Abstract
In his ambitious, macroscopic, and provocative book, Henriques begins by using the parable of the blind men and the elephant to describe the fragmentation of psychological knowledge and the quest for greater unity. (For those unfamiliar with this parable, several blind men try to discern the nature of the object before them, each with a different conclusion based on whether he has grabbed the elephant’s trunk, leg, etc.) Henriques concludes that the object, for human psychology, is justification (i.e., how individuals justify their actions to one another, leading to the creation of collective justification systems). He then tries to convince the reader he has assembled an “ultimate” conceptual framework. In other words, Henriques does not interpret the parable as a cautionary tale about the parochial nature of individual perspectives, which thus necessitates legitimate dialogue and an unassuming attitude toward the perspectives of others. Instead, he has taken on the arguably impossible task of occupying the position of the sighted parable narrator; and, furthermore, of convincing the reader they can adopt his framework and share his transcendent perspective. Henriques suggests the reader would then be able to see the “elephant,” which he formally articulates in a four-part model, including his “Tree of Knowledge” system, “Behavioural Investment Theory,” “Justification Hypothesis,” and “Influence Matrix.” The book includes a chapter on each.
While a critique of the merits and limitations of these components is beyond the scope of this review, I will address the bigger question of whether the book succeeds in its promise to deliver a “new unified theory of psychology,” or “theoretical system that organizes and explains empirical findings and provides psychologists with a shared language and conceptual frame to understand their subject matter” (p. 5) and a way to “assimilate and integrate [the insights of midlevel theories] into a comprehensive set of ideas that articulates a clearer picture of the human condition” (p. 13).
With regard to the first purpose, is Henriques’ theory new? While the gestalt of the theory is clearly original, many of its elements appear to be modifications or elaborations of existing theories, leaving the reader to discern whether they are sufficiently necessary. For example, he provides arguments in favour of redefining “worldviews,” “belief systems,” “memes,” and similar constructs as “justification systems” but the utility of reducing the richness of these constructs to a singular emphasis on justification is not sufficiently compelling.
Secondly, does Henriques’ theory unify psychology? He divides psychology into three distinct disciplines at the institutional level: psychological formalism (i.e., a natural science devoted to basic neuro-cognitive-behavioural research), human psychology (i.e., a “hybrid” between psychological formalism and the social sciences, concerned with justification), and professional psychology (i.e., an applied/healing discipline loosely affiliated with the humanities). He argues this institutional division is warranted by the conceptual unity provided by his unified theory. However, does it provide conceptual unity? Does it sufficiently account for the wide range of empirical findings? Will psychologists agree to adopt it as a shared language? Does it provide a comprehensive and clear account of the human condition? The answers to these questions will, no doubt, depend on who is answering, which is precisely at the heart of the unity–disunity debate and the challenge of pursuing greater unity. In short, I suggest psychologists who share Henriques’ objectivist leanings will be more likely to agree. However, those who commit to a more subjectivist perspective, such as social constructionism, but including psychodynamic and humanistic psychologists, amongst others, will be more likely to object that he does not do justice to the scholarship in these areas and does not succeed in “integrating and assimilating” them—at least not without committing theoretical violence in the process.
I would be remiss not to highlight Henriques’ conclusion wherein he elevates his unified theory beyond psychology to serve as a “new scientific humanistic worldview” and “an ultimate justification” for ensuring “the betterment of the human species and the world we live in” (p. 248). For example, Henriques includes a one-page “origin myth” for humanity based on his unified theory, which would replace the origin myths provided by the world’s religions. He briefly acknowledges the danger of such hegemony; however, targeting creation science, he suggests it is problematic for people to hold “false or inaccurate” beliefs when Western science has provided the means to approximate truth or at least to weed out false beliefs. In other words, one might conclude, using Henriques’ language, that the scientific justification system is a superior justification system; and, his new unified theory, grounded in this superior justification system, can therefore supplant the holy books of the world’s religions as a guide for human betterment. He concludes that his unified theory is an “effective blending of the true and the good” (p. 268).
I would like to draw on another parable involving blindness, namely that if a blind man follows a blind man, they will both fall into a pit. How can the reader be certain Henriques has occupied the position of the sighted narrator? Henriques positions the reader as akin to the blind men; however, it is probable that he is also a blind man, resulting in a situation where the blind is leading the blind, with the danger of falling into a pit. Presumably, such a pitfall might be a gap or hole in the terrain Henriques has covered, especially when he leads the reader into territory with which he is less familiar. As a result, as we all attempt to cope with our respective blindness, perhaps, rather than imposing our worldviews on one another, what is most important is working toward effective dialogue and, where appropriate, working together toward common objectives.