Theoretical proposal for the relationship between epistemology and ethics in psychology

Abstract

The concept of epistemological violence and recommendations on how to avoid it have been extensively developed by Thomas Teo. The objective of this article is to elaborate a conceptual proposal to investigate the relationship between ethics and the epistemology of empirical research in psychology. It is contended that some concepts of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition strengthen the ethical scope of the concept of epistemological violence. This article presents the concept of epistemological violence and shows how the production of psychological knowledge can have negative consequences for groups and individuals. The relevance of broadening the ethical dimension of the concept, theorizing the negative consequences of knowledge as probabilities of misrecognition, is discussed. To this end, central aspects of the theory of recognition are developed that will allow the consideration of epistemological violence as an accomplice in the practice of social injustices.

Keywords

critical psychology epistemological violence ethics of psychology recognition social injustice

The ethical dimension of psychology has been the object of theoretical reflection and institutional norms that regulate professional and research practices. Since the last decade of the 20th century, the ethical codes of different scientific and professional associations have been analyzed, revised, and updated, and committees have been set up in universities to safeguard the ethical aspects of psychological research (Gauthier et al., 2010; Hadjistavropoulos & Malloy, 1999; Malloy & Hadjistavropoulos, 1998; Sinclair, 2011; Teo, 2015a). The existing relationships among ontological bases, epistemological perspectives, and the ethical dimensions of psychological theories, concepts, and methods have been analyzed theoretically. Articulations in ontology, epistemology, and ethics stand out in the development of and focus on contemporary critical psychology (Fox et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2015; Parker, 2015; Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2002; Teo, 2015b, 2018; Walkerdine, 2002).

In the last few decades, work has been published on the relationships among psychology, ethics, politics, and social justice (Fine, 2006) with reflections on the implications and ethical bases of psychotherapeutic interventions and research (Drustrup, 2019; Hales et al., 2020; Paquin et al., 2019; Whitney, 2020), and empirical research regarding psychological differences in individuals and groups (Winston, 2004). The concept of epistemological violence (EV) proposed by Thomas Teo is included in this last group of work (2008, 2010, 2011, 2015a, 2018).

According to Teo (2008), empirical research in psychology commits a violent act when the interpretations of the empirical data are presented as scientific knowledge and then construct the Other as inferior and/or problematic even when there are alternative interpretations available (Teo, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2015a, 2018). The concept indicates an ethics of consequences that identifies negative results in individuals or groups derived from certain scientific interpretations. Nevertheless, the concept of EV does not propose a specific theoretical–philosophical approach that allows accurate identification of cases of violence in which the interpretations do not explicitly declare individuals or groups as inferior or problematic but contribute to the justification of structural socially unfair conditions.

Recent debates about EV have reflected the relationships among critical psychology, objectivity, and relativism. As a result of these discussions, different theoretical approaches have been developed to carry out research in psychology that avoids EV. Nevertheless, these proposals do not specifically thematize the problem of understanding the grounds and/or justification of ethical criteria with which EV can be identified and avoided in the interpretations.

Therefore, in this article it will be contended that to reveal and specify some forms of EV, it is necessary to take on an explicitly theoretical–philosophical approach. With this goal in mind, it will be shown that Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition allows identifying the negative consequences of scientific interpretations as actions that can promote contempt toward individuals and groups. Consequently, this kind of psychological knowledge would participate in the dynamics of social injustice.

The objective of this article is to contribute to the theoretical broadening and deepening of the ethical dimension of EV, theorizing the negative consequences of psychological knowledge as ways of contempt. To achieve this goal, the following arguments will be elaborated: (a) there are interpretations whose consequences are negative for individuals or groups even when these interpretations do not declare them inferior or problematic; (b) in these cases, one can see the relevance of broadening and specifying the criteria with which the consequences of the interpretations are identified; (c) with Axel Honneth’s (2003) theory of recognition, the negative consequences can be conceptualized as ways of contempt; and (d) assuming this theoretical approach contributes to making the participation of psychological knowledge in the dynamics of social injustice visible.

Debates regarding epistemological violence: Critical psychology epistemological proposals and a pending ethical challenge

Violence in psychological knowledge production can occur at the level of theoretical formulations, methodologies, and/or data interpretation. A critique of EV in any of these fields is consistent with an ethical–political project and epistemic democratization of the science of psychology. Thus, a critical psychology guided by this kind of project would not oppose scientific objectivity, but it would conceptualize it as the result of knowledge that does justice to its own object (Raskin, 2020; Teo & Wendt, 2020). From this perspective, Held’s (2020) apprehensions about the alleged anti-objectivism of critical psychology that would conduct it toward failure in the fight against oppression, would not be pertinent. Nevertheless, Held’s (2020) arguments against relativism give way to a debate on the ethical dimension of EV, going more in-depth into the investigation of the relationship between epistemology and ethics of psychology.

Of special interest in this article are the discussions on possible paradoxes that would affect critical psychology, whose knowledge is produced from and for people. As in relativism, the psychological knowledge from and for peculiarities manages to avoid and remedy the injustices committed by the hegemonic, universal, and objectifying knowledge but, at the same time, suffers from a deficit with regard to the ethical criteria with which to find and/or justify the critique. Consequently, the psychological knowledge from and for people who avoid universality does not automatically or necessarily ensure an effective protection against EV. It does not theoretically explain the point of view that substantiates and justifies its ethical principles and discernment. For example, research conducted in conjunction with communities may generate psychological knowledge of, from, and for people. However, would this knowledge be violent to the extent that it reinforced beliefs and values that do not ensure free expression and equal participation for everyone in the community’s relevant decisions? There are communities whose cultural values and beliefs assign an inferior status to women, children, young people, or sexual and gender minorities. In these contexts, if freedom and equality are considered universalizable beyond their historical–cultural and occidental roots, articulating the particular and the universal becomes a challenge to critical researchers and psychologists. To address this challenge, psychological research must be ethically strengthened, adopting an ethical approach that theoretically deals with this tension. Consequently, critical research could avoid EV if it considers an ethical–theoretical approach that grounds and justifies the principles of ethical judgment regarding possible interpretations of its results.

It is true that, at odds with the limitations of relativism, some proposals allow broadening reflections on the tension between what is universal and what is particular. However, it is necessary to go more in-depth into the specific theoretical approaches when it involves establishing the ethical judgment regarding the interpretations in which individuals or groups are not explicitly considered as inferior or problematic but share in the continuity and justification of unfair social conditions.

Regarding relativism, Schultz (2020) finds it dangerous and warns against the risks of double-standard ethics, in which the same idea could be criticized when enunciated by an oppressive power and allowed when it is upheld by the oppressed. In other words, the criteria to determine ethical judgment regarding an idea would depend on the relative position of power of the one holding the idea. Hence, he defended an objective knowledge that could avoid a double standard. Oppong (2020) shares Schultz’s worry regarding the double standard in ethics and proposes that the interpretations of data that dehumanize the Other will always be violent, whereas those that foment social justice will promote positive epistemological peace. Even though Oppong (2019) develops interesting conciliation proposals between universalism and relativism, his notion of social justice requires more theoretical clarification and precision.

In the presence of the difficulty of sustaining a from and for psychology for people who also resist relativism, Schuck (2020) proposes a from the future psychology in which the concepts would anticipate unfamiliar experiences and challenges. Notions of crises and emergencies are central to this alternative, as they refer to unexpected and/or uncontrollable possibilities that unlock new opportunities to imagine a shared future. However, Schuck does not explain the criteria that would establish ethical judgments with regard to the EV committed by the interpretations that contribute to maintaining unfair social conditions even when they are not explicitly constructing the Other as inferior or problematic.

Gonzalez and Guimarães (2020), Gut and Wilczewski (2020), and Hinton (2020) are developing an alternative to objectivist psychology based on approaches of cultural psychology. Gonzalez and Guimarães (2020) present a psychology made with the Other guided by the Bakhtinian coauthorship notion, an alternative category of the division between from above and from below which was criticized by Held (2020). Coauthorship is a notion that puts in dialogue two theoretical traditions: semiotic–cultural constructivism in psychology and Amerindian perspectivism in anthropology. The authors’ theoretical proposal, realized in research with Indigenous communities in Brazil, has built knowledge together with people of these communities. This kind of research creates conditions for hearing the voices of the Other to the extent it puts two or more contexts into perspective and generates a collective reflection.

Hinton (2020) exemplifies his proposal with his own cultural model of stereotypes. In his theoretical model, “stereotypes are not cognitive errors or biases but are associations constructed for an ideological purpose in a culture and disseminated through social communication networks” (p. 386). The author suggests that, in order to avoid EV, the “cultural meanings of constructed social categories and the attributed qualities of social groups” (p. 387) must be analyzed.

Gut and Wilczewski (2020) present a methodological project based on the narrative approach to researching intercultural communicative experiences and processes. The authors argue that the narrative approach allows access to the lived experience and subjectivity of the Other to the extent that

the narrator’s lived experience and cultural perspective may be captured through a narrative analysis of their personal story by disclosing sense-making and sense-giving processes, and identity construction processes. Such an analysis reveals how and what knowledge is created in a cultural encounter from the cultural other’s perspective. (p. 456)

The narrative approach also implies a change in the traditional cognitive model since it understands that concepts are individual and cultural creations that are realized in social interactions.

Likewise, from the three perspectives, the construction of concepts and theories in psychology that exclude sociocultural diversity is questioned because they result in a psychology that participates in the oppression of the Other. The elaboration of new ways to conceive cognition would also be essential for a psychology that includes diversity.

However, even though the contribution of these models to the theoretical–methodological strengthening of critical psychology is noteworthy, the previous proposals, although useful in many ways, are limited in outlining some of the ethical challenges we see that derived from relativism. In this sense, the psychological knowledge constructed from meeting the Other, whose theories and concepts are elaborated based on co-authorship and culturally placed narratives, does not fully address the problem we outline within this article of how to substantiate or justify the ethical criteria with which certain less evident methods of EV are identified and avoided.

Along an argumentative theoretical–methodological line similar to the previous ones, Macías-Gómez-Estern (2020) presents the concept of the “hybrid psychological agent.” The concept is directed at the development of a psychology with the Other taking into consideration the psychological diversity of the people who participate in psychological research and interventions. The psychology that is the result of this process would be able to include the Other in both research and practice. This process of hybridization of psychological knowledge would allow the construction of a more democratic science rooted in cultural diversity and integrating the different voices that participate in common actions with the experts. Hybrid psychology substitutes for the production of knowledge based on action in particular contexts. Nevertheless, even though it wants to ensure justice toward the Other in its research, this proposal does not reveal generalized ethical criteria with which the ethical judgments regarding EV are justified.

Some proposals link EV to structural violence. Gaborit (2020) and Winston (2020) have demonstrated how researchers in psychology are limited in their ability to avoid EV. These restrictions are due to the relatively privileged position of psychologists (Gaborit) and the existence of a scientific community that continues to sustain a racial progress project (Winston). Bhawuk (2020) recognizes that current financing and publication criteria are an obstacle to the production and dissemination of psychological knowledge that moves away from hegemonic scientific psychological standards. More dialogue among professional organizations, editors, and university administrators would allow more harmonious knowledge development. The dialogue would create the conditions needed to establish procedures based on merit and thus eliminate the current barriers in order to include alternative ways of conducting psychological research.

Markus (2020) proposes a dialogue guided by the Habermasian ethical discourse in order to overcome the dichotomy between objectifying scientific psychology and Indigenous psychology. It is also worthwhile to highlight the epistemological pluralism developed by Novis-Deutsch (2020). The latter, more than progress toward the theoretical grounds or justification of ethical opinions, shows the difficulties in contextualizing solutions regarding the definition of a progressive and culturally inclusive agenda. Based on the epistemological pluralism of Novis-Deutsch, how do we determine the cultural values that will be integrated in a progressive agenda, and which particular values will be regarded as progressive?

Considering that none of the previously mentioned arguments specifically thematize the problems of the basis and/or justification of ethical criteria with which EV could be identified and avoided in the interpretations, and that the negative consequences of interpretations may be more or less invisible, as a result of ideologies or even certain cultural traditions, the following arguments intend to broaden and deepen the ethical dimension of EV, theorizing the negative consequences of psychological knowledge as ways of contempt .

Application of the concept of epistemological violence in epistemology and ethics in psychology

According to Teo (2008), empirical research in psychology commits violence when the interpretations of its results identify individuals and/or groups as inferior and/or problematic. The discussions and conclusions of the results of the research are not determined by the empirically obtained data, and consequently, they are always data interpretations. These interpretations, nevertheless, are presented as objective scientific knowledge free from speculation. Epistemological violence is being committed with the interpretations of empirical data presented as scientific knowledge, and this constructs the Other as inferior and/or problematic even though there are alternative interpretations available (Teo, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2015a, 2018).

Teo’s (2008) argumentative logic can be described as follows: (a) speculation is a specter that has accompanied psychology throughout its history; (b) psychologists have represented the problem of speculation in the research of others but not their own; (c) speculation is an essential part of the interpretation of empirical data because they do not determine the discussions and conclusions of a research study; (d) the interpretation of data is especially relevant when referring to groups; (e) the interpretations that position the Other as problematic and/or inferior are considered a form of epistemological violence; and (f) psychology must reflect on the ethical–epistemological grounds and consequences of its interpretations.

Violence in the form of psychological violence can occur at the level of theoretical and methodological formulations and in the discussion and conclusions of the research. That is why three analysis perspectives are necessary in the critical examination of empirical psychology research: (a) the study of justification contexts (internalist reconstructions); (b) the study of discovery contexts (externalist reconstructions); and (c) the study of interpretation contexts (hermeneutical reconstructions; Teo, 2008). Even though the concept of EV is relevant to identify the violence committed in these three areas of research, Teo (2008, 2010, 2011) carefully analyzed the interpretation contexts.

Within the contexts of interpretation, it is necessary to differentiate between methodologically obtained data and the interpretations that these data contain, namely speculations. Speculation is an unavoidable part of the interpretation of empirical data. If that were not the case, research would conclude with a data presentation. This would not solve the problem of speculation either as it would move it toward others: readers, judges, editors, and so forth. Consequently, if the interpretations are not determined by data, but instead refer to speculations that give sense and meaning to that data, the analysis of the quality of the interpretations requires a hermeneutic process of reconstruction of the speculations (Teo, 2008, 2010, 2011).

Speculations in scientific interpretations are guided in part by logical criteria of internal consistency and coherence between the theoretical, methodological, and interpretative dimensions of the results of the research. The logical adaptation between these dimensions strengthens the internal validity of the interpretations of the obtained data. Nevertheless, an analysis of the logical adaptation of an interpretation is not enough to establish a normative judgment regarding the speculations in the interpretations. Likewise, the analysis of the ethical scope of the interpretations requires the questioning of all available interpretations of the same data.

On the other hand, the hermeneutic reconstruction of the speculations that are in the interpretations is essential for the reflective activity of scientific production. This is especially relevant when the interpretations have or can have negative practical, behavioral, and/or existential consequences for groups of people who are marginalized, stigmatized, oppressed, and/or excluded from certain rights and participation in the construction of sociocultural norms and values.

Consequently, the concept of EV signals an epistemological and ethical problem that motivates permanent reflection regarding research and the establishment of duties and responsibilities of the scientific community. It is relevant to note that EV is not limited to intentional processes or to the bad use of knowledge because it refers to the negative consequences of the interpretations for people and/or groups of people independent of the intentions of the researchers and/or the use of research. Therefore, the concept is registered in the ethics of the consequences that assume the hermeneutic deficit—the interpretations are deficient because they are not determined by data—as a problem that must be tackled by empirical psychology to favor its own scientific credibility.

The duties and responsibilities of the scientific community are embodied in three areas of the production, dissemination, and communication process: institutional, editorial, and personal. At the institutional level, a commitment would have to create spaces and mechanisms that generate and foment the reflection and dialogue regarding the research looking into the universe of possible interpretations and its ethical consequences. In the editorial area, an alternative would be the implementation of a collaborative hermeneutic model in which the researchers who produce the data are not the same as those who interpret the data, and with regard to the personal area, it would be crucial to develop epistemic and ethical skills (Teo, 2008).

Undoubtedly, Teo’s proposal implies some challenges, such as the risks and difficulties of implementing a collaborative hermeneutic model when research is conducted with active participation of people and, in many cases, with marginalized groups. In these cases, the eventual interpretations of data by people outside the research context could also generate violence precisely because these people do not participate in the research process.

In any case, ethical issues related to consequences still require clarifying the criteria upon which the effects of the actions on the Other are judged. These criteria can be reached through consensus and agreements generated with each case or by assuring some theoretically based ethical proposals. In the first case, it is necessary to establish procedures to create the conditions for a dialogue. It is therefore essential to start with prior agreements that legitimize the validity of these procedures. In cases in which theoretically based ethical proposals are upheld, debate is unavoidable when faced with different types of proposals. Consequently, in both cases, the clarification of positions, grounds, criteria, and/or procedures is crucial in order to reach an ethical judgment in moral-conflict situations.

The concept of EV contributes significantly to clarifying and specifying aspects that are relevant in the relationship between epistemology and the ethics of psychology. The concept is particularly important for theoretical–critical psychology committed to the deconstruction and reconstruction of concepts, theories, and methodology of psychology and to the construction of alternative concepts, theories, and methodologies (Teo, 2015b, 2018). The concept itself is the result of a hermeneutic reconstruction of empirical research in psychology. In other words, it is possible to consider Teo’s proposal as a critical reconstruction of the research process once the ethical dimension of interpretations of empirical data can be seen.

Therefore, the concepts of EV and critical psychology respect the methodological validity of the procedures and the theoretical validity of scientific statements. They recognize the ethical nature of questions regarding why, what, and at whom scientific practices are directed. The concept of EV enunciates epistemology and ethics when it identifies the negative consequences of interpretations for individuals and groups. The ethical issues related to those consequences derived from the concept of EV invites researchers to broaden their reflection on the grounds, procedures, and/or theoretical approaches with the goal of specifying and legitimizing the ethical judgments regarding the consequences of scientific interpretations. Consequently, the theoretical strengthening of the ethical dimension of the concept of EV is relevant for theoretical enunciation between the ethics and epistemology of psychology.

Recognition and contempt: Using the theory of recognition to strengthen the ethical dimension of the concept of epistemological violence

There are empirical data interpretations in psychological research whose consequences are negative for individuals or groups, even when these interpretations do not declare them to be inferior or problematic. A notable example of this type of EV is interpretations of gaydar. The research on gaydar has basically been guided by the following question: Are there nonverbal signs that allow identifying, without ambiguity, sexual and gender minorities, and which signs would those be and why do they exist? According to the hegemonic interpretations of the data obtained through empirical research, there are natural aspects—physiognomic and morphologic—associated with homosexual and bisexual orientation. Variations in the craniofacial structure are a determinant of the phenotypical expressions of the inverted gender (Vasilovsky, 2018). Consequently, sexuality would be a natural entity whose orientation is innate (Rule et al., 2009).

In these studies that conclude with the essentialism and naturalism of sexual orientation, sociohistorical and cultural dimensions are not considered determining factors, even though it is possible to interpret the same data as pointing to sociohistorical and cultural processes creating subjectivities. In this sense, the analysis of the same data from a different theoretical approach generates different interpretations regarding the sexual orientation of corporal and facial expressions. According to Vasilovsky (2018), there are interpretations that are less prone

to reduce the variability and fluidity of queer identifications to a single, stable orientation, or to normalize queer cultural practices, or characterize queer agency as an automatic product of inner propulsions; or to neglect homosexual subjection; or to pathologize gender variance; or to conflate queer expressions of masculinity and femininity with straight masculinity and femininity, such that queer bodies are rendered intelligible only within a framework that has established heterosexuality as its ontological ground. (p. 307)

Research on gaydar has been used to substantiate political arguments in favor of the rights of sexual minorities. The argument consists of the fact that there would be no motives to discriminate people on the basis of sexual orientation insomuch as these orientations are biologically determined. In this way, the hegemonic interpretations of gaydar do not explicitly position individuals or groups as inferior or problematic, and they also defend their inclusion in the rights systems. This naturalist and essentialist identity conception of gender identity promotes social injustice toward sexual and gender minorities. The argument derived from hegemonic interpretations transmits heteronormativity, which substantiates the defense of the rights of members of sexual and gender minorities is in fact that they are not responsible for their sexual orientations. Consequently, the naturalist base of the argument erases the agency of the people in constructing a gender identity different from that of heterosexuality.

Understood as keys to the theory of recognition, it is possible to confirm that these studies support the reproduction of existing contempt toward sexual and gender minorities, as their interpretations do not consider agency or social fights in the identity determination of these people and groups. Therefore, even though the naturalist interpretations of gaydar do not explicitly place the Other as inferior or problematic, their consequences are negative because they can provoke moral damage in individuals and groups. Having said that, what do moral damage and contempt consist of in the theory of recognition?

In the work of Axel Honneth (2009), every negative recognition experience provokes moral damage. Therefore, moral damage corresponds to distortion or lack of reciprocal and/or existential recognition. In Honneth’s critical theory, the concept of reciprocal recognition is central, with the exception of his critique of reification, where the explicative concept is that of existential recognition (Basaure, 2011). In order to specify the notion of contempt, it is essential to clarify the concept of reciprocal recognition.

For Honneth (2003), reciprocal recognition is a fundamental element in the constitution of subjectivity and in social integration, as there is an inevitable relation between subjectivity and social structure. As representative of the third generation of the School of Frankfurt, Honneth’s critical theory elaborates a reconstruction that is able to find, within its own social reality, the objective possibility of emancipation. The recognition concept guides the theoretical formulation toward reconstruction and determination of institutionalized social practices that, based on normative principles (morals), imply ways of reciprocal recognition (Basaure, 2011). To identify these social practices, Honneth (2003) reconstructs three concepts related to social interaction that characterize fields of recognition: love, rights, and social worth. In each of these fields, recognition embodies the idea of justice interpreted as an equal treatment.

Reciprocal recognition implies affirmative experiences of self-confidence (love), self-respect (rights), and self-esteem (social worth). Negatively, the distortions of reciprocal recognition correspond to experiences of contempt that damage one’s own practical self-relation: experiences of abuse and violation that affect physical integrity (field of love), dispossession and exclusion of rights that endanger social integrity (field of rights), and of humiliation and harm that threaten personal honor and dignity (social field; Basaure, 2011). For Honneth (2003) these are “forms of contempt that, as a negative equivalent of the corresponding relations of recognition can cause the social actors to feel the reality of a skimped recognition” (p. 116).

According to Hänel (2020), all these forms of distortion in the relations of reciprocal recognition that have a negative impact on self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem represent damage to the experience of recognizing oneself (self-recognition). Hence, the faults in reciprocal recognition imply damage in the recognition of oneself understood as the subjective capacity of self-definition and to make and value one’s own projects (Hänel, 2020).

The theoretical reconstruction of the reciprocal recognition principles and the ways of contempt allow identification of “the diversity of normative references around which the actors can establish justified demands of equal treatment, thus making it possible to analytically differentiate social conflicts” (Basaure, 2011, p. 79). Therefore, Honneth’s theory of recognition is a theory of social struggles that, based on the concept of reciprocal recognition, is capable of determining social demands motivated by experiences of social suffering and conflicts that, not always, manage to manifest themselves in the public and/or political field. For Basaure (2011), “such struggles are not only guided by the principles of recognition. . . . but they themselves contribute slowly to the unfolding and growing expansion of the moral structures of reciprocal recognition” (p. 79).

In Honneth’s critical theory of society, it is possible to identify a critique of social injustices and a critique of social pathologies. The critique of injustices requires identifying the implicit normativity of the social world and the principles of reciprocal recognition in order to report the injustices and flaws in the fair treatment of individuals and social groups. The critique of social pathologies is directed toward the social conditions that damage the possibilities of personal self-realization and a good life. Both the critique of social relations that reduces the possibilities of personal self-realization and the critique of distortions of reciprocal recognition allow identification of the experiences of contempt and reporting them as moral damage. In this way, Honneth’s critical theory explores the emancipator potential of the subjects through the disclosure of injustices that affect the moral base of individuals and groups.

This brief presentation of Honneth’s critical theory highlights some elements that allow establishing ethical criteria to substantiate moral opinions directed at the interpretations in empirical psychological research. First, to evaluate the potential ethical consequences of an interpretation, the implicit normative assumptions of the social world must be considered, along with the principles of reciprocal recognition and the existing structural injustices. An ethical opinion that would acquit these three elements would be able to answer both the universal criteria (principles of reciprocal recognition) and the contextual demands (implicit normativity and injustices of a determined historical sociocultural context).

Second, using the concept of contempt, scientific interpretations in psychology can be judged as violent if the consequences negatively affect the experiences of self-recognition, understood as the self-esteem, self-confidence, and self-respect of individuals and groups. In other words, when they negatively affect the experiences of self-realization of individuals and groups.

Third, the theory of recognition allows ethical evaluation of a scientific interpretation in psychology according to the criteria given to determine whether its consequences contribute to fomenting the reciprocal recognition and experiences of self-realization or if they favor justifying situations of contempt and moral affront.

When applying the concepts of the theory of recognition to the evaluation of consequences of the interpretations of gaydar, it is possible to propose carrying out an analysis that would include a reconstruction of the historical and sociocultural context in which violence is applied. In the reconstruction of specific contexts, the following should be considered: (a) the structural injustices toward sexual and gender minorities; (b) the implicit normativity of the analyzed social formation; (c) acceptance of the normative principles of the already established human rights and the expectations of equal treatment; (d) the historical and accumulated experiences of contempt experienced by sexual and gender minorities; and (e) the struggles for recognition undertaken by sexual and gender minorities.

Once the specific sociocultural contexts have been rebuilt, it would be possible to identify more precisely the EV committed by research that attributes a biological and innate cause to sexual orientation. Therefore, even though they do not explicitly declare that sexual and gender minorities are inferior and problematic, these studies are violent because: (a) they do not favor the recognition of the struggles undertaken by these groups; (b) they do not favor the recognition of sexual and gender minority identities and their courage regarding resistance, sociocultural deconstruction, and innovation for a fairer social integration; (c) they implicitly favor the contempt toward sexual and gender minorities according to what keeps on being considered phenotypical behaviors of a biological alteration of the natural heterosexual sexual orientation; and (d) all the aforementioned makes the experiences of sexual and gender minorities to recognize themselves difficult because it negatively affects self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem, damaging their subjective capacity of their own self-definition and making and valuing their own projects.

Consequently, the application of the theory of recognition as the basis of the ethical judgment of psychological interpretations requires a contextual analysis and an examination of probable implications in the development of experiences of self-esteem, self-confidence, and/or self-respect or in the reproduction, consolidation, and/or justification of experiences of contempt. This conceptual proposal can also extend to the research of the context of discovery directed at the ethical judgment of theoretical formulations, and the evaluation of justification context guiding the ethical judgment of methodological designs. All these analyses will be hermeneutical because they themselves will be an interpretation with information from a determined theoretical approach—the theory of recognition—and will be embodied in specific sociohistorical and cultural contexts. In any of these analyses, the ethical judgment guided by the theory of recognition would be able to support the tension between what is universal (expectations of reciprocal recognition) and what is particular (specific sociohistorical and cultural contexts).

In short, an ethical judgment directed at reporting the EV of interpretations in psychological research, guided by Honneth’s theory of recognition, should be able to reconstruct the legitimate demands for reciprocal recognition. In other words, the implicit normativity of the social world and the principles of recognitions and plural principles of fair treatment at certain historical moments. Likewise, it would be apt to reconstruct social movements in which actions or concessions are motivated by experiences of suffering social exclusion and denial of rights, moral affront, and/or social damage. Guided by the theory of recognition, these would be the reconstruction tasks of particular social contexts.

On the other hand, an ethical judgment directed at reporting the EV of interpretation in psychological research that is based on Honneth’s approach would involve identifying in the previously reconstructed contexts the ways psychology participates in: (a) the struggles for recognition, (b) the constitution of social values, and (c) the social conditions that allow or harm personal self-realization. Finally, the analyses could include an examination of the psychological practices, theories, techniques, and institutions that participate in ways of causing contempt and moral harm, thus contributing to the reproduction, maintenance, and/or justification of social injustice.

Lastly, analyses like the previously proposed could also guide the research of psychological practices, theories, concepts, and research that coincide with strengthening and legitimating ways of reciprocal recognition (Kaulino, 2015). In this way, it would be possible to identify, for example, the input of certain data interpretations in the processes of emancipation and resistance of social groups, such as women, children, immigrants, workers of different trades, and ethnic minorities.

Conclusions

The concept of EV shows the negative consequences of scientific interpretation in individuals or groups. Nevertheless, the concept does not propose a specific theorical–philosophical approach to specify the cases of violence in which the interpretations do not explicitly declare individuals or groups as inferior or problematic but contribute to the justification of unfair social conditions. The current article developed some conceptual elements of Honneth’s theory of recognition, contending that this approach allows identification of the negative consequences of scientific interpretations as actions that support the maintenance of sociohistorical and cultural contexts of social injustice and contempt for individuals and groups. The article aims to contribute to the theoretical amplifying, deepening, and strengthening of the ethical dimension of the EV concept.

Critical psychology has delivered valuable support to the reflexivity of the discipline, exploring the philosophical bases of ethics in its different fields of action: professional, academic, and teaching (Walsh, 2015). There are theoretical elaborations that defend other theoretical approaches regarding ethical orientations for psychology, such as the proposal of ethics of shared understandings that includes Judith Butler’s concepts of conceiving the construction of the Other (Stam, 2015). This article offers an alternative basis and does not offer comparative advantages with other theoretical proposals. This could be a future task. In any case, it does not seem reasonable to foster the expectation of generating unity regarding which philosophical perspective would be more adequate as a basis for ethics in psychology. This debate remains open within philosophy and expresses the constitutive conflicts and controversies of modern societies. Consequently, it would be a disproportional or delusional project to find unity in the field of ethical grounds, even within critical psychology. Nevertheless, critical psychology with its different theoretical perspectives could aspire to agree on the ethics of minimums that would include critical hermeneutic contributions, some contextualisms, and universalist proposals like those from Habermas and Honneth.

In the past few decades, there has been intense debate regarding Honneth’s intellectual project. One of the most heated debates refers to the controversy between Honneth and Fraser regarding the limitations of the concept of recognition in order to face conditions of injustice regarding redistribution (Fraser, 2010; Fraser & Honneth, 2003). In the face of this controversy between recognition and redistribution, authors such as Forst (2012) have developed a third alternative that incorporates an understanding of the processes of legitimation taking into consideration the motivational, institutional, and social elements that make up the grammar of justice. This alternative allows building a multidimensional critique of social relations and justification policies.

Honneth’s theory of recognition has also been criticized for its limitations in observing the processes of recognition that operate as an ideology, or rather, that serve with oppressive purposes (Honneth, 2009, 2012; Jaeggi, 2009). Added to this kind of critique are critiques that point out the weakness or insufficiency of the analyses of power that Honneth offers. Gaydar research is an example of how recognition can work as an ideology. The price of achieving recognition of rights based on a naturalist interpretation is the renunciation of the subjectivity agency that constructs an identity that is different from the heteronormative one. The renunciation of agency and accepting biological determination weakens the struggle for recognition of social values regarding resistance and the transformation of dissident identities and behaviors. To address these paradoxes and restrictions of Honneth’s theory, alternative theories have been developed that allow understanding the ideological dimension of recognition and its role as an oppression strategy (Bertram & Celikates, 2015; McQueen, 2015).

Also relevant are the critiques directed at the procedures of normative reconstruction that Honneth uses to reveal the principles of recognition that legitimize the institutional frameworks of modern societies. For Honneth, social injustice is not only explained as a form of contempt, but also as a problem of incomprehension or a bad interpretation of values and norms that are embodied, through a historical process, in modern institutions. Not fulfilling these norms and values indicates a social pathology that would explain the institutionalization of distorted ways of freedom. This perspective is criticized because the concepts of social pathology and anomy applied by Honneth in his diagnoses would not be enough to accurately identify and explain the distorted forms of freedom (Zurn, 2011).

Previous critiques may have weakened the theory of recognition. Nevertheless, these same critiques have strengthened Honneth’s critical theory. Honneth has actively participated in the debates regarding recognition, reification, power, and freedom in modern societies. Doubtlessly, an ethics of psychology whose principles are based on the theory of recognition should know about these discussions and take a stance. Nevertheless, we share the opinion with Giladi (2018) that limitations of Honneth’s critical project, and particularly his theorizing regarding power, do not justify abandoning the theory of recognition. On the contrary, we think that the restrictions of Honneth’s critical theory represent a challenge to promote the elaboration of future works to broaden and diversify his social theory.

With regard to identifying EV committed by scientific interpretations, the work to broaden, deepen, and diversify the theory of recognition would contribute to making the reconstruction of the contexts in which the expectations of recognition are embodied more complex. It would also contribute to identifying ideological recognition strategies and include multidimensional power analysis. In any case, the critiques and debates regarding Honneth’s project should favor works that consider the concept of recognition as a linking element of the epistemological and ethical dimensions of research in psychology.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful for the valuable comments and suggestions of the reviewers of the manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Adriana Kaulino

Teresa Matus

Author biographies

Adriana Kaulino is an associate professor at the faculty of psychology at Universidad Diego Portales. She has published on the history of psychology and on the relationships between ethics and epistemology of psychology. She is currently working on a psychosocial concept of autonomy and on the history of critical psychology in Chile. She is the director of the program in history and critical theory of psy knowledges at Universidad Diego Portales, and a fellow of the American Psychological Association (divisions 2, 24, and 26), the Interamerican Society of Psychology (SIP), the International Society for Theoretical Psychology (ISTP) and the European Society for the History of Human Sciences (ESHHS).

Teresa Matus is an associate professor at the faculty of social sciences at Universidad de Chile and a founding member of the Chilean Society of Public Policy. She has developed a line of teaching and research on ethics and epistemology of the social sciences, and on criticism in the theoretical traditions of social work. She currently directs the Transdisciplinary Nucleus of Effective Innovations in Public Policy and works on violent naturalizations in the logics of psychosocial teams that intervene in public programs on poverty and childhood.

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