Risk,communication and trust: Towards an emotional understanding of trust

Abstract

Current discussions on public trust, as well as on risk communication, have a restricted rationalistic bias in which the cognitive-reflexive aspect of trust is emphasized at the expense of its emotional aspect. This article contributes to a substantive theory of trust by exploring its emotional character. Drawing on recent discussions in science and technology studies, social psychology, and general social theory, it argues that trust is a modality of action that is relational, emotional, asymmetrical, and anticipatory. Hence, trust does not develop through information and the uptake of knowledge but through emotional involvement and sense-making. The implications of this conception of trust for public understandings of science and for risk communication are discussed.

Keywords

emotions risk communication science–citizen relations trust

1. The quest for public trust

Public distrust in science and regulation is widely discussed today. According to commentators, reasons for this distrust are related to regulatory failures (Löfstedt, 2005; Power, 2007), the new character of industrial risks (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993), increased capacity of citizens to evaluate science (Nowotny et al., 2001), inability of science to present remedies to real-life problems (De Marchi and Ravetz, 1999; Lidskog, 1996), science’s ignorance of local knowledge and citizen competence (Fischer, 2005; Irwin and Michael, 2003), the technical framing of public issues (Gustafsson and Lidskog, 2012; Jasanoff, 2003; Wynne, 2001), and science’s close involvement with companies and nation-states at the expense of wider social concerns (Beck, 1992; Jasanoff, 2005). Voices are therefore being raised that advocate the need for more deliberative, democratic, and communicative ways to earn trust (Felt and Wynne, 2007; Jasanoff, 2005; Lange and Gouldson, 2010; Liberatore and Funtowicz, 2003; Nowotny et al., 2001).

Lack of public trust in regulation has also led to an explosion in risk management practices across a wide variety of organizational contexts, such as environment, health, food, and traffic (Power, 2007). Regulation no longer restricts its scope to how organizations deal with technically defined risk, but has broadened its focus to include the organizational, political, and cultural context within which risk is evaluated, actors are involved, and regulation is developed. Rule-making concerns not only rules about what is acceptable in terms of how we should mitigate or accept certain environmental hazards or health risks, for example, but also the trustworthiness of the regulatory organization and the configuration of the regulatory process.

These responses to public distrust do not only concern how to manage issues and the regulators’ responsibility for an activity in relation to stakeholders. Because science is seen as pivotal in developing relevant and effective regulation, the issue of public trust in regulation also concerns the public trust in science. The issue of public trust is at the fore, and there is a growing body of literature that discusses its meaning and function (e.g. Barbalet, 2009b; Earle and Cvetkovich, 1995; Gambetta, 1990; Lidskog, 2011; Marková and Gillespie, 2008; Misztal, 1996; Möllering, 2006; Sztompka, 1999; Tilly, 2005). However, with few exceptions (see Giddens, 1990), this literature does not discuss the meaning of trust in relation to expertise and science.

Within the risk field (not least risk psychology) trust has become a key concept. Still, few researchers have been interested in the fundamental character of trust. Instead their studies focus on how different factors such as competence, fairness, and efficiency, explain why trust or distrust arises (Fischoff, 1999; Löfstedt, 2005; Siegrist et al., 2000; Slovic, 1993). To a large degree they base their discussion on a dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective, seeing trust as either instrumental or expressive (see Alaszewski and Brown, 2007; Dunning and Fetchenhauer, 2010).

Within science and technology studies (STS), public trust is a recurrent theme that is treated both theoretically and empirically (Critchley, 2008; Gauchat, 2011; Lach and Sanford, 2010; Luján and Todt, 2007). Nonetheless there have been few efforts to examine the meaning of trust. Attention has instead been devoted to working out implications of the science–citizen relationship. An exception to this is the work of Brian Wynne. He has repeatedly argued that trust is relational and that the emotional–rational dichotomy is fundamentally misleading when analyzing public trust.

A search in the journal Public Understanding of Science shows that the interrelations between trust, emotion, and risk are scarcely discussed. During the last couple of decades, a number of articles have discussed risks, and some of these discuss the role of public trust in science. But almost none explore emotional aspects of trust.

This state of affairs comprises the point of departure for this article. We argue that despite the quest for public trust and despite the study of public trust by social scientists, the meaning and usage of the concept need further elaboration. Current discussions on public trust, as well as on risk communication, have a restricted rationalistic bias that fails to do justice to the emotional character of trust. This article will contribute to the substantial theory of trust by drawing on recent discussions in science and technology studies, social psychology, and general social theory. The aim is to further develop the concept of trust, not least with regard to its relational and emotional aspects and its implications for public understandings of science and for risk communication.

The article consists of five sections, including this introduction. The second section elaborates on the current discussion on trust by reviewing risk psychology and risk communication. The third section discusses the contribution of STS, and its discussion of the relational and hermeneutical characteristics of trust. We find this contribution crucial, but believe that the meaning of trust needs to be further developed. The fourth section is devoted to this task, employing Charles Horton Cooley’s notion of the looking-glass self, George Herbert Mead’s view on emotional experience, and Jack Barbalet’s account of the emotional character of trust. The concluding section discusses implications of this conception of trust for public understandings of science and for risk communication.

2. Risk and trust

Technical risk analysis and risk psychology

Technical risk analysis is based primarily on a conceptualization of risk, with one set of experts establishing the probability and magnitude of the hazards, and another set of experts evaluating the benefits and costs of various options. Political priorities are then invoked and, if necessary, risk communication efforts are undertaken to advise stakeholders and citizens about the suitability of the chosen way to regulate the risk.

However, risk regulators and others responsible for the management of risk have gradually recognized that the public’s perception of risk is very different from the view held by experts, which often results in controversies and conflicts over risk issues. Because social resistance has tended to be understood as a result of a lack of knowledge on the part of the citizen, risk communication has been seen as a way to bridge the gap between experts’ and laypeople’s views (Irwin and Wynne, 1996). By informing and sometimes even educating citizens about “real” risk, it was believed that the public would be induced to correct its judgments and accept those risks that experts and regulators found to be acceptable. As companies and agencies began to communicate about risks, it became clear that the public was anything but a homogeneous category and that it had divergent views on risks. As a result, risk communication had to contend with the complexities of risk perception.

Much psychological research has been devoted to finding out how different groups and individuals perceive risks (Breakwell, 2007; Gutteling and Wiegman, 1996). According to the psychometric school of risk analysis, the layperson’s view of risk is a subjective assessment in which contextual factors play an important role. Much effort is devoted to finding and measuring the significant factors that shape laypeople’s risk perception; these include novelty (how new a risk is), dread (how feared the risk is), perceived influence (how much the public believe they can influence the risk), and cultural belonging (Finucane et al., 2000; Renn, 2008; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006). Also, numerous analyses have highlighted the significance of the ways in which different social groups access, interpret, understand, and respond to different forms of information in diverse contexts (Bickerstaff and Walker, 2001; Slovic and Peters, 1998).

According to this framework, risk assessment is a matter of objective analysis aiming to produce factual knowledge about specific risks, while risk communication concerns distribution/transmission of this factual knowledge to the public. To make risk communication effective it is important to understand how different segments of the public understand risks and view the sources of information.

Risk communication

The criticism of the technical definition of risk has been immense and has brought to light the difficulty of upholding a sharp separation between scientific and public understandings of risk (Amendola, 2001; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Lidskog, 2008; Renn, 2008). The critique was initially directed at problems within risk analysis. Consequently, public perception of risk was seen as a challenge to how risk was defined and handled by technical and calculative means. In the 1990s, however, there was a shift from this internal focus to the broader question of the legitimacy of institutions responsible for risk regulation. Thus, there has been a move from risk analysis to risk governance (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2012; Power, 2007). The focus is not only on the analysis itself but also on the organizations responsible for this analysis. Today trustworthiness is viewed by both regulatory agencies and corporate companies as an important part of their risk management practices. Openness, transparency, and dialogue are key words in their efforts to gain the trust of citizens and stakeholders.

If risk communication is to be relevant in this new situation, it should not be seen as a one-way transfer of knowledge from the regulator to the public. Rather, it should be seen as a long-term framework for maintaining and strengthening the profile of the company or public agency with the aim to create public trust and initiate processes that prevent ill-will from arising (Gouldson et al., 2007). The success of these kinds of processes depends on all participants being allowed to take part in a meaningful way (Santos and Chess, 2003). Although public participation and stakeholder involvement cannot alone resolve all issues related to environmental risk debates, they are commonly seen as a viable alternative to technical risk analysis and its consequences for risk communication (Löfstedt, 2005; Sjöberg, 2001).

Many researchers today define the objective of risk communication as a matter of building mutual trust through communicative processes that respond to concerns of the public (see e.g., Renn, 2008: 202). Risk communication is thus transformed from a means of distributing information to a vehicle for mutual learning and deliberation. From this perspective, it is important to include citizens not because they have something substantial to say about the risk object, but because they constitute a social reality that provides legitimacy. To a large extent risk communication is instrumentally framed and seen as serving to increase the legitimacy of the regulator while attempting to achieve more effective regulation (Lange and Gouldson, 2010). Hence, the plea for public inclusion may reinforce a modernistic and hierarchical understanding of risk in which inclusion primarily serves as a means of educating the citizens and obtaining their consent for an already defined risk. This tendency has, however, been heavily criticized within science and technology studies.

3. The contribution of STS

Many STS researchers have argued that the problem with the science–citizen relationship is that it is often based on a technocratic understanding of risk, citizens, and society (Jasanoff, 2003; Wynne, 2005). Within this framing, issues are presented to the public as pre-defined packages, thus limiting citizens’ ability to actively engage with and discuss the meaning of the risks involved. They must either accept or reject the expert evaluation outright. In this way, experts often exert hegemonic control over the meaning of an issue, resulting in the experts’ mistaken belief that the public’s viewpoints are framed by ignorance. Scientists erroneously construct a particular model of the public as defensive, uninformed, risk averse, and unreflexive, which contributes to conflicts arising between them and citizens. Such a viewpoint prevents scientists from understanding what citizens say. It is prescriptive and limits potential for citizens to engage in negotiations and deliberations over risks. The problem, however, is not that the public understands science incorrectly, but rather that scientists incorrectly understand the public. This view of the public is not restricted to natural scientists and risk analysts. Social and behavioral scientists may also harbor this view in their exploration of risk communication and citizen distrust (or trust) of science.

STS suggests that citizens do not restrict their search for understanding only to what is true. When evaluating an issue, the citizen also considers what it is about, that is, its social purpose and consequences (Jasanoff, 2003, 2005; Wynne, 2008). They frame risk in a way that includes the underlying causes of an issue’s emergence and an evaluation of its broader social consequences. In their evaluation of risk, citizens do not primarily reflect on quantitative estimates of a technically defined risk but on concerns and meanings of the issue at stake. As Wynne (2008: 22, emphasis in original) states:

People are not responding to science as we understand it. They are working with their own (collective) meanings, not ours. This is true for example, of my accounts of the trust question logically underlying risk and so-called attitudes to risk: that so-called public risk concerns are always also public concerns about their social relations of dependency – and rationally so.

This has been further developed by emphasizing that risk issues are connected to public concerns and that science often fails to consider the public concerns that certain issues may cause to arise (Irwin and Michael, 2003; Marres, 2007). In other words, a broader understanding of risk must view it as a question not only of knowing but also of living, because risks are always socially embedded. Citizens do not primarily discuss risks in the abstract. They put them in a social context.

Furthermore, whereas risk analysis excludes social relations from its assessments, citizens often include an evaluation of the institutional trustworthiness of the organizations involved in the management of risk (Wynne, 1993, 2001). Even if risk analysis shows, for example, that a chemical plant is safe, the citizens may evaluate to what extent the responsible company, regulatory agency, and risk experts are trustworthy. Based on their history and current actions and behaviors, do they deserve to be trusted? Wynne (2008: 24) finds that:

In the situations where I have analyzed public–science interactions, in all of which cases science was being enacted as attempted but contested public authority, over far more than scientific propositions alone, the relative extent of self-reflexivity was as I described it – much greater for the powerless publics on the receiving end, than it was for the scientists embedded as they were as agents in the institutional nexus of policy, science advice, political economy, and power. But this does not mean this difference was a reflection of essential qualities of their subjects. […] I am not really interested in categorizing the putative knowledge-differences, or “ontological” reflexivity-differences between lay and expert actors. The differences are contingent; but this does not make them easily revised, or non-substantial; not at all. My situational analytical perspective can also be upheld with respect to the vexed issue of the “self-reflexivity” of science.

The basis for this view on risk and society is a particular view of human agency, one in which the social identity of citizens reflects their social relations. Likewise, their reflexivity depends on their power and situational condition. The ontological assumption behind this argument is that the human being is relational, and that relationality is the foundation not only of being, but also of knowing. The consequence of this assumption is that the understanding of public trust in science moves from a restricted rational aspect (capacity for technical understanding) to broader social, cultural, and hermeneutical aspects that concern social relations and sense-making. Citizens evaluate the social meanings of an issue and the extent to which it threatens or supports their social identities.

From this perspective, contested meanings and concerns are legitimate and should not be seen as being caused by a limited or even wrong understanding of an issue. The problem is not that the public lacks the capacity, interest, or will to understand the perspective provided by scientists and regulators. The problem is that scientists and regulators do not leave space for other perspectives than their own. Their ignorance results in an institutional-scientific denial of the legitimacy of the public evaluation of an issue (Wickson and Wynne, 2012; Wynne, 1992).

Viewing relationality as the ontological basis of being and knowing makes an important contribution to the understanding of public trust. Until now, however, researchers have mainly been interested in its practical implications, that is, how to understand and evaluate public–science relations (see e.g., Critchley, 2008; Lach and Sanford, 2010). In the following section we will turn to the fundamental assumption of human relationality and elaborate upon the very meaning of trust, including its emotional character. First, we discuss the relational character of trust; second, we present an account of emotional experience that makes it possible to incorporate it into an understanding of trust as relational; third, we develop an account of trust that permits the discovery of its emotional character; fourth, we elaborate on this relational and emotional account of trust by discussing the fundamental object of risk communication.

4. Trust and emotion

A relational perspective on trust

When interacting with science, citizens bring to the process their personal and social identities. Citizens’ interpretation of science always includes projection of the familiarity of the past onto the unfamiliarity of the future. Science is never a complete stranger to the public. If it were, it would have no social existence for them. At the same time the projected familiarity seldom resembles the processes that actually occur in public–science interaction. Risk concerns the awareness of – and attempts to manage – the imperfect fit between familiarity and contingencies (Frederiksen, 2011: 69).

Scientific experts also bring their personal and social identities to the meeting with the public. Difficulties arise when science presents itself as neutral, objective, and value-free. Fact-finding is then separated from meaning-making, constructing a division of labor in which science produces facts and the public and politicians create meaning by situating these facts within a social context (Latour, 1993). The asymmetrical perspective that results from this purified self-presentation is a central obstacle to science–citizen interactions.

Wynne argues that public divergences from the views of scientific experts are based on ontological differences as much as differences regarding propositional knowledge claims. In other words, questions of trust include past experiences, social meanings, and social relations, as well as possible threats to personal and social identities of the citizens. Hence, we are confronted not only with trust as a relational process but also with trust as a process that might include costs. Wynne makes an important point when he claims that it is not possible to logically understand the trust issue underlying risk and attitudes toward risk without looking at it as a relational process that includes social and psychological costs. However, Wynne’s claim is not new.

As early as a century ago, George Simmel outlined a theory of trust as relational, including not only its benefits but also its costs. Trust is essentially a “leap of faith” in which social vulnerability and uncertainty are placed within brackets. Even if trust is based on rational choice, routine behavior, and reflexive reinforcement, none of these processes captures the essence of trust, which concerns the suspension of the unknown. Trust is “a state of mind that has nothing to do with knowledge, which is both less and more than knowledge” (Simmel, [1907] 1990: 179). Trust can therefore be defined as a positive expectation regarding the future that is dependent on two fundamental elements that are relationally constituted by each other: (i) the present, situated interpretation of a situation in which trust may be relevant, drawing on past experience; and (ii) the suspension of unknown aspects of and uncertainty about the situation and associated negative expectations regarding potential futures (Möllering, 2001, 2006; Frederiksen, 2011).

Simmel’s attempt to show the relational character of trust, including its cost, is sophisticated. Like Wynne’s relational perspective on public trust in science, it results in a move from cognitive to social and hermeneutical aspects of trust. Nonetheless, both of these theories of trust focus on reflexive dimensions of the social and hermeneutical at the expense of the emotional.

Wynne (2008: 24) argues that actors’ reflexivity is a function of their situational power and related social-institutional conditions, which means that their reflexivity is inversely proportional to the power they possess; i.e., powerlessness forces them to be reflexive. As we see it, both reflexivity and emotionality are functions of the actor’s situational power and are related to social-institutional conditions. The reason for this, as will be further developed below, is that powerlessness not only causes a need for reflection but also causes emotion. In saying this, we imply that Wynne’s statement is incomplete, which has substantial consequences for the meaning of trust.

Emotional experience

In his discussion of “the looking-glass self,” Cooley notes that what he calls self-reflection and self-feeling are both advanced forms of consciousness that are dependent on social interaction and social relations. The looking-glass self includes three principal elements: (i) the ego’s imagination of her/his appearance to the “alter”; (ii) the imagination of the alter’s judgment of that appearance; and (iii) some sort of self-feeling, such as pride/confidence or shame/lack-of-confidence (Cooley, [1902] 1992: 184). While pride and shame are related to the past interaction between the ego and the alter, confidence and its opposite are related to the future interaction between the ego and the alter. In many ways these are emotions that can be related also to what Randall Collins (2004) calls emotional energy, and which correspond to persons’ or groups’ power (authority) and status (prestige) (Kemper, 1978).

It is the second element of the looking-glass self that is the basis for the emotion that the ego feels in a certain social situation. Thus, Cooley ([1902] 1992: 184–185) argues for a relational character of emotional experiences:

The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one, and so on. A man will boast to one person of an action – say some sharp transaction in trade – which he would be ashamed to own to another. We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgment of the other mind.

Cooley’s line of argumentation does not mean that emotional experiences cannot be viewed as subjective processes of psychological and physiological characteristics. Obviously, the ego’s emotions are experienced by the ego and not by the alter. Although the alter can both empathize and sympathize with the ego, this does not mean that the alter experiences the ego’s emotions. Moreover, even though the ego and the alter take part in the same social situation, emotions experienced by them may differ radically. For example, in a competition, the winner is most likely to be thrilled, excited, happy, and content, whereas the loser is more prone to be disappointed, sad, embarrassed, or angry. Nevertheless, emotional experiences, just like reflexive experiences, are correctly understood as relational processes. The reason for this is that they emerge in social situations and help us to guide our actions in relation to the outer world and to others. The relational character of reflexivity and emotionality is more closely explored in the work of Mead.

Mead’s point of departure is that mind or reflexivity cannot be presupposed because it is a phase in the process of developing the self and social reality (Mead, 1903). He emphasizes that it emerges when individual behavior is transformed into social action. Thus, mind or reflexivity should not be reduced to behavior. Instead, Mead (1934: 11) sees social action as a result of inhibited behavior. In contrast to behavior, social action implies a sort of resistance to or inhibition of the act involving mutual adjustment and readjustment between the ego and the alter or the outer world. Social action is relational. It concerns interaction or taking on the attitude of the other.

It is less well-known that Mead understands emotional experience as a function of the inhibited act. Emotional experience arises when different impulses mediated by the same situation are in conflict. Mead (1982: 43, see also 1895) argues that one of the differences between behavior and social action “is the emotional content, which is much more vivid in social conduct. Emotion arises under tension. In social conduct there is constant adjustment and readjustment, hence emotion.” Mead furthermore claims that emotional experience, as a function of the inhibited act, informs the ego about its relationship to the outer world or to the alter (1936: 375). Emotional experiences function as unreflective values, which guide the ego when interacting with the alter or the outer world. It is with the help of such evaluations that we feel ourselves as we travel back and forth between the past and the future and between the position of the self and the position of the other (Engdahl, 2005: 63ff.)

Emotional experience is a felt inhibition of the act that is necessary for adjustment and readjustment in social relations. It underlies and motivates reflexivity related to development of the self and social identities. Furthermore, emotional experiences often arise as a means to solve problems within social interaction that are not possible to resolve through habit, past experiences, or acquired knowledge (Engdahl, 2005: 123ff.).

Essentially, emotion serves to arouse the individual to solve the problem that is blocking completion of the ongoing act. It thus serves as a driving force for the individual’s mobilization of resources to solve the problem because the solution is what dissolves tension created by the emotional state (Chappell and Orbach, 1986: 78). Emotions are therefore not something added to cognition. They do not occasionally affect people’s judgments about risks, as it is possible to make risk evaluations without invoking emotions. Instead, emotions are an integral part of risk evaluations. As unreflective values, they guide the processes of information-seeking and evaluation (Clore and Palmer, 2009; Zajonc, 1980). “Affective reactions may serve as orienting mechanisms, helping us navigate quickly and efficiently through a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous world” (Slovic et al., 2004: 313–314).

The emotional character of trust

Following Barbalet (2009a: 368f., 2011: 40f.), we define trust as the ego’s acceptance of dependency on the outer world or the alter in the absence of information about the outer world or the alter’s reliability, in order to create an otherwise impossible outcome.

The definition describes (1) well-known benefits of trust; it underlies and motivates co-operation, and hence most forms of social life rely on it. As we will discuss later, it also describes (2) the cost of trust and the situation of uncertainty in which it is embedded. Further, it (3) permits an understanding of trust as a relational modality of action including the ego’s emotional apprehension of a certain form of double-confidence, namely, the ego’s confidence in the outer world or the future actions of the alter, and the ego’s confidence in its understanding of the outer world or the alter. In the following section, we will expand on the concept of trust by discussing the fundamental object of risk communication that is suggested by our definition of trust.

The cost of trust is related to the asymmetrical relationship that an acceptance of dependency involves. It does not matter how congenial it may be to build mutual trust (by responding to each other’s concerns) because this does not do away with the asymmetrical relationship between the giver and recipient of trust. In the case of mutual trust, we are confronted with two separate instances of trust, each of which involves an asymmetrical relationship. The public has already accepted its dependency on science when trusting it, and vice versa. Therefore, the fundamental object of risk communication cannot be to build mutual trust, but must be to build what underlies and motivates trust.

As discussed above, public divergence from the views of scientific experts often involves ontological differences (Wynne, 2005, 2008). In light of the above definition of trust, this idea suggests that public trust in science can be seen as the public’s acceptance of dependency on expert views in the absence of knowledge about their reliability, in order to support personal and social identities, social meanings, social relationships, and social reality. An issue should not be closed or determined by the established frame of whichever expert culture has been given authority. Rather, it ought to be open to salient characteristics and concerns of the public. Accordingly, the fundamental object of risk communication seems to be to unveil ontological and hermeneutical differences.

Wynne’s perspective has important merits, but its stress on ontological and hermeneutical differences needs to be accompanied by the ego’s (the public’s) emotional apprehension of confidence in the outer world or the future actions of the alter (science), as well as the ego’s (the citizen’s) confidence in its understanding of the outer world or the future actions of the alter (science). Understood in this way, it becomes possible to view trust as a process that bridges the gap between ontological differences. We cannot ignore the fact that trust, in its broadest sense, amounts to confidence in one’s expectations, as Luhmann (1993: 9) states. With it comes an emotional experience of inner security that makes it easier to handle ontological and hermeneutical differences and the contingencies of social life. Ontological security is relational and includes both the ego and the outer world or the alter. Nevertheless, problems can stem from the fact that information which can motivate the act of giving trust comes from the past, whereas both the ego and the alter can act in unexpected ways. In this sense, the future has unlimited possibilities, and trust-givers act as if they know more than they really do: giving trust means to transcend the limits of prior experience and knowledge in order to generalize and extend them (Luhmann, 1979). Hence, trust is not the opposite of reflexivity or rationality but rather an emotionally based strategy that bridges the gap between the present and the future by anticipating the result that trust, if successful, creates (Luhmann, 1979: 25; Barbalet, 2009a: 369).

The above argument is related not only to the cost of trust and the uncertain situation in which it is embedded, but also to the gains it makes possible. As Barbalet (2009a: 374) notes, William James’s (1956) concept of a “forced option” is applicable to the character of trust because it contributes to the understanding of the emotional basis of trust and how it is related to the leap between the present and the future. We will first address the forced option and, thereafter, discuss trust as an anticipatory emotion.

Trust as an anticipatory emotion

In the essay The Will to Believe James (1956: 96f.) illustrates the notion of the forced option by quoting Fitz James Stephen as follows:

What do you think of yourself? What do you think of the world? These are questions with which all must deal as it seems good to them. They are riddles of the Sphinx, and in some way or other we must deal with them. In all important transactions of life we have to take a leap in the dark. If we decide to leave the riddles unanswered, that is a choice; if we waver in our answer, that, too, is a choice: but whatever choice we make, we make it at our peril. If a man chooses to turn his back altogether on God and the future, no one can prevent him; no one can show beyond reasonable doubt that he is mistaken. If a man thinks otherwise and acts as he thinks, I do not see that any one can prove that he is mistaken. Each must act as he thinks best; and if he is wrong, so much the worse for him. We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? “Be strong and of a good courage.” Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. If death ends all, we cannot meet death better.

In some sense, all social life includes elements of a forced option, as we always have to make a choice to be able to act. What James’s notion of forced options stresses, however, is the emotional basis of the choice of how to act in situations where one lacks sufficient knowledge. It describes the anticipatory character of trust, and how trust is an act motivated by an anticipatory emotion underpinning the creativity of action (compare Joas, 1997). Finally, it illustrates the self-referential element of trust, that is, the ego’s confidence in its understanding of the outer world or the future actions of the alter. We could even characterize self-confidence as an attitude essentially saying: “No matter what happens, I feel that I can make it or take it.” This does not mean that taking a leap into the dark should be done recklessly. Even if trust rests on a “will to trust,” the will must be in line with the very personal sentiments of the one giving trust (Möllering, 2006: 121).

Trust is an emotional attitude, a feeling that affects our judgments and makes us perceive the world (others as well as ourselves) in a specific way. It is also a participatory attitude in the sense that it implies that the ego regards itself as involved in interaction with an alter, and that both ego and alter are autonomous and therefore can be held responsible for their actions. The reason for this is that an alter needs to be perceived as a person with his or her own goals, standards, values, and capacity to choose actions (Lahno, 2001: 182).

Unlike emotional experiences such as love and hate, which have the alter as their object, or pride and shame, which have the ego as their object, trust has the future as its object. Because the act of giving trust is always a choice of an emotional subject, it is never solely based on the ego’s confidence in the outer world or the alter’s future actions. It also includes the ego’s confidence in its ability to judge the outer world or the alter’s future actions. The emotional experience of confidence that underlies public trust in science cannot therefore be reduced to the public’s confidence in the institutional trustworthiness of the organizations involved in managing risk. It necessarily includes the self-referential element – the ego’s (the public’s) confidence in its understanding of the future actions of the alter (science) or the outer world – as is obvious in the case of the forced option. Distrust may then be caused by a lack of confidence not only in the institutional trustworthiness of the organizations involved in managing risk but also in one’s understanding and evaluation of these organizations.

It is not enough for the public to feel confident that organizations involved in managing risk have a functioning internal system of control, which Luhmann (1979) argues to be the basis of what he calls system trust, and which a technocratic understanding of risk sees as a sufficient condition for public trust. Instead, public trust in science is also dependent on organized ways of including the public’s concerns and understanding regarding the issue at stake. Citizens must, to some degree, be able to positively recognize their personal identities and social identities in what Luhmann (1979) refers to as the system’s institutionalized distrust of itself within this system of control. Otherwise, instead of trust, we are faced with the phenomenon that Wynne (1996: 50) calls “as-if trust,” which is a kind of trust that occurs when citizens are aware of both their dependency on expert systems and their lack of power to influence the situation. They cannot do anything other than hope that the expert system will not fail them. “As-if trust” is not substantial, positive, or actively achieved. It arises from a lack of alternatives and lack of the double-confidence that we find characteristic of trust.

To sum up, we assert that citizens’ viewpoints about the meaning of the issue at stake and its broader social purpose and social consequences must be an integral part of expert systems’ self-reflection, at least as far as public trust is concerned. Our claim is partly explained by the second and third principles of the looking-glass self. Only as an integral part of science’s institutionalized distrust of itself is it possible for citizens to imagine science’s judgment of their appearance in a manner leading to a positive self-estimation such as pride/confidence, rather than a negative one such as shame/lack-of-confidence.

5. Conclusion

Risk communication theory and STS forcefully argue that a central problem of the science–citizen relationship is that it is frequently based on a technocratic understanding of risk, citizens, and society. They also argue that a pre-packaged definition of an issue is presented to the public, which limits citizens’ ability to actively engage with the issue and discuss the meaning of the risk. It is believed that by opening up decision processes, including the very definition of what sorts of things should be seen as risk issues and public issues, the problem will be eliminated. Configuring new relations between citizens and science, in which the public is not only talked to but also listened to, is the main path toward achieving public trust in science.

We agree with the criticism of the narrow and technocratic framing of issues but find that it is not enough to open the decision-making process to public participation and influence. The reason for our claim is that an extension of the citizens’ active involvement in risk issues cannot eliminate the trust issue that underlies risk and attitudes toward risk. Trust is not a rational modality of action nor does it concern the collection and organization of facts. Furthermore, trust is not based on a restricted deliberation over risk. Even if a relational perspective, as advocated by researchers in both risk communication (e.g. Lange and Gouldson, 2010; Renn, 2008; Vaughan and Tinker, 2009) and science and technology studies (e.g. Wynne, 1993, 2001), makes an important contribution by moving from cognitive to social and hermeneutical aspects of trust, it still frames it in a way that emphasizes the cognitive-reflexive aspect of trust at the expense of its emotional aspect.

As an alternative, we have posited that trust is a modality of action that is relational, emotional, asymmetrical, and anticipatory. In particular, we have stressed the emotional aspect of trust because current discussions on public trust, as well as on risk communication, have a restricted rationalistic bias that does not do justice to the emotional character of trust. Our exploration of the meaning of trust has implications for discussions within both public understanding of science and risk communication.

For public understanding of science, our perspective implies first that emotions are part of the evaluation of risk. Hence, trust is not the opposite of reflexivity or rationality but rather an emotionally based strategy that bridges the gap between the present and the future by anticipating the result that trust may create. Secondly, it implies that trust concerns citizens’ confidence not only in other actors and systems, but also in their own ability to evaluate and judge other actors and systems. Trust is therefore a relational modality of action based on an emotional apprehension of double-confidence. Thirdly, it implies that public trust should not be reduced to public confidence in the institutional trustworthiness of organizations involved in managing risk. Trust necessarily involves a self-referential component, as shown in the case of forced options, which means that public distrust may also be caused by a lack of confidence in one’s understanding and evaluation of these organizations.

For risk communication, our perspective implies first that trust may be associated with social and psychological costs. Trust is a relational process that can result in damage to the personal and social identities of citizens. Secondly, it implies that trust is always asymmetrical, and it is therefore wrong to speak of mutual trust. Instead, trust always implies the trust-giver’s acceptance of dependency on the recipient of trust. Thirdly, it implies that the fundamental object of risk communication cannot be to build mutual trust, but instead to build what underlies and motivates trust. Fourthly, it implies the presence of organized ways of including the public’s concerns, understandings, and meaning-making regarding the issue at stake. By taking an active part in the institutionalized distrust, it becomes possible for citizens to recognize their personal and social identities and their social relations.

To sum up, trust cannot be achieved by being a spectator, by passively being fed knowledge, or by standing alone outside of social life. Instead, trust is created when citizens are emotionally involved, take part, have a say, and in some sense are able to recognize themselves in the recipient of their trust. Trust is not only relational, but also emotional.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Both authors contributed equally to this work. We wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. The study was financed by the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences, and Spatial Planning.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Author biographies

Emma Engdahl is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Örebro University. Her research interest is the sociology of emotions, non-verbal communication and identity formation.

Rolf Lidskog is Professor of Sociology at Örebro University. His research interest is environmental governance on international and national levels, especially the role of expertise in environmental politics.

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