Networking expertise: Discursive coalitions and collaborative networks of experts in a public creationism controversy in the UK

1. Introduction

Who has and who does not have relevant expertise in public controversies about science and technology has been and still is a hot topic in science studies (e.g. Collins and Evans, 2002, 2007). However, many of the public debates about scientific and technological issues concern more than just technical details and scientific expert knowledge. In many cases the key issues are framed in scientific terms (Rayner, 2003) and therefore the authority and opinions of scientific and technical experts become particularly important key resources in public controversies. Statements of scientific experts are even more credible and valuable when there is a consensus among them; consequently things get messier when the scientific and technical experts disagree in public (Thomas, 2009). In complex socio-scientific controversies it is often difficult to determine what kind of and which experts are actually seen as the relevant experts for the issues at stake, as well as who should decide who the relevant experts are (e.g. Jasanoff, 2003). Even though it is commonly understood that more than just scientific and technical expertise is relevant for solving societal problems about science and technology it seems fair to say that scientific experts enjoy a particular status as public experts (e.g. Peters, 2008). Scientific and other forms of expertise are used in different ways by opposing parties in public controversies where expertise meets counter-expertise – it is no longer the case that scientific advice is a resource that is only available to government officials or other particularly well-equipped players (e.g. Maasen and Weingart, 2005).

However, less attention has been paid to the issue of how different kinds of experts connect and collaborate in public controversies and what resources they mobilize in order to achieve credibility. In this article I am going to illustrate a case about a school in England that was accused of teaching creationism in science classes. Various heterogeneous groups of actors formed that were either attacking or defending the school. Irwin and Michael’s (2003) concept of ethno-epistemic assemblages will be used to identify discursive connections and collaboratively acting networks between the experts involved in the debate and their role in the controversy.

2. Networked expertise and ethno-epistemic assemblages

From a sociological and a science and technology studies perspective the idea that there is clear distinction between expert knowledge and non-expert (or lay) knowledge has been criticized and abandoned (e.g. Irwin and Wynne, 1996). A range of case studies has found that “ordinary” citizens possess situated and local knowledge(s) that is often crucial to apply abstract scientific knowledge to particular contexts and cases. It is also a valuable and significant resource in reaching decisions about public policy issues (e.g. Fischer, 2003; Corburn, 2005). Furthermore, local knowledge usefully contributes to and can become an integral part of scientific knowledge.

Rather little is known about the basis of the credibility of expertise. To investigate this matter further, Limoges (1993) offers a processual understanding of expertise in controversy contexts. Limoges describes controversies as “controversist spaces” in which various actors and experts with completely different “worlds of relevance” meet. For Limoges, all participating groups are fully fledged actors in this space; thus expertise per se does not count more than the view of any of the other involved actors, and in most cases expertise is provided in plural and often contradictory ways. Limoges asserts that the actual issue during a controversy is the negotiation of the associations established between the different “worlds of relevance” mobilized by different participants. Such associations are not defined a priori but emerge as outcomes of the interactions between the participants. Nowotny (2003: 154) asserts that “the challenges posed by the social distribution of expertise and its ongoing societal contextualization, lies in the nature and robustness of links it can build with other types of knowledge, other kinds of experience and expertise.” In other words, the robustness, representation and credibility of expertise develop in the course of a particular controversy. How powerful and credible experts become in a particular controversy depends in this view on their ability to build networks and form associations with the other actors involved in the controversy.

The credibility of expertise needs to be developed within a controversy context and it is therefore not an individual property but a process of collective attribution. For Limoges the credibility of expertise in public controversies stems from the strengths of the networks with which experts are associated in the controversy. Expertise, in this view, is therefore seen as a collective learning process, which provides the experts with positive appraisal if they are successful in addressing the articulations of various “worlds of relevance.” In this sense, expertise is a public process, which creates the conditions of credibility of expert performance (Limoges, 1993).

This notion of a networked and collective form of expertise in public controversy contexts points to formations of heterogeneous alliances between different kinds of experts and citizens. Irwin and Michael (2003) propose the concept of ethno-epistemic assemblages that transcend the boundaries between experts and laypersons in order to analytically grasp such new forms of interweavings between science, technology and society, and people, texts, discourses and objects. Irwin and Michael suggest that in practice there is less a contrast between expert and lay actors in issues concerning science and citizens but that it is rather coalitions or assemblages of various actors that emerge and face each other. Here, they draw specifically on the work of Deleuze and Guattari (2004) on assemblages. The term “assemblage” connotes an anti-structural concept that stresses emergence, heterogeneity and the decentred-ness of the order of social life (Marcus and Saka, 2006). In scientific and technological issues that concern various actors one finds different coalitions that bring together laypeople and experts in the same group. These assemblages can entail expert practitioners such as communication or publicity experts but also experts with knowledge from different areas such as political, scientific, religious expertise and local, experiential and other types of knowledge.

Irwin and Michael (2003) argue that in practice it is such assemblages that are in conflict rather than experts and laypeople or science and society per se. These ethno-epistemic assemblages battle with one another for legitimacy and credibility in the wider public and also often try to gain influence on decision-making processes and use the media to do so. “Epistemic” here refers to the production of truth or truth claims; “ethno” connotes the idea of locality and situated-ness of knowledge; and the concept of “assemblage” is used to grasp interweavings of lays and experts (Irwin and Michael, 2003: 119–20). These assemblages are not static, they are dynamic and processual, and different actors with various knowledges, expertise and experience can join such groups, but also leave and abandon them if they are not successful. This concept is proposed for a better understanding of the way controversy, debate and negotiation are actually played out in public.

3. The case of Emmanuel College

A public debate about teaching evolution/creationism in the UK brought together experts from science and education, religious authorities, high-profile politicians and spokespeople of government departments, representatives of atheist, humanist and religious non-government organizations (NGOs) and action groups, creationist organizations, media professionals and commentators as well as teachers, parents and pupils. The range of issues addressed reached, among others, from new types of schools and sponsorship in education, to the epistemological status of the theory of evolution, the nature of science and purposes of (science) education, issues of free speech and free choice and the role of religion and faith in multicultural and multi-faith societies (Allgaier, 2008).

In January 2002, it was reported in a newspaper specializing in education coverage that educators at Emmanuel College in the north of England rented rooms to Answers in Genesis, a creationist organization that was going to hold a conference at the school in March (Dean 2002a). On the weekend the conference was held, a series of articles in the quality newspaper The Guardian accused the school of teaching creationism in science classes and the educators of undermining the theory of evolution (e.g. Branigan, 2002).

Emmanuel College was not just any school – it consistently received excellent exam results. The Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) wrote a very favourable report about the school and the government designated it the status beacon school. Another issue that was central in the debate was that the school, as a city technology college, was partly funded by the state and partly also by the private sector. The sponsor of the school was Sir Peter Vardy’s Vardy Foundation, a charitable trust with a Christian ethos (it was later renamed the Emmanuel School Foundation as a consequence of the press coverage). A member of the political opposition picked up the issue of Emmanuel College being reported as teaching creationism in science classrooms in Parliament and asked the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, about his views on the issue. Tony Blair backed the school for its good exam results, considered that the newspaper reports were exaggerated and said that he welcomed diversity in education (e.g. Kallenbach, 2002). The educators and the sponsor of Emmanuel College denied the accusations and stressed that all requirements of the National Curriculum were followed in the college – which was later confirmed by the relevant education authorities. Emmanuel College spokespeople emphasized the openness of the college to children of various cultural backgrounds and that at the school the children were offered both, religious views on creation and the theory of evolution, so that children could decide for themselves what they wanted to believe.

The issue of creationism being taught in science classes at Emmanuel College was reported in many newspapers – and it was also reported in scientific journals (e.g. Gross, 2002) and other media outlets (e.g. TV and radio news). Various action groups got together in the course of the controversy to write petitions and call for action concerning the controversy. Opponents of the school consistently claimed that religious “indoctrination” and “brainwashing” would take place and that the educators of the school and the Christian sponsor were “peddling” creationism in the school and undermining the teaching of Darwin’s theory of evolution (Allgaier and Holliman, 2006).

4. Methods

This contribution is part of a more comprehensive study on the public representation of science education (Allgaier, 2008). In this original investigation, 287 newspaper articles were sampled from eight national UK newspapers and their Sunday equivalents. Also included in this sample, were two regional/local newspapers (from the geographical area where Emmanuel College is situated) and two UK newspapers specializing in education reporting. ¹ These sources were analysed using qualitative and quantitative approaches to content analyses.

The news reports were sampled starting 1 January 2002 and ending on 20 February 2004. The newspaper content was retrieved from the electronic newspaper archive LexisNexis. All the articles referred to the debate around Emmanuel College during that time. They were coded for distribution over time and newspapers, names and bylines of the correspondents, types of articles, number of directly quoted sources, as well as the different issues of the controversy that were reported in the course of the debate. ²

In order to investigate the distribution of types of experts and other sources a quantitative approach of analysing media content was adopted and six categories of sources, based on their description in newspaper reports, were set up.

Additionally, a seventh category for parents and/or pupils was included, following the methodological recommendations of Limoges (1993). This analysis investigated the distribution of directly quoted sources in newspaper articles but not in letters (because they are written by the readers of newspapers). The analysis is therefore limited to expert and other source representation in newspapers. Furthermore, a qualitative approach was adopted that examined and categorized all statements from sources in quotation marks in all articles, apart from the letters. The same seven categories were used in this analysis in order to be able to make consistent comparisons between the findings of the different types of analyses. Similarities and differences in the arguments of the expert sources of the same category were investigated, using open, selective and axial coding procedures (see Flick, 2006). Here, it was of interest if the quoted experts of the same category all addressed the same or different issues of the controversy and if they used similar or different types of arguments in addressing the various issues of the controversy.

Furthermore, the newspaper articles were checked systematically in terms of connections between the quoted expert and other sources. All types of articles were included in this process, including the letters because some of the experts wrote letters themselves or were co-signatories in commonly drafted letters. A selective coding strategy (Flick, 2006) was therefore employed to filter out all the sequences referring to connections between expert sources. The resulting categorization was based on what the actors were arguing for, what kinds of issues their arguments concerned and what common aims the experts and actors had.

As an additional data collection strategy, online searches were conducted to check what information was available on the web. Search engines such as Google and the searchable online archives of newspapers and other media outlets were used to look for connections between the expert sources, institutions and organizations represented in the debate, as well as for relevant documents, such as letters, petitions and reports. As a result an information archive was created that collected all materials obtained through the internet that supplemented the newspaper sample.

5. Findings: Experts, discursive coalitions and collaborative networks of experts

A total of 304 expert and other sources were quoted directly in the sample. To find out more about the role of experts in a public controversy it is important to know not only how many and what kinds of experts are quoted in the reporting, but also what they are actually saying concerning in the disputes and which of the various controversial issues they address.

6. Discussion

Irwin and Michael’s (2003) notion of “ethno-epistemic assemblages” – a heuristic tool set up to conceptualize the complex interweavings in science–society relationships – was used to conceptualize the groups and coalitions that formed in the debate around Emmanuel College. The assemblages that appeared in the press coverage consist of discursive coalitions and collaborative networks of experts that came together to write petitions and call for action. Two ethno-epistemic assemblages could be identified in the sample: first, an assemblage attacking Emmanuel College, which includes a heterogeneous sub-group that does not see science and religion being contradictory, and, second, an assemblage defending Emmanuel College. These assemblages do cut across expert categories and contain, e.g. scientific, education and religious experts, politicians, NGOs and action groups, as well as parents and/or pupils. They employed different truth claims and worldviews (e.g. scientific arguments, political arguments, moral/ethical arguments etc. – the “epistemic” dimension) and contained different types of situated and local knowledge (from distanced observing and commenting academics to local parents and pupils that were directly affected by the results of the debate – the “ethno” dimension).

The findings also mean that in this controversy it was not the case that a group of experts of one category faced a group of experts from another category (as for instance scientific experts versus religious experts). Instead, coalitions that entailed different forms of expertise and knowledge formed to pursue common goals and faced other heterogeneous coalitions with opposing aims. In practice, one seems to encounter collective and plural forms of expertise instead or alongside struggles of single expert actors. (Online) networking with other experts can be one successful strategy to enhance credibility and to address various “worlds of relevance” (Limoges, 1993).

The experts and actors represented in the newspapers were not only passive commentators in the controversy but some of them also formed action groups in order to influence decision-making processes about some of the issues arising from the coverage about the controversy, for instance by writing a letter to a representative of the government. Here it is possible that the collection of different forms of expertise in action groups was a strategy to receive media attention and enhance credibility through the display of codified consensus. Holliman (in press) asserts that in the public sphere (scientific) consensus is hardly found in manifest forms and might only become visible when consensus is challenged and requires defending or repairing.

It is also noteworthy that written letters and petitions allow the signatories to add credibility to their names: in addition to the name, expert status of the individual signatory is further underlined by adding academic or ecclesiastical titles (e.g. Doctor; Professor, Reverend, Bishop), titles of nobility or of special national achievements (e.g. Sir, CBE; KBE ⁴ ), honorary membership in special professional societies such as the Royal Society (FRS), The Institute of Biology (FIBiol) or the Royal College of Surgeons (FRCS), together with professional domains and affiliated institutions. For instance, one signature to the petition that was signed by bishops and scientists reads “Lord May of Oxford, President of the Royal Society” another “Sir Martin Rees, FRS, Astronomer Royal” and Andy McIntosh’s name is followed by the letters “BSc, PhD, DSc, FIMA, CMath, FInstE, CEng, FinstP, ⁵ Professor of Thermodynamics and Combustion Theory, University of Leeds,” when he signed the petition initiated by him. ⁶ Here it is likely that the display of status and sometimes also media prominence is used to recruit the press, and in some cases signatories to petitions have different “types” of titles, which can be seen as signifiers for status and expertise, added to their name. The message seems to be that these individuals are not just “ordinary” citizens – their expertise and status are invoked to give their argument more weight, and maybe that does also imply for some more “right” to have their views represented in the media.

The analysis illustrated that within the different categories of experts there were varying views on the controversial issues of the debate and experts, who wanted to publicly engage with the issues of the controversy, formed collaborative networks with experts from other expert fields in order to enhance their overall credibility, visibility and weight of argument. Display of status, expertise and codified consensus were central resources in the battle for publicity and influence.

Action groups demonstrated the consensus on an issue among the signatories. This consensus can be particularly credible and effective if experts from different areas are seen to agree on a position concerning a controversial issue, for instance, when scientific and religious experts together sign a petition saying that the biblical account of creation is a “faith position” and that the theory of evolution is not. Moreover, it is also possible that the (unusual) combination of different types of experts was a strategy to get access to the media.

It is probable that coalitions were formed to take action against opposing coalitions (see also Michael, 2009). The results of the study suggest that newspaper coverage of the controversy around Emmanuel College provided a platform for various individuals, interest groups and institutions, who partly used newspaper reporting (and the internet) as an important channel to argue their case (Petersen et al., 2010). The petitions written in the debates around Emmanuel College illustrate the ability of a number of interested parties to mobilize and form alliances of experts and citizens and campaign on specific issues, thereby attempting to enhance their own credibility and legitimacy and to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of opposing groups. Beck (1992) describes this mobilization of resources in controversy contexts as the politics of expertise and counter-expertise.

However, the findings of this study also point to the methodological difficulty of systematically investigating assemblages of actors and of differentiating expertise, because many of the experts were members of various social groups and it is not always clear whether their statements were based on their specialism, experience and expertise, personal opinion or a particular worldview they personally promoted. Effectively, it is the journalists’ descriptions that determine whether sources are presented as citizens, experts or spokespeople of certain groups and organizations, with or without added credibility (Allgaier, 2008, 2010).

Coalitions of experts and citizens are transient and might be formed only in controversy contexts and break up and disappear once the controversy has been resolved or when they go on for long periods without being resolved. For instance, one of the most quoted experts in the sample, the atheist scientist Richard Dawkins, who signed a petition together with various bishops in the Emmanuel College controversy, is quoted in 2007 in a newspaper article saying:

If we are too friendly to nice, decent bishops, we run the risk of buying into the fiction that there’s something virtuous about believing things because of fate rather than because of evidence. (quoted in Jha, 2007: 11).

This suggests that it is unlikely that Dawkins would like to cooperate with his former co-signatories again. It shows that particular coalitions and assemblages are formed at particular times to achieve specific goals; often they are tenuous in substance, need constant (rhetorical and practical) reproduction and are liable to fall apart at any moment. Moreover, years after the initial controversy around Emmanuel College new petitions were signed and new coalitions appeared. For instance, in October 2006 it was reported that the Emmanuel School Foundation (the former Vardy Foundation) wanted to sponsor another school in Blyth. After opponents of the school argued that creationism would be taught at the school in science classes, more than 1000 parents signed a petition against the Vardy Foundation sponsoring the school. It was reported that this petition was backed by local politicians, teaching unions and scientists (Basnett, 2006). The politicians and scientists and other “experts” that sign petitions are generally named when a petition is mentioned in news articles, the “ordinary” citizens, such as the more than 1000 parents, have to remain anonymous and seem to count in numbers only. Therefore, once again, the question arises about whose voice counts, or counts more, and on what basis these judgements are made (see also Moore and Stilgoe, 2009). In the Emmanuel College case the assemblage that managed to enrol the most diverse set of people into their network was also the most successful in achieving its goals (Allgaier and Holliman, 2006).

It is argued that the various experts involved in a controversy can form collaborative networks in order to pool resources and enhance their credibility and influence in public debates. Networking processes between expert sources could be found between various groups involved in the public debate around Emmanuel College. The issue of networks of expertise in order to enhance credibility and influence in public debates is theoretically still relatively under-examined (see Limoges, 1993; Irwin and Michael, 2003) and this study provides further empirical evidence for the importance of understanding expertise not only in individual (i.e. expert versus lay actor/expert versus counter-expert) but also in collective and networked terms.