From objects to acting: Repopulating psychology with people who act

Abstract

This article builds on Billig’s (2013) claim that psychologists use too many nouns, which leads to inappropriately objectifying human beings and human functioning. Rather than treating human beings as physical objects or things in order to emulate the natural sciences, Billig calls for repopulating psychology with people who act. After summarizing Billig’s analysis, I argue that using nouns reflects prior theoretical assumptions about human functioning that inform psychology’s experimental and quantitative methods. I question varied theoretical assumptions and outline an alternative theoretical framework for conceptualizing what people do by positing action as a unit of analysis for psychology. This action perspective provides a theoretical basis for using verbs to characterize human functioning. Conceptualizing human functioning holistically and in terms of dynamic qualitative processes can transform psychology into a science focused on understanding the complexities of what people do as they act in relation to others in varied cultural contexts.

Keywords

action Billig holism objectifying theoretical assumptions

In 2013, Michael Billig published a wonderful book entitled, Learn to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences. A major claim of this book is that psychologists use too many nouns. By doing so, they are treating human beings as physical objects or things, rather than as people who act. Billig calls for repopulating psychology with people who act, and for using more verbs to describe and understand what people actually do. In this article, I first summarize Billig’s main points and recommendations. Then, my goal for this paper is to build on his work by arguing that psychologists’ habit of using nouns reflects prior theoretical assumptions about human functioning that lurk within the experimental and quantitative methods that dominate psychology. In addition to questioning those assumptions, I will outline an alternative theoretical framework for conceptualizing human functioning in terms of acting and active processes. This action perspective provides a theoretical basis for using verbs to characterize human functioning, and it can help to repopulate psychology with people who act in relation to others in cultural contexts.

So many nouns

Billig (2013) argues cogently that psychologists use nouns so frequently to characterize human functioning that one does not have to search far and wide to find them in the innumerable written texts that comprise the field of psychology. For example, some of psychology’s most well-known studies are about nouns, such as obedience, conformity, false memory, cognitive dissonance, selective attention, the bystander effect, and conflict resolution. Further evidence of using nouns can be found in how psychologists typically refer to the varied aspects of functioning that represent sub-fields and specialized research areas in psychology, such as cognition, emotion, personality, consciousness, motivation, social support, intelligence, memory, and attitudes. Billig shows that several books of key concepts in psychology include a preponderance of nouns, and that one book of key terms in developmental psychology includes only nouns. Developmental psychology is replete with nouns, including attachment, childrearing styles, theory of mind, identity statuses, peer relationships, and learning styles, to name a few.

Billig also shows how relying on nouns is manifest when authors nominalize, or turn verbs into nouns. For example, some developmental psychologists study attachment formation, and some study identity formation. Many of the nouns that are the focus of some of psychology’s most well-known findings are nominalizations, such as selective attention and conflict resolution. Along similar lines, but with adjectives, Billig discusses how adjectives are turned into nouns by putting the definite article “the” in front of them, as in “the imaginary, the comic, or the feminine…The general concept stands for all the various things that might be described as being imaginary, comic, or feminine” (2013, p. 78). He gives an example of how he was invited to contribute to a workshop on “the ethereal” that “aimed to examine how ‘we research and generate knowledge beyond the sensory’” (p. 78).

Psychology is also replete with variables, which is a noun. Variables are of course central to the quantitative and experimental research practices that comprise most of conventional psychology. Designing an experiment involves identifying at least one independent variable and at least one dependent variable. On a survey, several survey items may be combined to comprise a variable. Researchers analyze variables statistically to discern correlations among variables, and whether or not certain variables predict other variables. In these ways, psychologists are “depicting a world of interacting variables, rather than a world of interacting people” (Billig, 2013, p. 186). Billig argues that the goal of experimental research “is to see the effects of key experimental variables on other variables. The people, taking part in experiments, are ciphers for testing what the variables apparently do to each other” (2013, p. 187). Within this world, people become additive collections of variables, as well as the passive pawns of variables that comprise their functioning and experience.

Taken together, psychological research is a virtual “parade of nouns” (Billig, 2013, p. 158) in which varied specific noun forms march. Billig argues that by using nouns in these varied ways, psychologists have essentially transformed human beings and what they do into physical objects or things. In other words, by using nouns to characterize and analyze human beings, psychologists are objectifying human beings. For the purposes of this paper, the verb “to objectify” refers to treating people and what they do as physical objects or things. As Billig explains:

The trouble is that when we use noun-based styles in the social sciences, we run the risk of rhetorically turning people into things—of reifying people … By rolling out the big nouns, social scientists can avoid describing people and their actions. They can then write in highly unpopulated ways, creating fictional worlds in which their theoretical things, rather than actual people, appear as the major actors. (2013, p. 7)

Indeed, the objects of psychology are often treated “as actors, doing what people do” (Billig, 2013, p. 166). Some years ago in this journal, I argued that the self is often treated as an autonomous creature that is capable of doing what people do (Raeff, 2010). For example, the self has been described as “teleological and agentive, replete with desires, intentions, and aspirations [note the three nouns in a row] and endlessly in pursuit of goals,” as well as “moody, affective, labile and situation-sensitive” (Bruner, 2002, pp. 70–71). In addition, objects in psychology are presented as physical objects that people have, sometimes in varying amounts. For example, people may have attitudes, intelligence, thoughts, emotions, traits, a self or multiple selves, an identity or several identities, self-esteem, language, attachments, and varied styles (e.g., parenting styles, coping styles, learning styles). The mind is one of psychology’s quintessential objects. It is commonplace to characterize the mind as an object that people have, and it is sometimes equated with the brain. The mind is an object that can contain other objects, such as thoughts, ideas, mental representations, memories, and opinions. In addition, the mind is sometimes characterized as a kind of actor. For example, we may talk about someone’s wandering mind, or say that a book is the product of a brilliant mind, or that a crime is the product of a deranged mind.

If pressed, I suspect that most psychologists would agree that these phenomena are not literally physical objects or things. Some of the phenomena that we have considered thus far certainly involve physical dimensions, and can be characterized partly in physical terms. However, they are not literally objects that we have the way we have cars, or computers, or clothes. They are not literally things that we can hold in our hands. Minds are not literally beings who can wander, write books, or commit crimes. Only people can wander, write books, and commit crimes, and these complex modes of action cannot be reduced to physical characteristics.

Moreover, some of the nouns mentioned thus far are derived from analyzing people as they act. For example, parent–infant attachment patterns are based on observing parents and infants as they interact. Baumrind’s (1967, 1989) patterns of childrearing are based on observing parents and children, as well as interviewing parents. Theory of mind research involves observing what children do in varied experimental situations. Milgram’s (1974/2009) studies of obedience involved observing what people did in experiments. Bystander effect research involves observing what people do when they are faced with someone who needs help. These examples show that psychologists are indeed taking people and what they do into account. Why then do psychologists use so many nouns? Why do people talk and write about wandering minds, or about minds that produce books and commit crimes? Why do psychologists turn what parents and children do as they interact into attachment patterns that children have, and that are used as predictors of their well-being at some future time?

Why so many nouns?

To explain why psychologists objectify by using nouns, it is necessary to briefly go back into some of the early history of psychology. For centuries, it was philosophers who made sense of human beings and human functioning. In the late 19th century, psychology was established as a distinct discipline in which human functioning would be studied scientifically. Psychology was increasingly defined in terms of “the” scientific method of the natural sciences, and “the question of psychology as a field of study became problematized in methodological terms” (Danziger, 1990/1998, p. 22). As psychology was established and defined more specifically during the early 20th century, its reputation as a bona fide science was increasingly based on using experimental and quantitative methods to study human functioning (Danziger, 1993, 1990/1998). Part of using the methods of the natural sciences involves studying the same kinds of objects that natural scientists study. From oceans and planets, to rocks and rivers, many of the objects of the natural sciences are literally physical objects or things that can be represented with nouns. Of course, natural scientists do not only study inanimate objects. They study living things as well, such as plants and single cell amoebae. And from alligators to zebras, natural scientists study varied living creatures. Insofar as human beings are living creatures who are partly physically constituted, one can argue that they can be understood as natural science objects. Thus, psychology was established as a science by using natural science methods to study people-as-natural-science-objects. In other words,

By equating human action and experience with the inanimate phenomena of physics and the involuntary phenomena of biology, psychologists have aligned themselves with the methods and explanations of natural, physical science. In so doing, they have bestowed upon themselves…all of the prestige and privileges of modern science and technology. (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003, p. 9)

Ultimately, “nothing has been more effective in psychology’s disciplinary success than its natural scientific status” (Wertz, 2011, p. 85).

Within this historical context, Billig posits that psychologists objectify with nouns in order to be scientific and in order to be viewed by others as scientific. To be taken seriously as a science, psychologists have adopted the “literary practices of the natural sciences” (2013, p. 176). Objectifying with nouns enables psychologists to be scientific by studying the same kinds of objects that natural scientists study, and by using natural science methods to study those objects. In addition, Billig argues that creating scientific knowledge by using nouns to characterize human functioning comes at the price of depopulating psychology. By using nouns rather than verbs, psychologists end up writing about objects rather than people acting, or about what people do.

To avoid objectifying, Billig recommends using verbs to characterize active people and what they do. Billig argues that, “We should try to write clausally rather than nominally. … Rather than rely on a noun or noun phrase—especially one that is a technical noun or noun phrase—we should try to express ourselves in clauses with active verbs” (2013, p. 213). He also recommends that social scientists

should aim to populate our texts—to write about people rather than things. We should describe (and thereby imagine through our writing) what people do, feel, and think. We should be suspicious of unpopulated writings which seem to depict social worlds full of things and empty of people. (p. 215)

Billig acknowledges that it is sometimes difficult not to use nouns, and he clearly states that “there is nothing wrong with nouns or even with nouns formed from verbs (or nominalizations)” (2013, p. 214). The point is to write about what people do, and to explain what a noun means in terms of people acting. That is, “we should try to use an extended example saying, in effect, to the reader: ‘This is what I mean by x-ification; look closely at what the people are doing and I hope that you’ll see what I mean’” (p. 215).

For example, some of psychology’s major domains of functioning can be represented with verbs rather than nouns, such as thinking or to think for cognition, feeling or to feel for emotion, perceiving or to perceive for perception. It is difficult to refer to self with a verb, such as “to self,” which simply sounds odd in English. Nevertheless, McAdams (1997) uses “selfing” and “to self,” which he defines as “to apprehend and appropriate experience as a subject, to grasp phenomenal experience as one’s own, as belonging ‘to me’ … selfing is responsible for human feelings of agency, the sense that one is potentially a causal agent in the world” (p. 56). Even without using a verb, the point is to consider what people are doing. To go beyond treating the self as an object that people have and that can act autonomously, I suggested conceptualizing and investigating people as they engage in self constructing activities (Raeff, 2010). Of course, “activities” is a noun. But following Billig’s recommendation, the point here is that “self constructing activities” can refer to and be defined in terms of what people do as they actively construct who they are.

Theoretical assumptions of objectifying

The goal of repopulating psychology with people who act can be advanced by delving further into the practice of objectifying. What more specifically is going on when psychologists objectify by using nouns? I now turn to expanding on Billig’s claim that psychologists objectify in order to enhance psychology’s status as a science by considering how objectifying reflects some of the prior theoretical assumptions on which psychology as a science is based. Within the wider context of psychological science, treating people as if they were physical objects or things and using natural science methods to study such objects reflects prior (often implicit) theoretical assumptions that have permeated psychology since its official beginnings as a science in the late 19th century. Once we lay bare some of those assumptions, we can question them, and subsequently we can articulate an alternative theoretical framework that provides a basis for understanding human functioning in terms of acting and active processes. Conceptualizing human functioning in terms of acting and active processes will provide a theoretical basis for using verbs rather than nouns to describe and understand what people do.

During the course of establishing psychology as a bona fide science, studying human functioning scientifically meant emulating the natural sciences by using their methods to study what are taken to be natural science objects. However, emulating the natural sciences is not simply a matter of using particular methods to study people. It involves taking on varied theoretical assumptions about what is being studied because those methods are based on prior theorizing about what is being studied (Danziger, 1985, 1993, 1996, 1990/1998; Fox, Prilleltensky, & Austin, 2013; Gergen, 1982/1994, 2009; Robinson, 2007; Slife, 1998; Slife & Williams, 1997). As Slife and Williams (1997) explain, insofar as

method is always dependent on a set of theoretical assumptions and arguments … then method itself is a theory—a philosophy. Like any other theory or philosophy, method makes assumptions about the world, and important implications arise from those assumptions. (p. 120)

Methods are thus not only methodological; they are theoretical as well. As such, natural science methods are based on theoretical assumptions about the objects being studied, and using natural science methods is tantamount to accepting the theoretical assumptions that those methods entail. Using methods that were designed to study physical objects, as well as treating people and what they do as physical objects, reflect prior theoretical assumptions about how to conceptualize those objects.

More specifically, these methods reflect a Cartesian-split-mechanistic metatheory or worldview that has dominated science for centuries (Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Overton, 2006, 2013, 2015; Valsiner, 1997). According to Overton (2013), a metatheory or worldview “is a framework that presents a vision of the nature of the world and the nature of how we know the world” (p. 26). A Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview revolves around splitting, whereby the parts of a whole are taken to be split “into mutually exclusive pure forms or elements” (p. 38).

In addition, a Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview is characterized by foundationalism and atomism, which refer to “metatheoretical axioms that there is ultimately a rock bottom unchanging nature to reality (the foundation of foundationalism), and that this rock bottom is composed of elements—pure forms—(the atoms of atomism) that preserve their identity regardless of context” (Overton, 2006, p. 31). Viewing the world mechanistically also means that phenomena are taken to be caused deterministically by antecedent and independent factors. How then are these metatheoretical assumptions evident in psychology’s objectifying experimental and quantitative methods? I now turn to considering several interrelated theoretical assumptions that inform experimental and quantitative methods.

Quantitatively measurable characteristics

Using quantitative methods is based on the prior theoretical assumption that one is studying an object that is made up of quantitatively measurable characteristics. Depending on the particular object, physical objects can be understood in terms of quantitatively measurable characteristics, such as height, weight, circumference, density, and velocity. By emulating the natural sciences, assuming that objects are made up of quantitatively measurable characteristics is taken to hold for human beings and human functioning. This assumption certainly pervades psychology. One of the first questions a researcher may ask when faced with the prospect of designing a new study about some topic is: “How can we measure that?” Psychologists may refer to questionnaires as “measures” that are used to quantitatively characterize (or measure) some aspect of human functioning, from memory and attitudes, to self-esteem and well-being, to attachment and identity. Psychology programs in the United States typically require students to take quantitative methods courses in which they learn how to define and measure human functioning quantitatively.

Stability and consistency

Physical objects are also taken to be basically stable and consistent, and they can be understood in terms of universal principles, even universal laws. As such, a goal of the natural sciences is to identify universal laws, such as the laws of physics. Insofar as physical objects are basically stable and consistent, their functioning can be predicted in controlled experiments, and findings from controlled experiments should be replicable. Indeed, prediction and replication are scientific gold standards that render research results valid and credible. It is recognized that physical objects can and do change, but change is also conceptualized as being consistent and predictable.

By emulating the natural sciences, assumptions about stability and consistency are taken to hold for human beings and human functioning. That is, human functioning is being conceptualized as relatively stable and consistent over time and across contexts (Danziger, 1996, 1990/1998; Gergen, 1973, 1982/1994, 2014a; Gergen, Josselson, & Freeman, 2015; Koch, 1985/1998; Martin et al., 2003; Overton, 2015; Sarason, 1981; Shotter, 1975; Valsiner, 1997, 2009). In addition, if human functioning is stable and consistent, it should be predictable, and research findings should be replicable. Certainly, predicting behavior is a central goal of contemporary psychological science. A goal of a great deal of research in psychology is to discern if and how predictor variables predict outcome variables. In developmental psychology, there are efforts to discern how earlier experiences predict later outcomes.

Causality

Insofar as an experiment is a test of cause and effect, using experimental methods entails conceptualizing causality in a particular a priori way. In an experiment, the independent variable is taken to be the independent, antecedent, and deterministic cause of the dependent variable, which is taken to be the predictable outcome or effect of the independent variable. As such, conducting experiments is based on a deterministic conceptualization of causality. As Berlin (1999) explains:

Determinism declares that every event has a cause, from which it unavoidably follows. This is the foundation of the natural sciences: the laws of nature and all their applications—the entire body of natural science—rest upon the notion of an eternal order which the sciences investigate. (pp. 66–67)

A prototypical example of deterministic causality is predicting that a pool ball will roll a particular distance across a pool table to a particular spot, upon being hit by another pool ball that was rolling at a particular speed and angle. By emulating the natural sciences, assumptions about deterministic causality are taken to hold for human beings and human functioning. That is, conducting experimental research entails the theoretical assumption that human functioning is caused by independent, antecedent, and deterministic variables.

Splitting

The very notion of independent variables is also related to the theoretical assumption that physical objects can be understood in terms of parts that function independently of one another. In addition, objects may be understood in terms of multiple, but independent parts that combine additively to comprise the object’s functioning (Overton, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2015).

When applied to human functioning, this splitting assumption means that human functioning is being conceptualized in terms of separate parts that function independently of one another. Varied statistical inference methods entail this assumption. For example, partitioning the variance and discerning main effects are based on the prior theoretical assumption that one is dealing with phenomena that function separately and contribute independently to some aspect of behavior. Splitting is also evident in fragmenting the field of psychology, whereby human functioning is split up into fragmented bits of behavior that are the focus of specialized empirical studies (Raeff, 2016, 2017). Contemporary psychologists typically identify themselves in terms of their particular area of specialization, and academic job advertisements typically specify a particular area of psychology.

Analyzing objectively

Another theoretical assumption that lurks within natural science methods is that physical objects are conceptualized as phenomena that can be analyzed objectively. Analyzing objectively includes conceptualizing a phenomenon as an object that does not express individuality and that does not interpret experience subjectively. Insofar as physical objects neither experience the world subjectively nor express individuality, it makes sense to analyze natural science objects objectively. In other words, individuality and subjectivity do not have to be part of what one analyzes when one analyzes physical objects. In addition, researchers can proceed objectively as well. That is, physical objects can be treated as objects or things that can be analyzed dispassionately, without interference from a human observer’s individuality and subjectivity.

When applied to human functioning, this assumption means that psychologists are conceptualizing people as objects that can be analyzed objectively, that is, without focusing on how they construct what is going on subjectively and uniquely. Accordingly, psychologists can conduct research by “collecting data.” The phrase “collecting data” implies that one is dispassionately dealing with physical objects, rather than engaging as a human being with other human beings, all of whom are individuals who experience the world subjectively. By collecting data, researchers can avoid investigating how study participants might be experiencing the research situation, or how they might be subjectively construing survey items. A person is thus “‘objectified,’ standardized, and impersonalized in order to be studied scientifically” (Bibace, Clegg, & Valsiner, 2009, p. 69). In addition, statistical inference methods include aggregating data, whereby individuals’ data are combined in order to analyze overall group trends. Insofar as the objects being studied are not conceptualized in terms of individuality and subjectivity, there is no need to consider individual data. Researchers can thus focus on discerning average patterns that can be generalized from samples to populations. Analyzing group trends further means that researchers do not typically consider cases of individuals who do not follow the group average (Billig, 2013; Boker, Molenaar, & Nesselroade, 2009; Lamiell, 2013; Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010).

Questioning the theoretical assumptions of objectifying

Certainly, some of these theoretical assumptions apply to people who are physical beings. Human beings can be measured in terms of quantitative physical characteristics, such as height and weight. Some stability characterizes human functioning as well, and sometimes it is possible to predict what people will do. In addition, some aspects of human functioning can be well explained in terms of deterministic causality. Analyzing group trends and generalizing from samples to populations can provide important information about varied societal issues that involve considering what holds for people in general.

However, conceptualizing human functioning in these ways can be and has been questioned. When psychology was being established as a science in the late 19th century, some were questioning whether psychology should be defined in terms of natural science objects and methods, along with the theoretical assumptions they entail. According to the standard, textbook creation story, Wilhelm Wundt started scientific psychology toward the end of the 19th century by conducting experiments on human perception. However, even Wundt (1913/2013) did not consider all aspects of human functioning to be amenable to experimentation. In a nutshell, “the sciences that psychology wanted to emulate did not have [people] and society as their central subject matter” (Sarason, 1981, p. 149). Thus, the applicability to human beings of each of the theoretical assumptions explicated above can be questioned and analyzed critically.

Qualitative processes

Human functioning involves ongoing and dynamic qualitative processes that are not only describable in terms of quantitatively measurable characteristics. For example, characterizing self/identity in terms of amounts does not address what a person does over a period of time to define who he/she is, or how a person constructs who he/she is by positioning him/herself in relation to others in varied ways, or how a person is constructing and reconstructing a narrative about him/herself. Attachment between people involves ongoing and dynamic processes of establishing and maintaining ways of relating to one another. Piaget teaches us that cognitive development is not about changing amounts of cognition, but about qualitative changes in how infants, children, and adolescents actively think about the world.

Variability

Conceptualizing human functioning as essentially stable and consistent obfuscates dynamic processes, as well as how human functioning can be variable and inconsistent (Alper, 2013; Gergen, 1973, 1982/1994, 2014a; Koch, 1985/1998; Martin et al., 2003; Mascolo & Fischer, 2015; Overton, 2015; Sarason, 1981; Shotter, 1975; Valsiner, 1997, 2009). It is argued that variability is “pervasive rather than abnormal or exceptional. The complexity of activity varies widely and systematically from moment to moment within and across contexts” (Yan & Fischer, 2002, p. 144). One can question why one would even expect human functioning to be essentially stable and consistent when people change and develop, and when cultures change historically. Cultural change includes changes in how people behave, making it problematic to assume that research results about human functioning at one point in historical time will hold in the future (Gergen, 1973, 2009, 2014a; Sarason, 1981; Shotter, 1975). Rather than focusing on stability and consistency, Lerner has long argued that relative plasticity characterizes human functioning throughout the lifespan (e.g., Lerner, 1996; Lerner & Hood, 1986). Although human functioning is not infinitely plastic, people can and do change as well as develop. Moreover, insofar as development occurs through processes that can be played out in sometimes unknown ways, it is difficult to predict development (Gottlieb, 2001; Valsiner, 1997). Taken together, human functioning is variable, and it is not surprising that it is difficult to replicate research in psychology (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). Indeed, one can question using replication as a gold standard for research about human processes that are variable and inconsistent.

By questioning the theoretical assumption that human functioning is essentially stable and consistent, I am not suggesting that we go to the opposite extreme, and conceptualize human functioning as essentially variable and inconsistent. It does not have to be one way or the other; we can have it both ways. We can conceptualize human functioning in terms of both stability and variability. Along these lines, Gergen (1973) argues that human functioning can be understood “in terms of a continuum of historical durability, with phenomena highly susceptible to historical influence at one extreme and the more stable processes at the other” (p. 318). By conceptualizing lifespan development in terms of relative plasticity, Lerner (1996) recognizes that “systemic change is not limitless” (p. 782). Thus, it is important to understand how human functioning is both stable and variable, and characterized by “dynamic stability” (Fogel, 2006, p. 9).

Holistic and integrated functioning

With regard to splitting, conceptualizing human functioning in terms of parts that function independently of one another obfuscates how human functioning involves integrated processes that are occurring at the same time and in relation to each other (Raeff, 2016, 2017). As people go about their lives in all corners of the world, they are sensing, perceiving, thinking, feeling, interacting, and constructing who they are all at the same time. In addition, what people do is constituted by simultaneously occurring individual, social, cultural, bodily, and environmental processes. These varied processes may be distinct, but that does not mean that they have to be conceptualized as independent or separate. Robinson (2016) points out that thinking about the constituents of human functioning as if they were “partitionable features of mental life is to think that one can pull out of the cup what is hot, then what is sweet, then what is liquid and then what is brown—all the while accounting for ‘hot chocolate’” (p. 331). Sabat (2001) points out that the standardized tests of cognition used to diagnose Alzheimer’s disease split cognition up into separate parts (e.g., language, memory, attention, perception) that are “examined separately, one at a time” (p. 11). However, insofar as “these elements are not engaged separately, independently of one another, in natural everyday life” (p. 11), it is important to understand any one living with Alzheimer’s disease “in his or her totality as a person living in the world” (p. 10). In psychology more generally, there are increasing calls for conceptualizing human functioning holistically and integratively, as well as for investigating how varied aspects of human functioning mutually affect each other (Diriwächter & Valsiner, 2008; Overton, 2015; Raeff, 2016, 2017; Robinson, 2007; Shotter, 1975; Sternberg, 2005).

Subjectivity and individuality

One could say that the theoretical assumptions associated with analyzing objectively are suitable for understanding and investigating physical objects because physical objects are not people. Indeed, a pool ball is not a person. This claim implies that there are significant differences between physical objects and people. In turn, just as physical objects are not people, people are not physical objects, or at least not like physical objects in significant ways. A major way in which human beings are not like the physical objects of the natural sciences is that we express individuality and construct experience subjectively. In addition, human beings can be understood as agents who choose and decide, and who act for the sake of beliefs and values, as well as future goals. As Martin et al. (2003) put it, “the basic assumption that undergirds the idea of psychology as a natural science is in error. Human actions and experiences are not the same … as rocks, chemicals, plants, and brain tissue” (p. 10). Martin and colleagues distinguish between natural kinds and psychological kinds, and argue that as psychological kinds, human beings are “self-conscious and capable of self-knowledge” (p. 10).

It is important to point out that questioning objective analyzing here is not equivalent to abandoning studying and understanding human beings scientifically. Nor is it equivalent to denying any kind of reality. The point here is to highlight human individuality and subjectivity, which are rather neglected in psychology. Once individuality and subjectivity are recognized as worthy topics for psychology, we can proceed to designing scientific research to study how people express individuality and construct experience subjectively. In addition, we can recognize that psychological science is a cultural practice that involves human beings acting in relation to each other. As such, it is inevitably suffused with individuality and subjectivity on the part of both researchers and research participants (Gergen, 1973, 2014b; Sarason, 1981). Accordingly, researchers can recognize how values and subjective experience may inform their research.

Multi-causality

Although “the” scientific method of the natural sciences is based on the prior theoretical assumption that phenomena are the predictable effects of independent and antecedent causes, there are other ways to conceptualize causality. Considering multiple kinds of causality is typically traced back to Aristotle’s claim that any phenomenon can be understood in terms of four causes or explanatory perspectives, namely efficient, formal, final, and material causes. In brief,

Explanations that appeal to the material substance or substrate underlying a phenomenon are considered material causes. … Efficient causes involve an articulation of the antecedent conditions for a phenomenon, those circumstances both extra- and intra-organismic that reliably precede an outcome. … Formal causes abstract an organization, form, or pattern from a specific, real-time phenomenon and treat that pattern as an explanation in its own right. … Final causes involve an explanation of phenomena in terms of the end or purpose toward which the phenomenon moves, that is, the reason for the phenomenon. (Witherington & Crichton, 2007, pp. 630–631)

Efficient causality is privileged in psychology, and informs experimental methods which are directed toward discerning the antecedent conditions that reliably or deterministically precede an outcome. Material causality is also emphasized in psychology today as neurological explanations of behavior are highly prized and funded. However, insofar as human functioning involves ongoing qualitative processes that can be played out or organized in varied ways, formal causality would seem quite appropriate for understanding and explaining what people do. Insofar as people act for the sake of reasons and goals, final causality would also seem appropriate for understanding and explaining what people do. Even in the natural sciences, efficient deterministic models of causality are not the whole story. For example, rather than treating genotypes as antecedent and deterministic causes of phenotypes, epigenetic perspectives hold that gene expression in humans depends on experiential conditions, including cellular, behavioral, and societal conditions (Gottlieb, 1999, 2007; Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, 1998; Keller, 2010, 2014; Landecker & Panofsky, 2013; Lester, Conradt, & Marsit, 2016). Thus, gene expression is not fixed in advance, making for an ongoing interplay between a person’s functioning and genetic processes.

From objects to people acting

Insofar as objectifying is a theoretical issue, I take substituting nouns with verbs to be a theoretical issue as well. That is, overcoming objectifying will involve conceptualizing human functioning differently, including starting from different theoretical assumptions. First, rather than starting by conceptualizing people as physical objects, we can start by conceptualizing people as actors, or as creatures who act. By doing so, action/acting becomes a central issue for psychology, and we are activating people rather than objectifying them. By starting with action, using verbs will follow quickly because we will be focusing on what people do. I readily recognize that “action” is a noun, and as noted above, it is sometimes difficult to avoid nouns. The point here is not to completely abandon nouns; rather the point is to describe what people are doing. How then can we conceptualize action? How can we conceptualize what people do?

Conceptualizing action

The current conceptualization of action begins with the premise that all human beings are separate individuals who construct experience subjectively, are connected to others, and act in culturally informed ways. Taken together, much of what a person does involves acting as an individual in relation to others in cultural contexts (Raeff, 2016, 2017). I use the term “action,” and variations on it (e.g., acting, to act) as shorthand for acting in relation to others in cultural contexts. Examples of acting abound, from eating and telling stories; to cooperating and arguing; to texting, tweeting, and emailing; to consoling people in different settings; to working in varied settings; to becoming radicalized and terrorizing; to drinking in college; to taking care of varied others; to driving. By identifying action as a unit of analysis for psychology, we are starting by conceptualizing human functioning in terms of what people do.

Critically analyzing and questioning objectifying in the previous section suggests that we need to conceptualize action in terms other than the metatheoretical assumptions of a Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview. Toward that end, action can be further conceptualized in terms of a process-relational metatheory or worldview, which provides a theoretical alternative to the Cartesian-split-mechanistic worldview that informs objectifying practices (Overton, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2015). From a process-relational perspective, the world is understood in terms of: (a) holism, (b) ongoing processes that continuously emerge or come into being and change, and (c) multiple forms of explanation (Overton, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2015). In psychology, process-relational principles are evident in varied specific theories, including systems theory, sociocultural theory, social constructionism, and organismic-developmental theory, all of which inform how I am conceptualizing action here.

As Overton (2013) explains, “holism is the principle that the identities of objects and events derive from the relational context in which they are embedded.” As such, a “whole, unity, or system is a relational set of processes” (Overton, 2015, p. 37). Within a holistic whole, distinct processes can be identified, but they are also defined in relation to other processes, and in relation to the wider whole or system of which they are fleetingly part. Referring to a wider whole as a system is in keeping with systems approaches that define a system as a complex phenomenon that consists of multiple and interrelated constituents or parts (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Mascolo & Fischer, 2010, 2015; Overton, 2006, 2010, 2013; Polkinghorne, 1983; Thelen & Smith, 1994/1996; van Geert, 2003, 2011; von Bertalanffy, 1972, 1969/1998; Witherington & Heying, 2013). Claiming that a wider whole or system is made up of multiple and interrelated constituents means that the constituents are taken to be inseparable and to mutually affect each other. The principle of holism provides a theoretical basis for conceptualizing human action holistically and integratively, rather than in terms of split parts that function independently.

The “relational” in process-relational encompasses how holistic or systemic functioning emerges through varied kinds of connections between parts and wholes that are occurring at the same time. Part-part connections refer to how the parts of a system mutually affect each other. Part-whole connections refer to how the functioning of the system as a whole emerges through the organization of its parts, such that when the parts are organized in different ways, different, wider modes of system functioning may emerge. Whole-part connections refer to how the meaning and organization of the parts depend on the wider whole in which they are functioning. For example, extending one’s index finger may be part of many wider modes of action, but the meaning and structuring of extending one’s index finger are different within the context of wider modes of action. Depending on the wider whole, extending one’s index finger might mean: look at this great painting, come hither, do not do that, or we are number one. By conceptualizing holistic functioning in terms of emerging through multiple kinds of interrelations between the whole and its multiple parts, we have a theoretical basis for conceptualizing human action in terms of multiple causes, as well as in terms of multiple kinds of causality.

Ongoing processes are dynamic, meaning that they can be organized or structured in varied ways as they go on over time. By starting with the assumption that human action is made up of ongoing processes, human action is not being treated statically. Rather, it is taken to always be emerging through the changing structuring of the parts that comprise it. Although the functioning of a wider whole can be stable insofar as its ongoing processes are structured similarly, a process-relational perspective also holds that ongoing processes can be structured in varied ways that are not always predictable. Starting from the theoretical assumption of both stability and variability provides a theoretical basis for conceptualizing action in terms of both stability and variability. In addition, conceptualizing action in terms of unpredictable variability means that action is not taken to be the inevitable result of independent and antecedent factors. As such, assuming variability provides another theoretical basis for conceptualizing action in terms other than efficient or deterministic causality. That is, conceptualizing action in terms of dynamic processes that can be structured in varied ways provides a basis for understanding action in terms of formal causality.

From a process-relational perspective, action can be conceptualized holistically or systemically in terms of multiple and interrelated constituent processes that can be structured or organized in varied ways. The processes that make up action and through which action emerges are complex and conceptualizing them is not straightforward. The goal for now is to present a brief overview of how I conceptualize action in terms of multiple and interrelated constitutive, psychological, and developmental processes (Raeff, 2017, 2018).

Constitutive processes

Constitutive processes refer to the processes through which action emerges. More specifically, action is taken to be constituted by or to emerge through simultaneously occurring and interrelated individual, social, cultural, bodily, and environmental processes. From a process-relational perspective, these processes all contribute 100% to action, and none is taken to be prior or primary. Although they can be defined as distinct processes, they function in relation to each other as inseparable systemic processes.

Individual processes refer to how a person contributes to his/her own action as a distinct individual who can regulate aspects of what he/she does. Individual processes include how a person acts as a separate individual who constructs experience subjectively. Individual processes also refer to a particular person’s typical and developmentally organized ways of acting. Individual processes further encompass acting as an agent who can decide and choose how to act. In other words, individual processes encompass “the deliberative, reflective activity of a human being in framing, choosing, and executing his or her actions in a way that is not fully determined by factors and conditions other than his or her own understanding and reasoning” (Martin et al., 2003, p. 82). Individual agentive processes also include constructing and pursuing goals, as well as acting for the sake of reasons and values.

Social processes refer to how others contribute to or shape someone’s action during direct interaction, and to how action is co-constructed between people. In addition, even when someone is alone, his/her action may be affected by others. For example, someone may be thinking about someone else who is not immediately present, or someone may be considering others’ perspectives when deciding about a weighty life issue.

Cultural processes refer to how action reflects common and contested, as well as historically derived and dynamic, cultural meanings, including cultural attitudes, values, and guidelines for action (Gjerde, 2004; Miller & Goodnow, 1995). Cultural processes include the historically derived and dynamic, symbolic means and technologies or tools through which people act, from language to smartphones. Cultural processes also include how action is constituted by historically derived and dynamic wider societal processes, such as political and economic processes, as well as the structuring of power and authority.

Bodily processes refer to how human action is embodied, or accomplished with our bodies, including particular body parts. Bodily processes also include how action is constituted by varied biological, chemical, neurological, and genetic processes.

Human beings are always acting in a particular physical location which partly constitutes how we act. Action is thus constituted by environmental processes, such as air and water quality, climate, terrain, and natural resources. Environmental processes also include the human-built physical environment, from the physical layout of dwellings, work places, classrooms, and green spaces, to whether or not there are ramps for people who use wheelchairs.

Conceptualizing action in terms of these constitutive processes enables us to explain why people do what they do and to understand a person’s action. If you want to understand why someone did what he/she did, find out about how individual, social, cultural, bodily, and environmental processes were structured. This conceptualization enables us to consider how action emerges through multiple processes or in terms of multi-causality. Even if one process seems dominant, the others constitute action as well. For example, Down syndrome is certainly caused genetically, but people with Down syndrome act in relation to others, and their action is also constituted by individual, social, cultural, and environmental processes.

Moreover, as the varied processes constitute action, they can be interrelated in varied ways. For example, individuals draw on cultural meanings to act in terms of attitudes and values, as well as for the sake of reasons and goals, making individual processes inseparable from cultural processes. At the same time, cultural processes are inseparable from individual processes as individuals agentively interpret and use cultural meanings in unique or individualized ways (Lawrence & Valsiner, 2003; Wertsch, 1998). Some research shows how individuals in subordinate political and/or economic circumstances may resist and reject dominant cultural meanings (Turiel, 2003; Turiel & Perkins, 2004). Cultural attitudes and values are also debated, negotiated, and constructed by people as they interact, making for interrelations among individual, cultural, and social processes. Insofar as cultural meanings are interpreted and used in varied individualized ways, as well as jointly constructed by people, human action is not taken to be passively determined by cultural processes. Conceptualizing action holistically and relationally means that action is not taken to be determined by any single process. Rather, action is taken to be constituted by interrelations within and among simultaneously occurring individual, social, cultural, bodily, and environmental processes.

Positing that action is partly constituted by individual processes, which includes acting for the sake of goals, reasons, and values, provides conceptual room for understanding action in terms of final causality. In addition, insofar as the constitutive processes can be understood in terms of how they are organized or structured, the current conceptualization of action permits going beyond efficient or deterministic causality to understanding human functioning in terms of formal causality. That is, action is taken to emerge through the organization or structuring of the constitutive processes. Once again, genetic processes may deterministically cause Down syndrome, but action for a person with Down syndrome also emerges through the ways in which all of the constitutive processes are organized, including how they mutually affect each other. For example, the ways in which the Down syndrome genotype constitutes action has changed historically in relation to changing cultural attitudes. In other words, action is constituted through how genetic processes and cultural processes are organized, including how they are interrelated. According to the current action perspective, the ways in which people with Down syndrome act and the ways in which others act in relation to people with Down syndrome emerge through the organization of the varied constitutive processes. The same conceptual claim goes for any person and for any way of acting. Thus, understanding action, including why someone did X, Y, or Z, involves discerning the formal causality of how individual, social, cultural, bodily, and environmental processes were organized to constitute what the person did.

As ongoing and dynamic qualitative processes, constitutive processes may be structured in some stable or typical ways, but they are also subject to variability and change in relation to different circumstances and over time. As noted earlier, a plethora of research shows that human functioning is variable and characterized by relative plasticity. Variability and plasticity are to be expected insofar as the processes that constitute action can be organized or structured in varied ways. For example, a person may act in varied ways in relation to different people because social processes are structured differently. People act in varied ways as their bodies change over time. People are acting in varied ways in relation to the changing structuring of the environment, with some ways of acting even being swept away as rising sea levels destroy island communities. Human action is also historically variable because cultural processes can and do change historically. In other words, as cultural processes change historically, ways of acting can change historically. For example, in some cultures, historically changing cultural meanings regarding gender are evident as men and women act in different ways today than they did in the past. At the same time, historically changing ways of acting contribute to changing cultural ideas about gender. In other words, as ways of acting change historically, cultural processes can change historically. As such, this example also illustrates the holistic premise presented above that parts and wholes are reciprocally interrelated, as changes in the whole shape changes in the part processes, and vice versa. In this case, acting (whole) in different ways partly contributes to changing cultural attitudes (part) about gender, just as changing cultural attitudes (part) about gender are reflected in different ways of acting (whole).

This conceptualization of how action is constituted also enables us to know and understand human individuality and subjectivity in at least two ways. First, conceptualizing action in terms of individual processes provides a theoretical basis for understanding individuality and subjectivity. Second, knowing a person as an individual who experiences life subjectively involves knowing about how individual, social, cultural, bodily, and environmental processes have been and are organized specifically for that person.

Psychological processes

The wider whole of action is further taken to be made up of multiple and interrelated psychological processes, which refer to more specific domains of action, including but not limited to moving physically, sensing, perceiving, thinking, feeling, interacting, and constructing who one is. These processes may be structured in different ways to comprise different wider modes of acting. For example, thinking, feeling, sensing, perceiving, interacting, and constructing who one is may all be involved when a person is telling stories, when people are arguing about politics, and when a person is consoling someone. However, these psychological processes may be structured in different ways to comprise these different wider modes of action.

Within the current theoretical framework, telling stories, arguing, and consoling are conceptualized as wider modes of action or ways of acting that involve varied psychological processes. In turn, psychological processes can be understood as sub-modes of action. As such, they are being conceptualized as active processes that people do while acting in relation to others. For example, a person thinks and feels as part of telling stories, as part of arguing over politics, and as part of consoling someone. In these cases, thinking and feeling are part of what people are doing while acting in relation to others in cultural practices. Neither thinking nor feeling occur on their own, in pure forms, separately from action. As sub-modes of action, psychological processes are taken to be constituted by the same multiple and interrelated processes that constitute wider modes of action, namely, individual, social, cultural, bodily, and environmental processes. In addition, psychological processes can be particularized in stable ways as people act in their “characteristic multitude of contexts” (van Geert & Fischer, 2009, p. 327). At the same time, insofar as they are ongoing and dynamic qualitative processes, psychological processes can also be particularized in varied individual ways over time. In addition, they can be played out in varied culturally particular ways, as well as in varied cultural ways over time as cultures change historically. For example, a particular individual may construct self/identity in particular ways, as well as in varied ways during the course of his/her life. Constructing self/identity is also played out in culturally particular ways, but can change as cultures change historically.

Developmental processes

Wider modes of action, as well as the psychological processes that comprise them, develop. Developmental processes include what happens during development and how development happens (Raeff, 2011, 2016). With regard to what happens during development, organismic-developmental theory holds that action undergoes differentiation and integration in relation to historically derived and changing cultural goals and expectations (Kaplan, 1967; Werner, 1940/1980; Werner & Kaplan, 1963/1984). For example, insofar as what counts as a good story may vary within and across cultures, telling stories develops in relation to cultural goals and expectations (Heath, 1983/1992; Miller, Fung, Lin, Chen, & Boldt, 2012). Storytelling involves differentiating and integrating story characters, themes, and plot details. In addition, telling stories involves differentiating and integrating means to tell an effective story, such as sound effects, facial expression, or pausing at the right moments. Storytelling also involves differentiating between one’s own and the audience’s perspective, as well as coordinating with them while storytelling. The development of storytelling further involves development of the psychological processes that comprise storytelling. For example, storytelling involves thinking, feeling, perspective-taking, and interacting, all of which develop. With regard to how development happens, sociocultural theory holds that people develop by actively participating in cultural practices with others who guide them (Rogoff, 1990, 2003). To develop culturally particular ways of acting, a person has to engage in cultural modes of action with others who guide him/her. Engaging with others in cultural modes of action provides opportunities for people to develop in relation to cultural expectations for action, as well as for differentiation and integration to occur (Raeff, 2016).

Taken together, this conceptualization of action provides a theoretical basis for repopulating psychology with people who act, and for focusing on what people do. This conceptualization of action is also based on theoretical assumptions different from those that inform objectifying. That is, conceptualizing action as a wider whole that is made up of multiple and interrelated constituent processes is derived from a process-relational meta-theory. In addition, action is being conceptualized developmentally, as simultaneously stable and variable, as made up of qualitative processes, and as emerging through multiple kinds of causes. This conceptualization of action is also based on the premise that people express individuality and construct experience subjectively.

From nouns to verbs

Starting with acting in relation to others in cultural contexts, and further conceptualizing such action in terms of constitutive, psychological, and developmental processes highlights active processes and what people do. As such, verbs are appropriate for characterizing, describing, writing about, and talking about human functioning. In this way, conceptualizing human action comes first, and using verbs follows. Wider modes of action refer to what people are doing and can be represented with verbs, such as to resolve conflicts, to console, and to stand by. We can also use verbs to refer to psychological processes because they are conceptualized as active processes that people do while acting in relation to others, such as to think, to feel, to interact, to perceive, and to construct who one is. And when we do use nouns, the current conceptualization of action provides a theoretical basis for thinking about them in terms of active processes and what people are doing. For example, some may still want to understand and study the mind, or intelligence, or self/identity, or attitudes. According to the current action perspective, these phenomena are understood as active processes that people do as they act in relation to others. They are enacted and evident in action. For example, mind can be defined in terms of active processes that people do while acting in relation to others, such as thinking, remembering, categorizing, and planning (Wertsch, 1998). One can go on to consider how these action sub-processes emerge through the constitutive processes, as well as how they are organized developmentally. One can also conceptualize and analyze them in relation to other psychological processes that are comprising action at any given moment of analysis. Taken together, we are not simply trading verbs for nouns. We are conceptualizing human functioning in theoretical terms different from those that objectifying entails.

As explained earlier, objectifying in psychology is derived from the theoretical assumptions that inform experimental and quantitative research methods. Insofar as the current conceptualization of action is based on different theoretical assumptions, it leads to different research issues and questions, and requires different research methods. In general, the current conceptualization of action leads to discerning formal causality, which involves analyzing how constitutive, psychological, and developmental processes are organized or structured as people act in varied settings. In addition, the current conceptualization leads to discerning final causality to understand action in varied settings. Such research would involve observing people as they act, as well as talking to them to discern how they subjectively construe experience. The current action perspective also leads to preserving and analyzing individual data in order to enhance understanding of individuality. For example, one could analyze individuals to discern if and how individuals within groups do not follow their group’s average trend. It would be interesting to interview people about how they respond to surveys to discern how they subjectively understand survey questions. These research directions would permit discerning how action processes are organized in both similar and different ways for individuals, between individuals, as well as within and across cultural contexts. These research suggestions generally involve qualitative methods and analyses. By recommending qualitative research, I do not mean to suggest that we wholly abandon experimental and quantitative research goals and methods. Rather, the point here is to recognize that human action is complex, and that action involves different kinds of processes simultaneously. Researchers who focus on different action processes could collaborate to discern how they co-constitute and co-comprise the wider whole of action. For example, researchers could collaborate to discern how human action involves formal, final, material, and efficient causality at the same time.

The advantages of repopulating psychology with people who act, and of a process-relational conceptualization of action are manifold. First, the very notion of acting in relation to others in cultural contexts is based on considering fundamental dimensions of human experience, namely that all human beings are simultaneously separate and connected, and that human functioning is culturally mediated. Second, by treating people as actors and in terms of active processes, we are not objectifying people and what people do. Starting with action thus frees us from the problematic theoretical assumptions of objectifying.

Third, a process-relational approach provides a theoretical basis for conceptualizing what people do holistically and integratively, namely in terms of a wider system or whole that is made up of multiple and interrelated constituents. Understanding action holistically also permits thinking about whole people, rather than treating people in terms of fragmented bits of behavior, or as collections of fragmented variables. A whole person can be defined as someone who acts in relation to others, and whose action is made up of multiple and interrelated constitutive, psychological, and developmental processes. The current action perspective thus provides theoretical tools for understanding whole people as they go about their messy lives in all corners of the world. Moreover, action is a wider whole that involves a wide range of constituents that a wide range of social scientists study. As such, the current conceptualization of action provides a common language for studying human functioning that can bring researchers into productive contact. Researchers can still focus on specific topics, but the topics can be understood and investigated as parts of the wider whole of action. In addition, researchers can still define constitutive, psychological, and developmental processes in varied specific ways as they see fit, but these processes can be understood in terms of how they constitute and comprise the wider whole of action.

By understanding varied processes in relation to the wider whole of action, the current conceptualization of action also provides an antidote to contemporary psychology’s vast fragmentation. By conceptualizing action holistically in terms of multiple and interrelated constitutive, psychological, and developmental processes, this action perspective encompasses much of contemporary psychology’s topics and issues. However, thinking about and investigating human action in terms of this process-relational perspective does not mean that one has to always consider all processes all at once. No single study can address all the processes at once, and researchers can still focus on specific topics. Overton (2015) explains that

the most shopworn and illegitimate criticism of holism, repeated again and again, is the notion that if one accepts holism then one is committed to examine everything simultaneously. This assumption is simply false and it has always been false.

What is true is that the context-free specifications of any object, event, or process—whether it be DNA, molecule, cell, neuron, evolution, the architecture of mind, or culture—is illegitimate within a holistic system. (p. 40)

The point here is that specific topics can be understood as constituents of a wider whole, namely acting in relation to others. Rather than starting with and analyzing fragmented bits of behavior, we are starting with action as the wider whole, and we can consider how any bit is part of action, as well as how it is played out in relation to other parts of action. For example, cognition or thinking is clearly a major specialty area in psychology, and many studies involve investigating cognition in and of itself, independently of the wider action context in which people are actively thinking. However, people do not plan, remember, categorize, or weigh pros and cons just for the decontextualized sake of it. According to the current conceptualization of action, they do so as part of acting in relation to others. Starting with the wider whole of action “leads away from an obsession with measuring ‘cognitive abilities in general’ to an analysis of how particular abilities are brought into play in particular tasks” (Scribner, 1975/1997, p. 81). Some research shows that people who perform poorly on cognitive assessments and are diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, may function quite well in daily life situations (Sabat, 2001; Sabat & Gladstone, 2010). They can remember people, consider others’ perspectives, and reason through social situations, as they act in relation to others. Along similar lines, development is a fragmented specialty area within psychology, and psychologists in other specialty areas do not typically consider developmental processes. However, insofar as any way of acting develops, and insofar as all psychological processes develop, development is relevant to psychology as a whole.

Fourth, this conceptualization of action provides a systematic basis for discerning and analyzing ongoing and dynamic qualitative processes and how they may be played out in varied ways, within and across individuals over time, as well as within and across cultures historically over time. Fifth, while this conceptualization of action accounts for human individuality, it does not eschew generalizability and universal human processes. That is, this conceptualization posits that all people act in relation to others, and that action always involves constitutive, psychological, and developmental processes. At the same time, these processes can be played out in individualized ways, in culturally particular ways, and in historically changing ways. Ultimately, a process-relational conceptualization of action can transform psychology into a science of understanding the dynamic complexities of how people act in relation to others in all corners of the world.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author biography

Catherine Raeff is a Professor of Psychology at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. In earlier work, she addressed how individualism and collectivism co-occur during development. She is the author of Exploring the Dynamics of Human Development: An Integrative Approach (Oxford University Press, 2016). She is currently working on critically analyzing psychology, and articulating a theoretical framework for understanding and investigating human functioning that is applicable to psychology as a whole.

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