future, thus a question arises: what would construct the strategic, ideological and political ground base to (re)shape the future space in a particular way? As a possible response amongst many, Masini (2002: 250) maintains that under the influence of the World War II, the state of affairs in the present was assumed to determine and constrict the premeditations and the choice of changes and possible alternatives for the future. Thus said, critical readings of the history of the present and the past will throw light on what is going to happen in the future (Alessandrini, 2003: 213).
In this regard, looking critically at the relationship between public crises and the possible scenarios that politicians and social leaders proffer for the future, Mahony and Clarke (2013: 935) state that the instillation of the present perception as a site of crises demands public as well as governmental bodies into action so as to make resolutions for the future. Nonetheless, Masini (2002: 250) then argues that the significance of the present by no means dismisses the determining role of the past in constructing the foundations of the future. As a matter of fact, the past underlies and moulds the prospective goals and identity of institutions and individuals (Halbwachs, 1992, cited in Achugar, 2009: 289). Duncan (2011: 164) also suggests that coherent narratives of the present and the past remembrance and commemorations serve to exert a strategic function: it projects discursively constructed futures. Put differently, the constructed reality of the past or present obliges the exertion of certain measures to warrant the materialisation of the depicted future as an inevitable space (Elmer and Opel, 2006: 480). Case studies such as investigating discursive construction and commemoration of Israel and Zionist-entwined future world (Duncan, 2014), indicating the emergence of the ‘new Europe’ from the ashes of the ‘bitter past’ (Forchtner and Kølvraa, 2012), and scrutinising the discourse of job opportunities in Britain and Austria stemming from the pre-WWII colonialism and anti-Semitism (Richardson and Wodak, 2009), would prove that historiography of the past that would construct the main building blocks of the preferred future space.
To conclude this section, the primordial objective of political agenda, to a greater extent, is to pre-configure and exert control over the future by producing knowledge about the historical accounts of the past and present as well as the construed entities that allegedly threaten Our sovereignty. In so doing, the birth of ‘the privileged future’ (Dunmire, 2005, 2011) remarkably requires the preemptive measures that not only may insulate the privileged future from the alleged threats that may abrogate its materialisation, but also regulates the socio-political behaviours in such a way to pave the way for a so-called better future. Nevertheless, the body of scholarly works reviewed here deal less directly and explicitly with how and exactly whereabouts in the history of the context under observation the threats triggering the future start to exist. More importantly, they also disregard how the manufactured future space, in its own right, turns out to be a strategic counter-threat zone. Guided by these assumptions, the present study, taking a corpus of the Iranian Supreme Leader’s speeches into account, will examine the construed nest of the threats that are allegedly encroaching upon the present and the future of the Iran and the IRI. Also, it will observe how the future space in the SL discourse is architectured to preempt the represented threats.
The proximisation theory
Proximisation Theory (PT) (Cap, 2006, 2013) is a further elaboration of the Discourse Space Theory (DST) (Chilton, 2004), later renamed to the Deictic Space Theory (Chilton, 2014). Cap (2013: 21) notes that DST provides certain conceptual premises for the underlying foundation of the Proximisation Theory. Therefore, it seems necessary to give due space to the depiction of the DST prior to sketching the main tenets of the Proximisation Theory.
The main claim of the DST is that in any discourse processing, people, places attributions and events in discourses are located at a relative conceptual distance from the centre of a deictic centre (the self) (Cap, 2013: 16; Chilton, 2004: 58; Hart, 2015: 240). The distance, as Chilton (2004) maintains, cannot be measured by any explicit markers as ‘near relations’, ‘close relations’ and ‘remote relations’ from the self (p. 58) since people tend to position different entities, events and attributions ‘along a scale of remoteness from the self, using background assumptions and indexical cues’ (p. 56). All forms of discourse, for Chilton (2004: 57), involves certain assumptions not only about entities, locations, temporal aspects and their relationships, but also ‘the ontological status of these entities in the represented world’. Therefore, people’s representation of the entities and events subsumes various epistemic modifications due to their assumptions and perception of the situation. In this connection, Chilton (2004: 57) adds that ‘people’s representation have entities that may exist, might have existed, repeatedly exist, definitely don’t exist and so on. Entities and the relationship among them may be represented as physically necessary, socially imposed or as morally imperative’ (emphasis in original). On these accounts, Chilton (2004) suggests that people position different other entities at a relative distance from and in relation with themselves along with space (s), time (t) and modality (m) axes. The deictic centre is at the intersection of the space, time and modality axes and the other entities are located on these 3-D axes with a conceptual distance from the deictic centre (Chilton, 2004: 58).
The space axis (s) involves spatial deictic expressions and indexical cues. The self (the speaker) is at the origo of the deictic space (here, now, I/we). The other entities, then, are positioned along the s axis with a distance from the self; some nearer to and some more remote from the self (Chilton, 2004: 58). Spatial representation of entities and processes, therefore, seems to be fundamental due to its close ‘relation to physical extension and as a source domain for metaphorical representation’ (Chilton, 2004: 152). It has extensive political interest and significance; political speakers tend to invoke spatial representations since, in political affairs, it mainly has to do with considerably critical lemmas such as ‘defending territory and extending one’s own realm forcefully’ (Chilton: 152). In fact, spatial representations are unavoidable factors of legitimising. By employing spatial representation of entities and processes, Chilton (2004: 152) puts, political speakers can generate fear and anxiety of the other’s threatening actions towards the self. More particularly, Chilton (2004: 153) states: “The peculiar spatial connection with the legitimising function enters the picture in two ways. First the general public will not have direct experience of the realities that are at issue- territories that are physically and psychologically remote. The entire burden is then on linguistic expression, which somehow has to induce hearers to make mental representations of something for which they have no, or only very indirect, sensory evidence. . . Second, the electorate has to be persuaded that there is a significant reason for undertaking the risks of fighting war. One way to do this is to stimulate anxiety or fear”.
On the temporal (t) axis, the origin is the ‘now’ of the speaker: the time of speaking. It is ‘surrounded. . .by an area that counts as “now” dummytxt”’. (Chilton, 2004: 58). The time, for Chilton (2004: 58), is ‘conceptualised in terms of motion through space in a relative distance to or from the speaker’. The time of happening of events is conceptualised and located as near or remote from the origo (Chilton, 2004: 59). This is the main reason why ‘time’ is also of considerable significance to the political discourse. In fact, Chilton (2004: 59) maintains that ‘generally, subjectively “positioned” time periods can be of considerable importance – history, and which part of it are “close” to the “us” is central to national ideologies and to justifying the present and future policies’.
The importance of t axis further emerges when the political discourses involve historical flashbacks and analogy, metonymically connected the present states of an entity on s axis to historical events so as to gain legitimisation. For example, in analysing Bill Clinton’s text on Kosovo affair in 1999, Chilton (2004: 145) states that ‘Sarajevo is linked metonymically to WWI and WWI to WWII and the Holocaust. The link can be said to be metonymic because the relation between Kosovo, the Sarajevo, and WWI is of conceptual “contiguity” in a historical knowledge frame’.
In the m axis, besides being located at the origin of space and time, the self is ‘the origin of the epistemic true and the deontic right’ (Chilton, 2004: 59). Epistemic and deontic modalities are closely connected. The epistemic scale represents S’s commitment to the truth of a proposition, ranging from confident prediction to near impossibility (Werth, 1999: 314–15, cited in Chilton, 2004: 59). At each end of the m axis, scales including true are near or collocated with the self and untrue or falsity are proximate or collocated with the Other (Chilton, 2004: 59). Similar to the epistemic modality, deontic scales conceptualise remoteness-proximity structure (Chilton, 2004: 60).
The concept of ‘proximisation’ has recently been emerged in cognitive approaches to critical discourse analysis (Cap, 2014). It was first in Chilton (2004) that the verb form ‘proximise’ showed up (Cap, 2014: 190). The concept of ‘proximising’ in Chilton’s (2004) DST has ‘organisational and representational’ role in the sense that it solely points to ‘discourse role of certain words and expressions carrying “proximizing” meanings’ (Cap, 2013: 22). Discussing the conception of ‘proximising’ and ‘proximity’ in the context of DST, Filardo-Llamas (2015: 281) notes that positioning the entities and events as proximate to the deictic centre acquires ideological meaning. Moreover, construing the conceptual, perceptual and metaphorical proximising of the entities and events on the 3-dimensional axes (s, t and m) is represented as threats and danger to the deictic centre which results in fear and anxiety (see Chilton, 2004: ch. 7 and 8). Accordingly, the representational proximising, thus, involves ‘the representation of the location of a particular territory in subjective geopolitical space, the representation of potential dangers to the self and the representation of frightening and morally outrageous acts perpetuated by enemy’ (Chilton, 2004: 153)
The fear-generating feature of proximising of peripheral entities and events towards the deictic centre is followed in Cap’s (2013) theorisation of the conception of ‘proximisation’. Proposed by Cap (2006, 2008, 2010) to study the patterns of coercive rhetoric in the U.S. political interventionist discourse (Cap, 2017), ‘proximisation is a discursive strategy of presenting physically and temporally distant events and affairs as increasingly and negatively consequential to the speaker and her addressee’ (Cap, 2018: 97). Same as the proximising of entities and events in Chilton’s DST, the construal of the ‘proximisation’ in Cap’s (2013) terms contributes the speaker to solicit legitimisation for certain actions and/or policies to neutralise the cumulating threat of the deictically peripherised (distant) entity (see Cap, 2013, 2017, 2018; Chilton, 2004, 2014). Proximisation Theory (PT) holds that the threat comes from the entities at the periphery of the discourse space, known as ‘Outside-Deictic-Centre’ (ODCs) (foreigners, enemies, evils, they, Others). It is conceptualised to be crossing the conceptual spatio-temporal as well as ideological centre-periphery distance to invade the speaker-addressee territory, ‘Inside-Deictic-Centre’ (IDC) (friends, allies, good, Us) (Cap, 2018: 97). Influenced by Chilton’s (2004) proposal that proximising is done on the 3-dimensional space, time and modality axes, Cap (2013) indicates that the movement and proximisation of the distant entity (ODC) to the central one (IDC) in the discourse space is systematically organised in terms of a 3-dimensional deictic conceptualisation of Spatio-Temporal and Axiological axes (STA). This means that proximisation is enacted in terms of the conceptual axes. Both in Chilton’s DST and Cap’s PT, the proximity of peripheral entities is construed to be socially and/or individually consequential.
Spatial proximisation involves a forced construction in which distant entities (ODCs) encroach physically upon the central entities of the discourse space (Cap, 2013). It is conceptualised in terms of the following lexico-grammatical framework (Cap, 2013: 108):
Noun phrases (NPs) construed as elements of the deictic centre of the DS [Discourse Space] (IDCs)
Noun phrases (NPs) construed as elements outside the deictic centre of the DS (ODCs)
Verb phrases (VPs) of motion and directionality construed as markers of movement of ODCs towards the deictic centre
Verb phrases of action construed as markers of impact of ODCs upon IDCs
Noun phrases (NPs) denoting abstract concepts construed as anticipations of impact of ODCs upon IDCs
Noun phrases (NPs) denoting abstract concepts construed as effects of impact of ODCs upon IDCs
Temporal Proximisation (TP), in Cap’s own terms, is a ‘forced construal of the envisaged conflict as not only impending, but also momentous, historic and thus needing immediate response and unique preventive measures’ (Cap, 2018: 97). By using analogies, spatial and temporal proximisation conflate the present cumulating threat with the actual past catastrophic events to reinforce the threat construal and (re-)gain legitimisation for some preemptive/preventive policies and/or actions. As cap (2013: 116) puts, the main lexico-grammatical framework for the conceptualisation of TP includes:
Noun phrases (NPs) involving indefinite descriptions construing ODC actual impact acts in alternative temporal frames
Discourse forms involving contrastive use of the simple past and the present perfect construing threatening future extending infinitely from the past instant
Noun phrases (NPs) involving nominalisations construing presupposition of conditions for ODC impact to arise anytime in the future
Verb phrases (VPs) involving modal auxiliaries construing conditions for ODC impact as existing continually between now and the infinite future
Discourse forms involving parallel contrastive construals of oppositional and privileged futures extending from the now
Axiological Proximisation (AP) is a forced construal and embodiment of the ideological mismatches, conflicts and/or collisions between the constructed values of the home (IDC) values and the values of the constructed peripheral entity (ODC) (Cap, 2013). As a compensatory discursive tool, thus, AP seeks to maintain the legitimisation of the enacted/under-negotiation pre-emptive agenda in the absence or breakdown of the other two strategies, namely spatial and temporal proximisations (see Cap, 2013). The main lexico-grammatical framework for the conceptualisation of AP, as Cap (2013: 122) includes:
Noun phrases (NPs) construed as IDC positive values or value sets (ideologies)
Noun phrases (NPs) construed as ODC negative values or value sets (ideologies)
Discourse forms no longer than one sentence or two consecutive sentences involving linear arrangement of lexico-grammatical phrases construing materialisation in the IDC space of the ODC negative ideologies
Proximisation strategies have undeniable correlations with soliciting legitimisation, that is, proximisation strategies instigate fear and anxiety, thereby motivating to obtain legitimation to preventive/pre-emptive arrangements so as to keep the discourse space (DS) safe and secure from the presumed destructive and catastrophic impact of the ODC. The STA (Spatial, Temporal and Axiological) proximisation strategies contribute to fostering fear appeal in order to solicit legitimisation for the benefit of some preemptive or preventive policies. According to Mueller et al. (2006: 1) preemptive policies in the US National Security Strategy (NSSS) involves ‘defending oneself by attacking an enemy before it strikes, instead of seeking to deter attacks or striking back if deterrence fails’. What makes preemptive actions incontrovertible is the transition from a traditional era wherein ‘visual mobilisation of armies, navies and air forces preparing to attack’ to the time in which ‘terrorists are prepared to strike without warning against innocent civilians’ (Payne, 2005: 2).
Back to our main concern, the SL’s discourse subsumes the mechanisms of legitimising the future space construction based on construal of certain threats as encroaching upon IDC zone. The linguistic frameworks designed for proximisation strategies as well as pragma-cognitive equipment enables an analyst to scrutinise upon fear generation, threat construal and legitimising the politics of preemption. Also, the analytical facilities of the PT seem appropriate to examine the connections between threat construal and future space construction. What’s more, the theoretical and analytical strength of PT makes it an apt theory to reflect upon the strategic and ideologico-politically significant role the future space is doomed to serve in IRI’s socio-political terrain.
Data and analysis
The data for the present study comes from 180 speeches, statements and comments of the Iranian Supreme Leader (the SL), Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, spanning from 2005 to 2013. This timespan in considerable to be studied since during this era the IRI was put under heavy economic sanctions, threatened to be militarily attacked by the US and globally isolated due to its radical perspectives towards Israel, denial of Holocaust, pursuit of partly-covert nuclear programmes and support of the Hezbollah and para-military groups. All these events, on the one hand, invoked the SL to bestow his full-blown support to the recurrent tense domestic and international policies during and after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-term presidency and, on the other, put emphasis upon otherisation of the west and called for extensive scientific-technological developments in the future more than anytime. The selection of the present data set was based on the depiction of doshman and construing its threatening plots, policies and values. The rationale lying behind opting for this corpus is to investigate how the characterisation of doshman contributes the SL to picturing the image of the future space of the IRI under the shadow of the construed threats. The analysis concentrates upon pragma-linguistic toolkits and discursive moves that pave the way to characterise doshman as a threat to the present and the future of the IRI.
The IDC space (the US)
The IDC camp (the us) in the Supreme Leader’s (the SL) discourse is conceptualised as an independent and newly-transpired space in the course of Iran’s contemporary history. According to the SL, the occurrence of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and, consequently, the establishment of the Islamic Republic resulted in the rise of an unprecedented regime of thought and valuation in Iran that uprooted the previous socio-political identity and valuation system. On this account, as the SL’s discourse construes, the edifice of the Iranian socio-political identities is constructed upon the foundations of the ideological doctrines of the Islamic Revolution. This ideological bedrock, thus, has always served as a standard to determine the inclusionary criteria of all possible and probable entities to the IDC site.
1. Doran-e jomhuri-ye eslami yani doran hakemiyat-e an kasani ke az mardomand, ba mardomand, . . .montakhab-e mardomand va raftareshan shabih-e mardom ast (. . . The era of the Islamic Republic means the era of the ruling of those who are of people, with common people, selected by people and whose behaviour looks like the common people. . . .) Oct. 7, 2009
2. Inak ma mitavanim yek rahi ra baz konim. . .yek harakati ra shorou konim, yek ghalamrou az ghalamrou-haye mohem-e zendegi ra fath konim (. . .
3.
4. Ba’d az enghelab ta konun, ma ham dar zamine-ye elmi, ham dar zamine-ye ejtemayi, ham dar zamine-ye siyasi, ham binolmelali, ham dar zamine-ye eghtesadi va omrani pishraft-hayi ke kardim boht-avar ast (
5. Dar in si sal, melat va keshvar dar hame-ye zamine-ha pishraft karde ast va zamine-iy baraye yek harakate azim va mabna-yi, yek harekate mahsus ke asare an dar zendegi-ye mardom beshavad molaheze kard, faraham shod east (
6. Shoma bebinid masulin-e keshvar be har keshvar-i ke safar mikonand, agar betavanand dar bein roshanfekran ya bein tode-ye mardom hozur peida konand va harfi bezanand, ba pasokhi az del anha movajeh khahand shod (You see, if the authorities of the country in their travels to any country would be present amongst intellectuals or the common people [of host societies] and speak for them, they will face with heart-felt responses [of intellectuals and the common people].) May 29, 2007
7. Taghriban si sal ast ke jomhuri-ye eslami ba in moze’ giri shakhes tarikhi khod dar moghabele solte-garayi . . .istade (it is about thirtyyears that the Islamic Republic with its salient position-taking has resisted the dominationism.) March 20, 2008
According to the examples (4)−(10), the IDC (the us) territory mainly includes the country, people and the current political system (the Islamic Republic of Iran). Of considerable importance to the depiction of the IDC space and its entities is that there are certain temporal markers largely employed to refer to the birth date of the IRI and the present status of the three main entities, namely people, country and the political system. This helps to differentiate the IRI and the present condition of people and the country from the former political systems and marks the birth of the IRI as a cause of a deep rupture in the contemporary history of Iran. In this same vein, for instance, the structures ‘Dorane jomhuri-ye eslami [the era of the Islamic Republic]) (4)’, ‘ba’d az enghelab ta konun. . . [since the revolution. . .] (7)’, ‘Dar in si sal. . . [During these 30 years. . .] (8)’, ‘taghriban sis al ast. . . [it is about 30 years. . .]’ (10) deictically refer to the temporal origin of the IRI. These structures simply exclusivise the embedded events to the IRI and point to the idiosyncrasy of the historical space by virtue of the events they temporally index. Furthermore, in this connection, the use of the temporal deixis ‘inak [now]’(5) gives prominence to the present state of the IDC as an independent and stabilised phenomenon which is well-prepared to exert on reverberating its own independent voice (‘. . .mitavanim rah-e jadidi ra baz konim [. . .we can open a new way. . .]’ (5).
Besides the depiction of the temporal features, the characterisation of the IDC space and entities involves articulating the conceptualised core values that administers the root values, predilections and directions of the home territory:
Concerned with the functions of this value system, one may argue that on the one hand, the network of values pictures the overall populistic image of the IRI and on the other, it may serve to cultivate and then popularise the insight that there is an unmatched and still not-fully-materialised capacity in the IDC space to construct a powerful, independent and developed country. In this track, as can be seen from the examples (5) and (8), the SL’s discourse draws upon, to a greater extent, at lexical level, the concept of MOVEMENT and PROGRESS that leads to the conceptualisation of ‘DEVELOPMENT/PROGRESS IS FORWARD MOVEMENT’ metaphor (Langlotz, 2006: 100; see also Brône and Feyaerts, 2006).
The most important benefit is of course the propitious opportunity in service of the speaker to discursively urge and mobalise the IDC inhabitants to legitimise the progressive movements which are growing out of the cardinal value system of the IRI. This is mainly facilitated and administered by the ‘argumentative reasoning’ of the metaphorical mappings in which subjects are requited for commitment in political practices prior to their full materialisation in the given context (Musolff, 2004). Musolff (2004: 32) suggests that the argumentative reasoning of metaphor ‘typically aims to prove a contested issue and thus legitimise a certain course of action’. In examples (5) − (9) the SL’s discourse, then, describes some generally depicted preliminary accomplishments during the reign of the IRI in terms of innovation (6), development (5, 7 and 8) and global prominence and popularity (9) as evidence to warrant the accomplishment of unspecified, abstract, and arguable programmes. These discursive moves contribute to obtaining and upgrading the speaker credibility that ease the legitimisation of the construed system of values and predilections.
The ODC space (the Them)
The ODC camp (the them), by and large, contains entities with values that stand in ideological, socio-political, economic and strategic opposition/antagonism with the IDC space entities. The ODC entities in the SL’s discourse are regarded as enemies (‘doshman-an [the enemies]’). As a matter of fact, doshman [the enemy] is extensively used as a cover term in the political discourse of Iran to characterise any entity that manifests contrary ideologies, values and policies with that of the IRI. These entities, thus, widely refer to the US, the Zionists (14), the world economic, military and intelligence powers (14 and 16) which are mostly encoded by unspecified pronominal (‘anha [they]’ (12 and 13)) and lexical items (‘doshmanan-e ma [our enemies]’ (11), ‘doshmanan-e melat-e Iran [the enemies of Iranian nation]’, ‘edeye ziyadi [many]’(15)). In the SL’s discourse, these entities are endowed with ideological, economic, geopolitical and strategic capacities and values that stand in stark opposition with the core values of the IDC entities. This leads the SL to position them at the periphery of the IRI’s discourse space.
11. emrouz doshmanan-e ma be shekl-e mabnayi ba mabahese paye-ei jomhuri-ye eslami darand dasto-panje narm mikonand. Be ghole khodeshan darand tafakor zede jomhouri-ye eslami ra teorize mikonand. Dar vaghe baraye seitareye tafakor-e estekbari . . . paye-ye fekri dorost mikonand (Today, our enemies are fundamentally grappling with the issues that are basic to the Islamic Republic. As they say, they are theorising the anti-Islamic Republic thought. In fact, they are constructing thinking methodology for arrogant domination.) Sep. 8, 2005
12. Anha mikhahand mellat Iran in fannavari ra nadashte bashad; yani vabaste va agab bashad ta fasele-ye bein mellat-haye solte-gar va solte-pazir hargez kam nashavad (They want the Iranian nation lack this technology [nuclear technology]; in the sense that, it would be dependent and backward so as to the gap between dominant nations and other nations won’t be lost.) Feb. 7, 2006
13. mikhahand az torog mokhtalef na-amni ijad konand. . .maslahate anha dar nomid kardane madom ast (. . .they want to cause insecurity through variety of ways . . . their interest lies in disappointing people.) Feb. 27, 2006
14. Ma emrouz movajeh hastim ba yek jebheye doshmani-ye bozorg dar sarasare donya-ye ghodratmandan. In jebhe-yi ast ke shekl gerefte ast dar marakeze ghodrat binolmelali, ghodrat-haye mali va eghtesadi ke ghaleban ham dar daste sahyunist-ha va sarma-ye daran-e bozorg ast. In jebhe dar moghabel-e jomhouri-ye eslami az hame-ye vasayel estefade mikonad . . . baraye inke betavanad be jomhouri eslami zarbe bezanad (Today, we witness a great front of animosity all over the world of powerful [states]. This is a front constructed at the centre of international powers, financial and economic powers that are predominantly under the control of the Zionists and great capitalists. This front exploits all its means against the Islamic System. . .in order to impact the Islamic Republic.) Feb. 25, 2010
15. Kheily-ha hastand ke hemateshan in ast ke bein-e ghova-ye keshvar neza, ekhtelaf va da’va injad konand. Ijad-e sheksf va rekhne dar baft-e yekparche-ye farmandehi-ye kole keshvar yeki az arezou-haye bozorgi ast ke salhast baraye zarbe zadan va shekast dadan-e jonhuri-ye eslami ta’gib mikonnad. (There are many who endeavour to make dissention, opposition and disputes amongst the decision-making authorities in the country. Making rupture in the harmonious texture of the country’s leadership. . .is one of the great wishes that the enemies of the Islamic Republic are following in order to impact and defeat the Islamic Republic.) June 10, 2008
16. Ghodrat-haye eghtesadi avale donya, ghodrat-haye elmi-ye daraje yek donya. . . ghodrate-haye nezami va amniyati radife aval-e donya, emrouz jebhe-ye vasiyi ra alaihe in mellat tashkil dade-and . . . . Tahdid-e amniyati mikonand, tahdid-e siyasi mikonand, daneshmandan-e mara teror mikonand, tahrim mokonand . . . . (World economic powers, number one scientific world powers, . . . and first ranked military and intelligence powers of the world have constructed a vast front against this nation. . .they cast security threats, political threats, they terror our scientists, impose sanctions, politically pressurise us.) May 23, 2011
The examples (11)−(16) reveal the features and actions of the them (ODC) in regard with the IRI. The specific values in these instances are conceptualised through the verb phrases that construe the ODC’s actions and policies in regard with the IDC space. Thus, the most salient values identifying the ODCs include
The proximisation strategies: A scenario of encroaching entities
In the SL’s discourse, the values specific to doshman are conceptualised as threats and dangers to the IRI through the proximisation strategies. In examples (11)−(16), these strategies subsume the construal of policies and movements that conceptually pose certain threats to the IRI’s material-ideological strongholds such as the (ideological) core principles of the IRI (11), homogeneous texture of the governorship (15), scientific developments (12) and security and economic infra-structures (16 and 13). As a matter of fact, the value-laden policies and movements of the ODC (destructively) are shown to proximise the root elements that are central to the identity, values and programmes of the IDC, including innovation and independence, development, resistance and anti-domination inclinations as well as domestic and international popularity. On this account, the Spatial-Temporal-Axiological (STA) proximisation of the ODC towards the home site is prone to be regarded as certain types of threat.
Accordingly, examples (12), (13) and (16) above are representatives of the ODC’s spatial proximisation towards the IRI in which the verb phrases (‘ Anha mikhahand mellat Iran in fannavari ra nadashte bashad [They want the Iranian nation lack this technology]’ (12), ‘ mikhahand . . . na-amni ijad konand [they want to cause insecurity . . .]’ (13), ‘Tahdid-e amniyati mikonand . . . tahrim mokonand [they cast security threats. . .politically pressurise us]’ (16)) communicate all-embracing material impacts to scientific bastions, in particular the nuclear sciences (12), security (13 and 16) and politico-economic affairs (16) of the IRI. In fact, the policies of doshman are represented as curbing the development of nuclear technology and any scientific progresses in Iran. Further, the threats become larger when doshman is portrayed to direct security, political and economic threats to the IRI. This may produce heavy loads of anxiety simply because the construed threatening actions of doshman pose vital threats to the values and strategic macro-policies of the IDC that are strongly associated with independence, development and resistance.
However, in regard with the technology of spatial proximisation, interestingly, doshman (the ODC) is temporally and modally conceptualised to be in a remote conceptual relative distance from the ‘now’ of the IRI. In other words, it is implied that the construed threats of doshman, communicated through the embedded clauses (argument clause) of counterfactual ‘anha mikhahand’ structures (‘ mellat Iran in fannavari ra nadashte bashad [the Iranian nation lack this technology]’ (12) and ‘ az torog mokhtalef na-amni ijad konand [to cause insecurity through variety of ways]’ (13)) are not proximised to the IRI’s space to the extent that would cause critical impacts. Similarly, concerning the modality of the proximisation, the counterfactual ‘anhan mikhahand. . . [they want. . .]’ structures (12 and 13), make the conceptual IDC-ODC distance appear as remote. Consequently, it decertifies thorough materialisation of the construed actions and decreases them to mere vicious intentions. To put it differently, these structures imply that anti-development and insecuritising policies of doshman are not mainly temporary programmes solely intended to lay impacts in a certain historical point. Rather, they imply that the construed threatening policies would be coexistent with the IRI until an unknown future. Thus, the symbioticity of doshman’s spatial threats with the life of the IRI intensifies the fear appeals and enables the political speaker to wage on legitimising the privileged preemptive measures.
The ‘anha mikhahand. . .’ structures also convey a presupposed futurity regarding the temporal point of the construed threat materialisation. This allows one to imply that the epistemic and temporal implications of ‘anha mikhahand. . .’ structures conceptualise doshman as temporally remote form the ‘now’ but decisively encroaching upon the IRI in order to narrow down its distance with the future of the IRI. By this construal, doshman may appear to fully materialise its impacts in the future and defeat the values, policies and programmes that are nodal signifiers of the IRI. In this regard, the temporal properties of example (16) support and further extend the very pragmatic implication of the counterfactual ‘anha mikhahand. . .’ structures. The simple aspects of the VPs communicating spatial threats towards security, political, economic and scientific resources (‘ Tahdid-e amniyati mikonand, tahdid-e siyasi mikonand. . . [they cast security threats, political threats. . .]’ (16)) construe the ODC as ever-lastingly proximising towards the IDC site with no clear point of termination.
What is more, in the SL’s discourse, there is a cause-and-effect relation between the spatial and axiological proximisation strategies to strengthen the legitimisation of the IRI, its core values, predilections and ideological-material principles. In cause-effect conflation of spatial-axiological proximisation strategies, spatial threats of the ODC cause the birth of axiological impact consequences. In examples (12) and (13), the Europeans and Americans’ envisaged intention to damage and destruct Iran’s nuclear technology as well as causing insecurity is construed to be constructing the bedrock for the birth of dependency, backwardness and socio-political depression. Needless to say, these would-be axiological impact consequences are in pure antagonism with the central and identifying values and policies of the IRI. In another instance, the cause-and-effect relationship appears when the SL’s discourse states that a ‘jebhe-ye bozorg-e doshmani [a great front of animosity]’ (14), as an axiological proximisation, is opened on the IRI. The manufacturers of this axiological proximisation are metonymically referred to entities whose power arise from material resources such as financial and economic properties that cast axiological threats to the IRI. It means that material facilities such as economic and financial recourses are represented to set the international relations on accounts of animosity, antagonism and hatred (axiological threats).
Arguably, it appears that the SL’s discourse gives an ideological aspect to any material values. This allows one to assume that the material values and means (such as scientific development or economic resources) mainly serve the IRI to administer and protect its ideological desires and policies at regional and global levels. Relatedly, Adibzade (2008: 158) argues that safeguarding the revolutionary values and ideologies has been deeply implanted with the IRI to the extent that the security of its values and ideologies has been regarded as the ideal security in the dominant discourse of the IRI. Moreover,Adibzade (2008: 159) adds that the security of values and ideologies has always overshadowed the necessity of physical security.
Be that as it may, the construal of the threats to the ideological strongholds of the IRI predominantly remain vague in elucidating their real-world and even conceivable impacts and impact consequences. In excerpt (14), the SL’s discourse employs the war scenario (‘jebhe-ye doshmani’ [a front of animosity]”) to accentuate that the ODCs have taken a pure antagonistic position in regard with the IRI and other entities located in the home camp. But it is unclear what exactly threatening impacts or impact consequences the ‘ jebhe-ye doshmani “ would bring about. In other words, construing the “jebhe-ye bozorg-e doshmani [a great front of animosity]” (14) as an axiological threat, the SL’s discourse does not deal with the exact repercussions of the construed threat. However, the employment of the war scenario helps to indicate that the conceptual distance between the entities regarding the ideological (axiological) affairs is narrowing down and thereby the relation between the entities is growing more tense. In the same vein, the verb phrase “ ma movajeh hastim [we face with. . .] not only conceptualises the distance between doshman and IRI as diminishing, but also, by virtue of the verb semantics, renders “jebhe-ye doshmani” [front of animosity]” as a real, tangible and negative lived-experience with which the IRI is challenging.
The unspecified construal of the impact consequences of the axiological threats further continues when the SL points to pure axiological strategies of the ODC proximisation that imperil the doctrines of the IRI (‘. . . be shekl-e mabnayi ba mabahese paye-ei jomhuri-ye eslami darand dasto-panje narm mikonand. . .tafakor zede jomhouri-ye eslami ra . . . [. . . are fundamentally grappling with the issues . . . .are theorising the anti-Islamic Republic thought]’ (11)) and the homogenous structure of the elite power grid (‘. . . hemateshan in ast ke bein-e ghova-ye keshvar neza, ekhtelaf va da’va injad konand [. . . endeavour to make dissention, opposition and disputes amongst the decision-making authorities. . .]’ (15)). In (11), the VPs (“. . . ba mabahese paye-ei darand dasto-panje narm mikonand [. . . are fundamentally grappling with the issues) & ‘. . .tafakor zede jomhouri-ye eslami ra teorize mikonand. . . [. . . .are theorising the anti-Islamic Republic thought]’ (11)) and (‘ baraye seitareye tafakor-e estekbari . . . paye-ye fekri dorost mikonand [they are constructing thinking methodology for arrogant domination]’ (11)) indicate that the IRI’s core Islamic and revolutionary doctrines as well as the resistive and anti-domination values, desires and policies are jeopardised by doshman’s aggressive measures and movements. But the SL’s discourse does provide no clear and solid perspective to peep into the probable impact consequences. Further in the same manner, in (15) the SL’s discourse abstracts the would-be impact consequences of anti-solidarity and seditious threats of doshman in terms of a vague and unspecified image which barely provides a detailed perception of the threat consequences (‘zarbe zadan va shekast dadan-e jonhuri-ye eslami [in order to impact and defeat the Islamic Republic]’ (15)). Leaving the story open-ended, the SL, thus, creates a great discursive potentiality to picture any unfavourable domestic and/or international political relations as a war on the Islamic Republic and home entities.
The resurrection of the past?
As it was indicated, doshman’s spatial and axiological threats towards the IRI find a future-oriented direction on a temporal vector and a chain-like relationship. The spatial proximisation and material threats to the IRI eventuate in axiological (ideological) impact consequences (12 and 13) and axiological threats, though inexplicitly, are construed to jeopardise the entirety of the IRI (11, 14 and 15). Further in this track, interestingly, the SL’s discourse sketches the future conditions of the country and people in case all the envisaged spatial-axiological threats would be materialised. This is manufactured through historical flashbacks: by recourse to reconstructing an image of the pre-revolutionary era of Iran (the past). In the course of the flashbacks, the tapestry of the past condition, value systems and predilections of the ruling class stand in stark contrast with that of the post-revolutionary era. So, the impact consequences of doshman’s threats, however spatial or axiological, as construed, by way of implication, are programmed to deprive the IRI of all the material and ideological voices that articulate and gives shape to its rupture from the past. Therefore, the future of the Iran in the aftermath of the would-be materialisation of the envisaged threats is analogously depicted to be the same as the pre-revolutionary era. Such a portrayal of the ‘opposite future’ (Dunmire, 2011) through historical flashbacks lies at the bedrock of the SL’s construal of the spatial and axiological threats.
17. sad sal ghabl, masulan-e in keshvar va mellat dar moghabe-e doshmanan khodeshan ra dochar-e va dade-gi kardand va istadegi nakardand; ejaze dadand doshman biyayad va varede in sarzamin beshavad; bar eghtesad, siyasat, manabe va naft in keshvar tasallot peida konad (One hundred years ago, the authorities of this country and this nation submitted to the enemies and refused to resist. They allowed the enemy enter the land and dominate the economy, politics, and oil resources of this country.) March 26, 2006
18. Amrika mostakberane bar in keshvar. . .panje andakhte bud, dar omour mohem va asasi keshvar-e ma dekhalat mikard. Ellat ham in bud ke zemamdaran-e keshvar fased budand. Dar mellat jaygahi nadashtand; donbal-e tekye-gah migashtand (America had arrogantly enclasped this country . . ., and interfered in the major affairs of the country. The reason was that the rulers of the country were corrupt; they lacked any position amongst the people, so they were looking for support.) Feb. 8, 2010
The SL’s discourse symbolically represents the pre-revolutionary period (the past) as the dark age of Iran. The entities (‘masulin-e keshvar [the authorities of the country]’ (17), ‘zamamdaran-e keshavr [the rulers of the country]’ (18), ‘in mellat [this nation]’ (17), ‘in keshvar [this country]’ (17 and 18), ‘keshvar-e ma [our country]’ (18), ‘ eghtesad, siyasat, manabe va naft in keshvar [the economy, politics, and oil resources of this country]’ (18] ) are characterised as being totally servile, dependent, praxis-free and backward (‘. . .moghabe-e doshmanan khodeshan ra dochar-e va dade-gi kardand va istadegi nakardand [submitted to the enemies and refused to resist’] (17), ‘. . . Amrika. . . bar in keshvar-e . . .panje andakhte bud, dar omour mohem va asasi keshvar-e ma dekhalat mikard [America had . . . enclasped this country . . . and interfered in the major affairs of the country.]’ (18)). The alleged servitude of the nation, people and the ruling authorities arise from the particular governing fashion of the past political system which had surrendered itself to the Western powers. Thus, the ruling elites are represented as the cardinal agents who had responsibility in providing opportunities for the foreigners to take the control of major political events of the country (‘. . . Ellat ham in bud ke zemamdaran-e keshvar fased budand. . .donbal-e tekyegah migashtand [The reason was that the rulers of the country were corrupt. . . so they were looking for(foreign) support]’ (17), ‘. . .masulan-e in keshvar . . . dar moghabe-e doshmanan khodeshan ra dochar-e va dade-gi kardand va istadegi nakardand; ejaze dadand doshman biyayad. . .[ the authorities of this country submitted to the enemies and refused to resist. They allowed the enemy enter the land. . .]’ (18)). Therefore, the major values and identifying indices that characterise the pre-revolutionary space include servility, dependence and backwardness. Thus, such depiction of the pre-revolutionary era is the opposite version of the present states of affairs, signposting a cardinal rupture in the dominant episteme of the past.
The very construal of the past status of affairs is recruited to factualise the opposite future space under the materialisation of the future-oriented threats. Put differently, considering the analogy between the implied impact consequences of the future-oriented threats of doshman and the construed past states of affairs, one may argue that the occurrence of the opposite future is conditioned on the possible materialisation of the construed threats. The analogous use of the past to picture an unvisited future, then, contributes to providing and presenting a factualised and experienced account of an irrealis space in the future. Making the future real which is being lived and experienced in advance, thus, dramatically calls for the legitimisation and incontrovertibility of certain preemptive measures to stifle the illegitimate re-birth of the past.
The future space and the politics of preemption
In the SL’s discourse, the future space is a locus for the collision of two antagonistic forces: on the one hand, it hosts the ODC forces that endeavour to materialise the impacts of their threats and re-construct it as analogous to the pre-revolutionary era: the opposite future. On the other hand, it involves the IDC forces attempting to guarantee the perpetuity of the IRI domination over the history and the geopolitical area: ‘the privileged future’ (Dunmire, 2011). In the SL’s discourse the privileged version of the future manifests preemptive function: it puts forth certain policies to maximise the possibility of the privileged future occurrence and at, the same time, leaves no manoeuvring room for doshman to find a chance to materialise the opposite future.
19. Ma mikhahim keshvar ra elmi konim; amma hadaf az elmi shodan in nist ke keshvar ra gharbi konim. . . ma ne-mikhahim gharbi shavim [We want to make the country scientific; but the objective of being scientific is not to westernise the country. . . we don’t want to be westernised.] August 24, 2007
20. Baraye dahe-ye chaharom, baraye in dah Sali ke pishe ro-ye mast, do shakhes-e omde vojud darad ke bayad in do ra hatman be-dast avarim: yeki pishraft ast va yeki adalat. Ma mikhahim keshvareman az hame jahat – az lahaz-e elmi, eghtesadi, fanavari, siyasi – be pishraft beresad. Mardom be refah dast peida bokonand. Amma dar kenar-e pishraft mikhahim keshvar adelane va ba edalat edare shavad [For the forth decade, for the next 10 years ahead of us, there are two criteria that we must achieve them: one of them is development and the other is justice. We want our country to be developed scientifically, economically, technologically and politically; the people would attain prosperity. But besides development, we want our country to be justly administered.] March 20, 2008
21. Man arz kardam bayad javanan-e ma hemateshan in bashad ke ba gozasht-e yeki do dahe-ye digar, keshvareshan ra yek marja’ elmi baraye daneshmandan jahan gharar dahand [I already said that our youth must endeavour to make their country as a scientific reference to the world’s scientists after one or two decades.] March 21, 2010
In regard with the space characterisation of the future space, the SL’s discourse enumerates axiological and material principles that are probably designated to fixate the present-time power relations and project them to the privileged future space. Concerning the material principle, the future space includes scientific, economic, technological and political development (‘. . .Ma mikhahim keshvar ra elmi konim. . . [We want to make the country scientific. . .]’ (19) ‘. . .Ma mikhahim keshvareman. . . be pishraft beresad. . . [We want our country to be developed. . .]’ (20) ‘. . .keshvareshan ra yek marja’ elmi . . . gharar dahand. . . [. . .endeavour to make their country as a scientific reference. . .]’ (21)) that enable the IRI to strengthen the pillars of its independence and hegemony. Also, inasmuch as the axiological principles concerned, the future space is grounded upon de-westernisation of the country (‘. . .amma hadaf az elmi shodan in nist ke keshvar ra gharbi konim. . . [but the objective of being scientific is not to westernise the country. . .]’ (19)) and justice development (‘. . . mikhahim keshvar adelane va ba edalat edare shaved. . . [. . .But besides development, we want our country to be justly administered. . .]’ (20)). Accordingly, Adibzade (2008) states that de-westernising the Iranian ‘Self’ in the revolutionary discourse sources, to a greater extent, from a fear of all-embracing invasion of the west to westernise the world. To standup against such a fear, Adibzade (2008) adds that the revolutionary subjects have always involved that discourse of de-westernisation in all socio-political terrains of the Iranian world and also have delineated all humanitarian phenomena in terms of western and non-western polarities. Undoubtedly, these principles and ideologies are intended to insulate the IRI from the axiological threats that endeavour to transubstantiate the core values that construct the ideological bedrock of the IRI. These two principles, then, are set in strong accordance with the underlying values, policies and programmes of the IRI.
Regarding the function, the particular characterisation of the privileged future space to perpetuate and develop the present-time values and policies would open an avenue for us to argue that the future space serves to preempt the constructed axiological and spatial threats that are targeting the key issues of the IRI. To put differently, the occurrence of the privileged future is on a par with rendering the construed threats futile and, thereby, it will leave barely enough room for the opposite future to manoeuvre in the IRI’s socio-political spaces. Lying deep at the bedrock of the preemptive function of the privileged future space, thus, is to maintain and perpetuate the present political system so as to sustain the outcomes of the socio-political changes that were brought into existence after the Islamic Revolution. These changes are vital elements of the IRI simply because they provide the fundamental power resources for the system.
The SL’s discourse construes the futurity and the necessity of its occurrence via pragma-linguistic toolkit. The futurity construal is partly carried out by recruiting temporal space builders that are realised in terms of prepositional phrase (PPs) that point to the future realisation of the envisaged policies and programmes: ‘. . .baraye dahe-ye chaharom-e enghelab. . . [. . .for the 4th decade of the revolution]’ (20), ‘. . .baraye in dah Sali ke pishe roye mast. . .[. . .for the next 10 years ahead of us]’ (20), ‘ba gozashte yeki do dahe. . .[. . .after one or two decades . . .]’ (21). Furthermore, the futurity of the space is constructed in terms of the counterfactual (anha mikhahand. . .[we want. . .]) structures and temporal space builders. In the former, the counterfactual (anha mikhahand. . .) structures in (19) and (20) programmes the materialisation of the major ingredients of the envisaged ‘privileged future’. This means that the envisaged events to be occurred in the privileged future space have not been materialised thoroughly or partially in the present space, or the due opportunities for their occurrence have not been available thus far.
The achievement to all the envisaged privileged future in the SL discourse is featured with necessity. In this respect, the employment of the modal verb ‘bayad [must]’ (20 and 21) along with the epistemic obligatory reading from the counterfactual ‘ma mikhahim. . . [we want. . .]’ structures, originating from the socio-political subjective position of the SL, points to the necessity and momentousness of the realisation of the future space.
Discussion and conclusion
By virtue of the analyses conducted via pragma-linguistic and cognitive toolkit, I indicated that spatial and axiological threats are conceptualised in the SL discourse as encroaching upon the home camp to impact the IRI’s central values, programmes and policies. Importantly, unlike Cap’s (2013, 2017) analyses of the axiological proximisation in which it plays compensatory function in the absence of the spatial proximisation in the US ‘war on terror’ discourse, axiological proximisation figures in a cardinal position in the SL’s discourse and it constructs a cause-effect relation with the spatial proximisation.
Using different pragma-linguistic structures to represent the temporal aspects of the STA proximisation (Spatial-Temporal-Axiological), the SL’s discourse projects the so-called threatening spatial-axiological threats as being prospective and encroaching upon the future of the IDC space. In this regard, in the SL’s discourse the opposite future would resemble the pre-revolutionary space of Iran’s history provided that the envisaged threats of doshman would come true in the present and future of the IRI. On the contrary, the privileged version of the future is the extension and development of the present values, programmes and policies. The latter, thus, manifests preemptive function; it puts forth certain policies to maximise the possibility of the privileged future occurrence and at, the same time, leaves no manoeuvring room for doshman to find a chance to materialise the opposite future.
As findings suggest, it may be inferred that both the alleged successful status of the post-revolutionary era (the IRI time) and the submissive atmosphere of the pre-revolutionary period are the direct repercussions of different political systems that ruled each of these historical points. This may guide us to infer that in the SL’s discourse, the full-fledged responsibility of constructing the history and epoch-specific habitus of the political system falls on the political actors of each period. Then, it signposts to track the resources of threats through investigating the ‘mediated actions’ and ‘mediational means’ (Scollon, 2001) of the political actors that reproduce socio-political structures in one way or another. In the same vein, recognising various entities and agents in the ODC space with different sorts of threats that each of them casts towards the IDC space might provide the PT with a radial structure of the IDC-ODC spaces.
Concerning the future space, I attempted to describe the implicational correlation between the strategic function of the privileged future space and the construed past-to-future threats. I then argued that the privileged future space is construed to preempt the re-contextualisation of the past states of socio-political affairs (the opposite future) in the IRI space. The preemptory function of the future space does by no means dismiss the legitimising and persuasive functions of it; in fact, it serves to orchestrate the workings of the three. This finding provides a different perspective towards the structure and the function of future space construction in political discourses. Besides, the very preemptive function renders the investigations of the threat construal inevitable in constructing the future spaces in political and public discourses. To this end, the Proximisation Theory appears as an apt theory to cast critical look at accounts of future construction in terms of threat construction and fear generation in political and public discourses.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
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