Vygotsky’s analysis of the crisis in psychology: Diagnosis,treatment,and relevance

On the meanings of the term “crisis”

The term “crisis” (in German “krise” or “krisis,” French “crise,” and Latin “crisis”) originates from the ancient Greek word “κρίσις.” In the Ancient Greek language the verb “κρίνϵιν” meant “to separate,” “distinguish,” “judge,” or also “decide” (Shank, 2008; Sturm & Mülberger, 2012, p. 425). In Ancient Greece “crisis” was used predominantly as a medical term. Crisis in the context of the system of the Greek physician Hippocrates referred to a crucial stage or turning point in the progression of a disease, at which two outcomes are possible: the recovery of a patient and also the triumph of the illness and his death (Jones, 1868).

In the context of the Enlightenment and especially in the 19th century the concept “crisis” has acquired a new meaning and dimensions within the discourses of politics and economics (political crisis, economic crisis). John Stuart Mill in his Principles of Political Economy of 1848 referred to a “commercial crisis,” “when a great number of merchants and traders at once, either have, or apprehend that they shall have, a difficulty in meeting their engagements” (1848, p. 73). Crisis was presented as a temporary phase of the economic cycles.

Marx analyzed not only cyclical crises, but also the historic crisis of the capitalist system:

And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand, by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented. (Marx & Engels, 1840/2002, p. 202)

Crises were presented by Marx as inevitable consequences of the internal contradictions of the capitalist system.

In the early 20th century an awareness of a crisis of physics emerged (Einstein, 1922). Both the new ideas (special and general relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.) and new experimental data challenged the worldview and rules laid down by classic Newtonian physics.

In his work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, the philosopher Edmund Husserl (1936/1970) offered his interpretation of a crisis of rationalism from the standpoint of Phenomenology:

The “crisis” could then become distinguishable as the apparent failure of rationalism. The reason for the failure of a rational culture, however … lies not in the essence of rationalism itself but solely in its being rendered superficial, in its entanglement in “naturalism” and “objectivism.” (Husserl, 1936/1970, p. 299)

However, the most famous attempt at rethinking the concept of “crisis” in the field of history and philosophy of science is associated with Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. Thomas Kuhn argues that crises take place regularly in the history of science. The essence of a crisis in science is the accumulation of discrepancies between theory and observed phenomena. According to Thomas Kuhn (1970), a crisis of a dominant scientific “paradigm” anticipates a scientific revolution. The question of application of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions in psychology and social sciences provoked heated debates in the scientific community (Briskman, 1972; Buss, 1978; Warren, 1971).

Shank argues that “the history of crisis as a category of social scientific historical analysis becomes one piece of the larger history of the human sciences” (2008, p. 1096). The concept “crisis” is not only a category of historical analysis of science, but also becomes a useful category of philosophical and theoretical analysis of the status of concrete scientific disciplines. Thus, I will try to trace the possibility of using the concept of “crisis” to examine several key theoretical issues of psychology, based on Vygotskian analysis of the crisis of psychology.

First attempts to analyze the crisis in psychology

Vygotsky was not the first scholar who attempted to analyze the crisis in Psychology. Psychology was presented as “science in a critical situation” (Yaroshevsky, 1989), or as a “problematic science” (Teo, 2005, p. 36) from its birth as an independent discipline. Vasilev (1996) points out that the differentiation of psychology from philosophy is an indicator of the crisis.

Brentano (1874/1973) believed that mental phenomena could be considered from different perspectives:

And in 1874 the same Brentano, with whose name Lange would have the crisis start, demanded that instead of the many psychologies, one psychology should be created. Obviously, already at that time there existed not only many currents instead of a single system, but many psychologies. Today as well this is a most accurate diagnosis of the crisis. (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 295)

The crisis in psychology appeared as many divergent and competitive approaches in conceptualizing the subject matter, the research methodology, and the lack of unification of psychology.

Willy (1899) was one of the first scholars who gave a systematic analysis of the crisis in psychology. He argued that, at the end of the 19th century, psychology was still caught in the bonds of speculation (theoretical systems of Wilhelm Wundt, Franz Brentano, William James, etc.; Teo, 2008). In 1892, American psychologist William James offered a description of the situation in the field of psychology: “A string of raw facts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level …. This is no science, it is only the hope of a science” (James, 1892/2001, p. 335).

The Russian psychologist Nikolai Lange described the situation of psychology at the beginning of the 20th century with the metaphor of the ruin of an ancient city: “The psychologist of these days is like Priam sitting among the ruins of Troy” (as cited in Yaroshevsky, 1989, p. 171). German philosopher Driesch (1925) published a book about the crisis of psychology. Here the term “crisis” means the “critical points,” i.e., the crucial problems that contemporary psychology should solve to progress as a science in the future. In 1927, Karl Bühler’s book The Crisis of Psychology appeared. Bühler (1927/1978) argued that there were three main trends in Psychology (introspective psychology of consciousness, behaviorism, and the “understanding psychology”) and suggested their unification and foundation as an integral psychology. It would be useful to remind ourselves also that during the 1920s, Soviet psychologists focused on the crisis in psychology and proposed creating a “new psychology” on the basis of Marxism as a means of overcoming that crisis (Gilgen & Gilgen, 1996).

The conclusion is that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries many psychologists were concerned about the crisis in psychology and attempted to describe and analyze it. Vygotsky relied on the works of a few of them (Brentano, Bühler, Lange, etc.) to elaborate his explanation of the crisis in psychology. Vygotsky was actively engaged in debate with major figures of psychology, such as Wundt, Watson, Freud, Pavlov, Köhler, etc., and tried to rethink the main trends of the world’s psychology in the context of attempts to create a new psychology that corresponds to the needs of social practice in the Soviet Union.

Vygotskian approach to the development of psychology as a science

Vygotsky’s book THMCP was written in 1926–1927, but it was not published until 1982. Vygotsky was writing the manuscript when the cultural-historical theory of the development of higher mental functions had not yet appeared. The epistemological and methodological reflection on the state of psychology took place before the appearance of cultural-historical psychology: “Vygotsky the philosopher, methodologist, and theoretist of science spoke his word before the apparition of Vygotsky the investigator of the higher mental functions, the author of the cultural-historical conception in psychology” (Yaroshevsky & Gurgenidze, 1997, p. 365).

Vygotsky expressed his interest in the theory of Ludwig Binswanger (1922), who attempted a metatheoretical examination of the basic concepts and logic of psychology as a science and the creation of a special science about the ultimate foundation of psychological knowledge. According to Vygotsky, Binswanger’s “critique of psychology” was incorrect, because it was “merely a part of logic, as merely a logical discipline” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 247) and isolated from disciplines of psychology. For Vygotsky, the speculative construction of general principles of psychology did not “correspond with the actual state of affairs in any science” (p. 247). The concepts of psychology, which are historically and socially situated activities, should not be considered on a purely logical, epistemological level, but in their applications in practice.

The starting point of Vygotsky’s research is not a speculative, abstract-logic examination of psychology as a science, but a concrete historical analysis of a particular situation in psychology. Vygotsky proceeded from an analysis of the psychological theories and various scientific methods as real facts of the history of science:

We will examine these facts not from the abstract-logical, purely philosophical side, but as particular facts in the history of science, as concrete, vivid historical events in their tendency, in their concrete context, of course, and in their epistemological-theoretical essence, i.e., from the viewpoint of their correspondence to the reality they are meant to cognize. (1997a, pp. 236–237)

THMCP is not a usual descriptive work on the history of psychology, but develops a more complex approach. The concrete historical examination of context and content of psychology is included in a metatheoretical analysis of psychology as a science and an epistemological examination of its theoretical and methodological problems and contradictions. One of the strengths of the Vygotskian approach is the internal connection of historical and theoretical (and metatheoretical) analysis of psychology as science. As Lakatos (1970) pointed out, paraphrasing Kant’s famous dictum, “Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind” (p. 91).

According to Vygotsky (1997a), the development of science is determined by a complex process that depends on a wide range of external and internal factors. Especially, he distinguished three important aspects of this complex process: (a) the general socio-cultural context of the era, (b) the general conditions and laws of scientific knowledge, and (c) the objective demands upon scientific knowledge that follow from the nature of the phenomena that are studied in a given stage of investigation.

The idea that a mixture of social and scientific factors contributes to the development of science was an innovative and original approach in the realms of the philosophy of science and psychology.

Vygotsky (1997a) suggested a sketch of the main stages of scientific discovery. In the first stage an empirical discovery of a realm of phenomena takes place. During the second stage the influence of the new idea is extended to the adjacent areas. Various special psychological disciplines have a tendency to develop into general psychology and spread their influence to adjacent branches of knowledge. In the third stage the new idea dominates the whole scientific discipline (psychology) and transforms it. In the fourth stage the new idea transcends the boundaries of the domain of psychological knowledge and is formulated as a universal principle which can be used in other scientific disciplines (anthropology, sociology, etc.). The new idea becomes a worldview and as a philosophical fact reveals its social nature.

Every scientific discovery has the tendency to transcend the boundaries of particular realms and to turn into an explanatory postulate for all psychological phenomena. Different psychological schools (introspective psychology, psychoanalysis, behaviorism, etc.) not only investigate different categories of facts (consciousness, unconsciousness, behavior, etc.), but also offer different explanatory postulates of interpretation of those facts. In general, in psychology a struggle between different psychological schools and different explanatory principles for supremacy takes place. Vygotsky referred to four psychological schools which have developed general ideas in psychology: psychoanalysis, reflexology, Gestalt Psychology, and personalism. These general ideas transcend the boundaries of psychology and turn into worldviews. For example, the postulate of psychoanalysis transcended boundaries of psychology and became a universal principle, which may be applied to interpretations of all societal phenomena.

Vygotsky argued that the crisis in psychology was caused not by differentiation and the proliferation of new sub-disciplines, but by the tendency to generalize and unite knowledge. Vygotsky focused on the tendency of various disciplines towards a unified explanatory principle, transcending the borders of given specific knowledge within the general system of knowledge. Van der Veer and Valsiner (1993) point out that Vygotsky’s description of the expansion of scientific discoveries may be seen as an anticipation of Thomas Kuhn’s ideas. According to Kozulin, Vygotsky’s idea that scientific facts are theory laden “appeared in the context of the philosophy of science debate that stirred the American scientific community in the 1960s and 1970s” (1990, p. 90). For example, Kuhn highlighted the inadequacy of the positivist definition of science as an accumulation of scientific facts and proposed the thesis of the theory-dependence of observation. Thus, Vygotsky’s idea that scientific fact contains an implicit theoretical concept anticipates the subsequent development of the philosophy of science.

However, we should not underestimate the important differences between Vygotsky’s theory of development of scientific discovery and Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. In accordance with Kuhn’s epistemology, social sciences (including psychology) are “pre-paradigmatic sciences” (or still in the “pre-paradigmatic stage”) characterized by coexistence of multiple, competing schools. For Thomas Kuhn (1970), a crisis in science arises when the ruling “paradigm” fails to explain new facts and “anomalies” have been severe and prolonged. He argued that a crisis emerged when a large number of observed discrepancies exist between theory and empirical data. According to Vygotsky, the cause of the crisis in psychology is not the disagreement between new facts and the ruling structure of knowledge, but the development of applied investigations which connected with new types of social practice.

Kuhn argued that science is non-cumulative and stressed discontinuity in the history of science. In contrast to Kuhn’s model of the “paradigm’s replacement,” Vygotsky proposed a dialectic approach to the development of science as a set of evolutionary (cumulative) and revolutionary moments (Yaroshevsky & Gurgenidze, 1997). In accordance with the dialectic point of view which was accepted by Vygotsky, the moments of continuity and discontinuity are interrelated in the history of science.

Vygotsky rejected the linear, positivist approach to scientific progress as an accumulation of empirical facts. In addition, Vygotsky rejected the empiricist approach that scientific investigation operates only with “pure” facts and demonstrated that scientific investigation includes implicit theoretical assumptions. The different psychological theories have hidden implicit theoretical assumptions which have been accepted uncritically. Vygotsky criticized the empiricist view that science derived from pure facts: “Everything described as a fact is already a theory” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 249). Every fact includes a concept or a set of concepts that are needed for its description. Thus, Vygotskian analysis of the crisis in psychology includes one of the first criticisms of empiricism in psychology.

In the field of epistemology much literature on the limitations of empiricism has emerged, especially after the appearance of Quine’s (1951/1980) article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” However, in psychology empiricism remains a widespread tendency. At this point, it will be useful to draw attention to Toulmin and Leary’s (1985) critique of the cult of empiricism in psychology:

The ultimate expression of the cult of empiricism—of the faith in the data. Ironically such naïve empiricism, precisely because it disavows its dependence upon the theoretical realm, is all the more likely to be a vehicle of unexamined metaphysical assumption about the nature of the data, the organism, and the world. (p. 606)

The cult of empiricism prevents an investigation of the philosophical background of different psychological theories and leads to an uncritical adoption of their implicit ontological and epistemological assumptions.

Vygotsky’s historical and theoretical investigation is contrary to a methodological imperative (Danziger, 1985) and methodologism (Teo, 2009): “Methodologism means that the experimental-statistical or empirical-statistical methodology is applied to all research questions” (Teo, 2009, p. 44). Vygotsky (1997a) criticized overestimating the importance of quantitative measurements and the fetishization of particular techniques of applied research, which arises when the separation of the technical function of science from theoretical thinking takes place:

A correct statement of a question is no less a matter of scientific creativity and investigation than a correct answer—and it is much more crucial. The vast majority of contemporary psychological investigations write out the last decimal point with great care and precision in answer to a question that is stated fundamentally incorrectly. (p. 258)

Vygotsky attempted to investigate open-ended fundamental theoretical and methodological questions which were not raised by the vast majority of psychological investigations in his time. Vygotsky’s position retains its relevance in contemporary psychology, which is characterized by an increasing accumulation of empirical publications that do not promote new psychological knowledge: “Psychology as science would probably suffer no loss if the overwhelming majority of empirical papers that are currently published never saw print” (Valsiner, 2006, p. 604).

The cult of methodologism of contemporary empirical investigations is internally connected with an indifference of researchers for the context and the ontological and epistemological foundation of their research: “Methods are evaluated separately from the context of their use—and separately from the context of the phenomena to which they become applied” (Valsiner, 2006, p. 603). Researchers lost their sensitivity to the concrete context of the real life phenomena and the particular characteristics of the object under investigation.

A diagnosis of causes of the crisis in psychology

The crisis in science could not be explained as a result of personal mistakes of its founders or “good” or “bad” intentions of its practitioners. Vygotsky emphasized that objective tendencies operate behind the actions of its founders and practitioners and the process of the development of science. Vygotsky took the first steps toward the elaboration of an explanation of the crisis in psychology in the context of a theoretical and methodological analysis of the history of scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge was presented as “a socially determined and dialectically contradictory process with its peaks and lows, its critical and revolutionary situation” (Yaroshevsky & Gurgenidze, 1997, p. 364).

For Vygotsky the growth of many psychologies and the lack of an accepted, single system of psychology is an indicator of crisis. The essence of the crisis in psychology is not only the struggle of different views and approaches, but “the struggle between different types of science, separate disciplines which tend to turn into a general psychology, i.e., to the subordination and exclusion of the other discipline” (Vygotsky, 1997a, pp. 295–296). The crisis is not merely a matter of conflicting viewpoints or divergent opinions, but it is an expression of fundamental scientific contradictions which should be systematically examined. Behind all systems, directions, and theories, contemporary psychology is divided into two parts, two struggling tendencies: “Two psychologies exist—a natural scientific, materialistic one and a spiritualistic one” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 300).

Vygotsky attempted to analyze the causes or driving forces in the crisis in psychology: “the main driving force of the crisis in its final phase is the development of applied psychology as a whole” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 305). Applied psychology was first confronted with a new, highly developed practice, i.e., industrial, educational, political, military practice. This practice demands reform of scientific theory and serves as criterion for testing scientific truth:

The center has shifted in the history of science: what was at the periphery became the center of the circle. One can say about applied psychology what can be said about philosophy which was rejected by empirical psychology: “the stone which the builders rejected is become the head stone of the corner.” (p. 305)

The applied psychological disciplines had reached a turning point in their development, when “the simple continuation of the same work, the gradual accumulation of material” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 233) proves impossible. The rapid development of applied psychology had dramatically challenged the position of general psychology and its methodology. Practice and practical applications of science transform the whole methodology of science. The view that practical activity provides the basis for the transformation of psychological methodology and the foundation of new psychology anticipated the foundation of the psychological theory of activity. But the term “activity” (deyatelnost) did not exist in Vygotsky’s book THMCP (Veresov, 1999).

Thus, social practice through the development of applied psychology creates the conditions for changing the scientific method and causes the crisis in psychology: “Practice and philosophy are becoming the head stone of the corner” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 309). Vygotsky discussed the possibility of the foundation of the philosophy of practice which enabled the reconstruction of the theoretical and methodological background of psychology.

Contemporary psychologists are concerned about the “the long-standing, conflicted relationship between science and practice” (Henriques & Sternberg, 2004, p. 1060) and the gap between academic psychology and professional psychological practice. Fahl and Markard (1999) argue that existing academic psychology and professional psychological practice can be brought together with difficulty. Two interrelated aspects of the gap between academic psychology and professional psychological practice can be distinguished. The first one is connected with the widespread view that scientific description is “the superior form of knowledge and the only possible way of seeing the world. It implies that there are correct ways to gather data and if properly applied will lead to value-free authoritative knowledge” (Lane & Corrie, 2006, p. 97). One of the consequences of this approach is the indifference of academic psychology and lack of reflection on professional psychological practice, challenges, problems, and experiences of psychological practitioners who daily face the concerns and questions of their clients (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003). Another aspect of the gap between academic psychology and professional psychological practice is connected with the “question of how practitioners reflect upon their activity, and of the scientific assumptions behind their work” (Bury & Strauss, 2006, p. 119). The question of the opportunity of practitioners to conceptualize their experience and promote psychological knowledge also arises.

In order to overcome the split theory and practice, the elaboration of an “epistemology of practice” (or “practice epistemology”) is presented as an alternative strategy (Green, 1999; Polkinghorne, 1992; Raelin, 2007). Many scholars speak about a “practical turn” in social sciences (e.g., Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2001). However, the concept “practice” is “one of the least theorized concepts that circulate in professional discourse” (Green, 1999, p. 2). Despite the increasing interest in investigation of professional practice (Green, 1999; Lane & Corrie, 2006; Polkinghorne, 1992), the mutual, historical relationship between knowledge and practice remains poorly researched and clarified.

According to Green (1999), two distinct philosophical “meta-traditions” in investigation of practice have emerged. Neo-Aristotelianism constitutes a powerful philosophical “meta-tradition,” referring to Aristotle and Ancient Greek philosophy. The representatives of Neo-Aristotelianism use and develop such notions as “integrity,” “praxis,” “phronesis,” focusing mainly on the moral-ethical dimension of practice. In post-Cartesianism the problem arises of subjectivity within a philosophy of subject. This line of thought includes a critique of Cartesianism. It is “an alternative and even oppositional line of thinking which seeks to problematise the sovereignty of the subject, and all that that involves in terms of prevailing concepts of mind, consciousness and knowledge” (Green, 1999, p. 5).

The impact of these two philosophical “meta-traditions” can be found within the Vygotskian legacy. For example, Vygotsky (1991) offered a brilliant analysis of moral action in his early book Pedagogical Psychology, bringing to mind the Aristotelian concept of “praxis.” Moreover, Luis Gonzalez Rey demonstrated that Vygotsky’s works, especially in the last years of his life, “opened a path to advance on the topic of subjectivity as a continuous production of symbolic–emotional configuration” (Luis Gonzalez Rey, 2009, p. 71).

However, Vygotsky was inspired mainly by the Marxian concept of practice as a social, transformative activity. Participation in social practice was presented by Vygotsky both as the deepest foundation for the development of psychological knowledge and the supreme judge of theory:

Practice pervades the deepest foundations of the scientific operation and reforms it from beginning to end. Practice sets the task and serves as the supreme judge of theory, as its truth criterion. It dictates how to construct the concepts and how to formulate the laws. (Vygotsky, 1997a, pp. 305–306)

According to Bradley (2008), “Vygotsky’s solution was to reverse the usual predominance of theory over practice, making practice the ‘supreme judge’ of truth” (p. 37). The relevance of the Vygotskian concept of practice is connected with its rejection of the positivist concept of science (and science-based practice) and the adoption of a historical and reflective understanding of practice, “when a practice is understood as an evolving social form which is reflexively restructured and transformed over time” (Kemmis, 2009, p. 20). The Vygotskian view of practice as a socially and historically constituted, transformative activity anticipates the emergence of critical approaches in psychology and social sciences (Fahl & Markard, 1999; Nissen, 2000).

Is a crisis resolution in psychology possible?

Contrary to the tendency to be depressed when reflecting on the crisis situation of psychology, Vygotsky proposed an optimistic view on the future of psychology: “The crisis is destructive, but wholesome. It reveals the growth of the science, its enrichment, its force, not its impotence or bankruptcy” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 295). Vygotsky emphasized the constructive aspects of the crisis in psychology and its positive potential, which should not be underestimated. The scientific contribution of Vygotsky might be in the awareness of the contradictions of psychology and highlighting the need for the foundation of a new, revolutionary psychology that will overcome (aufgehoben) those contradictions (Packer, 2006).

The construction of a methodology for scientific psychology, which includes a set of goals, concepts, principles, and methods was presented by Vygotsky as a real perspective for a resolution of the crisis in psychology. No philosophical system can take “possession of psychology directly, without the help of methodology, i.e., without the creation of a general science” (Vygotsky, 1997a, pp. 329–330). Psychologists should lay the foundation, the basic principles of their science before starting to build. “General psychology” (or “general science”) was considered by Vygotsky as the field for integration of psychological knowledge and empirical research. General psychology deals not with real psychological processes, but with knowledge developed in the specific psychological sub-disciplines.

Vygotsky attempted to create a theoretical system that could overcome the objective–subjective conflict in psychology. Objectivistic (naturalistic) and subjectivist (intentionalist) psychologies were presented by Vygotsky merely as two sides of the same coin (Packer, 2006). Vygotsky believed that Marxism is the conceptual system that offers an opportunity for a resolution of the crisis in psychology. However, Vygotsky rejected the applications of Marxism in psychology accepted by psychologists—Marxists like K. Kornilov. These applications are characterized as explaining psychological phenomena as simple manifestations of universal laws of dialectics such as a transition of quantity into quality, the universal connection of all phenomena, etc. Vygotsky accepted Engels’ formula “not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but to find them in it” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 330).

Vygotsky argued that Marxists at that time, first, “take the wrong things” from Marx, second, applied Marxism “in the wrong place,” and third, “in the wrong manner.” “Psychology nowadays is a psychology before Das Capital” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 331). The same should be done in the field of psychology as was done by Marx in the field of political economy: “Psychology is in need of its own Das Capital” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 330). Vygotsky searched the “cell” of psychology as a science as Marx searched the “cell” of political economy. The political economy of capitalism, the only science that has reached a level of methodological maturity, had been presented as an analogical example of what should be done in psychology. But Vygotsky’s period was only the starting point of discussion on Marx’s methodology of scientific research in Soviet philosophy and the knowledge of the dialectics of Marx’s Das Kapital (1867/2009) was as yet very limited.

Vygotsky attempted to use at least two of Marx’s ideas for the elaboration of a strategy to overcome the crisis in psychology: historical method and systemic analysis of social phenomena. One of the most important of Vygotsky’s scientific contributions is the application of an historical method for the investigation of psychological phenomena: “historical study simply means applying categories of development to the study of phenomena. To study something historically means to study it in motion” (Vygotsky, 1997b, pp. 42–43). It is worth mentioning that the historical examination of the development of psychological knowledge and especially the crisis situation in psychology appeared before the emergence of the idea of the development of psychological functions and prepared the conditions for the foundation of cultural-historical psychology. From this perspective, the emergence of cultural-historical psychology is presented as an attempt to overcome the crisis in psychology.

Vygotsky searched intensively for the “living cell” which could offer a starting point for discovering the laws of the complex system. As pointed out by Veresov, THMCP is one of the reasons why “Vygotsky changed the analysis by functions (elements) into analysis of units” (Veresov, 1999, p. 192). For Vygotsky, a unit is the part of an organism that retains all the essential characteristics of the whole organism: “In contrast to the term ‘element’, the term ‘unit’ designates a product of analysis that possesses all the basic characteristics of the whole. The unit is a vital and irreducible part of the whole” (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 46). In different periods of the development of his research program, Vygotsky selected different units (the mechanism of one reaction, mediated action, meaning, experiencing—“perezivanie”—etc.; Veresov, 1999). The analysis by units had been presented as a key strategy to overcoming elementarism of the mainstream trends in psychology. Contrary to the positivist view of the world as composed of separate and independent elements (Ratner, 1997), Vygotsky suggested the analysis by units as an optimal method of investigation of psychological phenomena.

When Vygotsky was writing THMCP, he was looking for the “cell” of psychology as science. He presented “the mechanism of reaction” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 320)—the core concept of Korninov’s “reactology”—as the key concept of psychology. Vygotsky had not yet overcome elementarism in his own psychological research. A core concept of a concrete psychological theory (“reactology”) was presented as the key concept for the unification of psychological knowledge in the field of general psychology. During this particular period Vygotsky attempted to achieve the unification of psychological knowledge on the basis of a concept of a reductionist psychological theory. Vygotsky’s self-awareness and self-criticism were pushing him constantly to face the unsolved problems and limitations of his own research program and develop it in new directions.

Limitations of Vygotskian analysis of the crisis in psychology

The methodological critique of the main psychological approaches and theories remained incomplete and imperfect, because Vygotsky in that period did not even draw up a positive research program. When Vygotsky was writing THMCP, he had not yet elaborated his own theoretical system, which could overcome the paradoxes and contradictions of psychology. Unfortunately, after the foundation of cultural-historical psychology, Vygotsky could not systematically consider the issue of the crisis in psychology from a cultural-historical perspective. Moreover, he failed to adequately explain how to accomplish in “general psychology” (or “general science”) a resolution for the crisis in psychology.

I have already mentioned Vygotsky’s failure to find the “cell” of psychology. We can find an internal contradiction between a dialectical framework, which Vygotsky attempted to develop in psychology, and his reductionist approach to the issue of the “cell” of psychology as a science (the mechanism of reaction as a “cell” of psychology; Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 320), when he was writing THMCP. The internal contradiction of Vygotsky’s views on the resolution of the crisis in psychology expresses the truly theoretical difficulties of the endeavor of integration of psychological knowledge: “We know that science on its path toward the truth inevitably involves delusions, errors and prejudices. Essential for science is not that these exist, but that they, being errors; nevertheless lead to the truth, that they are overcome” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 337).

For Vygotsky, the “new psychology” could only be a materialistic, deterministic psychology which should overcome the contradictions and dichotomies of the “old psychology.” However, the adoption of one side of the contradiction (materialistic point of view) and the exclusion of the opposite side of the contradiction (idealistic point of view) does not lead to overcoming the theoretical contradictions as the main source of the development of scientific and philosophical knowledge. In accordance with the dialectics, the main task is to historically explore the conditions of appearance, formation, and resolution of the philosophical problems (in this particular case, the contradiction between the Materialist and Idealistic point of view; Vaziulin, 1988).

The strengths and limitations of Vygotskian analysis of the crisis in psychology are closely related to the particular social and scientific context within which that approach had been developed. It was a time of rapid and deep social transformation that could not be realized without transformation of the structure and orientations of sciences, including psychology.

How relevant is the Vygotskian analysis of the crisis in psychology?

In the decades after the writing of Vygotsky’s book THMCP, the concern over the crisis in psychology has deepened. The crisis in psychology has been recognized since the mid-1960s. Elms pointed out that “whether [psychologists] are experiencing an identity crisis, a paradigmatic crisis, or a crisis of confidence, most seem agreed that a crisis is at hand” (Elms, 1975, p. 968). According to Goertzen (2008), the crisis literature (over 300 sources published in different book and journals) is extremely fragmented and its meta-analysis has not yet taken place: “Psychology lacks knowledge of theory, theory methodology, and theory needs with respect to changing from a disunified to unified science” (Staats, 1999, p. 3).

Usually, the crisis in psychology has been defined as a crisis of fragmentation and disunity (Goertzen, 2008; Staats, 1983; Yanchar & Slife, 1997). The discourse on the crisis in psychology expresses a concern about the contemporary situation of psychology, when the status and coherence of the discipline is at stake. An elegant, multidimensional description of psychology is suggested by Yurevich:

The “vertical” disunity of psychology—with various schools such as cognitivism, behaviourism, and psychoanalysis, “horizontal” division into natural scientific and humanitarian psychology and “diagonal” division into research and practical psychology is compounded by the watering down of the foundations of scientific rationality, which in turn affects the cognitive status of psychology. (2009, p. 92)

The fragmentation narrative has been criticized by some scholars arguing that it is based on a disputable postulate “healthy state of psychology.” “It seems that the underlying model of this analysis is that of a cumulative, objective, fact-seeking science—just like an idealised natural science” (Zittoun et al., 2009, p. 107). The idealized model of linear and progressive development is connected with the domination of functionalism in contemporary psychology. At the institutional level functionalism is presented as a theoretical framework for unification of psychology of science:

Functionalism has served institutional purposes well because it is ontologically neutral with respect to the kinds of entities under investigation. Hence, psychology proceeds through the multiplication of entities without ever committing itself to the reality (or lack thereof) of the objects it so constitutes. (Stam, 2004, p. 1261)

Contrary to functionalism, Vygotsky attempted to elaborate a kind of historizing, materialistic epistemology in psychology, taking into account a wide range of ontological, epistemological, methodological assumptions, and the complex interconnection of external and internal factors in the development of science. Rejecting agnosticism and relativism, Vygotsky accepted a materialistic epistemology able to rethink “the objective demands upon the scientific knowledge that follow from the nature of the phenomena studied in a given stage of investigation (in the final analysis, the requirements of the objective reality that is studied by the given science)” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 241).

Moreover, in accordance with Vygotsky, the fragmentation and disunity, which is presented in the contemporary crisis literature as the core of the problem, is only the external symptom of the crisis in psychology. The crisis in psychology emerged as a result of fundamental philosophical, theoretical, and methodological tensions and it is impossible to develop a strategy to overcome it, without its systematic consideration.

In contemporary psychology the issue of the possibility and the theoretical framework of the integration of psychological knowledge remains a controversial, open-ended question. On the one hand, the universalistic claims of unification on the basis of positivism and functionalism (Staats, 1983, 1999) lead to a legitimization of the dominant mainstream psychology. On the other hand, the relativistic cult of diversity and the rationalization of the increasing fragmentation of psychological knowledge is problematic (Gergen, 1988).

In contemporary theoretical psychology a set of complex theoretical questions connected with the perspective of integration of psychological knowledge arise: Is it possible to avoid the Scylla of positivistic universalism and the Charybdis of relativistic particularism? How to deal with the issue of generalization of psychological knowledge (the construction of a “general psychology” in Vygotsky’s terms)? How a theoretical synthesis is possible, an integration of the findings of specified sub-disciplines in the broader theoretical framework?

There are at least two main attempts toward the solution of the problem of generalization of psychological knowledge in Vygotsky’s footsteps. The first attempt is connected with the approach of Soviet philosopher Ilyenkov (2009). He demonstrated the limitations of the empirical generalization based upon the simple classification of common characteristics of static objects. Such types of generalization have an abstract character, while the individual empirical objects are identified with the concrete. Statistical analysis is a typical example of the empirical generalization in psychology. Ilyenkov (2009) argued that it is possible to develop a theoretical generalization on the context of the analysis of “concrete universals.” Ilyenkov—as well as L. S. Vygotsky—was inspired by the dialectics of Marx’s Das Kapital. His analysis of “concrete universals” is focused on the investigation of the concrete objects in the process of their development. Theoretical thinking is focused on reconstruction of the general transformations of the concrete objects. In accordance with that dialectical theoretical framework, psychological objects should be considered not as static, natural kinds, but as historical objects which are transformed both in the human history and the history of science.

The second attempt to analyze the problem of generalization in psychology, which was posed by Vygotsky, on the basis of a dialectical framework, is associated with Holzkamp’s critical psychology. Rethinking Leontiev’s theoretical legacy, especially his investigation of the development of mind, Holzkamp elaborated a historical methodology:

Developmental (sometimes called “historical”) methodology … provides the criteria of relevance by which empirical generalizations can be sorted out and ranked. When we understand how different abstractions are interrelated, even when some of them appear to be contradictory, we have obviously made the first great step toward a unified theory. (Tolman, & Lemery, 1990, p. 400)

The developmental perspective in psychology inspired by Vygotsky’s cultural-historical psychology, activity theory, and German critical psychology provides a solid theoretical framework for consideration of such fundamental theoretical problems as generalization, integration of psychological knowledge, etc.

Some authors locate psychology’s crisis mainly at a philosophical (especially epistemological), level (Goertzen, 2008). However, the crisis in psychology is a more complicated, multilevel, multidimensional phenomenon that should be considered in integration with its external (socio-cultural) and internal (cognitive, scientific) aspects. One of the best contributions of Vygotsky is to bring to prominence the social context of the crisis in psychology and the connection between methodological crisis and social practice. Vygotsky argued that the deeper source of the crisis in psychology is the tension between existing psychological theories and rapidly growing practice: “The most complex contradictions of psychological methodology are transferred to the ground of practice and only there can be solved” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 306). For Vygotsky, the resolution of crisis and unification of psychology cannot be adequately achieved merely on an epistemological, philosophical plane.

As Stetsenko and Arievitch (2004) point out, the concepts and theoretical ideas of Vygotsky’s project reflect its unique orientation toward social transformation. Vygotsky wrote: “Our science could not and cannot develop in the old society. We cannot master the truth about personality and personality itself as long as mankind has not mastered the truth about society and society itself” (Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 342). Participation in social, transformative practice offers the opportunity for rethinking and developing psychological knowledge in accordance with emerging tendencies of socio-historical development.

In conclusion, despite the fact that the Vygotskian investigation of the crisis in psychology was carried out nearly 85 years ago in another social and scientific context, nowadays it still retains its potential and offers a framework for the analysis of crucial theoretical, metatheoretical, and methodological problems, which concentrate the attention of many contemporary scholars. The dialectical approach of Vygotsky provides an essential insight to rethinking key theoretical issues of psychology, such as relationships between psychological theory and practice, interdependence of fact and theory, dualism in psychology, and generalization, etc.