Post-accession migration in construction and trade union responses in Denmark,Norway and the UK

Abstract

The article compares trade union responses in Denmark, Norway and the UK to the arrival of construction workers from the new EU member states. Organizing has been seen as a crucial means to avoid low-wage competition and social dumping. We analyse how the unions developed strategies for recruiting migrants, the novelty of their approaches and the results in terms of membership.

Keywords

construction Denmark labour migration Norway organizing trade unions UK

Introduction

The mobility of labour and services across Europe following EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 has exceeded expectations. During the first five years, the UK received over 949,000 registrations by Central and Eastern European (CEE) workers (Border and Immigration Agency, 2009). The Nordic countries issued more than 200,000 work permits to CEE citizens in the same period. The accession of new ‘low-wage’ member states has stirred intense debates on the implications for wages and working conditions and national labour market regimes (Krings, 2009; Lillie, 2010). The construction sector is one of the main industries recruiting migrants, who are often exposed to irregular forms of employment and bad working conditions (Fitzgerald, 2006; Friberg and Tyldum, 2007; Hansen and Andersen, 2008).

Construction has a long tradition of migration (Baganha and Entzinger, 2004). As Bruno Koebele (then president of the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers, EFBWW) said in the early 1990s ‘for building workers, moving from place to place is nothing new. It is an historical fact that they always made their migratory rules themselves and organized the way these were supervised’ (Koebele and Cremers, 1994: 11). In all three countries discussed in this article, labour immigration has been driven by employer demand, and has been welcomed by most labour market actors. In Norway and Denmark, the inflow of CEE workers to the construction industry helped sustain a high level of activity, displacing local labour only to a minor extent until the impact of the financial crisis in mid-2008 (Dølvik and Eldring, 2008). In the UK, CEE workers have filled gaps in the ‘reserve army’ of relatively cheap foreign labour (Balch et al., 2004). However, employers are now adopting a more global outlook and transnational sub-contractor chains are becoming commonplace in the sector (Bosch and Philips, 2003), threatening to make labour migration a vehicle for undermining national regulation (Lillie, 2010; Lillie and Greer, 2007). This tendency has been aggravated by the declining market for construction services since 2008, which has increased both domestic and trans-European competition for jobs and contracts.

While these pressures are transnational, trade unions still react mainly on a national or even local level. This article provides a comparative analysis of these responses in Denmark, Norway and the UK. Organizing the newly arrived workers has been one crucial element in preventing the presence of CEE workers from causing low-wage competition and social dumping. In cataloguing trade union and migrant engagement we have identified three key themes that have underpinned union responses, all relating to organizing: first the interplay between central and local levels of unions, second the innovative character of the strategies adopted, and third the degree of success in recruitment.

We explore these themes in three local case studies: Copenhagen, Oslo and the northeast of England, involving interviews with union representatives. All focus on organizing strategies and initiatives which gave special attention to Polish workers, who have been by far the largest labour migrant group in each country (though in the article we do not distinguish between different groups of CEE workers). The union officials interviewed commonly represent workers in this sector at national or local level. We have also analysed recent union policy and strategy documents that deal with migration. As the analysis below shows, this has in all cases involved very detailed accounts, as a common hypothesis of the studies is that the interplay between national and local efforts is vital for understanding the strategies followed.

Trade unions and immigration: Strategies and dilemmas

Efforts to organize migrant workers should be seen as part of an ongoing struggle. For many years, employers have been restructuring employment relations, for instance through the use of subcontracting and self-employment; but internationalization has added a new dimension, as EU liberalization and the migration of low-wage labour have become increasingly important. Lillie argues that these transnational factors enable employers to ‘remove specific work spaces, contexts, and categories of people from the protection they would normally enjoy within sovereign states’ (2010: 688, 695). This restructuring is of course not uncontested. First, Dølvik and Ødegård (2009) show both successful trade union initiative and employer disagreement at the EU level with regard to the (Bolkestein) Services Directive. Second, Menz (2005) has emphasized the significance of national regulation and the importance of national varieties of capitalism in mediating European liberalization policies: employer organizations may not always choose a liberalizing path. Such variation in national regulation can be seen with regard to labour migration after EU enlargement. However, Lillie and Greer (2007: 553), in a transnational study of construction, argue that national interests are becoming increasingly fragmented: as ‘capital abandons national institutions, in reality if not always in rhetoric, labor unions are increasingly left to their own devices’. Cremers argues that despite trade union efforts at a European level, member states are becoming ‘subordinated to supranational law and to a hierarchy based on the primacy of the free provision of services’ (2010: 305). Thus, the opportunity for national labour market regulation is receding whilst opportunities to use EU labour market regulation grow, and it becomes crucial to establish worker solidarity at local as well as transnational level if unions are to challenge employers’ restructuring efforts.

However, establishing transnational worker solidarity is difficult, just as labour migration is a problematic issue for trade unions. Historically, trade unions have attempted to promote worker solidarity within and across national boundaries, while limiting and regulating the market power of employers. While initially complementary, these two goals are potentially bought into conflict by the presence of migrant workers who may often be willing to accept what are traditionally perceived as low-status jobs in the host country. They may have low wage expectations because of low wage levels in their home countries (Menz, 2005). The increased labour supply caused by immigration may also strengthen an employer’s position in the labour market. Thus it has been argued that trade unions have often been sceptical of labour migration: ‘if employers have a long-standing reputation for preferring immigrants over native-born workers, then the reverse is equally true of trade unions’ (McGovern, 2007: 228). Nonetheless, it is at the same time crucial for trade unions to organize migrant workers in order to avoid these negative effects.

Kahmann (2006) argues that unions have three possible responses. First, they may press governments to regulate the labour market to prevent the presence of migrant workers from undermining wage levels and working conditions. Second, they may target employers to establish minimum standards in collective agreements, thereby reducing the use of migrant workers to undercut conditions. Third, they may attempt to unionize migrant workers so as to demand better pay and working conditions through joint action. In relation to the latter strategy, which is the main focus of this article, Penninx and Roosblad (2000) also identify three main dilemmas faced by unions: whether to oppose or cooperate with the recruitment of migrants; whether to include migrants as regular members of the union, or with separate forms of affiliation that exclude them from full membership; and whether special measures be taken to meet their distinctive needs.

Thus the strategic choices of trade unions seem to be crucial. At the same time it should be noted that choices of recruitment strategies are not just formal decisions made once and for all, but involve internal power struggles and gradual change (Heery, 2005; Kelly and Heery, 1989). Therefore we note that questions of local versus national initiatives, traditional approaches versus activities specific to the new target groups, as well as questions of how to measure results, are all involved in resolving the dilemmas described above.

Contextualized comparison and industrial relations in construction

EU enlargement and the resulting migration have challenged trade unions in our three countries in a similar way. (Note that while Norway is not in the EU, as a member of the European Economic Area it is subject to the same obligations regarding free movement.) Yet this migration has had profoundly different effects in different sectors, both because of the difference in the numbers entering each sector and the impact on employment relations in those sectors. Therefore we have chosen to focus on the construction sector, which has received a large number of migrant workers and for which the inflow of migrant workers may (as described above) have significant effects for employment relations. Moreover, studies which focus on national policies alone fail to highlight the day-to-day practices of local unions, which are vital for the actual success of organizing campaigns. Therefore we have focused on local activities and the interplay between national and local initiatives. This raises issues regarding the unit of analysis, which we would describe as local activities nested within national settings. We thus follow Locke and Thelen (1995) in arguing for a contextualized comparison of local trade union activities. Thus it is important to not only underline the communalities of the challenges and dilemmas trade unions face, but also the differences between the national settings in which they are embedded. Above, we emphasized some of the challenges unions face in the construction sector in the face of labour migration. Below we consider the similarities and differences in industrial relations in the construction sectors of the three countries.

There are significant differences. First, in the structure of the trade unions: one large union, Fellesforbundet (United Trade Union Federation), the main private sector union, covers Norwegian construction; in Denmark there are a number of small specialized construction unions and one large general union, 3F (Fagligt Fælles Forbund); while in the UK one industry union (UCATT) competes with two general unions (GMB and Unite). Second, both unionization rates and collective bargaining coverage in the sector differ markedly: 88 and 74 percent in Denmark, 39 and 60 percent in Norway, 15 and 17 percent in the UK (Mercer and Notley, 2008; Nergaard and Stokke, 2010). Third, whilst flexibility through subcontracting and self-employment is not new in any of the countries, there are differences in the way these contractual forms are used. For example in the UK, Clarke (2006) argues that employment is now fragmented, casual and insecure, and the industry is increasingly based on contingent forms of employment (Forde et al., 2009). Allied to this, many workers are undocumented or bogus self-employed (Gribling and Clarke, 2006; Harvey and Behling, 2008). This makes it increasingly difficult for unions to enforce agreements on sites. In that sense UK construction unions have more experience of dealing with this difficult and multifaceted situation than the two Nordic countries, which only recently have experienced such challenges. Fourth, there are significant differences between the countries with regard to the legal opportunities and practices related to using industrial conflict to force employers to sign collective agreements. Whilst Norwegian unions are in a far better position than their UK counterparts, they are more restricted than their Danish counterparts. Danish unions are faced with a fixed fine for action deemed unlawful, but Norwegian unions face the threat (as in the UK) of having to compensate companies for losses caused by such action. Although Norwegian unions can take industrial action without having members in the targeted firm, this very seldom takes place, unlike in Denmark (Stokke and Thörnqvist, 2001).

Despite these marked differences there are also many similarities between the Danish and Norwegian labour markets. Both countries have relatively small and open economies, with well-developed social welfare systems. There are also similarities in provisions for regulation of the labour market. Minimum wage levels have traditionally been based on collective bargaining, and have been binding only for workers who are covered by a collective agreement. Although coverage is lower in Norway, minimum-wage provisions in agreements have often established norms in enterprises that are not formally bound by them (Stokke et al., 2003). In contrast, the UK is a far larger economy, and following decades of neoliberal restructuring has a receding social welfare system, with extensive full and quasi-privatization. Although it does have a national minimum wage, its social ‘safety net’ is ever more shaped by the low common standards of EU directives. However, wages and conditions in construction are mainly based on collective bargaining and there are a range of national and sub-sector collective agreements (NECC, 2005), including the Construction Industry Joint Council Working Rule Agreement (WRA). As with the Scandinavian countries, these agreements can establish a norm even in enterprises that have not signed them. For example, the then dominant employers’ association, the Construction Confederation (which closed after our research) encouraged their main contractor members to follow agreements. As in Norway and Denmark, collective agreements cover not only minimum wage levels but also a range of other additional payments. In all three countries, local rates of pay are often above the agreed minimum rates, making these of limited importance for actual wage levels. However, the recruitment of CEE migrants who may (at least initially) be willing to work on conditions far inferior to what is common, has caused fragmentation in bargaining arrangements. Despite clear national differences between the two Nordic countries and the UK, at sectoral level they face similar challenges.

Trade union responses to EU enlargement: Targeting government and employers

An important consideration with regard to CEE migration is how trade unions have interacted with government and employers. Under the terms of the accession agreements, countries could impose a seven-year ‘transitional period’ before free entry to their labour markets, and both Norwegian and Danish trade unions endorsed such a regime. They launched campaigns insisting that CEE workers were welcome, but social dumping was not. The governments of both countries introduced almost identical transitional regimes (Dølvik and Eldring, 2008): work permits would be granted only to workers who could document that their wages and conditions would accord with ‘normal’ standards, and that they had full-time jobs. No specific quota was imposed. Self-employed and posted workers were not encompassed by these transitional restrictions, and had free entry.

There have been major variations in how unions targeted the employers of migrants. In Denmark, they have used the traditional practice of regulating wage levels and working conditions through collective bargaining with both foreign and Danish enterprises employing CEE workers. This has been a demanding task and has encountered some limitations. First, comprehensive efforts and many industrial disputes have been required in order to obtain very few collective agreements. Second, the unions have experienced problems with the enforcement of those agreements which have been signed (Andersen and Arnholtz, 2008). These problems have led to discussions of the desirability of an erga omnes rule making collective agreements generally applicable, but so far this option has been rejected.

In Norway, unions changed their strategy when encountering low-wage competition from the CEE countries, by resuscitating a long-dormant Act on the general application of wage agreements (Allmenngjøringsloven). The purpose is to ensure that foreign workers receive wages and conditions equal to those of Norwegian employees. Following EU enlargement, in particular with regard to posted workers, general application of collective agreements has become a key instrument for avoiding unreasonable low-wage competition and distortion of market competition in general. The nationwide application of parts of the collective agreement for construction means that since January 2007 a statutory minimum wage level has been introduced in this industry (Alsos and Eldring, 2008). However, the general application of collective agreements has long been a controversial instrument in Norway, for unions as well as employers’ organizations. For the unions, two aspects are especially problematic. First, even though non-unionized workers in enterprises that have signed a collective agreement are thereby covered by the agreement, this may prove a disincentive to join the union. The statutory general application of key provisions in the agreement could therefore increase the problem of ‘free riders’ (Checchi and Lucifora, 2002). Second, there have been concerns that a general application of the minimum wage provisions in the collective agreements would not prevent the segmentation between high-paid and low-paid workers (or low-wage competition), because the minima in most cases are set far below the normal average wages. In spite of these provisos, Fellesforbundet consider that the general application has been an appropriate means and response to the comprehensive labour immigration since 2004 (Eldring and Hansen, 2009).

In contrast to their Nordic counterparts, British unions supported free entry for CEE workers. For example, a statement in the UCATT magazine welcomed new migrants and pledged that the union would work with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) to develop an organizing strategy for migrant workers (UCATT, 2004). The first main example of this strategy was the northeast project discussed in this article. There was no identifiable conflict between union and government policy; there was a general assumption, shared by unions, government and employers that only a ‘manageable’ number of workers would come to the UK. In reality both the scale and the scope of migration were unprecedented, affecting most areas of the labour market, with Poles the largest single national group (Salt and Millar, 2006). Migrants have mainly entered low-paid sectors (Border and Immigration Agency, 2009), and recruitment agencies have gained a dominant position in the provision of labour, including in construction (Fitzgerald, 2007).

In response to the unexpected level of immigration, a Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) was hastily arranged, but this turned out to have a number of shortcomings (Anderson et al., 2006; Fitzgerald, 2006). Workers registering were meant to be given information on employment rights and trade union membership, but as in the two Nordic countries the scheme only applied to employees, not to the self-employed or posted workers. This limited its utility for trade union organizing.

The UK has a long-established system of voluntary national and local collective agreements which are not legally binding, though a National Minimum Wage has existed since 1999. Because of membership decline, unions have little or no control over employer recruitment and have therefore increasingly sought to influence government policy (Fitzgerald and Hardy, 2010). The most obvious example of this is their central role in the adoption of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, which established regulation of recruitment agencies in parts of the food-processing sector which are dominated by migrants. Construction unions are now seeking to extend these regulations to their sector (UCATT, 2009; Unite, 2009). Lillie and Greer (2007) also identify union lobbying of government for regulation of public works projects, as with the Heathrow Airport Terminal 5 project (2002–2007) which restricted self-employed labour and maintained national collective agreements. Unions now seek better and clearer enforcement of current legislation and more legal regulation of certain sectors such as construction, whilst maintaining current collective agreements as best they can.

Organizing migrant workers in construction: The evidence

Below we present the findings of our case studies in Copenhagen, Oslo and northeast England. We argue that to understand the unions’ strategies and their engagement with CEE workers, three key themes must be considered. First, we focus on the interplay between the central and local levels of the unions in formulating and implementing strategies. Second, we look more specifically into the degree of innovation in the strategies adopted. Finally, we discuss the success of the strategies adopted in terms of membership recruitment.

The formulation of strategies

In Denmark the main union in the construction industry, 3F, also organizes workers in many other industries that employ CEE workers (agriculture, manufacturing, hotels and catering). The other two main unions are Træ-Industri-Byg (TIB), which organizes carpenters, joiners, etc., and has merged with 3F since the completion of our research, and Malernes Fagforening, which organizes painters. The construction unions were traditionally concerned mainly with maintaining their own pay rates and the boundaries of union representation, but this has gradually changed since EU enlargement. The first clear indication was a strategy document published in late 2006 by Bygge- Anlægs- og Trækartellet (BAT), the umbrella body for trade unions in the construction and related sectors. This argued that the unions should treat CEE migrant workers as potential union members rather than adversaries to be excluded. The next step was the innovative measure of a joint, cross-union standard collective agreement for foreign enterprises, to ensure that all employers were covered by the same collective rates. At the same time a tacit consensus developed that it was more important to get CEE workers organized than to argue over who organized them.

These initiatives at central level were only a formalization of existing developments at local level, where construction unions had for some time cooperated in organizing CEE workers and ensuring that they were covered by collective agreements. The two objectives were seen as closely connected, but the second received priority. What local unions needed was the official establishment of a cross-union collective agreement for foreign enterprises, and BAT and the central unions used this local need as an opportunity to promote the efforts to organize CEE workers at local level. In this way, a back-and-forth exchange between local activist unions and more pragmatic national officers has been taking place.

In Norway, Fellesforbundet has actively promoted the unionization of labour migrants since 2006, following intermittent action by local unions in 2004–2005. In the past, shifting labour demand in the sector resulted in frequent cross-border movement of construction workers within the Nordic region, but this did not traditionally involve workers from other countries. The unions did not therefore recruit foreign workers, instead formulating agreements with sister unions in the Nordic countries on cooperation and the application of collective agreements. Allied to its new strategy, Fellesforbundet campaigned to eliminate dishonest practices in the construction industry in order to combat social dumping. The change in emphasis to active recruitment of CEE migrants was then presented not as a change in policy but as a logical continuation of the union’s previous efforts.

The central level of Fellesforbundet, as well as the local unions in Oslo, have emphasized that local enthusiasts have contributed strongly to success in recruiting labour migrants. The Oslo unions have traditionally been more radical than the national organization, and their methods when engaging with employers in the sector have not always received approval from the leadership. Given this at times tense relationship, it was significant that the general secretary in his address to the 2008 union congress warmly thanked the local unions for their efforts in organizing migrants and in combating social dumping. He stated that although there had been disagreements over the years, he felt a deep respect for local achievements in this area.

As noted above, the principal British construction union, UCATT, supported the recruitment of CEE migrant workers and accepted that a strategy should be developed in conjunction with the TUC. However, initiatives were piecemeal. The case study region, UCATT Northern, had little prior engagement with migrant workers and hence the migrant organizing ‘project’ was not initially driven by the union locally but rather initiated centrally by the TUC. The latter had encouraged their regional offices to bid for funding to undertake mapping and exploratory work with newly arrived CEE workers. The Northern TUC, UCATT and Northumbria University combined to undertake an initial ‘project’ over a nine-month period, with UCATT appointing a development officer to support this task. Although the project was regarded as generally a success by both local and national representatives of the union, there were also tensions. The most evident began to emerge after the first six months of the project, when increasing pressure was placed on the union locally and in turn on the development officer to show a recruitment return on engagement with CEE workers. Involvement with the project had meant that the development officer and other officials were spending an increasing amount of time visiting sites to engage with Poles and indeed visiting them in the community. Allied to this was also expenditure on the translation of documents. Overall, if conflict existed between local and national union structures with regard to organizing CEE workers it was with resource allocation that it was most evident.

Strategic innovation

In Denmark the local unions in Copenhagen in particular have engaged in a large number of activities, including cooperation across union boundaries and exchange of information on a regular basis. Overall, their approach has two complementary strands: first, the traditional approach of industrial action to support existing collective agreements, second, more innovative forms of engagement with CEE workers in the workplace and community. The first strand has included a large number of blockades and industrial conflicts, undertaken with comprehensive media coverage in order to prevent employers from using CEE workers to depress wage levels. The increased industrial action has helped both union legitimacy and unity among (Danish) construction workers. The second strand began in early 2006 when the association of local unions in Copenhagen, Byggefagenes Samvirke, hired a Polish-born officer to assist Danish officers on matters related to migrant workers. A Polish club was subsequently established, in which meetings and social activities now take place. Inspired by these local initiatives, the national federations provided funding to employ another five Polish-speaking ‘consultants’ whose central aim is to assist local unions all over the country. National funds have subsequently been allocated to support local organizing initiatives; for instance, local unions can apply for funds to start a Polish club or to hold information meetings for CEE workers. In Copenhagen, all local unions decided to assist non-unionized CEE workers, contrary to normal practice. The assumption was that such assistance would gain the unions a good reputation in the growing CEE community and would eventually mean higher membership. However, this dual strategy, combining traditional blockade approaches (which migrants might perceive as aggressive behaviour) and the more inclusive initiatives, has been difficult to balance.

In Norway, the strategy initiated by local unions in 2004–2005 was a response to non-unionized Polish workers coming to local union offices for assistance; this raised the question whether it was appropriate to assist those who were not members (Eldring and Hansen, 2009). At that time the unions’ rules stated that it would provide assistance only to those who were members before raising a problem, a policy broadly similar to that of unions in the other two countries. The rules were temporarily suspended to allow local branches to gain a foothold in migrant communities. As the union has become well known among migrants, the central union organization has signalled that the rules should now be enforced. This has gained support within the local unions, which have experienced an increased pressure on resources.

A significant policy decision adopted by local branches from an early stage was that they should not take any action that would cause labour migrants to be expelled from the country. This principle was emphasized by interviewees as a key to establishing trust with CEE workers. Also significant was that the generally applied collective agreement has become a key instrument for the efforts to increase unionization:

The general application of the agreement means that we can recruit more members. Without general application we must demand a collective agreement before we can claim any rights in terms of wages. When the agreement has been made applicable to all, we can help individual members. (Fellesforbundet representative)

Although the formal decision to apply for extension was made by the central confederation, LO, in close consultation with Fellesforbundet nationally, the local level played a significant role by actively promoting the issue within the internal structures of the union.

At the start of the northeast project, UCATT representatives and full-time officials were invited to a CEE workshop at the TUC to dispel a number of potential myths surrounding newly arrived CEE workers. At this meeting an English-speaking Pole ‘told his story’ and reported some of the poor conditions suffered by Polish construction workers in the northeast. The meeting provided an important early message to UCATT activists and members that the union was supporting and actively seeking to recruit newly arrived Polish workers. It was also used to encourage local activists to engage with new migrants to provide them with information on the current local pay rates. The day-to-day UCATT organizing strategy was very similar to that used with indigenous workers. Recruitment and retention traditionally rely on local knowledge from site agents regarding newly arrived subcontractors; site-based lay representatives engaging with newly arrived workers; the diligence of full-time officials as they move from site to site; good working relationships with main contractors and local subcontractors; and the national WRA, which the union endeavours to display in larger site canteens. However, the project was considered pioneering in nature and received considerable attention given its limited funding and resourcing. An example of this innovation was the use for a short period of a TUC-seconded Solidarność national organizer, although this is currently the only cross-border collaboration undertaken. The development officer also spent time in the Polish community visiting people’s homes to discuss the union and WRA rates. Overall, the novelty of the project was that it was the first time that the union locally had engaged with migrant workers and particular initiatives undertaken as part of the project, such as the link with Solidarność, were certainly innovative.

Membership increase: The ultimate criterion of success or failure of engagement?

Whilst our analysis has identified significant trade union engagement with CEE workers, there is always a tension within membership organizations regarding the actual numbers who become members. In essence, resources spent on organizing must eventually lead to increased membership. Therefore there comes a time when a central criterion of success is how many new members have been gained and retained. Although concerns with social dumping extend this timeline, most of the initiatives and projects presented have had a clear aim of gaining new members amongst migrant workers. Financial support was evident in three main ways, first through actual money spent on projects, second through secondment of officials, and lastly by more informal in-kind support at a local level. Given this commitment of resources to projects and initiatives, it is surprising to report that in Denmark and the UK most unions involved in our projects did not record national origins when recruiting new members, instead estimating numbers of CEE workers recruited as a whole. In Norway the numbers of Poles joining the union was initially obtained through identifying those members whose surname was Polish, not a wholly accurate approach. In 2008 an administrative change was made and the language of new members is now recorded, which provides a more solid base for calculations of national origin. In our study, calculations of membership gain were mainly based on estimates by local officials working with CEE workers (Denmark and UK), the limited or more concrete evidence provided by administrators in union offices who process membership (Norway), or increases identified in fees received from a particular employer of CEE workers (Denmark and to some extent the UK).

Nevertheless, all unions estimated the numbers of CEE members and made judgments of the success of projects. For example, in Oslo it was believed that Poles accounted for a total of 9 percent of the membership of the two local construction workers’ unions in autumn 2006 (Oslo Bygningsarbeiderforening and Tømrer og Byggfagforeningen). By 2008 these unions, using membership language data, calculated that the number of Polish members had increased considerably: a total of 40 percent of members came from the accession states, with a majority from Poland. At national level, Fellesforbundet estimated in spring 2008 that it had between 4000 and 5000 Polish members, mostly in construction. This constitutes around 20 percent of total membership in the construction industry. However, the majority of CEE construction workers remained non-unionized, and they still have a lower rate of unionization than Norwegians (Eldring, 2007). Importantly, though, the local unions reported that Polish members have gradually become more involved in regular union activities, becoming members of branch committees and taking on representative positions. In Copenhagen it was estimated in September 2008 that the three local unions had a combined total of 300 CEE members, which amounts to approximately 3 percent of total membership in construction. There was no estimate of the actual numbers of CEE or Polish members recruited in the UK; the general opinion was that the project had provided a successful example of migrant engagement, but not of initial membership gain.

On the evidence of our studies, the Norwegian unions have been more successful in their attempts to unionize CEE workers than their Danish and UK counterparts. In Norway, most of the unionized Polish workers are regular members, paying their dues in the standard electronic manner, mainly through their employers. In contrast, in both Denmark and the UK the electronic process of payment was a barrier to recruitment of CEE workers, who found difficulties in opening bank accounts. In both countries this compounded barriers to organizing those transitory Polish workers who moved on after a short period. Furthermore, a survey amongst Polish workers in the Copenhagen area showed that a large number of respondents had never had any contact with the Danish trade unions (Hansen and Hansen, 2009).

Discussion and conclusions

The evidence of our studies shows that the Norwegian construction union has been more successful in unionizing CEE workers than its Danish and UK counterparts. This is an interesting finding, given that the Danes normally have a higher organization rate and have put a lot of resources into engaging Polish workers, while it is less surprising that the weaker UK unions have not achieved similar results.

There is no evidence to suggest that Poles migrant workers are resistant to union membership; indeed evidence suggests the opposite. For example, a survey among Polish workers in Oslo indicated that their ideology or normative attitudes towards union membership would induce them to join (Eldring, 2007). This is consistent with findings in a similar survey conducted in Copenhagen (Hansen and Hansen, 2009) as well as the finding from our UK case study (Fitzgerald, 2006) and a national TUC study. In this national study, CEE workers when asked why they would choose to join a union mentioned collectivist values and the need for a ‘sword of justice’, rather than more individually oriented ‘service’ and self-interest needs (Anderson et al., 2007). Thus union strategies are of vital importance in understanding our studies.

Implicit in our discussion of the three main themes above is that our case study unions have all been inclusive in their organizing strategies and have made an important contribution to integrating migrants. However, each union has been faced with crucial dilemmas when it came to the means and extent of inclusion, since CEE workers are often used by employers as low-wage substitutes for indigenous workers. Thus there were tensions with regard to the relative effort put into organizing CEE workers and opposing social dumping. In Denmark the stronger union framework meant that a delicate balance existed between the traditional blockade strategy and newer more organizing-based approaches. This balance has been hard to strike, as Danish unions typically rely on ‘passive recruitment’ factors such as the ‘Ghent’ unemployment insurance system; while weaker unions, such as UCATT in the UK, had difficulty in providing the required resources for the longer period that a migrant organizing approach may need. A further, as yet unexplored, issue is that efforts to integrate migrant workers may initiate a revival of a more activist approach at the expense of official union officers. Thus, classic questions arise regarding resource allocation for organizing and power struggles between fractions within unions (Kelly and Heery, 1989). Unions may also seek new allies among the new actors of industrial relations (Heery and Frege, 2006), which UCATT has begun to do in the UK (Fitzgerald, 2009). This though will again challenge the boundaries of a union and indeed its focus on who are its potential members. At the same time, external constraints are put on union activities: channels of migration and migrant employment status (posted, self-employed or directly employed) affect a union’s opportunity both to organize and to help migrant workers (Andersen and Arnholtz, 2008). More generally the employers’ relation to the national system of industrial relations may affect their willingness to cooperate with unions on this issue of organization, and thus affect union strategies towards migrant workers (McGovern, 2007).

So while our case study unions have accepted the recruitment of CEE workers in Denmark and Norway, this has been on condition that the workers should be employed on equal terms with host workers. These requirements regarding labour conditions have been promoted in relation to government as well as employers in both countries, even though some differences remain with regard to the specific regulation of wage levels and working conditions. In the UK, trade union influence with regard to equal conditions is more limited. UCATT and the other construction unions are constrained by a lack of membership and the large number of very small building contractors present on sites. With regard to the dilemmas identified by Penninx and Roosblad (2000), CEE workers have been included as regular members in all three countries; however there are issues over the sustainability of membership because of the transient nature of construction projects and employment.

On the other hand, there have been major variations in trade union responses and outcomes with regard to the other set of strategies described by Kahmann (2006), concerning policies towards employers. At the same time, it is worth noting that the practical recruitment efforts have mainly taken place locally, and it is therefore necessary to focus on the activities of the local unions in order to gain an understanding of the actual strategies followed. Local initiatives have undoubtedly had a large effect on the success in recruiting CEE workers. In all the three cases we find many examples of enthusiastic local activists and local unions. Their recruitment efforts have made a strong impact, and have often been portrayed as activities of an exemplary character by the media (Økonomisk Rapport, 15 June 2006; Dagens Næringsliv, 21 November 2007; Aftenposten, 2 September 2008). Without these enthusiasts, the nationwide drive to increase unionization would not have been as effective. In looking at the interplay between national and local levels, it is interesting to note that the clearest ‘bottom-up’ drive for organizing efforts has been found in Norway, which is at the same time where unions have been most successful. Thus the unions’ approach to the dilemmas outlined by Penninx and Roosblad should not necessarily be perceived as choices made at a certain point in a formalized process, but rather as the outcome of practical activities that depend on institutional and historical circumstances, and not least on factors that are embedded in local contexts.

Comparing Denmark and Norway, how have apparently identical frameworks and purported strategies resulted in widely differing outcomes in terms of recruitment of labour immigrants? One key explanation can probably be found in the institutional dissimilarities in the two countries’ traditions for handling conflict (Evju, 2008). In the Danish labour market, the legal opportunities to take industrial action are wider, and historically this has resulted in a far higher number of conflicts (Stokke and Thörnqvist, 2001). Denmark also differs from the UK in this respect. Thus while the Danish unions’ efforts to establish collective agreements may have appeared too aggressive in the eyes of migrant workers, Norwegian and UK unions’ approach of providing assistance to individuals may have appeared a more convincing basis of solidarity. The Danish trade unions are larger and more powerful than their sister organizations in Norway and the UK, and appear to a greater degree as monitors and administrators of the industry, rather than as organizers and activists. This latter role may inspire more confidence in the power and utility of the union, but with time and resources focused on maintaining rules and regulations, labour migrants might not feel that unions are there for them. In Norway and the UK, resources have been used for local recruitment, personal contact and strong engagement with migrants.

This should not lead to overall conclusions regarding the successful handling of the challenges unions face in the light of post-accession migration, as these challenges involve a number of issues. As Locke and Thelen (1995) note, common challenges may be translated into specific conflicts in different national settings that make the organization of migrant workers more important in some countries than others. Thus overall this comparative analysis highlights that all three strategic areas described by Kahmann should be considered in an explanation of the differing outcomes of union activities. Some research on trade union recruitment has focused on what Kahmann would refer to as the autonomous activities of unions (Heery et al., 2000, 2003). In addition, our investigations indicate that unions must undertake coherent efforts along several dimensions in order to be successful in recruiting and including labour immigrants.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The Norwegian study is part of a research programme on labour and service mobility, financed by Norges forskningsråd (Research Council of Norway). Our thanks to the journal editor and the anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.

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