Abstract
Self, selves, and subjectivity have long been an important field of study in philosophy, sociology, and particularly in psychology. Accounts of individuals attempting to understand the “self” can be traced back as far as the late medieval period. However, it was during the early modern period (16th–18th century) that individuals began to conceptualize the “self” as something that resides within the individual (Baumeister, 1987), with Descartes boldly proclaiming “I think, therefore I am.” Philosopher and psychologist William James saw the concept of “self” as “the most puzzling puzzle with which psychology has to deal” (James, 1890, p. 298). Recently, critical psychology and critical theory more generally have challenged 19th- and 20th-century conceptualizations of the self as being too individualized, realist, and essentialist. It has been suggested that we should conceptualize our “thoughts” and “feelings” no longer as expressions of an inner, coherent self, but rather as discursive performances (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987). However, this “purely” discursive approach has come under much criticism for undermining and downplaying embodiment and materiality (Nightingale, 1999). Therefore, calls have been made to abandon, or at least put to one side, epistemological and ontological “battles” between realism and relativism that rely on polarized extreme positions—which are unproductive in the quest for knowledge construction (e.g., Cromby, 2004; Falmagne, 2009). It is these recent calls that Richard Hallam attempts to address in his book Virtual Selves, Real Persons: A Dialogue across Disciplines.
Hallam sets up his critical realist stance from the onset, highlighting the influences of Rom Harré and Roy Bhaskar. He proposes an innovative approach to conceptualizing “selves” and “persons” through the view that both are co-constructed via joint activity. Therefore he adopts a social constructionist perspective of “self” as emerging and being understood through social interaction (personal). In addition, Hallam proposes two other levels which constitute humans, one suggesting an element of inner cognition or “mechanisms in the mind/brain” (p. 12; sub-personal), and one that is “supra-personal,” addressing issues around biological (embodiment) and natural causation. Hallam suggests that although these three levels have been looked at in some depth across various disciplines, it is the combination of all three that is essential to developing our understanding. For Hallam, it is this relationship between the three that has been problematic in previous theorizations and the case is made that, “[i]f supra-personal interactions are, from a natural perspective, biologically mediated, the supra-personal level of explanation does not supplant the personal, more than the personal and sub-personal are necessarily opposed to one another or hierarchically related” (p. 12).
Drawing on these three levels, Hallam embarks on the intimidating task of reviewing theories from biology, philosophy, psychology, and sociology to provide a comprehensive account of previous conceptualizations relating to persons and selves. It is this review that provides strength and depth to the book with an interesting and extensive account that truly embraces the interdisciplinary challenge Hallam sets for himself. Having established a range of different perspectives (with conflicting and contradictory epistemological and ontological assumptions), he suggests evolutionary theory as the means to bridge the gap between naturalistic theory, relational, and discursive approaches. It is at this point that the challenge Hallam set himself appears problematic.
Virtual Selves, Real Persons: A Dialogue across Discipline provides a nice account of how evolutionary theory can help to link the natural with the social. However, Hallam suggests at the end of the book that he embarked on a shift from psychology to anthropology in his academic career, and it is here that the account can be perceived as being potentially incomplete, if not troubling. For example, the deployment of evolutionary theory in this book falls short of what Fabian (1983) referred to in anthropology as the “denial of coevalness.” The key to this claim is that through the interpretation and dissemination of anthropological study there is an inherent problem in the way other cultures are presented. Fabian argues that the tendency to banish the other from the present is simply an interposition of discourse, resulting in a denial that the “other” are our contemporaries (i.e., “they” live in “our” past). In order to present the other in such a way, the discourses draw on a social-evolutionist approach whereby the temporal is spatialized.
It is through reference to the socio-evolution of ideas about person and self that this critique appears particularly salient. For example, an “evolutionary pressure to develop a more efficient brain with greater storage capacity” (p. 236) is suggested as part of the process of human “development” that enabled “new cultural achievements” (p. 233), despite acknowledgement of a significant time lag. Through this assumption of socio-evolutionary development in reference to “advanced cultures” and the development of tools and technologies, the implicit assumption is made that we can study more primitive forms of “humans” in different parts of the world. For example, the case is made that with the evolution of the “mind,” “[w]ords are said to form a higher-order system of relationships that are about indexical relationships” (p. 243) and therefore those more “developed” will draw on language to better understand and interpret their selves and others. Hallam suggests that we should not “privilege the beliefs and desires of modern individuals” (p. 243) over the “pre-literate” and “indigenous” other, despite their often having very different accounts of an event in comparison to the anthropologist. Although this privileging is not desired, the “pre-literate” other is still constructed as falling behind on the evolutionary paradigm (even through reference to pre). Hence, this places the “indigenous” as not only spatially distant from the (Western) anthropologist, but also temporarily distant on the linear time frame adopted by Hallam. This “denial of coevalness” represents, at best, an unfortunate overlooking of relevant critiques of time and reflexivity (e.g., Adam, 1988, 1990; Fabian, 1983, 2006), and at worst a re-emergence of the “civilizing” discourse associated with colonial conquest. Further, the socio-evolutionary approach adopted is open to the relevant debates and critiques most prominent in feminist studies and critical theory.
In this book, Hallam provides both a comprehensive and a multidisciplinary account of self, which is well crafted and interestingly presented. The challenge he addresses is becoming increasingly important, and he is courageous in his approach and his willingness to take on such a proposition. However, the use of evolutionary theory to bridge the unproductive void between realism and relativism appears to fall short of the same problematic conceptualizations of time and other addressed by Fabian (1983). Therefore, it would appear that in his attempt to provide “generalizations about humankind of a universal nature” (p. 14), Hallam falls under the spell of ethnocentrism.