Towards a psychology of free action

Abstract

Although freedom has been of grave concern to people for centuries, it has surprisingly not been a central topic in psychology. The goal of this article is to begin constructing a theoretical framework for addressing freedom issues in terms of free action, which is generally defined as doing as one sees fit without coercion or constraint. Insofar as free action is a form of human action, it is first necessary to conceptualize action. The paper begins by conceptualizing action from a systems perspective in terms of interrelated individual, social, and cultural processes. Next, free action is conceptualized as a form of action that involves particular ways of structuring individual, social, and cultural processes. The article ends with some implications of this conceptualization of free action for continued theory building and research on the psychology of free action.

Keywords

free action freedom individual processes social processes cultural processes systems theory

Freedom is a complex and messy issue that has been rather overlooked in psychology. There have been some sporadic and disparate treatments of freedom issues in psychology over the years (e.g., Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008; Deese, 1985; Dennett, 1984/1990; Fromm, 1941/1969; James, 1890/1983; Skinner, 1971/2002; Westcott, 1988), and freedom issues are implied in some of the topics that some psychologists pursue, such as self-regulation, autonomy, and decision making. Although explicitly conceptualizing human functioning in relation to freedom has not been a central topic in psychology, freedom seems to be important to people the world over. Indeed, around the world, people have fought and died for freedom for centuries. Wars and social movements have been waged for the sake of freedom. Freedom is a value-laden and fuzzy concept that has been and continues to be widely discussed and hotly debated. All of this concern with freedom suggests that it is an important dimension of human experience that could be the subject of systematic psychological analysis. The complexities of freedom go in many directions and encompass a wide range of vexing issues. The goal of this paper is to begin hewing a theoretical path through the uncharted terrain of freedom and psychology by arguing that psychology address freedom issues in terms of free action, and by conceptualizing free action from a systems perspective. This theoretical framework can provide a basis for discussing and addressing varied freedom issues, including and going beyond the particular ones raised here.

Introducing free action

The term freedom probably conjures up political issues for some readers. Wars and social movements have been waged for the sake of varied forms of political freedom, such as freedom of self-government, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech, all of which encompass the political arrangements that enable people to do and express themselves as they see fit. In the United States, when someone undertakes a course of action that someone else finds dubious, it is not unusual to proclaim, “It’s a free country.” This statement means that political policies and arrangements provide the conditions that enable individuals to act as they see fit, or to act freely (no matter how hare-brained) without interference from others. As a political issue, freedom generally refers to the sociocultural arrangements that contribute to enabling people to act as they see fit, or to act freely. The political philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1958/1969) distinguishes between two kinds of freedom, namely negative and positive freedom. According to Berlin, negative freedom refers to acting without interference from other people, or “the area within which a [person] can act unobstructed by others” (p. 122). Berlin recognizes that the area of negative freedom cannot be unlimited because people are “largely interdependent” (p. 124). One consequence of such interdependence is that one person’s free action can obstruct another person’s free action, wittingly or unwittingly. Thus, there must be some public regulation of individual negative freedom. Of course, debates have long raged over the parameters of negative freedom, as well as the role of government in establishing and enforcing them. These debates are part of what makes freedom so complex and messy. Berlin defines positive freedom in terms of self-control and self-direction. He writes that positive freedom “derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be [his/her] own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind” (p. 131). Berlin further points out that positive and negative freedom are “at no great logical distance from each other” (p. 131). In addition, they can be and have been played out in harmonious as well as opposing ways. For our current purposes, it is noteworthy that positive and negative freedom encompass ways of acting in daily life circumstances. Insofar as psychology is the study of action or of what people do, and insofar as people can act freely, free action provides an entry point for thinking about freedom issues from a psychological perspective. In addition, psychologists are paying increasing attention to sociocultural processes, further suggesting space for psychologists to address freedom in terms of sociocultural aspects of free action.

The term freedom may also be readily associated with sociocultural processes because it invokes cultural values. People may claim to value freedom, and freedom may be central to a group’s value system. Indeed, another connotation of “It’s a free country” is that people can do as they see fit because Americans ostensibly value every person’s freedom to do what he/she wants, or to act as he/she sees fit without interference from others and without coercion or constraint. As a value-laden concept, freedom has been defined in varied and dynamic ways, and has been the source of much debate and even violent strife, within and across cultures. Insofar as cultural meanings and values are reflected in action, one can consider how values regarding freedom are reflected in action. Acting in ways that reflect freedom values may be referred to as free action or acting freely. Once again, we find an entry point in free action for considering psychological aspects of freedom.

The term freedom also probably conjures up the thorny issue of free will for many readers. The heated free will–determinism debate has occupied philosophers for centuries. On the side of determinism, it is argued that human behavior is determined by causes other than the individual him/herself. Because people do not cause their own behavior, they are not free, making free will and freedom illusory. Conversely, on the side of free will, it is argued that free will exists, and that people are free because individuals do play a causal role in their own actions. Straddling these two positions, compatibilists argue that free will and determinism are not opposing phenomena, and that both characterize human functioning. The debate continues to rage, but the point here is neither to explicate the details of the free will–determinism debate, nor to go over the arguments in support of free will. Nevertheless, given that I am trying to connect freedom and action, I start from the assumption that notions of free will and freedom encompass ways of acting that can be characterized as free. In other words, freedom is involved when people act as they see fit, or when they control what they do without coercion or constraint. Indeed, in English one can characterize what a person does as “an act of free will.” From a psychological perspective, it is necessary to focus on the action, and what it means to engage in free action or to act freely. For the third time now, we encounter the notion of free action or acting freely, thus opening up possibilities for psychological considerations of freedom issues.

As indicated above, a person engages in free action or acts freely when he/she acts as he/she sees fit or controls what he/she is doing without coercion or constraint. Doing as one sees fit encompasses positive freedom, and doing so without coercion or constraint encompasses negative freedom. In this paper, acting as one sees fit without coercion or constraint, or controlling what one is doing without interference, will be used as a general working definition of free action. Before proceeding, it is important to recognize that human action is always constrained in some ways. For example, as physical creatures living in a physical world, human action cannot defy the laws of physics. We cannot, for example, flap our arms and fly wherever we want. However, a person can get on a plane and fly almost anywhere in the world. Even so, people are not totally free insofar as a person can get on a plane only when the plane is scheduled to fly, and only if he or she can afford a plane ticket, and if he or she is not encumbered by other reasons not to fly somewhere. This example shows that human action may be constrained in all kinds of ways, yet a person can still act freely. In addition, people may still value freedom and view themselves as free, even in the face of varied constraints. Taken together, the terms freedom and free action are not being equated with a total lack of constraint, or with doing whatever one pleases, whenever one wants, no matter the consequences. I am also not claiming that a person who is acting freely is the sole cause of his/her action. Indeed, as will be explained very soon, free action is constituted by varied processes. The point here is to conceptualize free action in a way that enables us to think systematically about varied complex and dynamic issues that arise in relation to freedom.

Throughout the article, I will use “free action” and “acting freely” interchangeably as shorthand terms. The question then arises: How, more specifically, can free action be conceptualized? Insofar as free action is a kind of action, it is first necessary to conceptualize action. Towards that end, I begin by briefly explicating a systems conceptualization of action. Then, I use this systems approach to action in general to conceptualize free action systemically in terms of individual, social, and cultural processes. The paper ends by considering some implications of the current conceptualization of free action for further theory and research.

A systems conceptualization of action

During the last 20 to 30 years, systems theory has been gaining ground as an antidote to the mechanistic paradigm that dominates much of conventional psychology. A systems perspective proceeds from the premise that human action emerges through ongoing dynamics among multiple and interrelated constituent processes, which in turn are understood in terms of multiple and interrelated sub-constituent processes (Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Ford & Lerner, 1992; Gottlieb, 2007; Gottlieb & Halpern, 2002; Mascolo & Fischer, 2010; Overton, 2013; Oyama, 2000; Thelen & Smith, 1994/1996; van Geert, 2003, 2011; von Bertalanffy, 1969/1998; Witherington & Heying, 2013). In other words, a systems view provides a way “to understand the world through the use of synthesis … It stresses the relationship among parts, but the relationships are viewed as part of an integrated process rather than as unidirectional chains of cause-effect relationships” (Wapner & Demick, 1998, p. 768). The current conceptualization of action also starts from the premises that all people are simultaneously separate individuals and connected to others in varied ways, and that all human action reflects cultural meanings. Synthesizing these premises leads to conceptualizing human action in terms of interrelated individual, social, and cultural processes (Raeff, 2016, 2017). As multiple and interrelated constituents of action, individual, social, and cultural processes are viewed as distinct, as well as mutually constituting processes. Thus, action cannot be reduced to individual, or social, or cultural processes alone, nor is one constituent process privileged over the others. Rather, people’s ways of acting are taken to emerge out of systemic interactions among simultaneously occurring, and 100% necessary individual, social, and cultural processes.

Individual processes refer to a person’s action as a separate individual, or a physically distinct being who constructs experience from a unique subjective perspective. Conceptualizing action in terms of individual processes also means that a person controls or regulates aspects of what he/she does. That is, individuals are assumed to be capable of deciding how to act, and of initiating their own action. As such, individual processes encompass “the deliberative, reflective activity of a human being in framing, choosing, and executing his or her actions in a way that is not fully determined by factors and conditions other than his or her own understanding and reasoning” (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003, p. 82).

At the same time, individuals are not wholly separate beings because they function or act in relation to each other. Thus, individual processes are inseparable from social processes, which refer to the ways in which action is partly constituted through engagement with others. For example, a person may adjust the way he/she expresses an opinion in relation to another person or people who are acting simultaneously. A systems perspective further highlights ongoing and reciprocal or mutual connections among system constituents. With regard to action and the dynamics of social processes, reciprocal or mutual connections include reciprocal or mutual influences between people. Thus, at the same time that other people are contributing socially to a person’s action, that person is also contributing socially to others’ action.

At least since the days of American Pragmatism, theory and research on self-construction have long pointed to the ways in which people think about and construe themselves in relation to others. For example, according to Mead (1934/1962), people construe themselves by turning others’ attitudes towards themselves, and James (1890/1983) argued that people construe themselves along varied dimensions, including physical, psychological, and social dimensions. Conceptualizations of social self-processes have been elaborated more recently from a dialogical perspective, which holds that people position themselves by engaging in private dialogues with varied others when those others are not immediately present (Hermans, 2003). Thus, a person’s action may also involve social processes when he/she is alone. For example, a person may take some time to be alone on a mountaintop to think through some major life issues, such as whether or not to accept a tempting job offer. Making this decision may involve thinking about the other people in one’s life, and how the new job might affect them. It could also involve considering the impact on current colleagues, as well as thinking about one’s potential new colleagues.

People always act within cultural practices, and therefore, individual and social processes are also inseparable from cultural processes. As such, human action reflects common, as well as contested cultural meanings, which refer to historically derived and dynamic beliefs, values, and guidelines for action (Gjerde, 2004; Miller & Goodnow, 1995). For example, driving is not only a matter of mastering varied physical skills; driving also reflects cultural meanings. That is, if being able to drive enables a person to have a better job, driving may reflect values regarding achievement, as well as providing for oneself and one’s family. Driving may also reflect values regarding self-reliance and freedom because it enables people to do as they see fit, at least to some extent. Cultural processes also include political and economic arrangements, as well as the ways in which power and authority are structured within cultural practices. At the same time, cultural processes are inseparable from social processes insofar as cultural meanings are co-constructed and negotiated by people as they interact with each other. In addition, cultural processes are inseparable from individual processes insofar as an individual construes cultural meanings from a unique subjective perspective (Lawrence & Valsiner, 2003; Wertsch, 1998). In doing so, individuals sometimes resist and subvert dominant cultural meanings (Turiel, 2003, 2008; Turiel & Perkins, 2004; Wertsch, 1998).

Conceptualizing free action

In the introductory section, free action was defined in general terms as controlling one’s action or doing as one sees fit without coercion or constraint. The issue before us now is to conceptualize free action more specifically from a systems perspective. Based on the systems position that action consists of interrelated or inseparable individual, social, and cultural processes, free action emerges when individual, social, and cultural processes are organized in ways that support doing as one sees fit. As systemic processes that co-constitute the wider system of free action, individual, social, and cultural processes are taken to be distinct, yet utterly interrelated. Thus, it will be impossible to consider each process wholly separately, or without sometimes mentioning the other processes.

Free action and cultural processes

As is the case with any kind of action, free action or acting freely always occurs within the context of historically based cultural practices in which dynamic cultural meanings are enacted or expressed. Thus, free action is carried out within cultural practices in which action reflects cultural meanings regarding freedom, or cultural ways of understanding what it means to do as one sees fit. It is readily recognized that volumes have been written about cultural conceptions of freedom in other disciplines, but it is neither possible nor necessary to summarize that work in a paper that explores some psychological aspects of freedom. The point here is to draw attention to some cultural aspects of freedom that are relevant to free action. In particular, we will consider conceptions of a domain or area of free action, parameters of free action, within culture differences, and issues pertaining to individualism and collectivism.

Conceptions of domains or areas of free action

Cultural meanings regarding freedom include a cultural community’s ideas about domains or areas of freedom, or aspects of action that are considered to be under individual control. Some research shows that people’s understanding of social issues includes a personal domain of functioning which refers to

the set of social actions whose import and effects are perceived to be primarily upon the actor rather than other individuals or the societal structure. As such, the personal represents the circumscribed set of actions that define the private aspects of one’s life; the set of social actions for which the issue of “right or wrong” is one of preference rather than obligation or custom. (Nucci, 1981, p. 114)

The personal domain can be viewed as a domain or area of free action because it encompasses doing as one sees fit with regard to certain issues. It encompasses positive freedom insofar as what a person does is up to the person and cannot be controlled by others or wider societal processes. Negative freedom is also implied insofar as controlling your own action presumably means that others are not interfering with what you are doing. Analyses suggest that constructing a personal domain may be universal, but that the specific issues that go into the personal domain may be culturally variable (Helwig, 2006). For example, there may be cultural differences regarding whether clothing, hairstyle, friendship choices, and job choices are considered to be up to individuals. Across cultures there have been and still are different ideas about whether marital arrangements are a matter of personal choice, and thus within a culturally defined area of free action. Conceptions of areas or domains of freedom are dynamic, meaning that they are subject to debate and discussion, and thus they have also changed historically within and across cultures. For example, in some cultures where individuals currently choose whom to marry, marital arrangements were not always considered to fall within a personal domain of functioning.

The cultural construction of domains of freedom further implies that people can choose among options with regard to those domains. If marriage is viewed as a domain of free action within a culture, then it is reasonable to assume that more than one potential spouse is available. In cultures where people choose their own careers based on personal interests, it is reasonable to assume that varied career paths are possible. If people choose their elected officials by voting, it is reasonable to assume that there is a choice of candidates. In these ways, choosing among options is a way of acting freely that is partly constituted in relation to cultural conceptions of domains of free action. However, just because a domain is generally viewed as a domain of free action, it does not mean that people are wholly unconstrained because acting within a cultural domain of free action is systemically related to other cultural processes. For example, choosing to be a doctor based on personal interests may not be an option for someone who cannot go to medical school for financial reasons. It is also important to point out that acting within a domain of free action may constrain further action within that domain, as well as action within other domains of free action. For example, choosing a particular job can constrain where one lives and whom one meets, which can constrain one’s partner choices. On the other hand, where one lives can enable new opportunities to meet new people. As such, the further consequences of choosing can be both constraining and enabling of free action. Taken together, action within cultural domains of free action does not exist within a systemic vacuum, and involves ongoing dynamics between choice and constraint that may be played out differently in different cultures.

It has been argued that contemporary western contexts, especially the United States, can be characterized by an overwhelming array of choices, from material goods to jobs to identities (Schwartz, 2000). Schwartz claims further that being able to choose among virtually limitless options for so many domains of action can lead to paralysis and dysfunction, thus rendering freedom, which he defines in terms of self-determination, a form of “tyranny.” Others dispute such claims. For example, Ryan and Deci (2006) point out that it is problematic to “equate self-determination with choice in the very narrow sense of making decisions between (often meaningless) options” (p. 1558). One can of course question what count as meaningful and meaningless options, and that question may be answered in different ways within and across cultures. Arguing about the amount and kinds of choices available to people, as well as how they are related to free action, represents only some of the ways in which cultural conceptions of freedom are subject to debate. The point here is that the cultural structuring of free action reflects debated or contested cultural ideas about what aspects of life are up to individuals, and about how choices regarding those aspects of life are structured. Moreover, choices do not occur in a systemic vacuum, and individual choice or self-determination can be constrained economically, as well as structured in relation to varied personal and cultural values. For example, choosing among soup brands at the grocery store depends in part on how much money a person has to spend, as well as the means available to even get to a grocery store. What if the store is beyond walking distance from your home, but you have no car and public transportation is circuitous and erratic? Choosing careers, spouses, and/or presidents also occurs in relation to varied personal and cultural values. Such choices are additionally co-constituted by social processes because a person is making a choice that involves other people in varied ways.

Cultural parameters of free action

Cultural processes also include political arrangements, and as pointed out in the introductory section, freedom is clearly a concept that encompasses political policies regarding areas of free action. Depending on the cultural context, free action occurs in relation to political policies which may both enable people’s free action, as well as constrain it in varied ways. For example, in the United States, the first amendment to the Constitution establishes areas of negative freedom by stating that the government cannot regulate religion, speech, the press, assembly, and petition. Although there are laws that support acting as one sees fit within these domains, it does not mean that people can do whatever they want. In other words, it is not a totally free country after all. Thus, there are also laws that limit people’s action, so that doing what one wants neither harms others, nor unduly prevents others from doing what they want. For example, in the United States, laws regarding free speech enable people to express themselves as they see fit, as long as they do not engage in what is known as hate speech. In addition, there are laws that limit individual freedom in order to allow people to use and share common resources (Meadows, 2008). Establishing legal parameters for free action reflects a recognition that no person is an island, and that anyone’s action can affect others. Of course, where to draw the parameters of free action is subject to ongoing political debate and negotiation, and varies across cultures as well. Indeed, the line between free speech and hate speech is not always clear, and what some people define as a common resource may conflict with others’ conceptions of individual rights.

Whether formalized in laws or not, cultural ways of limiting free action occur in part because cultural meanings do not exist in isolation. Instead, they may be viewed as parts of wider cultural meaning systems, suggesting that cultural meanings regarding freedom are understood in relation to other cultural meanings. Accordingly, freedom is not necessarily an absolute value, but is understood in relation to other values. As Berlin (1958/1969) explains, freedom “must be weighed against the claim of other values, of which equality, or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are perhaps the most obvious examples. For this reason, it cannot be unlimited” (p. 170).

Analyses of American attitudes towards civil liberties point to how conceptions of freedom are related to other cultural conceptions and values. A classic survey conducted in 1978 indicates that general statements about freedom of speech “are so widely endorsed by both the general public and opinion leaders as to suggest that freedom of expression may very well be the most cherished of all American rights” (McClosky & Brill, 1983, p. 48). At the same time however, “As soon as one moves from questions about freedom of speech in the abstract to questions about the exercise of speech in particular situations, the level of support drops sharply” (1983, p. 49). For example, survey responses indicate that 18% of the sample “would permit the American Nazi party to use the town hall to hold a public meeting” and 23% supported “a group’s request to use a public building to denounce the government” (1983, p. 49). In addition, McClosky and Brill point out that “Even the most civil libertarian justices of the Supreme Court” are not “likely to regard as legitimate the use of speech and press for the purpose of harming others or infringing on their rights” (1983, p. 81).

A study conducted in an Arab Druze community in Israel indicates that Druze adolescents and adults endorse varied forms of freedom, such as freedom of speech and religion (Turiel & Wainryb, 1998). At the same time however, conceptions of freedom are inseparable from the exigencies of concrete social situations. That is, “issues of harm, community interest and authority in the family are all considered in weighing decisions that bear on the exercise of the freedoms” (1998, p. 392). Thus, unlimited freedom is not being endorsed because freedom is understood in relation to other cultural conceptions and values, especially values about interpersonal relationships.

Insofar as values regarding freedom are inseparable from other values, free action can include choosing how to limit one’s own action. If those limitations are the result of acting as one sees fit, they are not necessarily subjectively construed as antithetical to being free or being able to act freely. For example, consider the Puritans, who settled in the New World to pursue religious freedom. At the same time that they were concerned with being able to freely choose and practice their religion, they imposed limits on individual action in varied ways (e.g., Coontz, 1988/1991; Demos, 1970; Shain, 1994). Church and civil authorities regulated life “from sexual conduct to prices of goods to whether a person could build a fence or take up a trade [to] where people should live, [and] what they should wear” (Coontz, 1988/1991, p. 75). Thus, freedom of religion was understood in relation to other cultural values, and occurred in tandem with freely choosing a highly regulated way of life. However, such arrangements are not always or necessarily permanent as people may chafe under and resist public regulation. Whether they enter highly regulated communities by choice or not, some people choose to leave them. Yet, in some authoritarian circumstances, leaving may not be a straightforward option. Taken together, there are complex systemic connections between choice and constraint that can be played out in varied and dynamic ways.

Within-culture differences

As already pointed out, cultural meanings are subject to disagreement, debate, and ongoing negotiation (Lawrence & Valsiner, 2003; Turiel, 2003; Turiel & Perkins, 2004; Wertsch, 1998). Thus, “cultural values should be taken as contested propositions” (Gjerde, 2004, p. 148), suggesting that there are differences within cultures regarding what it means to act as one sees fit, as well as differences regarding what counts as coercion and constraint. For example, in the United States today, debates about the meaning and practice of freedom continue unabated in arguments about varied domains of action, including guns, speech, marriage, and abortion. In the Arab Druze community mentioned above, the freedom to make choices about varied life issues (e.g., work, education, leisure, and friendships) is considered to be applicable to men but not to women (Turiel & Wainryb, 1998; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). However, “the large majority of females considered the cultural arrangements to be unfair” (Turiel & Wainryb, 2000, p. 253). Debate and conflict about cultural meanings occur within cultures partly in relation to societal power relations. More specifically, Turiel argues that “conflicts occur when people are treated unequally, hold subordinate positions, and are restricted from exercising their freedoms and rights. People in subordinate positions are not simply content to accept the perspectives of those in positions of power” (2003, p. 123). In their daily life activities, people in subordinate positions often engage in varied forms of “defiance, resistance, and subversion” (Turiel & Perkins, 2004, p. 162) against dominant conceptions of free action. Historically, struggles for freedom, such as the civil rights movement in the United States, have been directed towards changing cultural conceptions of free action and altering cultural parameters for free action, including the structuring of coercive and constraining power relations. Using the example of driving again, in Saudi Arabia, women are not allowed to drive, making driving a cultural domain of free action for men only. However, women have been protesting this arrangement at least since 1990, and in an interview with CBS News, a Saudi woman said, “it’s like you are not free. It’s like living your life in a box. You can’t live life in a box” (“In Saudi Arabia,” 2014).

Individualism and collectivism

At first glance, considering cultural conceptions of freedom might seem specifically applicable only to cultures that have been characterized as individualistic or independence oriented, but not to cultures that have been characterized as collectivistic or interdependence oriented. For decades, it has been commonplace to characterize the world’s cultures in terms of either individualism/independence or collectivism/interdependence (Hofstede, 1980/2001). Insofar as an independence orientation implies functioning as a separate individual, it may be associated with valuing freedom. However, an abundance of evidence has long shown that both independence and interdependence are valued in varied cultural contexts, and that it is problematic to label cultures as individualistic or collectivistic (Killen & Wainryb, 2000; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Raeff, 2006a, 2006b, 2010; Waterman, 1981). Such findings suggest that freedom may be valued in varied cultures, including ones that have been traditionally characterized as collectivistic or interdependent.

For example, respecting the “inviolability of the individual” (Downs, 1972/1984, p. 24), and the concomitant “right of an individual to do as he wishes and to make up his mind” (1972/1984, p. 25) is central to Navajo culture. Similar views that reflect the value of positive freedom are evident in varied non-western cultures where young children are “treated with respect for their freedom of choice even before they become accountable for their own actions” (Mosier & Rogoff, 2003, p. 1047). Research suggests that the Japanese distinction between inner and outer—or private and public—settings can be understood in terms of freedom issues. For example, inner cultural practices are structured partly in terms of amae, which is a central emotional dimension of experience in Japanese culture (Behrens, 2004; Marshall, Chuong, & Aikawa, 2011; Yamaguchi & Ariizumi, 2006). According to Doi, amae “is the noun form of amaeru, an intransitive verb that means ‘to depend and presume upon another’s benevolence’” (1974/1986, p. 121). Moreover, “Freedom in Japan … has traditionally meant freedom to amaeru, that is to behave as one pleases, without considering others” (Doi, 1973/2001, p. 84). Along similar lines, Peak (1991/1993) explains that “The home, Japanese believe, should be a place where one can freely demonstrate feelings of amae, or the desire to be indulged. This legitimate desire for indulgence encompasses the free display of feelings” (pp. 5–6) that would be considered inappropriate in outer practices. The structuring of inner/private and outer/public ways of acting also suggests that positive and negative freedom may be structured and interrelated in culturally particular ways. That is, in contrast to outer/public settings, inner/private settings seem to be settings where a person can act as he/she wants not only without interference from others, but with support from others.

Taken together, a wide range of research indicates that cultural differences regarding freedom do not necessarily lie in whether or not freedom is valued, or even in how much freedom is valued. Instead, there are cultural differences in how freedom is understood and how varied freedom values are particularized and interrelated through systemic action as people engage together in cultural practices. In addition, Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom provides a framework for thinking about varied cultural ways of understanding and structuring free action. That is, modes of free action may reflect culturally particular ways of structuring negative freedom and positive freedom, as well as the interplay between them.

Free action and social processes

For the purposes of this paper, free action is taken to occur when other people are neither coercing nor constraining what an individual is doing. However, according to the current systems framework, all action—including free action—always involves individual, social, and cultural processes. Therefore, free action is being conceptualized relationally, and is not taken to entail a complete lack of social dimensions or to be a wholly self-oriented phenomenon. Instead, free action occurs when social processes are organized in certain ways. That is, if a person is controlling what he/she is doing, he/she may be acting in relation to others, but those others are not sources of coercion or constraint. People may even make each other’s free action possible.

Let us go back to the example of the person on the mountaintop who is thinking about whether or not to accept an attractive job offer. She and her family discussed the move at length, and her family has told her that whatever she decides is absolutely fine with them. Her current work colleagues are very supportive. The decision would appear to be hers, and hers alone. Yet, she thinks about how moving might affect all of them. In this situation, the person’s free action occurs in relation to others, but those others are not sources of coercion or constraint on free action. On the contrary, her interactions and relationships with others are part of what makes her free action possible. This view of social processes is in keeping with Deci’s and Ryan’s conceptualization of how the social context is neither inherently supportive nor unsupportive of autonomy, which they define in terms that are compatible with the current definition of free action as “rule by the self” (Ryan & Deci, 2006, p. 1562). They argue that people can experience themselves as autonomous “even when their actions are influenced by outside sources” as long as “the actors concur with those influences, feeling both initiative and value with regard to them … Indeed, one can quite autonomously enact values and behaviors that others have requested or forwarded, provided that one congruently endorses them” (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 8). Classic research suggests that adolescents feel “open and free” (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984, p. 165) when interacting with their friends, suggesting that experiencing oneself as free occurs in relation to other people. Beyond adolescence, people may consider whether and how they feel free to act as they see fit in relation to varied others.

If social processes can both support and inhibit free action, it is reasonable to ask: When do interactions and relationships with others inhibit free action, and when do they facilitate free action? The answer to that question depends partly on an individual’s point of view, or subjective construal of a situation. In other words, free action also involves individual processes.

Free action and individual processes

Individual processes may contribute to free action in varied ways. As explicated earlier, individual processes include agency, which refers to aspects of action that a person controls or regulates him/herself. It is because of the human ability to control aspects of action that free action is even a possibility. Controlling one’s action and doing as one sees fit further include deciding and judging how to act. In addition, individual processes involve constructing or interpreting experience from a subjective perspective. Such subjective interpreting involves interpreting cultural meanings—including cultural conceptions of freedom—from a subjective perspective. Freedom issues can also enter into how individuals construct or define themselves from a subjective perspective. In this section, I will consider free action in terms of these varied individual processes, beginning with deciding how to act, and then I will take up the issue of free action in relation to constructing experience from a subjective perspective.

Deciding how to act

There is a longstanding tradition of associating freedom with cognitive processes, such as reflecting, deciding, and choosing, which partly enable a person to control what he/she does or to act as he/she sees fit. According to Dewey (1933/1974),

Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests in the trained power of thought, in ability to “turn things over,” to look at matters deliberately, to judge whether the amount and kind of evidence requisite for decision is at hand, and if not, to tell where and how to seek such evidence. If a man’s actions are not guided by thoughtful conclusions, then they are guided by inconsiderate impulse, unbalanced appetite, caprice, or the circumstances of the moment. To cultivate unhindered unreflective external activity is to foster enslavement, for it leaves the person at the mercy of appetite, sense, and circumstance. (pp. 258–259)

This approach to freedom isolates cognition or thinking from action as a whole, and it even pits cognition against emotion. Treating thinking and feeling as separate and even opposing processes is entrenched in western thought, including psychology. However, cognition and emotion do not have to be conceptualized dichotomously, and some argue that cognition and emotion co-occur as people act (e.g., Lutz, 1988; Nussbaum, 2001/2003). From a systems perspective, free action in the form of deciding how to act can involve varied sub-constituent processes, and thus may not be as purely cognitive as Dewey suggests. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the connections between cognitive and emotional dimensions of reflecting, deciding, and choosing. The point here is that acting freely involves an individual who is considering an issue explicitly or consciously.

Research on ideas about what counts as free action indicates that “participants rated people’s action as freest when their choices were made after conscious deliberation” (Baumeister, 2008, p. 16). Reflecting or deliberating, deciding, and choosing may all be viewed as representing aspects of prototypical free action. That is, prototypical free action, or a prototypical way of doing as one sees fit, involves reflecting upon various matters and deciding how to proceed in a given situation. Prototypical free action, or controlling what one does, also occurs when a person reflects upon and chooses among alternatives. However, thinking about and deciding how to act in some situations are not necessarily enough to ensure full free action. A person must also undertake the course of action upon which he/she has decided.

When individuals make decisions and undertake a course of action without coercion or constraint, it can be said that they are exercising freedom. The English phrase, “exercising freedom” suggests that cultural and social processes alone do not make free action possible. Cultural circumstances may provide opportunities to act freely, and no other person may be coercing or constraining someone, but still an individual has to act. Thus, within the current theoretical approach, cultural conceptions of freedom are taken to be realized partly through the individual processes that comprise free action. For example, in varied democracies around the world, political arrangements enable self-government and protect voting rights. In such democratic cultural contexts, electing government officials is a cultural domain of freedom for individuals. However, cultural processes do not single-handedly sustain self-government because this form of freedom has to then be exercised through individual action in the form of voting. As a form of free action, voting can further be understood in terms of varied sub-constituent processes, including reflecting upon and choosing among alternatives, perhaps discussing candidates with other people (thus simultaneously implicating social processes), then going to a voting booth, and finally submitting a ballot.

Constructing experience from a subjective perspective

Variability within cultures regarding meanings of freedom points to the role of individual processes in the construction of conceptions of freedom. That is, cultural meanings, including cultural conceptions of freedom, are constructed by individuals who interpret cultural meanings from their subjective perspectives, and in communication with others. As pointed out earlier, dominant cultural conceptions are not always accepted by individuals, but may be resisted and subverted as well. This basic principle can be played out when individuals resist or subvert dominant cultural conceptions of freedom in varied ways, and along an overt–covert continuum.

Constructing experience from a subjective perspective also includes constructing conceptions of oneself, and individuals can construct themselves in terms of freedom issues. That is, a person may construct him/herself as free in general, and a person may construct him/herself as free within specific circumstances, and in relation to particular people. Insofar as self-construction is an ongoing and dynamic process, constructing oneself in relation to freedom issues is also taken to be dynamic. For example, people may feel generally free at different times in their lives, and relatively free or unfree when they are engaging in certain activities or in particular situations.

Varied sources suggest that constructing oneself in relation to freedom issues is highly subjective (e.g., Deci, 1980; Dweck & Molden, 2008). Sometimes individuals do not necessarily believe that they are free, nor do they always feel free, even if they are acting within cultural areas of freedom. However, other individuals may construct themselves as free even if their action appears severely limited. For example, insofar as free action includes controlling what one does, controlling one’s physical movement would seem to be rather essential to acting freely. Does that mean that paralysis renders a person incapable of free action or incapable of feeling free? The answer to that question depends in part on how a particular paralyzed individual deals with the situation, including how he/she constructs him/herself in relation to the paralysis.

As Deci (1980) points out,

there must be perceived freedom (perceived control or perceived response-outcome dependence) … People may have a variety of options in a highly responsive environment, but if they do not believe they are free, if they do not feel free, they will not behave like free people; they will not be self-determining. (p. 117)

On the other hand, individuals may feel free or construct themselves as free, even in circumstances of utmost social and cultural constraint and coercion. For example, the Nazi concentration camps represent circumstances of extreme lack of freedom. However, according to concentration camp survivor, Viktor Frankl (1959/1985), it was possible for some concentration camp inmates to construct themselves as free. He writes:

We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms—to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.

And there were always choices to make. Every day, every hour, offered the opportunity to make a decision, a decision which determined whether you would or would not submit to those powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom. (pp. 86–87)

In some instances, individuals found and continue to find ways to define themselves as free and to act freely at times, even in the midst of the coercion and constraint of communism and other authoritarian political circumstances.

Implications and future directions

As Westcott (1988) aptly puts it, “the notion of human freedom” is “a conceptual labyrinth. It is a labyrinth with a very large number of entrances, a very large number of turnings, and no clear exit” (p. 26). In this paper, we have entered the freedom labyrinth with action, and by viewing freedom in terms of certain ways of acting. That is, people may act in varied ways, including ways that can be characterized as free, which has been generally defined in terms of doing as one sees fit or controlling what one does without coercion or constraint. The current conceptualization of freedom as a psychological issue also starts from an overarching systems conceptualization of human action in terms of interrelated individual, social, and cultural processes. From a systems perspective, free action occurs when individual, social, and cultural processes are structured or organized in ways that enable people to do as they see fit.

This conceptualization of free action opens up varied directions for continued theory building and for research on the psychology of freedom. In the following discussion, I consider some directions for further theory and research on how free action is structured in terms of interrelated individual, social, and cultural processes, and I raise some issues regarding biological aspects of action. This section also includes a consideration of conscious and non-conscious aspects of free action, as well as a consideration of free action from a developmental perspective.

Interrelated individual, social, and cultural processes

A central premise of systems theory is that system functioning emerges through multiple and interrelated constituent processes, and I have conceptualized human action as a system that emerges through interrelated individual, social, and cultural processes. As a way of acting, free action cannot be reduced to a single process, nor is it taken to be located in one process alone, or even primarily in one process. A systems perspective assumes that all constituent processes are fully necessary for system functioning, and leads to discerning the different ways in which they are structured and interrelated.

One way to address how individual, social, and cultural processes come together in the emergence of free action is to consider that cultural conceptions of freedom do not spring into existence suddenly on their own. Rather, they are co-constructed by people through social interaction, and thus entail individual and social processes. For example, earlier in this paper, the American Constitution was discussed in the section on cultural aspects of free action, and specifically as an example of how the parameters of free action are culturally organized partly through laws and official policies. Even though the Constitution is a cultural document that reflects and expresses American conceptions of freedom, those conceptions of freedom were co-constructed through interactions among the “founding fathers.” Moreover, as the 27 amendments to the Constitution indicate, legal policies and constitutional parameters regarding free action continue to be negotiated and co-constructed through social interaction among people who espouse individual perspectives on cultural conceptions of freedom. For example, the 13th amendment abolished slavery, thereby transforming cultural conceptions and parameters of freedom. Subsequently, the 14th amendment granted citizenship rights to anyone born in or naturalized in the United States. It also grants equal protection for all citizens, including not being deprived of liberty by the state. The 14th amendment was used as a constitutional basis for identifying abortion as a domain of free action in Roe v. Wade in 1973. The 14th amendment was also used as a constitutional basis for expanding marriage as a domain of free action in 2015. The ongoing negotiation and co-construction of cultural conceptions of freedom and ways of structuring free action are part of what makes freedom very hard to pin down as an issue for psychological investigation. The current perspective provides theoretical tools for addressing some of the complexities and dynamics of freedom by starting with the premise that freedom issues are reflected in or expressed through action, and by conceptualizing action in terms of dynamic individual, social, and cultural processes.

Further theory building and research are needed to articulate the varied ways in which individual, social, and cultural processes are structured and interrelated to comprise free action as people go about their lives in all corners of the world. Insofar as individual, social, and cultural processes can be organized in different ways, there may be different ways of acting freely within and across cultures. Research is needed to identify different ways of acting freely, and how they reflect different interrelations among individual, social, and cultural processes. Such research would include discerning how some of the dynamics between choice and constraint are particularized in relation to individual, social, and cultural processes. It would also be important to discern how different ways of acting freely involve both positive and negative aspects of freedom. It would be particularly interesting to conduct such research in emerging democracies, or in cultural communities where a particular form of free action is in the midst of change and explicit negotiation. Such research could also include investigating how people’s conceptions of freedom and ways of acting freely reflect individual, social, and cultural processes.

Of course, biological processes also contribute to human action of any kind, including free action. In psychology today, there is much emphasis on the brain’s role in human behavior, and there have been some discussions of the brain and freedom (e.g., Gazzaniga, 2011; Libet, 2002; Pinker, 2008). The current perspective leads to considering how varied biological or physical processes co-contribute systemically to free action. From a systems perspective, the brain is viewed as an equal partner in the emergence of action, and therefore action cannot be reduced to brain processes (Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Kagan, 2008). Let us go back to the prototypical case of free action, namely reflecting upon possible courses of action and deciding among them. Certainly, the human brain is part of what makes such pondering possible. However, when a person is engaging in such action, his/her action is also still emerging through individual, social, and cultural processes. That is, a particular individual is imagining and deciding what to do in a particular cultural situation, and in relation to particular other people. As such, neurological processes are co-contributing to the person’s action, and they are inseparable from the interrelated individual, social, and cultural processes that are also constituting what he/she is doing. It is important to acknowledge that some forms of brain damage may inhibit a person’s ability to reflect upon possible courses of action and to decide among them, thus inhibiting free action. Nevertheless, a systems perspective leads to considering how varied processes continue to function in relation to each other to constitute any kind of action, even if one or another constitutive process is compromised. Research is needed to discern more about how the brain functions in relation to individual, social, and cultural processes in the emergence of varied modes of free action.

Conscious and non-conscious aspects of free action

To begin conceptualizing free action in this paper, I have focused on action that is relatively conscious and deliberate, and that involves complex life issues over which people sometimes struggle mightily (e.g., marriage, voting, jobs, abortion). The prototypical case of free action discussed earlier involves explicitly or consciously thinking about varied possible courses of action, and then choosing or deciding upon a course of action. However, it is readily recognized that human action does not always involve consciously deliberating and choosing. We are also not always making weighty life decisions, and much of our days may be spent engaging in rather routine and well-developed activities. Accordingly, Robinson (2012) points out that such “routine and well rehearsed actions are especially inapt as markers for actions based on choice and deliberation” (p. 397). This claim suggests that a starting point for conducting research on free action would involve focusing attention on daily life situations in which a person is explicitly deliberating or choosing (Gallagher, 2005/2006).

Yet even in the case of deliberate action, not all aspects of action are subject to conscious awareness. There are studies on neurological correlates of choosing and deciding that involve rather routine activities, such as deciding when to lift one’s finger, or choosing between doing an addition or subtraction task (Libet, 2002; Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 2013). These studies indicate that preparatory brain activity is occurring milliseconds before a person is consciously aware of choosing to lift a finger or do a math task. It may be argued that the occurrence of non-conscious activity with clear neurological correlates is evidence for a lack of freedom in human functioning. That is, how can a person be doing as he/she sees fit or controlling what he/she is doing if a person is not conscious or aware of what he/she is doing, and if brain activity is occurring? However, although some aspects of action are automatic and not always subject to conscious awareness, the freeness of action at some given time is not necessarily diminished, and a person’s action can still be characterized as free (Gallagher, 2005/2006; Robinson, 2012). Doing as one sees fit does not require one to be explicitly conscious of all aspects of one’s action all of the time. In addition and drawing again on systems theory, we are led to thinking about action in terms of both parts and wholes, as well as in terms of how parts and wholes are interrelated. From a systems perspective, the parts of action cannot be viewed in isolation or as independent parts. Rather, the meaning and function of action constituents depend on their interrelations, and on the wider mode of action of which they are momentarily parts (Overton, 2013; Witherington, 2011; Witherington & Heying, 2013). In other words, “analysis of parts must occur in the context of the parts’ functioning in the whole” (Overton, 2013, p. 44).

Thus, from a systems perspective, non-conscious aspects of action cannot be isolated from the wider whole of which they are parts, and sometimes, the wider whole of which non-conscious aspects of action are parts is a form of free action. The non-conscious activity does not occur in isolation, but takes on meaning within the wider whole of free action. As such, it does not necessarily mean that the person is not acting freely, but rather that non-conscious activity is integrated into free action. For example, in some cases, voting involves pulling a lever or placing a ballot into a box. A person may have deliberated and decided whom to vote for, and thus he/she is engaging in free action when voting. However, pulling the lever or folding the ballot before putting it in the ballot box may occur quite non-consciously, as the person does not explicitly decide to move his/her arm towards the lever, or explicitly decide to curl his/her fingers around the paper ballot in order to fold it. One could argue that the wider free action of voting is possible in part because a person does not have to be aware of and make conscious decisions about curling his/her fingers. Insofar as some aspects of action are automatic, people do not have to expend time and effort on executing them, thus leaving time and energy for thinking about and deciding what to do. Theory and research on free action can be advanced by focusing on the explicit or conscious processes that are occurring.

Free action from a developmental perspective

A fundamental truism about human action is that it develops, and further insight into free action can be gained by conceptualizing it from a developmental perspective. Certainly, the modes and aspects of free action discussed in this paper all develop, from considering possible courses of action, to choosing a course of action, to exercising freedom in varied personal domains, to constructing oneself as free, to constructing cultural conceptions of freedom from a subjective perspective. Of course, considering free action from a developmental perspective requires a theoretical approach to what happens during development and how development happens (Raeff, 2011, 2016). It is beyond the scope of this article to offer a comprehensive theoretical account of the complexities of development, and thus the goal for now is to raise some issues regarding the development of free action.

Insofar as development is cumulative it is useful to begin a developmental analysis of free action with some aspects of newborn functioning that may be viewed as providing an initial basis for the development of free action. When development is viewed as a cumulative process, it means that the development of some ways of acting does not begin at a particular age, or appear in isolation from previous ways of acting. Although newborns cannot engage in varied complex modes of free action, those modes of free action do not simply start at some later age. Rather, they build on and incorporate previous aspects and modes of free action, including ones that are possible at birth (which themselves developed prenatally).

For example, from a Piagetian perspective, human functioning is taken to involve organized sensorimotor schemes from the outset (Piaget, 1953). Sensorimotor schemes refer to action patterns (e.g., grasping, sucking, looking) that enable individuals to begin construing experience from a subjective perspective because they are self-generated and provide sensory feedback. Infant sensorimotor schemes are initially reflexive, but during the first few months of life, infants are increasingly able to initiate varied sensorimotor schemes non-reflexively. Increasing control over sensorimotor functioning is evident in “the child’s ability to engage in a voluntary motor act (e.g., reach and grasp) and change the act in response to events that arise” (Kopp, 1982, p. 203).

By the end of infancy, children are able to formulate some individual goals, and to initiate action to achieve them. Their action becomes

increasingly less dominated by the immediate concrete situation … A consequence of this freedom [emphasis added] is the clearer understanding of goals, the possibility of employing substitutive means and alternative ends. There is hence a greater capacity for delay and planned action. The person is better able to exercise choice and willfully rearrange a situation. (Werner, 1957, p. 127)

Such free action is further inseparable from language development, which is part of what enables human beings to engage in aspects of free action, such as considering varied options. According to Vygotsky, language is a central tool for regulating one’s own action, or controlling what one is doing. As such, language provides a basis for “the incomparably greater freedom [emphasis added] of children’s operations, their greater independence from the structure of the concrete, visual situation” (Vygotsky, 1978. p. 26).

During this time, children are also increasingly complying with caregiver demands (Kopp, 1982), suggesting that the development of controlling aspects of one’s own action and setting goals to do as one sees fit are occurring in relation to parameters for action. Subsequently, children increasingly act in accord with caregiver demands, even when the caregivers are not physically present. However, coordinating with others does not always go smoothly, as differentiating between one’s own and others’ goals sometimes leads to conflict with others over which goals to pursue. In these ways, development involves developing ways of doing as one sees fit in relation to others and in relation to cultural standards.

As suggested above, the notion of modes of free action or ways of acting freely could be refined theoretically. Doing so would then also permit more specific analyses of the development of different modes of free action. In previous sections of this paper, free action was discussed in terms of identity or self-processes, such as defining oneself as free or capable of doing as one sees fit. There is certainly a plethora of research on self or identity development, and such research could be expanded to include analyses of identity/self-development within and across cultures in relation to freedom issues. In addition, a person’s ways of conceptualizing freedom could also be subject to developmental analysis.

Considering the development of free action also has bearing on the issue of conscious and non-conscious aspects of free action discussed above. That is, some sub-constituents of action are non-conscious, or automatic, or pre-reflective because they are highly developed, and occur repeatedly as systemic parts of action (Gallagher, 2005/2006). Thus, just because a part of free action is non-conscious, and can be associated with particular neurological activity, it does not mean that the brain is independently causing or determining what a person is deciding. Rather, some aspects of action are so well-developed that they are automatic or non-conscious, but still under the person’s control. Well-developed non-conscious aspects of action include the sensorimotor activity discussed above that provides a developmental basis for free action. As such, the well-developed non-conscious aspects of deciding in a particular situation do not diminish the freeness of what the person is doing. Moreover, deliberately or explicitly deciding about complex life issues is a mode of free action that does not necessarily occur at one particular moment of awareness or over the course of milliseconds (Gallagher, 2005/2006). Such action may occur over hours, days, weeks, and even longer. From a systems perspective, consciously deliberating about and deciding what to do can be viewed as a wider whole whose parts include some well-developed non-conscious activity. Taken together, this analysis suggests that it would be useful to refer to these aspects of free action as “well-developed non-conscious activity,” or “well-developed non-conscious sub-constituents of free action.”

Developmental analysis involves not only identifying sequences of what happens during development, but also considering how development happens (Raeff, 2011, 2016). Sociocultural theory offers a systems-compatible conceptualization of how development happens as individuals actively participate with others in cultural practices (e.g., Rogoff, 2003). Accordingly, one direction for research on how free action develops would involve observing developing individuals as they engage with others in cultural practices to discern how interactions with others provide opportunities for developing culturally particular modes of free action or ways of acting freely. In addition, analyses could be directed toward discerning how opportunities for free action may be differentially structured during interactions with different people in different settings, and with whom a developing person has different relationships. Although not specifically designed to analyze the development of free action, a study of an American kindergarten indicates that the children were guided in the process of voting (Raeff, 2006b). They voted about whether to go outside or stay inside, they voted on whether to sing or read the words of a book, they voted about what to write on the calendar. Much child development research in the United States focuses on how caregivers balance encouraging children to make their own choices with providing parameters for children’s action. Analyses could be more explicitly directed towards discerning how such practices are linked to the development of varied modes of free action. In addition, analyses could be directed towards discerning dynamic cultural expectations for free action at different times during the life span in different cultural contexts.

Across varied academic disciplines, freedom is ambiguous, vexing, and intractable. It involves issues that do not belong to any single academic discipline, and it is played out in varied complex and dynamic ways. In this article, I have argued that psychologists can contribute to discussions of freedom by focusing on free action. Entering the topic of freedom with a systems conceptualization of free action provides a conceptual basis for psychological treatments of freedom, as well as a basis for psychologists to engage in productive discussions of freedom with scholars from other disciplines. The current systems conceptualization of free action provides theoretical tools for understanding and investigating the ways in which free action is understood, valued, and structured in varied sociocultural circumstances. Conceptualizing and investigating free action from a systems perspective in terms of interrelated individual, social, and cultural processes permits considering some of the varied ways in which freedom is played out in human action as people act in relation to each other in varied circumstances. Such considerations may ultimately help to bridge different ways of understanding and particularizing freedom, as well as to enhance freedom as people go about their lives in all corners of our global world.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author biography

Catherine Raeff is a professor of psychology at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. This essay on freedom is an extension of her work that explores how both individualism and collectivism are played out during development in different cultural contexts. She is the author of Exploring the Dynamics of Human Development: An Integrative Approach (Oxford University Press, 2016). She is currently working on articulating a theoretical framework for understanding and investigating action in terms of multiple and interrelated processes.

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