Slovenia at the crossroads: Increasing dependence on supranational institutions and the weakening of social dialogue

Introduction

Since the 1990s, Slovenia has been generally classified as a coordinated market economy, with strong intermediary interest organizations. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia (Gospodarska zbornica Slovenije, GZS) was based – like its Austrian counterpart – on obligatory membership; the trade union density rate was 40 percent (Toš, 1999, 2009), above the average level in the old EU member states and significantly above that in other future accession countries (Visser, 2011: 26). The presence of these robust actors strongly influenced the formation of a centralized collective bargaining system, at both sectoral and peak levels. As the Chamber was involved in the collective bargaining processes, collective agreements had a coverage rate of almost 100 percent in the 1990s. At the micro level, given the Yugoslav self-management legacy, Slovenia developed a mode of workers’ participation that was quite close to the German works council system: in companies with more than 20 employees, works council (if requested by trade unions or groups of workers) must be established; in companies with more than 500 employees, a workers’ director, who is a full-member of the management board, can be proposed by the works council.

This model of coordination arose in the context of stable, moderate economic growth that lasted up to 2004, when Slovenia joined the EU member. Before this turning point, the tripartite interest integration or neo-corporatist consensus (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Feldmann, 2006, 2013) functioned as a source of significant competitive advantage for the Slovenian economy. Yet the context then changed dramatically: fuelled by a massive inflow of cheap money, economic growth increased sharply, and then, when the crisis hit, it declined dramatically. This reversal significantly reshaped the nature of social dialogue by narrowing the space for consensual policy-making.

Our study is based on data collected in 2014. Our fieldwork consisted of interviews with relevant stakeholders at three levels. At the national level, we interviewed senior representatives of the government (the Minister of Labour); the main Slovenian trade union confederation ZSSS (Zveza svobodnih sindikatov Slovenije, Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia); and three of the four most important employers’ organizations (the general secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, the president and director of the Chamber of Craft and Small Business of Slovenia (Obrtna Zbornica Slovenije, OZS) and the general secretary of the Association of Employers in Craft and Entrepreneurs of Slovenia (Združenje delodajalcev obrti in podjetnikov Slovenije, ZDOPS)).

Following the cross-national research design, at sectoral level we focused on the metal and the chemical industries. Interviews were with the president of SKEI (Sindikat kovinske in elektroindustrije Slovenije, the ZSSS affiliate in the metal sector) and the general secretary of SKNG (Sindikat kemične, nekovinske in gumarske industrije Slovenije), its affiliate in the chemical sector, and with the director of the Association of the Metal Industry (Združenje kovinske industrije) and the sectoral Chamber for the metal industry (GZS). We also studied two leading companies from these sectors: a white goods manufacturer (Gorenje) and a pharmaceutical company (Krka), interviewing the head of the human resource management (HRM) department and a union leader in Krka and the head of HRM department and workers’ director in Gorenje.

Finally, we organized a workshop with the interviewees in order to obtain the participants’ feedback and verification of the research findings. The findings of the research conducted in 2014 are complemented by data collected in three companies in the paper, publishing and printing industry as part of another research project for the trade union confederation Konfederacija sindikatov Slovenije (KSS) PERGAM - a breakaway from ZSSS in 2013–2014. These case studies involved 15 interviews with managers and workers’ representatives at enterprise level, surveys of employees in the three companies (a 60% response rate), focus and study groups.

In this article, we proceed as follows: first, we briefly outline developments before the crisis; second, we discuss the impact of the crisis and accommodation by the state to the rapidly changing conditions; third, we examine the functioning of social dialogue during the crisis; finally, we discuss the outcomes at micro level.

Before the crisis: a package of radical neoliberal reforms

Slovenia’s political scene changed significantly in 2004, immediately after it joined the EU and shortly before the crisis: the conservative Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS, Slovenian Democratic Party) won the elections. This was a major change from the centre-left coalitions that had been in office for over a decade, and it significantly influenced Slovenia’s developmental trajectory. At the outset of its 2004–2008 mandate, the new government launched a package of radical neoliberal reforms, which it tried to justify by the country’s inclusion in economic and monetary union. Indeed, Slovenia was the first new member state to join the eurozone (2007). At the centre of the reforms was a flat-tax rate; the second wave of privatization was a less visible but definitely more important part of that programme.

The attempted radical neoliberal reform was strongly supported by two key contextual factors. First, admission to the eurozone implied a ‘monetarist turn’. It had a big impact on relations within companies as well as between companies and sectors of the national economy. The greatest immediate impact of this turn, which implied the introduction of a fixed exchange rate, was on labour and industrial relations in the export sector.

Second, the mass inflow of cheap money enabled the start of endogenous privatization (leveraged buyouts) as well as the formation of overheated business expansion. Growing company indebtedness clearly reflected these two processes. Bank of Slovenia reports show that loans to non-financial companies doubled in the period 2005–2008 (from €10.7 billion to €20.2 billion) and then after the crisis rapidly decreased below the 2005 level (€9.1 billion in 2014).

The neoliberal reforms were naturally strongly opposed by the unions. They organized the mass mobilization of workers and the wider public, culminating in November 2005 in an enormous rally in Ljubljana. Accordingly, the intended reforms had a clear shock effect which immediately caused a strong polarization of society and the politicization of the stances of all social partners. This polarization and politicization represent a historic turning point in development of the industrial relations system in Slovenia. The conflicts from 2005 have strongly influenced all subsequent perceptions and mutual relations of all actors during governmental reform attempts after 2008.

Despite this major conflict, the structure of collective bargaining remained highly centralized. The new law on collective bargaining adopted in 2006 did not introduce any significant changes to this system. According to surveys (Kahancova, 2013), the coverage rate in 2008 remained high, at about 70 percent. However, although the institutional context was formally almost unaltered, significant changes were developing within the main interest organizations of both employers and workers.

Already before the crisis began, between 2005 and 2008 the unions started to lose members under the pressure of the rapid privatization that was triggered by the right-wing government. After a sharp decline in the early 1990s, density stabilized in second half of the decade at over 40 percent in 2003, but the rate plummeted to 26 percent in 2008 (Toš, 1999, 2009). The first response of the trade union leadership to this sudden drop in membership was a turn towards the membership environment (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005), towards the everyday interests and demands of ordinary workers. This turn implied the almost ‘automatic’ radicalization and fragmentation of trade union policies.

On the employers’ side, also before the crisis, the position of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry was changed: its compulsory status was abolished in 2006. A new law, adopted by the right-wing government, transformed it into a voluntary interest organization. This triggered an immediate decline in membership. As in the case of the trade unions, this provoked a search for new membership by a radical repositioning of its stance. Accordingly, the transformed Chamber started to argue more or less consistently for drastic cuts in taxation, increased labour market flexibility and complementary institutional and regulatory changes. In combination with the radicalized interests represented by the unions, this clearly narrowed the space for dialogue and consensus among the actors.

The density rate of employer organizations decisively influences the regulative capacity of a collective bargaining system. Falling density entails a shrinking collective bargaining coverage rate and thus a weakening of the main institutional infrastructure for developing social dialogue.

These developments indicate that the Slovenian industrial relations model was already exposed to intensive, significant pressures and changes in the years before the world crisis hit the country. But reinforcing these changes, the crisis further undermined key elements of social dialogue in Slovenia.

The crisis and the growing dependence on supranational institutions

The world financial crisis hit Slovenia’s overheated economy in 2009. The gross domestic product (GDP) dropped 8 percent (OECD, 2011), and the repayment of (private) debt at the levels that had accumulated in the ‘years of prosperity’ became extremely challenging overnight. Solvency problems and then a chain of bankruptcies first hit the construction sector. Then, the steep drop in demand from European markets affected the export sector. In consequence, the budget deficit and public debt started to rise. Within a few years, Slovenia exceeded the Maastricht threshold for public debt, which rose from 22 percent of GDP in 2008 to 80 percent at the end of 2014. As in other countries, this escalating debt led to a growing impact of financial markets and credit-rating agencies on the country’s economy.

One consequence was increased political instability: since the crisis began, there have been four successive governments. Three of these overlapped with different policy responses to the three successive phases of the escalating crisis. The fourth, post-crisis government is continuing the policies articulated during the crisis, focusing primarily on privatization.

After the 2008 elections, a new centre-left government was formed. Right at the beginning of its mandate, it was faced with the eruption of the economic crisis and with the first clear signs of growing social discontent. This culminated in the autumn of 2009, in the first year of the crisis, when a series of strikes broke out in several major companies. The largest, which shook the Slovenian trade union and political establishment, was a wildcat strike in the home appliances producer Gorenje: a large exporter, widely recognized as a leading rule-maker in the metal sector. The unexpected wave of discontent was probably a decisive factor behind the government’s decision to raise the minimum wage by 23 percent (OECD, 2011: 41). At the same time, the government prepared a programme of structural reforms. With its Exit Strategy (Slovenska izhodna strategija 2010–2013; Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010) presented in early 2010, it tried to respond to the demands for ‘excessive deficit reduction’ policies demanded by the EU institutions (European Commission, 2009). According to the Strategy, the government would reduce public sector expenditure, reform social policy in terms of a ‘workfare’ approach and implement pension reform. It hoped that in exchange for the rather generous increase in the minimum wage, the unions would support these structural reforms. This was not to be and faced opposition from the social partners; the government decided to formulate and implement the reforms unilaterally. However, this led to open conflict with the unions, including a massive referendum campaign against the legislative proposals on pension reform and mini-jobs. The unions succeeded in collecting 40,000 signatures, reaching the threshold at which the parliament is legally obliged to organize a public referendum. In the end, both legislative proposals were rejected, resulting in a serious political crisis and a vote of no confidence in the government. In the early elections in November 2011, the governing parties were heavily defeated.

The conservative government that was formed after these elections considered the fiscal crisis the priority of its anti-crisis efforts. In line with its general ideological profile, it tried to implement immediate radical cuts in public sector spending. At the outset, it proposed a 15 percent salary reduction in the public sector, but following a general strike by public employees in April 2012 and negotiations with the unions, this was reduced to 8 percent (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 40/2012). The government also proposed a constitutional amendment incorporating a ‘golden fiscal rule’ which would require balanced budgets. The EU institutions explicitly supported these austerity measures; their representatives frequently stated that the reforms in Slovenia were ‘going in the right direction’. However, the austerity policy provoked immediate public resistance and was a key factor behind the emergence of the massive civil society movement: the Slovenian ‘winter of discontent’ of late 2012 and early 2013. This mass civil society resistance was followed by a vote of no confidence in parliament.

The third government, a coalition led by a liberal party formed 2 years earlier, began work in March 2013, the fifth year of the crisis, and announced an end to the austerity measures. Within a week, the interest rate on state bonds rose from 5 to 6.37 percent. Facing falling credit ratings, a growing budget deficit, rising public debt and a banking crisis, accompanied by threats of intervention by the Troika, the prime minister announced that the reforms would continue. Accordingly, the third ‘anti-crisis’ government did not abandon cuts in public expenditure, but unlike its predecessor it sought to create new forms of taxation. In addition, it announced it would privatize some of the bigger companies still majority-owned by the state.

In May 2013, the parliament adopted the ‘golden fiscal rule’. Moreover, referendums on all fiscal and financial issues were forbidden; a consensus across the otherwise sharply divided political scene was easily reached in this regard. The narrowing of possible subjects of referendums was warmly welcomed at the EU level and noted by the financial markets to which the message had been directed. The changed rules on calling referendums removed a powerful tool from the trade unions to combat anti-labour proposals. In the first half of 2013, the EC (and the European Central Bank (ECB)) demanded that reform of the banking system be accelerated. The focus was on transferring non-performing loans to a ‘bad bank’ and recapitalizing the banks. In June, when the government was already in a position to undertake the recapitalization and to transfer the loans, the process was suddenly suspended by the European institutions, which demanded new stress tests to be undertaken based on a methodology previously only used in countries under bailout programmes (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Cyprus). Consequently, state capitalization of the three largest banks increased from €0.5 billion (the deficit established in early 2013) to €3 billion by the end of 2013. Subsequently, Professor Jože Mencinger (2014), an influential economist, economics minister in the first democratically elected government and subsequently Rector of the University of Ljubljana, condemned the ‘stress tests’, arguing that the European institutions ‘obviously defined the result in advance, the one they needed … and they then accommodated the “methodology” to this politically suitable result’ (p. 44).

The new government in turn collapsed when the ruling coalition fell apart, and elections in July 2014 were won by a newly formed ‘anti-establishment’ centrist party. This coalition government remained committed to balancing the budget, eliminating the deficit, the long-term sustainability of public finances, although it has the benefit of signs of economic recovery.

In Slovenia’s case, the escalation of the crisis obviously overlapped with the direct involvement of supranational institutions in the formation of its internal policies and measures aimed at ensuring that the government pursued austerity policies. As shown, most of these measures provoked powerful resistance both by the trade unions and by citizens more generally.

The weakening of social dialogue

Slovenian coalition governments have been relatively weak and unstable. Accordingly, they are inclined to pursue social dialogue as a potential source of further legitimization. This tendency was strongly accentuated in the 1990s during the process of EU accession. As explained previously, the key feature of that period was stable, moderate economic growth. In the new circumstances after 2008, when growth had vanished and GDP declined, all three governments just mentioned proceeded with attempts to attract the social partners’ support. However, given the pressures of the crisis, the radicalized stances of the social partners and the demands of the supranational institutions, they were and have been significantly less successful in their attempts to (re)create meaningful social dialogue.

Outcomes at micro level

The two companies we selected for detailed analysis are Krka, a pharmaceutical company, and Gorenje, a white goods manufacturer. Both have a long history as successful business entities and are also known as examples of active and successful social dialogue. Both were founded in the early 1950s during the creation of the Yugoslav self-management system. Today, both have dispersed ownership. Krka has mainly Slovenian owners; Gorenje is a multinational with more diversified ownership. We selected these two leading companies from the two key, export-oriented sectors of the Slovenian economy, because both used to be rule-makers in their respective industries. Accordingly, we tried to collect evidence concerning changes in their status which could be connected to the worsening business situation in their sectors. As we show below, it seems that both were exposed to significant changes. Our evidence suggests that Krka has basically preserved its relatively developed social dialogue practice, but has nevertheless lost its role as a rule-maker: because of the crisis, other firms in the sector are unable or unwilling to follow its leads. On the other hand, changes in Gorenje’s ownership and business model have caused turbulence in the company’s social dialogue.

Krka is one of the most successful Slovenian companies and a respected international player in the pharmaceutical industry. In the last 10 years, the number of workers has increased in both Slovenia and abroad. In 2005, there were 5224 workers, including 1644 of them in foreign subsidiaries; the number of workers rose to 7602 in 2008 (3543 in other countries) and to 10,543 (5637 abroad) in 2015; most foreign employees are in Russia and Poland. The company has a works council, workers’ director and two representative trade unions (SKNG Krka Novo Mesto and Sindikat Krka); the density rate is over 50 percent.

Although according to our interviewees the crisis has hit the pharmaceutical industry as hard as others (forcing companies to merge, reduce workforce levels or even close), since 2008 Krka has grown by at least 5 percent annually. Our respondents attributed this success to a well-prepared and timely strategy to grow in Eastern markets. Krka management does not often publicize this successful performance and the practices which explain this and tend to feel ‘as if they do not really fit into the rubber-chemical sector’. Besides having salaries 30 percent higher than defined by the sectoral collective agreement (the lowest net monthly salary in Krka is €800 and the average above €1700), the company has well-developed pay, incentive and promotion systems; education, training and talent development programmes; employee satisfaction monitoring and development programmes; and policies for the better reconciliation of working and domestic life.

Part of the strong organizational culture entails Krka being a Slovenian company embedded in the local environment and taking responsibility for it. Our respondents stressed this proudly and explained their business advantage over the second largest pharmaceutical company in Slovenia, which is foreign-owned. In the words of a trade union representative, Krka ‘defines the policies, system, strategy here … while the philosophy of foreign owners is different’. In many other companies in the sector, ‘there is no social dialogue at all. It is as the management says’.

In Krka, as in many other Slovenian companies, there is a history of consensually accepted plans for resolving business problems; these were used extensively in the early 1990s following the break-up of Yugoslavia and the loss of the previous national market. It is therefore not surprising that a management respondent indicated that the recent crisis has affected the employees in Krka in a way that has ‘made people realise that not everything can be taken for granted; trade unions, at least ours, understand that’. Our interviewees reported such an acceptance of change on the part of workers during the crisis in other companies as well.

The Gorenje Group is the largest Slovenian manufacturer of white goods and one of the country’s biggest exporters. With a continent-wide market share of 4 percent, it is one of the eight largest manufacturers of domestic appliances in Europe. However, the number of Gorenje employees in Slovenia was reduced from 5630 in 2005 to 5243 in 2008 and 4081 in 2014. In the company’s foreign subsidiaries there are 4512 workers (2886 of whom are in production). There is a relatively high trade union membership, which was not significantly affected by the crisis; currently, 53 percent of workers are members of the SKEI trade union.

Trade unions used to be exceptionally strong in Gorenje. A management interviewee claimed that

employers were a hostage of Gorenje as Gorenje had strong trade unions, strong social responsibility; the works councils were strong; they set the standards … When the trade unions felt that something was wrong, they just threatened a strike in Gorenje and the pressure … made all accept what was demanded … Today it is not like that anymore … The situation in the sector is so serious.

Gorenje has been hard hit by the global economic crisis because of its dependence on exports. The workers complained about low wages (€280–400 per month), which have remained unchanged despite the subsidies approved by the government and about unpaid overtime. Discontent exploded in the wildcat strike in the company in 2009, mentioned previously. As the strike was not supported by the company’s union, the workers blamed it for maintaining too close ties with the management. Under the pressure of the strike, the company’s union leadership changed and social dialogue in Gorenje had to be re-established. The workers’ representative, company trade union and management agreed to increase wages by 10 percent, and to additional cost-of-living allowances for workers with the lowest incomes (including those temporarily laid off). They formed a committee with responsibility for social dialogue in the company and strengthened communications, introducing quarterly workers’ assemblies to provide regular information, annual human resource (HR) plans and annual employee interviews. After moving some of the production to Serbia, which created additional tension among the workers, a company agreement on ‘saving jobs until 2015’ was signed. In addition to these immediate intra-company changes, the wildcat strike by Gorenje workers had a significantly wider impact, as we explained earlier. A few months after the strike, the government adopted the Minimum Wage Act, increasing the statutory minimum wage by more than 20 percent.

A representative of Gorenje’s management estimated that the crisis has served as a catalyst of positive change regarding social dialogue in the company. He believed that both sides have redefined their positions: the employer has realized how important the workforce is for the company’s survival while the workers have realized that they cannot succeed without the success of the company.

The situation in the Slovenian metal industry is difficult, and companies have pursued different strategies to address the challenges. Some of these are not built upon social dialogue principles. One case company that has attracted much public attention and is regarded by some commentators as taking over the role of the sector’s rule-maker from Gorenje is the Iskra Group, part of what was once one of the biggest and most successful Slovenian companies. Its owner and manager is one of the more radical opponents of most of the existing social dialogue framework and labour legislation. Known for his radical statements regarding the need to abolish the minimum wage, he required employees to give up part of their wages and ‘voluntarily’ reduce their income below the basic salary set by the collective agreement for the industry.

As we explained in the introduction, during 2013–2014, as part of another project, we conducted interviews and a survey in three enterprises from the paper, printing and publishing industry. As we obtained access under the condition of anonymity, we cannot reveal their identities here. These three cases, in conjunction with those presented above, reveal that among the otherwise highly diversified outcomes at the micro level there are some common trends in the different sectors which we outline.

The paper factory and the publishing house are domestic companies. The first is a 140-year-old manufacturer of paper and hygienic materials; the publishing house covers all book programmes and many sales channels. The first is heavily export-oriented, and the other is mainly focused on the domestic market. Both companies were hit hard by the crisis. The first is a state-owned company in the process of privatization; during 2006–2012 it reduced the number of workers from 1000 to 750, but retained the same level of production. The publishing house is also under sale after the bankruptcy of its majority shareholder. In 2013, it had 1000 employees. During 2009–2013, one worker in four was dismissed. The printing company is a subsidiary of a multinational corporation. It mainly prints advertising material for large Austrian and German retail chains operating in Central and Eastern Europe. It benefits from its intra-corporate links and is technologically advanced. It operates successfully, with a stable position in the market of printing services and products, and during the crisis has not had any business problems; indeed, between 1999 and 2012 company income increased more than five times. During the crisis, the number of employees remained more or less stable at around 100.

Union density is relatively high in the two domestic enterprises and is relatively low in the printing house. The trade union in the paper factory has a membership of more than 80 percent of employees. In the publishing house, density exceeds 50 percent. In addition to trade unions, both companies also have a works council. Union representation is weakest in the printing house: there are two competing unions, which together cover less than half of all employees.

In all the enterprises, there is a clear distinction in terms of trade union membership between high-skilled (better paid) and low-skilled (lower paid) workers. In all cases, but most notably in the paper factory, union membership contains a higher proportion of older employees and a higher proportion of low-skilled workers with lower wages.

In the survey, workers evaluated nine different trade union activities. In every plant, they gave primacy to ‘the representation of workers in negotiations with the government and employers’, ‘wage increases’ and ‘legal assistance’; they also estimated relatively highly ‘the improvement of working conditions’ and ‘trade union solidarity funds’. Workers in the printing house gave a slightly lower score to ‘solidarity funds’. In the printing house and the paper factory, respondents also mention union provision of subsidized food and vacation facilities as well as organized leisure activities. Analysis of the survey shows that employees with a lower education and lower wages still regard (or do so again because of the crisis) these ‘old-fashioned’ trade union activities as extremely important.

We found that in the paper factory and the publishing house, the fear of job loss is extreme. This is a key basis for trade union activity in these organizations. Numerically strong trade unions, driven by this basic concern, participate actively in the struggle for the survival of both companies. The key method of the ‘post-crisis’ struggle for survival is to reduce the number of employees and wages while maintaining or increasing the volume of production, which entails intensifying the pace of work. Workers and trade unions are therefore systematically trapped in a negative exchange, or concession bargaining; in both cases, the unions are caught in a race to the bottom. The reduction in the pay gap between the highest and lowest wages is actually the only visible manifestation of trade union power in these organizations.

In the printing house, where union density is relatively low, there is also a strong sense of job insecurity, although this company enjoys a strong market position. Because of its advanced technological character, the ‘high’ levels of Slovenian wages do not make its products uncompetitive: indeed, it provides wages above the standard defined by the sectoral collective agreement but nevertheless easily achieves a satisfactory degree of profitability. These are conditions which may trigger the exchange of higher productivity growth for higher wages. But there is no such exchange in this company. There are at least two reasons for this: the trade unions are weak and wages in turn are decent with respect to the Slovenian norm. Instead of a (theoretically) possible exchange of higher productivity for higher wages, the company has systematically intensified work, given that while production has continuously expanded, the number of employees remains the same or has only minimally increased. Trade unions participate in negotiations about the increased workload and payments for additional work, but in the printing company, as in the other two firms, these negotiations take the form of concession bargaining.

Conclusion

According to our findings, the formal structure of industrial relations in Slovenia did not undergo any major changes during the economic crisis. But within this formal structure, which has been exposed to small, incremental changes, there are clear signs of major changes in power relations as well as in the logic and quality of the industrial relations system.

Since 2008–2009 when the world crisis hit Slovenia, the reconfiguration of the system has been determined significantly more by supranational forces. A succession of short-lived governments, which have tried to respond to the dramatically escalating crisis-related problems, have been faced with a rapidly narrowing space for the formation of autonomous national policies. The rising public debt and hence increasing dependence on supranational institutions and financial (bond) markets have been strongly associated with increasingly unilateral government implementation of the demands and pressures of these institutions.

As we have shown, almost all attempts at unilateral implementation of these externally mandated austerity measures have caused open social conflicts: from the mid-2000s, the nature and pace of change have definitely not been based on a consensus comparable to those from the 1990s. However, despite this major transformation, social dialogue at the macro level has not vanished. Trade unions, which have retained significant mobilizing capacity (and have emerged as a leading oppositional force to the externally required ‘structural reforms’), are still able to influence the formation of policies and to enter into political exchanges with the government. The cases of the soft pension reform and the new labour legislation clearly reveal this. In Slovenia, the inherited institutional infrastructure, especially the ESS, has not yet been emptied of effectiveness.

Within the context outlined, bargaining within companies, where employees’ negotiating power is now significantly weaker, has acquired a more significant role than before, often being part of company crisis-solving adjustments. It seems that the company-level unions, involved in these crisis-solving negotiations, are trapped in a mechanism of concession bargaining. This leads to a weakening of the trade union influence within the companies and, more generally, a further decline of trade unions at the micro level as well as, in the longer term, in the wider society.